ROBERT J. SHELBY, District Judge.
On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Petition for Judicial Review of the Emery County Career Services Council's decision in the Seventh Judicial District in Emery County, Utah.
For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes Plaintiff's first cause of action—the review of the CSC's decision—is within its supplemental jurisdiction. The court declines to sever and remand the claim to state court. Defendants' Motion is denied.
This action arises from the termination of Leslie Bolinder's employment with Emery County, Utah. She was employed by the County as an Executive Administrative Assistant.
Ms. Bolinder filed a grievance in accordance with the County's policies and procedures.
Ms. Bolinder was a career service employee.
Defendants removed the action to this court based on Plaintiff's due process claim.
Under to 28 U.S.C. §1441(c), "(1) If a civil action includes—(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States . . ., and (B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute, the entire action may be removed. . . ."
Defendants contend the court must sever and remand Plaintiff's first cause of action because it lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. The court finds Defendant's argument unpersuasive and concludes Plaintiff's claim is within its supplemental jurisdiction.
Defendants argue Utah's statute prohibits the federal district court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's first cause of action. Defendants also argue this court cannot exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state administrative appeals. The court considers each argument in turn.
Defendants argue the Utah County Personnel Management Act prohibits this court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's appeal.
This court agrees that "district court" as used in the statute refers to the state district court.
The court concludes the Utah statute does limit its subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's first cause of action.
Defendants also argue this court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state administrative appeals. Defendants assert this court is "NOT vested . . . with appellate jurisdiction over state administrative appeals."
The Supreme Court has instructed otherwise, explaining that state court actions involving claims challenging the decisions of state or local agencies may be removed to federal court when removal jurisdiction has been established.
In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, the plaintiff brought an action in state court including claims that local administrative actions violated federal laws and state law claims for on-the-record review of state administrative findings, similar to Plaintiff here.
Notwithstanding the holding in International College of Surgeons, Defendants cite to several other cases for the proposition that this court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state administrative appeals. Upon close review, the court concludes these cases, all of which preceded the Supreme Court's International College of Surgeons decision, do not support Defendants' position.
Plaintiff asserts this court has supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate her first cause of action. The court agrees. Once the court has "established federal jurisdiction, the relevant inquiry respecting the accompanying state claims is whether they fall within a district court's supplemental jurisdiction."
Even if jurisdiction is proper, however, pendent jurisdiction is discretionary.
Here, the court concludes Plaintiff's first cause of action and the federal claim within the court's original jurisdiction both derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. Specifically, the facts for both the appeal of the CSC's decision and the 42 U.S.C. §1983 procedural and substantive due process claim derive from the events leading up to the termination of Ms. Bolinder's employment with Emery County, her actual termination, and the events that followed her termination.
The court also concludes that none of the statutory factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim at this time. This case does not raise a complex or novel issue of state law, nor does Plaintiff's appeal predominate over the claim over which this court has original jurisdiction. The court has not dismissed the claim over which it has original jurisdiction, and there are no other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Based upon the foregoing, this court concludes it is appropriate to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's first cause of action.
This court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's first cause of action under 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). Under these circumstances, the court is not compelled to sever and remand according to 28 U.S.C. §1441(c). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Remand, Dkt. 11, is DENIED.
Because the court has so decided, Defendants' Motion to Stay Pending Remand of Claim for Judicial Review to the Seventh District Court, Dkt. 18, is DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED.
Next, in Anderson v. State of Colorado, 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986), a father attempted to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in what the court understood as an attempt to "undo the custody decision of a Colorado state court." Id. at 264. In its analysis, the court reiterated that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to "review final state-court judgments in judicial proceedings." Id. at 263 (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). Ms. Bolinder, however, is not seeking federal review of a final state-court judgment. While she originally appealed the CSC's ruling to state court, Defendants chose to remove her appeal to federal court before she could receive a state court judgment. Thus, Anderson fails to support Defendants argument because hearing Plaintiff's first cause of action does not require this court to engage in federal appellate review of a state court judgment.
In Misischia v. Pirie, 60 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff failed the required exam for admission to practice dentistry in Hawaii three times. Id. at 627. Members of the Dental Board reviewed his test results and upheld the failing test scores. Id. The plaintiff could have appealed the board's decision to the Hawaii Circuit Court, but chose not to do so. Id. at 628. Rather, he brought an action in federal court against the board members. Id. In its analysis the court noted, "[a] litigant cannot use supplemental jurisdiction to have a federal judge instead of a state judge perform the judicial review of a state administrative agency decision which the state statute assigns to a state court." Id. at 631. That is— if a state statute assigns the appeal of a state administrative agency decision to a state court, litigants cannot bypass that state court by using the federal district court's supplemental jurisdiction. As Ms. Bolinder did not attempt to bypass her appeal to the state district court, but was removed from that court to this one, Misischia does not support Defendants assertion either.