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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs DAVID L. RHOTEN, II, 04-004449PL (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Dec. 13, 2004 Number: 04-004449PL Latest Update: Nov. 06, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain his trust account properly, failed to examine and sign monthly reconciliation statements for his trust account, and failed to respond appropriately to disputes concerning escrow deposits that he held. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Since 1994, Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker, at all times serving as the broker of record for Castles By The Sea (Castles). The Arnston transaction involves a contract dated August 30, 2000, in which Michael Arnston is the buyer, Advanced Builders is the seller, and Castles is the real estate broker. The contract contains a financing contingency that gives Mr. Arnston 20 days to obtain financing, acknowledges that Mr. Arnston has paid $42,800 in earnest money to Castles, calls for a closing on October 1, 2000, and provides Advanced Builders with 30 days from post-closing notice to cure any title defects. As pleaded by Petitioner and admitted by Respondent, on September 11, 2000, Mr. Arnston's attorney wrote a letter to Advanced Builders, with a copy to Jennifer McCrary, who is an employee of Respondent. In the letter, Mr. Arnston's attorney withdrew Mr. Arnston's offer to purchase and demanded the return of his earnest money. The stated reason is that the offer was never accepted by the owners of record, who were Michael Mucha, as owner of a two-thirds interest in the property, and Carolyn Kline, as owner of a one-third interest in the property. Although Mr. Mucha signed the contract, apparently in an individual capacity, Ms. Kline never signed the contract. As pleaded by Petitioner and admitted by Respondent, on September 14, 2000, Advanced Builder's attorney wrote a letter to Mr. Arnston's attorney stating that Ms. Kline was a beneficial owner of Advanced Builders, Ms. Kline had authorized Advanced Builders to enter into the Arnston contract, and Ms. Kline, Advanced Builders, and Mr. Mucha were prepared to convey good title to Mr. Arnston at closing. Treating the September 11 letter as an anticipatory breach, the September 14 letter, a copy of which was furnished Castles, demands the $42,800 earnest money deposit. As pleaded by Petitioner and admitted by Respondent, on September 25, 2000, Mr. Arnston filed a complaint with Petitioner concerning Respondent's handling of the earnest money deposit. This complaint led to the office audit in 2000 described below. The Sims transaction involves a contract dated March 26, 2000, in which Stephen and Claire Sims are the buyer, Jacqueline Bardach is the seller, and Castles is the real estate broker. The contract contains a financing contingency that runs through closing, defines the contingency in part as the buyers' ability to acquire 75 percent financing, acknowledges that the Simses have paid $10,000 in earnest money to Castles, calls for the Simses to pay Castles an additional $20,000 in earnest money within 10 days, and calls for a closing within 90 days. As pleaded by Petitioner and admitted by Respondent, on May 2, 2000, Stephanie McCauley, an agent of Castles, wrote Ms. Bardach and informed her that the Simses had been unable to acquire the 75 percent financing and were withdrawing from the contract and requesting the return of their earnest money. As pleaded by Petitioner and admitted by Respondent, on May 8, 2000, Ms. Bardach's attorney wrote Ms. McCauley and the other broker at Castles, with a copy to the Simses, and stated that the cancelation of the contract and release of the escrow money was premature. In the letter, the attorney informed Castles and the Simses of alternative financing sources for 75 percent of the contract price consisting of a lender for 60 percent and the seller holding a purchase money note and mortgage for the remaining 15 percent. On May 18, 2000, Ms. Bardach's attorney wrote another letter to Ms. McCauley and the other Castles broker formally declaring a default on the part of the Simses for their failure to exercise due diligence to obtain financing and demanding the $30,000 in earnest money. The letter offers Castles the option of interpleader in circuit court. On July 20, 2000, Ms. Bardach's attorney wrote a letter to Respondent stating that Castles had taken no action since his letter of May 18 and authorizing him to submit the dispute to circuit court or the Florida Real Estate Commission. On November 29, 2000, Petitioner received a complaint from Ms. Bardach concerning Castle's handling of the earnest money deposit. Since early 1996, Respondent had employed Chris McMahel as a comptroller/bookkeeper in his real estate office. Prior to employing Ms. McMahel, who was a licensed real estate salesperson, Respondent had been acquainted with her from her employment in an ERA office in Boynton Beach and as the executive vice-president of the local Board of Realtors. At the time of the events described below, Ms. McMahel had had 20 years' experience in real estate. Each month while employed by Respondent, Ms. McMahel, who had placed her real estate license with Castles, prepared the reconciliation statements for the Castles escrow account. For some time prior to the events described below, Respondent was not signing these reconciliation statements. With Respondent's consent, and presumably at his direction, Ms. McMahel stamped the monthly statements with Respondent's facsimile signature. Ms. McMahel had similar authority to stamp Respondent's facsimile signature on trust account checks, and she routinely exercised this authority. The last monthly reconciliation statement that Respondent saw was for July 2000. Petitioner's investigator had conducted an office audit in August 1999 and had met with Ms. McMahel. Although the investigator had found the real estate records poorly kept, he did not find anything in violation of applicable law and did not attempt to communicate directly with Respondent about the audit or the audit findings. The investigator's findings and actions were identical with respect to the 1998 audit. On October 23 or 24, 2000, Respondent received a telephone call from a title insurance company informing him that a Castles trust account check in the amount of $54,000 had failed to clear. Respondent called Ms. McMahel, who assured him that there had been some sort of mistake and she would call the bank to clear up the problem. Ms. McMahel later called Respondent back and told him that she had given the title insurance company a new check. However, this check also failed to clear. Upon learning that the second check had failed to clear, Respondent immediately approached Ms. McMahel and told her to produce the books and records. She did so, and Respondent found that the books and records were in disarray. Respondent demanded an explanation from Ms. McMahel, but she remained silent and offered no excuse. Respondent also contacted SunTrust, which held the trust funds, and confirmed that the account balance was insufficient to pay the trust account check. Upon learning of this shortage, Respondent contacted a representative of the Division of Real Estate and was told to document the problem and deposit sufficient money into the account as soon as possible. Respondent immediately borrowed $50,000 from a friend and deposited it into the trust account, so that the twice- dishonored check could be paid. The next day, Respondent went to Ms. McMahel's home to discuss the matter, but found that she had fled. Neither Respondent nor Petitioner was able to find her subsequently. Respondent formally fired Ms. McMahel at this time. Eventually, Respondent pieced together much of what had happened. The ultimate shortage in the trust account was about $658,000. Ms. McMahel had paid herself, as payee on numerous trust account checks, almost $400,000. She had used additional trust account funds to pay off her obligations, such as credit card debts, although it is unclear if these fraudulent transactions account for the remaining $258,000. By October 30, 2000, Respondent sold 25 percent of Castles, which he owned, for $250,000, and he deposited the sale proceeds into the trust account. Still needing over $350,000 to eliminate the shortfall, Respondent offered for sale the remaining interest in Castles. At the same time, Respondent decided not to file a police report against Ms. McMahel because he believed that such an action would reduce the price for which he could sell the company. Pending the sale of Castles, Respondent borrowed $200,000 personally and deposited this money into the trust account to pay off outstanding trust account liabilities. In late November 2000, Respondent found a buyer for Castles. Following a closing in January 2001, Respondent deposited sufficient funds into the trust account to eliminate any shortage. Respondent continued to work with Castles for a month after the closing, at which time the new owners fired him. Respondent filed a police report in April or May 2001. However, the Delray Police Department, with which Respondent filed the complaint, never found Ms. McMahel. Respondent never filed suit against Ms. McMahel or SunTrust. At the time of these events, Castles was closing 35-50 sales per month. With respect to contracts for which Castles held the escrow money, all closings took place as scheduled without delays, and no one lost any money due to the theft from Respondent's trust account.

Recommendation RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of one violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes; one violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by virtue of a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(2); and one violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, by virtue of a violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-10.032(1)(a); and imposing a penalty of one year's suspension and a fine of $3000. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Juaan Carstarphen Watkins, Acting Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Hurston Building, North Tower Suite N801 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Gary J. Nagle, Esquire 14255 U.S. Highway 1, Suite 223 Juno Beach, Florida 33408

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57475.25718.503
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs NESTOR G. MENDOZA AND DIAMONDS REALTY OF MIAMI BEACH, 09-001219PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 09, 2009 Number: 09-001219PL Latest Update: Oct. 26, 2009

The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed to preserve and make available certain records relating to trust accounts and real estate transactions, and/or obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigators in an official investigation, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Nestor G. Mendoza ("Mendoza") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Diamonds Realty of Miami Beach, Inc. ("Diamonds Realty") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Mendoza is an officer and principal of Diamonds Realty, and at all times relevant to this case he had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that Diamonds Realty engaged in any conduct distinct from Mendoza's in connection with the charges at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Mendoza" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department"), Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, the Department is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. On January 15, 2008, Veronica Hardee, who was then employed by the Department as an investigator, conducted an audit of Mendoza's records at Mendoza's real estate brokerage office, which was located in Miami Beach. Ms. Hardee was accompanied by her supervisor, Brian Piper. Ms. Hardee knew Mendoza because, in the latter part of 2007, she had investigated a consumer complaint against him, which arose from a transaction that had taken place in the fall of that year. In the course of that investigation, which focused on the period from August 20, 2007 through November 30, 2007, Mendoza had provided Ms. Hardee with business records, including bank statements and documents relating to the brokerage's escrow account. Ms. Hardee's previous investigation had not resulted in charges of wrongdoing being brought against Mendoza. During the audit, Ms. Hardee asked to review some of Mendoza's business records. She testified about this on direct examination as follows: Q. All right. Did you tell [Mendoza] what he would need to bring——or what he could expect from an audit? A. I don't remember, but usually procedure [sic], I would tell them we need to see older escrow accounts, older operating accounts, deposit slips, deposit checks, anything that has to do with their financial matters. Final Hearing Transcript ("TR.") 40-41 (emphasis added). On cross examination, Ms. Hardee elaborated: Q. (BY MR. MENDOZA) . . . I remember quite well that you did not ask me for the whole year of——for instance, of 2004, you never asked me for whole year, you asked me for a certain month; is that correct? * * * THE WITNESS: During the investigation I requested certain documents, yes. You're correct, I asked you for certain months, you had different issues with the Department that I was looking at. . . . * * * You didn't provide all the months requested and we came to the audit, you didn't provide——at that time, we asked you to see all of your accounts, it just wasn't for the investigation, we wanted to see your escrow account so you should have had for——I don't remember the——we wanted 1-15-08, we would have done from January of '08 to six months prior, let's just say. I don't remember what dates we gave you at the time. But then you would have a file with those documents in your escrow reconciliation statement, with all of your checks, all of your deposits with the bank statement attached, you know, organized. But it wasn't so and you said that you wanted to organize it properly and that's why we allowed you to organize it. So the question, did you provide me documents, yes, you provided me documents in the investigation but not all of the documents requested. TR. 58-60 (emphasis added). The undersigned attempted to elicit from Ms. Hardee a more detailed description of the materials requested during the audit, giving rise to the following exchange: THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. And can you describe for me what it was in particular that you did request on that day in January of 2008? What did you ask [Mendoza] for? THE WITNESS: Yeah. We asked him for his escrow documents, reconciliation statements, such as the one that you see in [Petitioner's Composite] Exhibit 3. We asked about those months that were missing. We asked him——I don't know if we asked him for six months or one year. I don't remember the time frame we gave him, but pretty much when we go in to do an audit, we get the last six months, usually the months that are particularly discussed, the checks or the deposits that we're looking into for an investigation. * * * So pretty much that's what we asked, all of his escrow operating account that we had for the company, which includes the reconciliation statement, bank statement, deposit checks, as the statute statues here. THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. You're standard procedure would have been you say in an audit like this, to have asked for the last six months of records right? So you're nodding your head, that's a yes? THE WITNESS: Yes. In this case we asked for the months that I was missing and plus I wanted to do a whole——we were going to do a whole audit. I don't remember right now if I asked him for six months or twelve months, I don't remember that part, but usually we ask for all the documents. THE HEARING OFFICER: And if I could just ask you to clarify do there's no mistake about this, when you say the months that are missing, what months are you referring to? THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, November of '04 and December of '04. TR. 73-75 (emphasis added). The Department did not, at the time of the audit, reduce its request for records to writing, which is unfortunate for the Department because, as the above-quoted testimony shows, Ms. Hardee's memory of specifically what Mendoza had been asked to produce was spotty. Although Ms. Hardee did identify two particular months——November and December of 2004——for which contemporaneous records were sought, this detail is practically random (because no context was given to explain the description of these periods, which predated the audit by more than three years, as "missing" months) and, in any event, fails to make the testimony as a whole explicit or distinctly remembered. The undersigned finds that Ms. Hardee's testimony was insufficiently precise to constitute clear and convincing evidence concerning the particular items that the Department wanted to see. Even if Ms. Hardee's testimony were sufficient on the previous point, however, the proof regarding Mendoza's alleged failure to produce records, which is a separate issue, is less compelling. Ms. Hardee's testimony was that Mendoza made available some but not all of the documents she and Mr. Piper wanted to see. (Actually, a fairer characterization of Mendoza's relative compliance, accepting Ms. Hardee's testimony as true, would be that he produced most of the documents requested, namely six-to-12 or 13 months' worth, failing only to make available documents associated with the last two or three months of 2004.) Mendoza then requested, and was given, additional time to assemble the rest of the materials. For some reason, Mendoza never contacted the Department thereafter to produce the items he could not locate on January 15, 2008, which caused the Department to initiate the instant proceeding. The undersigned largely credits Ms. Hardee's testimony regarding this overview of the events, with the qualification that Mendoza's compliance, while less than 100 percent, was nevertheless substantial. (He might, after all, have produced satisfactorily as much as 13 months' worth of documents, according to Ms. Hardee's testimony.) Given that Mendoza is alleged to have failed only to produce specific documents relating to the particular period from October through December 2004, the undersigned infers that he produced everything else that the Department wanted to see. The Department did not, however, at the time of the audit (or later), prepare an inventory of the records Mendoza made available (or failed to produce), take copies of the materials Mendoza produced, or otherwise reduce to writing the particulars of his noncompliance (e.g. by sending him a letter, soon after the audit, reminding him of the obligation to produce the materials that were not accessible on January 15, 2008, and listing or describing those materials). The absence of a contemporaneous written record of Mendoza's alleged failure to make documents available at the audit is unfortunate for the Department because, on the question of what Mendoza did and did not produce, Ms. Hardee testified as follows: THE HEARING OFFICER: All right. And when you went back in January of 2008 to see the ——Mr. Mendoza at his office and audit his books and records, he produced nothing to you and your supervisor whatsoever on that date in response to the things that you requested to see? THE WITNESS: He may have provided certain documents but were incomplete. I do not remember which documents he provided. * * * I'm not saying he didn't provide me with anything. He didn't provide us with all of the documents we requested. TR. 71-72 (emphasis added). In sum, the evidence against Mendoza consists of the testimony of Ms. Hardee, who in a nutshell says that, while she cannot clearly remember exactly what the Department asked Mendoza to produce, she knows that she requested documents relating to November and December of 2004, and that, while she cannot remember what documents Mendoza made available, she is sure he did not produce everything associated with the fourth quarter of 2004. Assuming for argument's sake that the Department requested the specific documents Mendoza is charged with failing to produce (which is not entirely clear), and accepting that Mendoza did not produce everything that the Department asked to see, the Department's evidence is still too conclusory to support disciplinary action, in view of Ms. Hardee's testimony that the temporal scope of the Department's request for documents was not limited to the three-month period comprising the fourth quarter of 2004 and indeed might have covered 15 months or more. Because, as found above, Mendoza did produce a substantial, albeit indeterminate, amount of documentation, and because there is no clear proof regarding the contents of the records that Mendoza made available, the undersigned is unable to find, based on clear and convincing evidence as the law requires, that Mendoza failed to produce the documents he has been accused of failing to produce. The Charges In Counts I and V of the Administrative Complaint, the Department alleges that Mendoza and Diamonds Realty are guilty of failing to preserve and make available to the Department all deposit slips and bank statements associated with the broker's trust account(s), in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(1), which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts II and VI, it is alleged that Mendoza and Diamonds Realty failed to prepare written monthly statements comparing the broker's total trust liability to the bank balance(s) in the broker's trust account(s), in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(2)-(3). This alleged violation is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts III and VII, the Department accuses Mendoza and Diamonds Realty of having failed to preserve and make available to the Department books, accounts, and records pertaining to the brokerage business, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes. This alleged violation constitutes a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts IV and VIII of its Administrative Complaint, the Department asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Ultimate Factual Determinations As found and explained above, the evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Respondents failed to make available the specific records they are alleged to have withheld. At most the evidence establishes that Respondents were unable, on January 15, 2008, to produce an imprecisely identified (and not clearly proved) subset of the universe of documents that the Department's investigators sought to examine during the audit. This is insufficient to prove, much less clearly and convincingly to demonstrate, that Respondents failed to keep or preserve any particular documents. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondents obstructed or hindered the Department's audit. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Mendoza cooperated with the Department's investigators and substantially complied with their demands. Ultimately, therefore, it is found that Respondents are not guilty of the offences charged in Counts I through VIII of the Administrative Complaint.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Mendoza and Diamonds Realty not guilty of the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nestor G. Mendoza Diamonds Realty of Miami Beach 12501 Southwest 26th Street Miami, Florida 33175 Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57475.25475.2755475.278475.42475.5015 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-14.012
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs MARY ANN WILSON, 94-006038 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Oct. 27, 1994 Number: 94-006038 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 1996

The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d), (e), and (k), Florida Statutes, 1/ by committing the acts alleged in two administrative complaints; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0377781. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker at Wilson Realty International, 1059 Aurora Road, Melbourne, Florida 32935. The Myrie Transaction On July 22, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Harold E. and Bernia L. Myrie (the "Myries") who are residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Myries and located in Florida (the "Myrie property"). On August 20, 1993, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement for the Myrie property with Mr. Eric A. Bogle and Ms. Jearlene Davis, as tenants. The tenants paid Respondent $2,590.60 in rental payments for the period August 20 through November 18, 1993. Respondent failed to deposit the rental payments into her escrow account. On November 19, 1993, Respondent issued check number 1501 to the Myries in the amount of $562.50. Respondent represented to the Myries that $562.50 was the net amount due them. The Myries deposited check number 1501. However, the check was returned for insufficient funds. Respondent replaced check number 1501 with another check for $562.50. There were sufficient funds to cover the second check. On December 29, 1993, the Myries cancelled their property management agreement with Respondent. They demanded the balance of $2,028.10. Respondent claimed that $562.50 was the total amount Respondent owed the Myries. Respondent represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Myrie property. Respondent never provided an accounting of either the rental proceeds received from the tenants or the alleged expenses for repairs and maintenance. 2/ Respondent failed to produce documents Petitioner needed to conduct an audit of her escrow account. Respondent failed to produce deposit receipts for rent and cancelled checks and written receipts for expenses incurred by Respondent. After Respondent failed to comply with two requests to produce the records Petitioner needed to conduct an audit, Petitioner subpoenaed Respondent's records on August 1, 1994. 3/ Respondent agreed to produce her records for review and audit on August 12, 1994. However, Respondent failed to keep her appointment and never produced the documents subpoenaed by Petitioner. 4/ Respondent misappropriated $2,028.10 paid to her by the tenants and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. The tenants paid those funds to Respondent in trust for the Myries. The Myries authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Myrie transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account is culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Myrie transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(1). 5/ Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 2. The Timoll Transaction In June, 1993, Respondent negotiated a property management agreement with Lawrence and Sheila Timoll (the "Timolls") who were residents of New York. Pursuant to the property management agreement, Respondent agreed to manage a rental house owned by the Timolls and located in Florida. (the "Timoll property"). On July 14, 1993, Respondent procured tenants for the Timoll property. William and Sambri Dulmage (the "Dulmages") executed a one year lease. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, the Dulmages agreed to pay a security deposit of $625 and rent at the monthly rate of $600. Respondent received $4,800 from the Dulmages as payment of rent, a security deposit, and expenses associated with the Timoll property. Respondent never delivered any part of the $4,800 to the Timolls. Respondent represented to the Timolls that they were not entitled to any of the $4,800 because the Dulmages had vacated the property and stopped paying rent. Respondent also represented that she had incurred expenses for repairs and maintenance to the Timoll property. 6/ The Dulmages in fact occupied the Timoll property for the duration of the lease and timely paid all amounts in accordance with the terms of the lease. The Timolls knew that the Dulmages were complying with the lease and arranged for the rent to be paid directly to the Timolls in February, 1994. With three minor exceptions, 7/ Respondent did not incur expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. 8/ From July 14, 1993, through February 22, 1994, the Timolls made repeated demands for Respondent to deliver the rent and security deposit, and to account for the expenses allegedly incurred by Respondent. Respondent produced property accounting forms describing expenses for maintenance and repairs to the Timoll property. With three minor exceptions, the accounting forms provided by Respondent contained fabricated expenses for maintenance and repairs. 9/ Respondent misappropriated $4,419.45 10/ paid to her by the Dulmages and converted those funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Timolls. The Timolls authorized Respondent to collect those funds in trust and to remit the funds to them. Respondent breached the trust of both parties in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds for personal purposes. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow funds paid to her in the Timoll transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Timoll transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2- 14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 3. The Veil Transaction On November 29, 1993, Respondent entered into a short term lease agreement between Respondent, as the landlord, and Herman J. and Joyce Veil (the "Veils") as tenants (the "Veil transaction"). The Veils lived out of state. They paid Respondent a deposit of $1,919.36 to secure the seasonal rental of Unit 511, Ocean Walk Condominiums ("unit 511"). On March 1, 1994, the Veils traveled to Melbourne and discovered that unit 511 was not available. Respondent never provided the Veils with a rental unit of any kind. The Veils demanded the return of their deposit. On March 11, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1127 in the amount of $1,394.01. Respondent represented to the Veils that $1,394.01 was the total amount due. Respondent deducted $525.35 for motel charges allegedly incurred by Respondent to provide the Veils with temporary lodging for 11 days while Respondent attempted to procure an alternate rental for the Veils. The deduction of $525.35 was not authorized by the Veils. The Veils did not agree to pay for their own motel room. In addition, the motel charges deducted by Respondent included charges for two nights paid by the Veils. After Respondent issued check number 1127 for $1,394.01, Respondent ordered the bank to stop payment on the check. The bank erroneously cashed the check and subsequently requested the Veils to return the proceeds. The Veils refused. Respondent misappropriated $525.35 paid to her by the Veils and converted those escrow funds to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were paid to Respondent in trust for the Veils' seasonal condominium. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds belonging to the Veils. Respondent engaged in false pretenses to justify her misappropriation and conversion of the escrow funds. Respondent's failure to account for escrow funds paid to her in the Veil transaction and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's accounts constitutes culpable negligence. When all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Veil transaction are considered, Respondent's attempt to stop payment of her check to the Veils constitutes dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver rental trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 4. The Sella Transaction On February 14, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Militano Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Mr. Lino Sella, (the "buyer"). The buyer lived in Italy and required an interpreter for his negotiations with Respondent. On February 14, 1994, the buyer entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $12,250. The buyer authorized Respondent to administer funds entrusted to her because the buyer was in Italy. 11/ On February 15, 1994, Respondent cashed the check for the escrow deposit. Respondent obtained a cashier's check for $12,250 made payable to "Wilson Realty." Respondent then endorsed the cashier's check for her personal use. 12/ In July, 1994, the buyer authorized Respondent to release the escrow deposit to the seller upon issuance of a certificate of occupancy ("CO") by the City of Indian Harbour Beach, Florida (the "city"). The city issued the CO on September 1, 1994. After the city issued the CO, the seller repeatedly made verbal demands for Respondent to deliver the escrow deposit. On September 9, 1994, the seller wrote a letter to Respondent demanding the escrow deposit. On September 13, 1994, the buyer physically inspected the house, found that it was acceptable, and again authorized disbursement of the escrow deposit. The seller again demanded the escrow deposit. Respondent never delivered the escrow deposit. Respondent never accounted for the deposit to the seller, the buyer, or Petitioner. The seller was unable to pay approximately $9,000 to subcontractors used to construct the buyer's house. The subcontractors recorded mechanics' liens against the Sella property and precluded the seller from delivering good and sufficient title to the buyer. The seller's failure to provide the buyer with good and sufficient title precluded the seller from satisfying its obligations under the terms of the contract with the buyer and caused the seller to breach the contract. The buyer incurred legal expenses in an attempt to quiet title to his house. The seller incurred legal expenses in an attempt to recover the escrow deposit from Respondent. Respondent misappropriated a $12,250 escrow deposit in the Sella transaction and converted that escrow deposit for personal use. The escrow deposit was given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of the escrow deposit in the Sella transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's escrow account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Sella transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 5. The Stanley Transaction In March, 1994, Respondent procured a construction contract between Atlantic Construction, Inc. (the "seller"), and Trevor and Carol Stanley (the "buyers") who are residents of New York. The buyers entrusted Respondent with an escrow deposit of $7,800. The buyers were unable to qualify for a mortgage and terminated the agreement in accordance with the terms of the construction contract. The buyers agreed to forfeit $500 of the escrow deposit to Respondent as real estate commission. On July 12, 1994, the buyers demanded that Respondent return $7,300 of their escrow deposit. Respondent claimed the entire $7,800 escrow deposit and neither delivered the $7,300 agreed to by the buyers nor accounted for any of the escrow deposit. Petitioner was unable to audit Respondent's escrow account. The bank where the escrow account was maintained closed the account because the account was overdrawn. The bank charged off $3,483.45 in overdrawn funds. Respondent misappropriated a $7,300 escrow deposit in the Stanley transaction and converted the escrow deposit to Respondent's personal use. Those funds were given to Respondent in trust. Respondent breached that trust in a business transaction within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent misrepresented and concealed her use of escrow funds in the Stanley transaction. Respondent's failure to account for the escrow deposit and her failure to produce records needed by Petitioner to audit Respondent's account constitutes culpable negligence. When considered in their totality, the acts committed by Respondent in the Stanley transaction constitute fraud and dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(b). Respondent failed to timely account or deliver trust funds within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(d). Respondent failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records, and supporting documents and failed to keep an accurate account of all trust fund transactions within the meaning of Rule 61J2-14.012(1). Respondent failed to maintain trust funds in her real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was authorized within the meaning of Section 475.25(1)(k). 6. Respondent's Conduct Respondent evidenced a gross disregard for the rights and property of others, applicable laws, and the legal process. 13/ Respondent's conduct demonstrated culpable intent to commit the offenses for which she is charged. Respondent has made no attempt at restitution to any of the five clients she harmed, and has made no attempt to pay the overdraws charged off by the bank. Respondent has made no attempt to pay the Sella subcontractors or otherwise remove any cloud on the title to the Sella property. Respondent ignored valid subpoenas issued by Petitioner. Respondent engaged in dilatory acts and misrepresentations. Respondent delayed this proceeding through repeated false pretenses that she was represented by counsel who was unable to appear for previously scheduled formal hearings. Respondent participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of law or fact in Respondent's defense. Respondent's defense was baseless and a sham. It was no more than a stonewall defense presented for the purpose of delay. Respondent failed to show any of the facts asserted in her defense. She called no witnesses and submitted no material exhibits for admission in evidence. Respondent's cross examination of Petitioner's witnesses nominally attempted to create issues but failed to produce any competent and substantial evidence to support those issues. Respondent repeatedly attempted to establish issues either by unsworn representations or by arguing with witnesses during cross examination. Respondent's sworn testimony at the formal hearing was not credible and was unpersuasive. No competent and substantial evidence supported her testimony. Any evidence that Respondent adduced during her testimony, her cross examination of other witnesses, and in her exhibits was immaterial. Respondent's conduct in this proceeding constituted a reckless waste of quasi-judicial resources as well as a waste of the time and money of Petitioner and its witnesses. Many of those witnesses had already lost time and money as a result of Respondent's conduct before this proceeding began.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d)1., (e), and (k); and Rule 61J2- 14.012(1); revoking Respondent's real estate license; and imposing a fine of $20,000. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November 1995.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25 Florida Administrative Code (2) 61J2-14.01261J2-24.001
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STEVEN A. MASON, TRUSTEE OF THE IRVING MASON TRUST DATED 12/5/1996 vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, 10-003063 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jun. 03, 2010 Number: 10-003063 Latest Update: Oct. 25, 2010

Findings Of Fact 1. On November 6, 2009, the Department of Financial Services (“Department”) received a claim for certain unclaimed property filed by Bess Mason and Steven A. Mason, Esq., as Trustees of the Irving A. and Bess Mason Joint Living Trust. On or about June 21, 2010, Bess Mason resigned as Trustee of the Irving A. and Bess Mason Joint Living Trust. 2. On June 25, 2010, an Amended Notice of Intent to approve the claim for unclaimed property filed by Steven A. Mason, Esq., as Trustee of the Irving A. and Bess Mason Joint Living Trust was issued on the basis that the date of last contact is August 1, 1977, and Claimant has provided a copy of a document that places Irving A. Mason at the address of 500 Bayview Dr., North Miami Beach, FL, on March 14, 1977. 3. In accordance with Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, the Amended Notice of Intent was served upon Barbara T. Mason on July 10, 2010, by certified mail, which was refused. 4. Barbara T. Mason. was notified in the Amended Notice of Intent that failure to respond within twenty-one days would result in an order approving the claim for unclaimed property being entered in this case, 5. Barbara T. Mason failed to answer the Amended Notice of Intent or request a hearing in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, or Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. 6. The factual allegations contained in the Amended Notice of Intent filed on June 25, 2010, attached hereto as Exhibit One and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as findings of fact in this case.

Conclusions On June 25, 2010, an Amended Notice of Intent to approve the above-referenced claim for unclaimed property filed by Steven A. Mason, Esq., as Trustee of the Irving A. and Bess Mason Joint Living Trust was issued by the Department of Financial Services. In order to take final agency action concerning the claim, the Chief Financial Officer has considered the record in this matter, and being fully advised in the premises, makes the following:

Appeal For This Case Any person adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Fla.R.App.P. 9.110. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a notice of appeal with Julie Jones, CP, FRP, DFS Agency Clerk, Department of Financial Services, 612 Larson Building, 200 E. Gaines Street, Tallahassee, - Florida 32399-0390, and a copy of the same accompanied by the required filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order. DONE and ORDERED this __10th. day of August , 2010. — ws TAMMY TESTQN Chief of Staff COPIES FURNISHED TO: WALTER T, GRAHAM, CHIEF Bureau of Unclaimed Property 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0358 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this_¢o°”_ day of fun ws ; 2010, to: Steven A. Mason, Esq. Barbara T. Mason 3363 Sheridan Street 6497 Hamlet Dr., Unit B Suite 201, Hollywood, FL 33021 Englewood, FL 34224-7529 Barbara T. Mason 6497 Hamlet Dr., Unit 31 Englewood, FL 34224-7529 ZO hn J fobs a PAUL C. STADLER, JR. ~ Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4247 Telephone: 850-413-3010 Counsel for the Department

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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. MOLLIE M. HALE COSTA, D/B/A OCALA SILVER SPRINGS REAL ESTATE, 86-002387 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002387 Latest Update: May 01, 1987

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The Respondent was at all times material to this proceeding a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0035275. The last license issued was as a broker, d/b/a Silver Springs Real Estate, Corp., 4121 East Silver Springs Boulevard, Ocala, Florida 32671. On or about August 3, 1984, the Respondent obtained Teri L. Lochman (Lochman) as a tenant of certain residential property belonging to Gail and Valerie Cox (Cox) that was involved in a sale to A. Pillot. In connection with this sale, a lease had been prepared between A. Pillot as Lessor and A. Alongi as Lessee. Lochman signed this lease as Lessee, and in connection with this lease, paid Respondent $1,600.00 representing $700.00 for the first month's rent, $700.00 for the last month's rent and $200.00 security deposit. These funds were paid by Lochman to Respondent in two separate checks in the amount of $500.00 and $1,100.00 dated August 5, 1984 and August 13, 1984, respectively. The Pillot/Cox escrow account, which had previously been established in Respondent's escrow ledger, was credited with these funds and the funds deposited in Respondent's real estate brokerage trust bank account, No. 805 0006583, in the Sun Bank of Ocala (Trust Account), on August 9, 1984 and August 17, 1984, respectively. Upon attempting to move into the home she had rented, Lochman discovered that Cox was still in possession because the sale had not gone through. At this point, August 17, 1984, Lochman and Cox signed an agreement which would allow Lochman to reside in the home rent free for two weeks while Cox was out of town in return for acting as a security guard. Sometime after the August 17, 1987 agreement was executed by Lochman and Cox, Lochman and Cox signed a handwritten month to month lease of the premises requiring Lochman to pay Cox $700.00 for the first month's rent, $700.00 for the last month's rent and a $200.00 damage deposit. This payment was conditioned upon Lochman receiving her refund from the Respondent. There was no credible evidence that Respondent agreed to release Cox from any previous agreement with Respondent wherein Respondent acted as agent for Cox in obtaining Lochman as a tenant or the handling of Cox's property, i.e. mowing grass or preparing house for rent. Additionally, there was no credible evidence that Respondent agreed to Lochman dealing directly with Cox. Respondent was at all times relevant to this proceeding acting as agent for Cox, and therefore, demanded from Cox her commission for obtaining Lochman as a tenant and reimbursement for other services rendered before returning Lochman's rental deposit. There is no credible evidence that the Respondent agreed to return Lochman's rental deposit without first obtaining her commission or reimbursement for other services rendered from Cox. There is no credible evidence to show that Cox paid Respondent her commission or reimbursed Respondent for other services rendered or that Cox made a demand on Respondent to pay the Lochman rental deposit to Lochman. There is credible evidence that Lochman made a demand on Respondent for the return of her rental deposit and that Respondent refused to return Lochman's rental deposit because there was a dispute between Respondent and Cox concerning Respondent's commission and reimbursement for other services rendered. Lochman did not pay Cox the rent for the month of September, 1984, therefore, she contends that Respondent only owes her $900.00 of the rental deposit. Upon Respondent's refusal to pay her the balance of the rental deposit, Lochman obtained a default judgment for $900.00 in civil court, however, and although the record is not clear, the default judgment may have been set aside. (See transcript, page 15, lines 9-13). The evidence is clear that check no. 257 drawn on the Trust Account in the amount of $1,465.00, paid on April 18, 1985, included $1,278.00 from the Pillot/Cox escrow account and depleted the funds in the Pillot/Cox escrow account. However, there was no evidence presented to show that the Lochman rental deposit was paid to Respondent. Likewise, there was no evidence presented to show that Cox did not receive the Lochman rental deposit. There was no evidence presented to show the payee on Check No. 257, or any other check, drawn on the Trust Account. There was no evidence presented to show that Respondent commingled trust funds and personal funds in the Trust Account in regard to deposits and withdrawals. There was insufficient credible evidence to show that Lochman was entitled to delivery of $900.00 or any funds from the Trust Account. There was no evidence that Respondent notified the Real Estate Commission (Commission) of the conflicting demands on the Lochman rental deposit or followed any of the procedures set forth in the statutes to resolve such a conflict.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding the Respondent guilty of failing to notify the Commission of the conflicting demands on the trust funds and failing to follow the procedures set forth for resolving such conflict in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes and that Respondent's real estate broker's license be suspended for a period of six (6) months, stay the suspension, place the Respondent on probation for a period of six (6) months under the condition that the issue of conflicting demands on the trust funds be resolved within sixty (60) days and under any other conditions the Commission feels appropriate, and assess an administrative fine of $300.00 to be paid within sixty (60) days of the date of the Final Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order DISMISS Counts I, III, IV and V of the Administrative Complaint filed herein. Respectfully submitted and entered this 1st day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-2387 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. 4.5 Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Additionally, Petitioner has treated certain facts in this case as background in unnumbered paragraphs which I have numbered 6-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2 as clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4 except for the phrase that Respondent agreed to the return of the rental deposit which is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. I did not find Lochman's testimony credible in this regard. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9 as clarified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10 as clarified. This paragraph is a statement of Lochman's testimony and not presented as a fact, therefore, is rejected. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent For the reasons set forth in the Background portions of this Recommended Order, there has been no rulings of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jeffrey J. Fitos, Esquire Valley Forge Military Academy Wayne, Pennsylvania 19087

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs MARSH A. FERREIRA AND M A F REALTY, INC., 91-007797 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 04, 1991 Number: 91-007797 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1993

Findings Of Fact The following are the facts which the parties agree should be considered in resolving the legal issues raised in the instant case: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent Marsh A. Ferreira is now, and has been since 1990, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0523079. Since becoming a licensed broker, the only complaint that has been made against him in connection with the practice of his profession is the complaint that is the subject of the instant case. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent Ferreira was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent M A F Realty, Inc. (Realty). Realty is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida under license number 0263255. The license reflects that Realty's address is 4143A S.W. 74th Court, Miami, Florida 33155. Like Respondent Ferreira, Realty has an unblemished disciplinary record to date. On or about July 31, 1991, Hector Schwerert, an investigator with the Department, conducted an office inspection/audit of Realty during business hours. The inspection/audit was routine. It was not prompted by any complaint against Respondents. Schwerert gave no advance warning of his visit. Nonetheless, Respondents gave him their full cooperation and did not seek to postpone or delay the inspection/audit. Schwerert's inspection/audit revealed the following: Realty's sales escrow account #20207038305 had an approximate shortage of $8,359.31. Its total trust liability was $8,500.00, but there was only $140.69 in the account. Respondent Ferreira was the sole employee of Respondent. He, and he alone, had access to the escrow account, as well as Realty's operating account. On occasion, he would "unintentionally confuse the checkbooks" of the two accounts and inadvertently use monies in the escrow account for operational purposes and monies in the operating account for escrow purposes. It was this "unintentional confusion" that caused the shortage in the escrow account. During the period from January, 1990, when Realty was incorporated, to the date of the inspection/audit, Respondent Ferreira, on behalf of Realty, prepared and signed written escrow account statements/reconciliations on a monthly basis. On two, and only two, of these statements/reconciliations, the escrow account balance did not equal the amount of Realty's trust liability and there was no explanation given for the discrepancy, nor any indication that corrective action would be taken. On August 1, 1991, immediately upon realizing that he had inadvertently deposited trust funds in Realty's operating account instead of its escrow account, Respondent Ferreira withdrew $10,000.00 from the operating account and deposited it into the escrow account to eliminate the shortage in the escrow account. Since the July 31, 1991, inspection/audit Respondent Ferreira has taken a 30-hour broker's course in which he received an above average score and has met his continuing education requirements. 1/

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing upon them, for having committed these violations, the penalties proposed by the Department in its proposed recommended order, which are recited above. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of April, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1993.

Florida Laws (2) 455.225475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs RICHARD MICHAEL REGAZZI AND ATLANTIC RENTALS, INC., 97-002675 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jun. 06, 1997 Number: 97-002675 Latest Update: Feb. 16, 1998

The Issue Whether the Respondents' Florida real estate licenses should be disciplined based upon the following charges, as alleged in the administrative complaint: COUNTS I and II: Whether Respondent Richard Michael Regazzi ("Regazzi") is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. COUNT III: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of failure to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV: Whether Respondent Atlantic Rentals Realty, Inc. is guilty of failure to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow bank account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. COUNT V: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of failure to prepare the required written monthly escrow statement- reconciliations in violation of Rule 61J2-14.012(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI: Whether Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. is guilty of failure to prepare the required written monthly escrow statement-reconciliations in violation of Rule 61J2-14.012(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. COUNT VII: Whether Respondent Regazzi is guilty of having been found guilty for a third time of misconduct that warrants his suspension or has been found guilty of a course of conduct or practices which shows that he is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest, or untruthful that the money, property, transactions, and rights of investors, or those with whom he may sustain a confidential relation, may not safely be entrusted to him in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaint pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent Regazzi is, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed Florida real estate broker. License number 0273453 was issued in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Atlantic Rentals, Inc., 6811 North Atlantic Avenue, No. B, Cape Canaveral, Florida. Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. is, and was at all times material hereto, a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker having been issued license number 0273444 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 6811 North Atlantic Avenue, No. B, Cape Canaveral, Florida. At all times material hereto, Respondent Regazzi was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. On January 28, 1997, Petitioner's Investigator Maria Ventura ("Investigator Ventura") conducted an audit of Respondents' escrow account #3601612291, maintained at NationsBank and titled Atlantic Rentals, Inc., Multi Unit escrow Account (escrow account). On January 28, 1997, Respondents had a reconciled bank balance of $46,166.93. As of January 28, 1997, Investigator Ventura determined that Respondents had a total trust liability of $84,586.77. By comparing Respondents' reconciled bank balance with Respondents' trust liability, it was determined that Respondents had a shortage of $38,419.84 in their escrow account. In addition, Respondents were not performing monthly reconciliations of their escrow account. On January 28, 1997, Respondent Regazzi prepared a monthly reconciliation statement (reconciliation statement) for December 1996, and provided it to Petitioner on the same day. Respondent Regazzi's reconciliation statement indicated that there was shortage of $28,885.36 in the escrow account. Respondent Regazzi's reconciliation statement is not signed, and does not indicate what month was being reconciled. The statement indicates that the reconciled bank balance and trust liability agree when, in fact, the reconciliation statement indicates a shortage of $28,885.36. Respondent Regazzi's explanation of how the funds were removed from the escrow account by a third party is not credible. Even if this account were credible, it does not lessen Respondent Regazzi's culpability. On April 21, 1992, the Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC") issued a final order whereby Respondent Regazzi was found guilty of misconduct and was fined $200, and placed on probation for one year with a requirement to complete and provide satisfactory evidence to the Department of having completed an approved 30-hour broker management course. Respondent successfully completed the terms of probation. On November 12, 1996, the FREC issued a final order whereby Respondent Regazzi was fined $250 for misconduct and Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. was reprimanded.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Regazzi be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), (e), (k), and (o), Florida Statutes (1995), as charged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc. be found guilty of having violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (k), and (e), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint. That Respondents Regazzi's real estate license be revoked and that he be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $38,419.84, plus interest. That Respondent Atlantic Rentals, Inc.'s corporate brokerage registration be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Michael Regazzi, pro se Atlantic Rentals, Inc. 6811-B North Atlantic Avenue Cape Canaveral, Florida 32920 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.5720.165475.25 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61J2-14.012
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CONSTANCE B. MASTELLONE, 76-000472 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000472 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1992

The Issue Whether the Certificate of Registration of the Respondent as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked For alleged violation of Sections 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), 475.25(1)(i), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed February 11, 1976. A final hearing was scheduled to be held on June 29, 1976, but pursuant to Motion of Respondent was continued until July 6, 1976 and, pursuant to a further Motion of Respondent For continuance, the hearing was continued until November 15, 16, 1976. A prehearing Motion of Respondent to strike Counts I, II, III, V, VII, VIII, IX & X of the Administrative Complaint was denied at the commencement of the hearing. At the hearing, Petitioner moved to amend Count X of its Complaint to correct a typographical error as to the statutory provision alleged to have been violated. The Motion was granted and the said Count was amended to reflect an alleged violation of Section 475.25(3), F.S. rather than Section 475.25(1), F.S. Pursuant to further Motion of Petitioner, a typographical error appearing in Count VII of the Administrative Complaint relating to the address of the property in question shown in paragraph 1 thereof was corrected to read "1558". Pursuant to further Motion of petitioner, Count Seven was also amended to include an alleged violation of Section 475.25(1)(i), F.S. No objections to any of the above amendments were made by Respondent.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate broker, Certificate No. Q056337. During the year in which the alleged statutory violations occurred, i.e., 1974, she was also registered under the trade name "Watson Real Estate". Also, effective November 4, 1974, she was additionally registered in the name of Connie B. Martin. Her place of business was listed at 17031 North Dixie Highway, North Miami Beach, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2) On April 16, 1974, Respondent, in the name of "Connie Martin and/or Nominees" entered into an Agreement of Sale and Deposit Receipt with Richard Infante and Susan Infante, his wife, whereby Respondent agreed to purchase real estate located at 1558 N.W. 102nd Street, Miami, Florida, For the price of $24,607.50. The contract provided For a $1,000.00 security deposit by the purchaser in the Form of a check payable to "Watson Real Estate Trust Account" and the Agreement recited an acknowledgement of receipt of these escrow funds by Constance B. Mastellone For Watson Real Estate. The Agreement further provided that closing of the transaction would be on June 23, 1974 and that, in the event of failure or refusal of the purchaser to comply with the obligations thereunder, without fault on the sellers' part, all monies paid under the contract could be retained by the sellers as liquidated damages. Respondent did not place the $1,000.00 deposit in the Watson Real Estate Trust Account that was maintained in the City National Bank of Miami Beach, Miami Beach, Florida. Instead, she wrote a letter to the Infantes on the same day that the contract was executed advising them that the money was in an interest-bearing account at Chase Federal Savings, North Miami Beach, Florida. The letter stated that she preferred to handle the matter in that manner because there was a possibility she would not be able to obtain financing and close the purchase. Although Respondent testified that Mr. Infante called and told her that he had received the letter and had expressed no objection to this disposition of the funds, no written instrument or addendum to the contract in this respect was ever executed by the parties. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14; Respondent's Exhibit 16). The transaction with the Infantes did not close on the scheduled date because Respondent was unable to obtain mortgage financing. On July 1, 1974, Respondent, in the name of "Connie B. Martin, broker" as seller, entered into a deposit receipt agreement with Carrie Clark, as purchaser to sell the Infante property For the sum of $25,000.00. The deposit receipt reflected that the sum of $1,450.00 was acknowledged to be held in escrow by Watson Real Estate as a deposit on the property. There was no showing in this Agreement that Respondent did not hold title to the property at the time. The contract was contingent upon the delivery by the seller of an FHA appraisal of not less than $25,000.00. The Agreement reflected that "Watson Real Estate, Connie B. Martin, Broker" had received the aForesaid deposit. Under the same date of July 1, 1974, another deposit receipt was executed by Carrie Clark as buyer, whereby "Watson Real Estate Trust Account, Connie B. Martin", acknowledged receipt of $1,450.00 from Carrie Mae Clark on the same property as a deposit to be held in escrow by Watson Real Estate. This document showed the purchase price to be $24,607.50. It did not reflect the name of the proposed seller of the property. At the time she executed these documents, Clark did not know who owned the property in question. Respondent viewed Clark as her "Nominee, as referred to in the original contract with the Infantes, and had contracted with Clark on the assumption that she could deliver clear title to her when she had received the same from the Infantes. Respondent considered this transaction to be what she termed a "double closing". Her original contract with the Infantes provided that she would receive as "Watson Real Estate, Connie B. Martin, Broker", 40 percent of the real estate commission on the sale with 60 percent to be paid to the listing broker, Edwin C. Bagby. (Testimony of Respondent, Clark, Petitioner's Exhibit 8; Respondent's Exhibit 6). During the next several months after June, 1974, Respondent advised Infante and his attorney Benjamin Agronow, that she was endeavoring to sell the house to Clark. Infante was desirous of selling the property and did not press to close the transaction. He hereby tacitly agreed to an extension of the time For closing. However, when the Clark deposit receipt was submitted to Agronow in early November, 1974, he advised Infante that the changed method of financing therein would result in higher costs to him. By this time Infante wanted no further dealings with the Respondent and declined to consider the offer by Clark. Thereafter, on November 12, 1974, Agronow advised the Respondent that she had breached the contract of April 16, 1974 For, failure to close the transaction, and demanded delivery of the $1,000.00 deposit under the terms of the contract. It provided that upon default of the purchaser all monies paid thereunder could be retained by the seller as liquidated damages and the contract terminated. Respondent did not pay over the deposit funds to Infante. (Testimony of Respondent, Agronow, Infante (Deposition), Respondent's Exhibit 6, Petitioner's Exhibit 14). On May 25, 1974, Respondent, in the name of "Connie B. Martin and/or Nominees" as purchaser, entered into an Agreement Of Sale And Deposit Receipt with Ruth E. Higgins, as seller, to purchase property located at 1065 N.W. 127th Street, Miami, Florida, For the sum of $31,000.00. The contract provided For the payment of $1,000.00 in the Form of a check to "Watson Real Estate trust account", escrow agent, as a security deposit, and receipt was acknowledged of this amount on the same date by Constance B. Mastellone For Watson Real Estate Trust Account. The contract further provided that it was a "back-up" contract and would not become effective until the date that Higgins was notified that a previous contract with one Hyde was known to be void. Respondent was advised several months later that the Hyde transaction had failed. Neither the listing broker, Associates Real Estate, nor Higgins saw the $1,000.00 at the time the aForesaid agreement of May 25 was entered into by the parties. A letter of Respondent to Higgins on the same date as the contract was executed stated that Respondent held the deposit of $1,000.00 in her account with Chase Federal Savings, North Miami Beach, Florida, in an interest-bearing account. It further stated that Respondent did not want to lose the interest during the time spent waiting For a mortgage commitment. Respondent testified that Higgins called her on the phone and told her she had received the letter and accepted the provisions thereof. Respondent encountered difficulties in obtaining financing For the purchase due to a tight money market and there was also a title problem to be resolved. In any event, the deal did not go through and Respondent obtained a release of the deposit receipt to herself which was executed by Higgins on December 19, 1974. Respondent admitted at the hearing that at no time was the $1,000.00 deposit ever placed in the Watson Real Estate trust account. (Testimony of Respondent, Higgins, Shaeffer; Petitioner's Exhibit 15; Respondent's Exhibits 8, 10, 11, 12, 13). On December 10, 1974, Respondent's daughter, Pamela A. Mastellone entered into an Agreement Of Sale And Deposit Receipt as purchaser of the Higgins property For the sum of $34,000.00. This agreement provided For a security deposit in the sum of $3,000.00 in the Form of a check payable to Ruth E. Higgins. The check was issued by Connnie Mastellone" on December 10, 1974 and was drawn on the City National Bank of Miami Beach. The contract further provided that if it did not close by December 24, 1974, the contract would be null and void and the parties relieved of all obligations. The agreement provided For an even split of a 7.5 percent commission between Associates Realty and Watson Realty. Respondent testified that at the time she gave the check to Higgins, she asked her to hold it until a firm commitment from a mortgage company had been received. Higgins, on the other hand, testified that Respondent had asked her to hold it For two weeks. Respondent was unable to get mortgage financing For her daughter and the contract expired by its terms on December 24, 1974. On December 27, 1974, Higgins deposited the check For payment and it was returned For insufficient funds. (Testimony of Respondent, Shaeffer; Petitioner's Exhibits 16, 17, 18; Respondent's Exhibit 14). On June 18, 1974, Respondent in the name of "Connie B. Martin" as purchaser entered into an Agreement Of Sale And Deposit Receipt with Rose Gilbert, represented by Jean Fielding, Attorney in fact, to purchase real estate located at 16150 N.E. 12th Avenue, North Miami Beach, Florida, For the price of $26,000.00. The Agreement provided that upon signing of the contract, the purchaser would place $2,00.00 in escrow with Watson Real Estate Trust Account and receipt was acknowledged of this sum by Constance B. Mastellone For Watson Real Estate. The contract provided For a 50-50 commission split between Watson Real Estate and Pete Lipinsky, listing broker. At the time the contract was executed, Lipinsky told Respondent that if she did not place the money in escrow, he would "nail her hide to the wall". Respondent testified that she instructed her daughter, Pamela Mastellone, to go to the Chase National Bank and withdraw $2,100.00 and send the same to the Watson Realty Trust Account at City National Bank of Miami Beach. She further testified that it was not until she was investigated by petitioner that she learned her daughter had neglected to follow her instructions in this regard. The contract did not close on the agreed date and thereafter, on September 20, 1974, Respondent, in the name of "Constance B. Mastellone, Broker" entered into another Agreement Of Sale And Deposit Receipt with Gilbert on the same property For a price of $29,000.00. Although this Agreement provided For a security deposit of $2,600.00 to be placed in the Watson Real Estate Account, the parties understood that these were the same funds deposited under the Former contract. This deal closed on October 14, 1974. (Testimony of Respondent, Fielding, Lipinsky; Petitioner's Exhibits 6, 7; Respondent's Exhibits 1, 2). On May 28, 1974, Peter A. Mastellone and Respondent, in the name of "Constance B. Mastellone, Broker, and/or Nominees" was purchaser entered into an Agreement Of Sale And Deposit Receipt with Roy M. Hall and Kitty H. Hall, his wife, to purchase property located at 1517 N.W. 101st Street, Miami, Florida, For the price of $17,000.00. The contract provided For a $1,000.00 check payable to Watson Real Estate Trust Account as escrow agent as a security deposit, and receipt of the said deposit was acknowledged by Constance B. Mastellone on behalf of Watson Real Estate. The contract further specified that the property was being purchased For the purpose of resale and provided For a closing within 30 days. The contract provided that there would be no real estate commission paid on the transaction. Also, on May 28, 1974, Respondent directed letters to the Halls advising them that the $1,000.00 security deposit was in her account at Chase Federal Savings, North Miami Beach, an interest- bearing account, and that she did not want to place it in an escrow account where it would earn no interest. Respondent testified that the Halls orally agreed the deposit money could stay in the savings account of Respondent. This contract did not close, but on August 9, 1974, Respondent executed an FHA deposit receipt as seller whereby she agreed to sell the property to Nicholas Torek and Mary McDonnell Torek For the sum of $23,000.00. The document acknowledged the receipt of a $500.00 security deposit, which was in the Form of a check issued to Watson Real Estate by M.L. McDonnell on August 11, 1974, to be placed in the Watson Real Estate Account. Respondent was unaware at the time that McDonnell and Torek were not married. Torek had authorized McDonell to use his name on the instrument because they were planning to be married. Respondent sent them to a mortgage company to qualify For a mortgage. Several days later, she learned that they were not married and Torek came back and signed a new contract, which was also dated August 9, with the Halls at the same purchase price as his contract with Respondent. The latest agreement provided For a security deposit of $1,250.00 to be held in escrow by Watson Real Estate Trust Account and also provided For a real estate commission to Watson Real Estate of $3,750.00 to be paid by the Halls. An addendum to this contract was executed by Torek and Respondent, dated August 9, 1974, whereby Torek agreed that the $1,250.00 escrow should not be deposited in the trust account, but be given to Peter A. Mastellone For the purpose of making repairs on the property. It further provided that he would hold $850.00 toward closing costs and "prepayables". The document reflects the receipt of $2,100.00 by Peter A. Mastellone. Respondent testified that since $2,100.00 was all that was necessary to close the transaction, her husband returned $500.00 cash to Torek to reimburse McDonnell For her original deposit on the other contract. The Halls were not a party to the addendum to the contract and Torek was not aware that the Halls were the owners of the property until after the transaction was closed on October 4, 1974. Torek testified that he had not signed the second August 9 contract which had been executed by the Halls. However, Torek had agreed to close in his own name when he learned that McDonnell could not qualify For FHA financing. Torek was not concerned about the name in which the transaction was consummated but later, after disputes with McDonnell, quitclaimed his interest to her. Although McDonnell was present at the closing on October 4, the deed to the property was issued in the name of Torek only. McDonnell testified that Respondent had told her to sign the original contract In the name of Torek and in that way the deed would come out in her married name. McDonnell was surprised when the deed was issued only in the name of Torek. McDonnell was aware that the Halls owned the property and that Respondent was attempting to sell it in order to get out from under her own contract with the Halls. McDonnell was not aware that Torek had signed the subsequent agreement in his name only. (Testimony of Respondent, Torek, McDonnell, Petitioner's Exhibits 10, 11, 12, 13; Respondent's Exhibits 5 & 20).

Recommendation That the registration of Constance B. Mastellone as a real estate broker be suspended For a period of six months For violation of subsections 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25 (1)(i), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida James, A. Baccus, Esquire Attorney For Respondent Triangle Building 595 N.W. 91st Street Miami, Florida 33150 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ANATOL ARIAN, Petitioner, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2788 vs. DADE COUNTY DOAH NO. 76-472 CONSTANCE B. MASTELLONE, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (4) 475.125475.23475.25832.05
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs LESLIE G. SIMMONDS AND L. G. SIMMONDS REALTY, INC., 90-004438 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 20, 1990 Number: 90-004438 Latest Update: Oct. 09, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent (all references to Respondent are to Respondent Simmonds) is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license numbers 0404486 and 0245930. His most current licenses are as a broker, c/o the corporate Respondent. He has been licensed about six years in Florida. The corporate Respondent (all references to the corporate Respondent are to Respondent L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc.) is a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0245825. At all material times, Respondent was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of the corporate Respondent. He is the sole shareholder of the corporate Respondent and the only broker employed by the corporate Respondent. Respondents were brokers in three sales transactions in which they received competing claims for earnest money deposits that they held in trust. The three contracts are the sale from Durant to Durant by contract dated February 13, 1987, and amended December 7, 1987; the sale from Dyer to James by contract dated August 27, 1988; and the sale from Kollar and Nilands Bar & Package, Inc. to Hamilton by contract dated October 11, 1988. Each of the three contracts is on a standard printed form. Each contract requires the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit in escrow and disburse it at closing, at which time the corporate Respondent earns its commission. Each contract provides that the corporate Respondent may interplead the funds in circuit court in the event of a dispute and further provides that the corporate Respondent shall comply with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Durant contract provides for the corporate Respondent to hold a $1000 earnest money deposit. A dispute between the parties to the Durant contract arose, and Respondent contacted the Florida Real Estate Commission for advice. By letter dated November 22, 1988, Respondent informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of a demand by the seller for the deposit because the buyer had failed to follow through on his mortgage application. The letter states that Respondent is convinced that the seller is entitled to the deposit and that Respondent intends to pursue interpleader. By Notice dated February 2, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of the unenforceability of certain contractual language. Referring to Rule 21V-10.32, the letter advised Respondents that, within 30 days of receipt of the letter, they must pursue arbitration, with the consent of all parties, or a judicial adjudication, such as through interpleader. At some point, Respondents obtained an application for arbitration and sent it to the parties. By letter dated June 12, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they had sent an arbitration contract on March 21, 1989, to the seller, who had not yet responded to the request to arbitrate. Subsequently, Respondents retained counsel at their expense to discuss interpleading the funds in circuit court. Counsel advised them that the relatively modest sum involved, as a practical matter, precluded the judicial remedy because the attorneys' fees would exceed the amount in dispute. Eventually, the parties to the Durant contract settled their dispute, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondent failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Dyer contract also involved an earnest money deposit of $1000, which was later increased by addendum to a total of $3000. The Dyer contract, which also failed to close, provides for the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit. By letter dated March 2, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that, as of the same day, they had received conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit. By Notice dated August 28, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of factual disputes that the Commission is not empowered to resolve. The Notice states that Respondents must "immediately" choose one of the remaining alternatives--arbitration or interpleader in circuit court. By letter dated September 8, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they would seek help through the Arbitration Society of Florida, Inc. It is unclear whether Respondents sent an arbitration application to the parties in the Dyer contract, but no arbitration ensued. The parties to the Dyer contract resolved their dispute in March, 1990, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Kollar contract resulted in the receipt by the corporate Respondent of an earnest money deposit of $10,000. This contract also failed to close. By letter dated January 19, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands received the same day. The Commission issued an Escrow Disbursement Order on August 16, 1989, with which Respondents promptly complied. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposit, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. On January 30, 1990, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office pursuant to a complaint that never provided any basis for disciplinary action. Respondent said that he was ill and asked her to reschedule the visit. They agreed to reset it for February 6, 1990. On February 6, 1990, Petitioner's investigator met Respondent at his office and asked for copies of all pending contracts, bank statements, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and similar materials so that she could reconcile the trust account. Respondent supplied her with all of these materials except for the cancelled checks, which he said were at the accountant's office. Respondent gave the investigator access to his office copier so that she could copy whatever she needed. She apparently copied various documents, but failed to copy the pending contracts. From February, 1988, through February, 1990, Respondents held 6-10 earnest money deposits. On February 6, Respondents had only three pending contracts for which they held deposits. These were the Dyer contract and two unidentified contracts with $3500 and $500 earnest money deposits. Respondents did not handle other trust funds, such as property management funds. Petitioner's investigator determined that the trust account was short $2897.73. She found pending contracts indicating that Respondents should be holding a total of $7000 in earnest money deposits, but she found a bank balance of only $4102.27, which included a deposit of $1392.26 made on February 5. Respondents' trust account has been short previously. For example, in August, 1989, the Dyer, Durant, and Kollar contracts, which were still outstanding, generated a trust account liability of $14,000, but the account balance was as low as $700. Respondent admits that he improperly removed funds from the trust account, without the parties' knowledge, to apply toward personal medical expenses that he had incurred. In the fall of 1989, he deposited into the trust account proceeds from a loan he had recently received. However, he removed additional trust funds when he later incurred more medical expenses. By February 6, Respondent knew that the trust account was short, but evidently did not know precisely by how much. His repeated vagueness concerning the specifics of trust account withdrawals and deposits from August, 1989, through February, 1990, discredits his testimony that he never withdrew more than the amounts of pending commissions, which were unearned in any event when withdrawn by Respondent. On February 7, Respondent deposited $2897.73 into the trust account to eliminate the deficiency found by Petitioner's investigator. During the following week, the investigator returned to Respondents' office. She requested Respondent to produce the same documents that she had examined previously, but Respondent refused on the grounds that he had already produced all the documents once and he was seeking legal counsel. The investigator contacted Respondent a couple more times concerning the requested documents, but Respondent continued to refuse to cooperate. Petitioner next tried to compel the production of the requested documents by service of an administrative subpoena. By subpoena duces tecum issued February 19, 1990, and served February 21, 1990, Petitioner demanded that Respondents produce, on February 26, 1990: All current pending sales contracts, on L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #144100004792 all bank deposit slips from 2/1/88-2/1/90, the check book for account #14410004792. Upon receipt of the subpoena, Respondent contacted his attorney, who prepared a petition to invalidate subpoena, which was served by mail on February 25, 1990, and received by Petitioner on February 28, 1990. The basic objections are that the subpoena is "unreasonably broad in scope and/or requires the production of irrelevant material" and that Respondents are entitled to know what complaint is being investigated prior to producing the information. Petitioner issued another administrative subpoena on March 12, 1990, which was served upon Respondents on March 26, 1990, and requested, by March 30, 1990: On L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #14410004792: All sales contracts for which L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc. is holding escrow deposits, the 1/90 and 2/90 bank statements, cancelled checks, number 177 through 270. On March 29, 1990, Respondents' attorney served the same objections to the petition, and Petitioner received the objections on April 4, 1990.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order reprimanding Respondents; imposing on each Respondent an administrative fine of $3000 (for a total from the two Respondents of $6000); requiring Respondent to complete an approved 60-hour course; suspending the licenses of both Respondents for a period of six months, commencing retroactive to when their licenses were revoked pursuant to the emergency order; placing both licenses on probation for a period of three years commencing the conclusion of the suspension; and requiring, during the period of suspension, that Respondents provide the Florida Real Estate Commission, or its signated representative, with escrow account status reports at such intervals as the Commission shall require. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4438 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-7: adopted. 8: rejected as subordinate. 9-10 (first sentence): adopted. 10 (second and third sentences): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. In fact, Respondent supplied the investigator with copies of the contracts on February 6, but refused subsequent requests to produce them. He indicated that he wanted to obtain advice of counsel. 11: rejected as subordinate. In addition, the implication that files of the Division of Real Estate were the sole source of information regarding the contracts is rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. The investigator found in the EDO files of the Division of Real Estate a copy of the Dyer contract, which, as noted in the recommended order, was one of the three contracts generating the escrow account liability that the investigator calculated on February 6. Although she saw the other two contracts (in order to generate the liability), she never received copies of them, even through the final hearing. 12-19: adopted or adopted in substance. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, first sentence and first clause of second sentence): adopted. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 22: adopted. 23: rejected as irrelevant. 24-27 and 30-33: adopted. 28 and 34: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and unnecessary. 29: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondents 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14-15: adopted. 16 and 19: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 17: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18: adopted. 20: rejected as irrelevant. 21: rejected as subordinate. 22: adopted. 23-24 and 26-27: rejected as recitation of testimony. 25: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 28-33 (first clause of second sentence): adopted. 33 (second clause of second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 33 (remainder): adopted. 34-35: except as to the fact of the issuance of the subpoena and petition to invalidate, rejected as unnecessary. 36: rejected as unclear. Respondent gave the investigator a chance to see the three pending contracts generating the February 6 trust account liability, but never gave her copies of any of them when she later discovered that she had failed to copy them. She found a copy of the Dyer contract in the EDO file, but she never received copies of the other two contracts, even at the final hearing. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The determination in the recommended order on this point was not dependent upon Respondents' handling of the subpoenas, but on their handling of repeated and reasonable requests for relevant information. 37: rejected as irrelevant. 38: adopted. 39: rejected as unnecessary. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: adopted. 45: rejected as unnecessary. 46-49: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Thomas V. Infantino Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0030 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorney James H. Gillis Division of Real Estate Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 *Previously assigned DOAH Case No. 90-4319 closed as a duplicate.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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