The issue is whether proposed regulations for Brevard County manatee protection areas by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC), which are amendments to Rule 68C- 22.006, Florida Administrative Code, noticed in the April 20, 2001, Florida Administrative Weekly (F.A.W.)("Proposed Rule"), with a Notice of Change published in the F.A.W. on June 15, 2001, are an invalid exercise of legislative authority.Challenges to proposed rule are dismissed. Proposed rule not vague and does not exceed delegated legislative authority.

The issue is whether proposed regulations for Brevard County manatee protection areas by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC), which are amendments to Rule 68C- 22.006, Florida Administrative Code, noticed in the April 20, 2001, Florida Administrative Weekly (F.A.W.)("Proposed Rule"), with a Notice of Change published in the F.A.W. on June 15, 2001, are an invalid exercise of legislative authority.Challenges to proposed rule are dismissed. Proposed rule not vague and does not exceed delegated legislative authority.

The issue in Case Number 90-5021GM is whether the Town of Indian River Shores' Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance Number 386 is "in compliance," as defined in Section 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes. The issue in Case Number 92-6784GM is whether the City of Vero Beach's Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance 92-21 is "in compliance," as defined in Section 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes.Plans designating density of one unit per five acres for islands was upheld. Provision requiring bridge was not in compliance.

The issue is whether Rule 68N-22.006(1)(d)4, 7, 8, and 9 and (f)7 (former Rule 62N-22.006(1)(d)4, 7, 8, and 9 and (f)7), Florida Administrative Code, which designates three manatee speed zones in Brevard County, and the language on the signs implementing these speed zones are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.Rules designating manatee speed zones at either end of Canaveral Barge Canal and at the north end of Sykes Creek are not invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.

Whether Petitioner, Department of Community Affairs (the Department), is legally precluded in this proceeding from taking agency action to enforce the reporting and fee provisions required pursuant to Chapter 252, Part II, Florida Statutes, against Respondent, Goodson Paving, Inc., for the reporting years of 1989 through 1994, inclusive, by operation and application of Section 95.011 and Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (statute of limitations); and, Whether the Department is legally and equitably precluded in this proceeding from taking agency action to enforce the reporting and fee provisions required pursuant to Chapter 252, Part II, Florida Statutes, against Respondent for the reporting years of 1989 through 1994, inclusive, by operation and application of Section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes (doctrine of laches).The Department of Community Affairs is not legally precluded by statutes of limitations or laches from enforcing the reporting and fee provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act for the years 1989 through 1998.

The issues for determination in this case are whether certain portions of Amendment RU-27 to the Sarasota County Comprehensive Plan, as adopted in Sarasota County Ordinance 96- 027, are in compliance with Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9J-5, Florida Administrative Code.Evidence did not show that amendment to comprehensive plan was not in compliance with applicable rules and statutes.

The issue in this case is whether it should be determined that the Highlands County Comprehensive Plan, as amended, was in compliance with Chapter 163, Fla. Stat. (1993), as of the adoption of the County Ordinance 94-1 on March 2, 1994.Petitioner unable to meet burden to prove noncompliance beyond fair debate. Federal and State regulations' do not have to be duplicated and limited what county could do in plan.

Whether Respondent, a licensed insurance agent, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.Supervisor not shown to be responsible for acts of unlicensed trainee.

The issues to be considered were framed through challenges to the aforementioned rules as alleged invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, and if held to be invalid that the rules constitute agency statements that violate Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. In particular Petitioner alleges that the rules are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority for reason that: The Respondent failed to publish notice of its decision to modify the challenged rules after they had been proposed. Rules 25-22.056(1)(a) and (4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, deny parties the opportunity to file exceptions to any order or Hearing Officer's recommended order as allowed by Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes. Rules 22-25.056(1)(a) and (4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority in that they modify and contravene Sections 120.53(1)(c), 120.57(1)(b)4 and 6 and 120.58(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and are arbitrary and capricious. Concerning Section 120.53(1)(c), Florida Statutes, the challenged rules are alleged to be other than "rules of procedure appropriate for the presentation of argument." It is asserted that the possibility exists that the failure to accept a finding of fact could be considered as a waiver of objection on appeal in the setting where the rules are not procedures appropriate for presentation of argument. Therefore, the rules are alleged to be inappropriate. It is alleged that the rules violate Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes, specifically in that the rules do not allow parties the opportunity to file exceptions in the instance where two or more Public Service Commissioners conduct the formal proceeding, contrary to the referenced statutory provision which does not contain that limitation. Similarly, it is alleged that the rules violate Section 120.57(1)(b)6(e), Florida Statutes, by failing to provide the parties the opportunity to develop a record which includes exceptions, in that no opportunity to file exceptions is provided other than the instances where a hearing officer conducts the formal proceedings. It is alleged that Section 120.58(1)(e), Florida Statutes, is violated in that the challenged rules do not provide the parties the opportunity to file exceptions to the proposed order in those circumstances where a majority of those who are to render the final order have not heard the case or read the record, and where a decision adverse to a non-agency party is to be made, thus contravening the legal requirements set out in that statute. It is alleged that there is no logical rationale for limiting the statutory opportunity to file exceptions according to the number of Public Service Commissioners conducting the formal hearing, when considering the aforementioned statutes. It is alleged that Rule 25-22.056(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, is vague in that it fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions by not specifying what is meant by the right to file exceptions to a proposed order "within the time . . . designated by the hearing officer." Moreover, Rule 25-22.056(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, when contrasted with Rule 25- 22.056(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, is said to be inconsistent when describing the right to file exceptions to recommended orders. Rule 25-22.058, Florida Administrative Code, is alleged to limit oral argument in formal proceedings to only those instances when the Respondent exercises discretion to grant oral argument in contravention of Section 120.58(1)(e), Florida Statutes, which is alleged to grant a mandatory right of oral argument in instances where a majority of those who are to render the decision have not heard the case or read the record and a decision adverse to a party other than the agency is contemplated by a proposed order.Rules of the public service commission dealing with post-hearing rights upheld. Notice requirements for rule promulgation met.

On September 2, 1988, the Surveyors caused to be published notice of rulemaking within Chapter 21HH-6, Florida Administrative Code, which included amendments to Rule 21HH-6.002 and the addition of proposed rule 6.0052. This rulemaking addresses standards utilized in surveys done to establish the ordinary high water mark (OHWM), also referred to as ordinary high water line (OHWL), and prompted the challenge. Briefly stated, the challengers question the validity of the Surveyor's actions based on these allegations: (a) the Surveyors have materially failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; (b) the Surveyors have exceeded the grant of rulemaking authority; (c) the proposed rules enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented; (d) the proposed riles are vague, fail to establish adequate standards for agency decisions or vest unbridled discretion in the agency; (e) the rules are arbitrary and capricious; and (f) the rules violate Article II, Section 7, and Article X, Section 11, Florida Constitution (1968). More specifically, the Trustees contend that they, rather than the Surveyors, have exclusive or primary rulemaking authority to establish the means by which an OHWM is determined, subject to court review. The Trustees also contend that the economic impact statement is insufficient, and that the rules under attack do not constitute minimum technical standards as advertised, but are instead an attempt to establish statements of legal principles pertaining to the location of an OHWM in a circumstance where this issue is unsettled in the courts, the forum ultimately responsible for resolving disputes related to the proper location of an OHWM.Rules of the board of Land Surveyors which attempt to establish legal principles for determining location of ordinary high water mark stricken.