Filed: May 24, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit May 24, 2012 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT JOHNNY LEE ROBINSON, Petitioner–Appellant, No. 11-6306 v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00836-D) JAMES RUDEK, (W.D. Oklahoma) Respondent–Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit May 24, 2012 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT JOHNNY LEE ROBINSON, Petitioner–Appellant, No. 11-6306 v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00836-D) JAMES RUDEK, (W.D. Oklahoma) Respondent–Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 24, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHNNY LEE ROBINSON,
Petitioner–Appellant, No. 11-6306
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00836-D)
JAMES RUDEK, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Respondent–Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability to
appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 habeas petition. Following a jury trial,
Petitioner was convicted by an Oklahoma state court of assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon after former convictions. His conviction and sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal. He then filed two applications for post-conviction relief, both of which
were denied. In denying relief on Petitioner’s second application for post-conviction
relief, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the claims raised in this
application were procedurally barred because they could have been and were not raised in
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
the first application for post-conviction relief.
In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner argued that (1) he was not mentally
competent at the time of his trial; (2) he was denied his right to appeal the prior
convictions used to enhance his sentence; (3) his conviction violated his Double Jeopardy
rights; (4) his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; and (5) he was denied effective
assistance of appellate counsel because counsel mistakenly referred to his conviction as
one for first-degree murder rather than assault and battery. The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, who concluded that all but the first claim were procedurally barred
because they were raised for the first time either in the second application for state post-
conviction relief or in the instant federal habeas petition. See Smallwood v. Gibson,
191
F.3d 1257, 1267-69 (10th Cir. 1999). As for the competency claim, the magistrate judge
recommended denial of this claim on the merits. The magistrate judge concluded that the
evidence in the record did not support this claim and, indeed, that Petitioner’s trial
testimony demonstrated his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings
against him. After considering Petitioner’s objections, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied relief.
After thoroughly reviewing the record and Petitioner’s filings on appeal, we
conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s ruling. See Slack v.
McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Our independent review of the record persuades us
that reasonable jurists would not debate the magistrate judge’s thorough explanation of
why relief should be denied, nor would reasonable jurists debate the district court’s
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decision to adopt that recommendation. For substantially the same reasons given by the
magistrate judge and district court, we DENY Petitioner’s request for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS the appeal. Petitioner’s request for the appointment of
counsel to represent him on appeal is DENIED. Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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