v. Tate, 
586 F.3d 936
, 943 (11th Cir. 2009)).

      Here, the officers were aware of the following facts: (1) a confidential

source had stated that Lockett’s residence was used to store narcotics; (2) Tuff had

recently stated that he had purchased approximately one kilogram of cocaine from

Lockett; (3) approximately 13 individuals and six vehicles had come and gone

from the Property while the officers were observing it; (4) an unidentified man

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rode with Lockett a short distance away from the Property, got out of Lockett’s

vehicle, and walked away into the woods carrying a white grocery bag; and

(5) Wynn and Young resisted a routine traffic stop and were found with cocaine

and marijuana shortly after they left the Property.

      Lockett argues that the two tips and the unusual amount of traffic to and

from the Property are insufficient to support probable cause for the warrantless

entry of his residence. (See Appellant’s Br. 14.) He claims that the key question

on appeal is whether the discovery of narcotics at the Nissan traffic stop created

probable cause to support the warrantless entry of Lockett’s residence. (Id.)

Lockett relies on a Georgia state case, Shivers v. State, 
258 Ga. App. 253
, 
573

S.E.2d 494 
(2002), to argue that this information “amounted to no more than mere

suspicion” of criminal activity which cannot “support [the] warrantless entry of

. . . [a] defendant’s residence.” (Appellant’s Br. 17.)

      Lockett’s argument fails for two reasons. First, his argument frames the

probable cause inquiry too narrowly. A court cannot evaluate each piece of

evidence on an individual basis and then disregard it if, standing alone, it fails to

establish probable cause; rather, a court must examine and consider all of the

evidence under the totality of the circumstances. See 
Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1510
(including consideration of the totality of the circumstances in the probable cause

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analysis). Thus, while a court can evaluate and consider an individual piece of the

puzzle to determine the existence of probable cause, the ultimate inquiry turns on

the picture presented when those pieces are combined and viewed as one. Here,

the officers relied on more than just the Nissan traffic stop in making their

warrantless entry. They had a plethora of information which, when considered

under the totality of the circumstances, suggested a fair probability that the

Property would contain contraband or evidence of a crime.

      Second, Lockett’s attempt to compare the instant case with Shivers is not

persuasive. In Shivers, officers received a search warrant after submitting a

supporting affidavit with the following information: (1) allegations from unnamed

informants that the defendant was selling narcotics; (2) conclusory and

uncorroborated statements from a “tipster” claiming the defendant hid cocaine in

his residence and had sold him cocaine in the past; (3) a report that a vehicle was

stopped after leaving defendant’s residence and cocaine was found in the

passenger’s sock; and (4) stale reports from officers who smelled marijuana on the

defendant when they spoke with him outside his residence. 
Shivers, 258 Ga. App.

at 254–57
, 573 S.E.2d at 496–98. After reviewing this evidence, the Georgia

Court of Appeals concluded that it failed to establish probable cause to support a

search warrant. 
Id. at 257, 573 
S.E.2d at 498. At best, “police officers were in

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possession of mere rumors . . . that [defendant] was violating the drug laws. Mere

rumors of criminal activity from sources not otherwise shown to be reliable do not

establish probable cause . . . .” 
Id.

      Here, officers staked 
out the Property for approximately eight hours and

observed no less than six vehicles and 13 people come and go. These 13

individuals included an unidentified man who inexplicably walked off into the

woods carrying a grocery bag and Wynn and Young, who were discovered with

narcotics just after they departed the Property. This suspicious traffic is a key part

of the probable cause analysis in the instant case and was completely absent from

Shivers.

      Second, the Nissan traffic stop is arguably more probative of illegal activity

than the one that occurred in Shivers. In Shivers, the Georgia Court of Appeals

discounted the evidence discovered in the traffic stop because the officers did not

witness the driver take contraband from the defendant’s residence and there was

nothing to indicate that the passenger’s information was reliable. 
Id. at 256, 573
S.E.2d at 497. Here, officers had witnessed a suspicious amount of traffic coming

and going from the Property throughout the course of the day. When they

attempted to conduct a routine traffic stop of one of these vehicles, Wynn and

Young refused to stop, fled on foot, and were ultimately apprehended with a bag

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containing 54 grams of cocaine. Shortly thereafter, officers observed one of them

talking on the phone at approximately the same time officers observed Lockett

talking on the phone at the Property. While the connection between the cocaine

found at the Nissan traffic stop and the Property remained inconclusive at that

point, the unusual amount of traffic on the Property, the fact that Wynn and Young

attempted to flee from officers immediately after leaving the Property, the

discovery that Wynn and Young possessed narcotics, and their subsequent phone

call from the patrol car rendered this traffic stop far more probative of illegal

activity than the traffic stop in Shivers. In fact, when the Nissan traffic stop is

viewed in conjunction with the other evidence then known to the officers under

the totality of the circumstances, it rises to more than a “mere suspicion” of illegal

activity. It creates a “fair probability” that the Property contained contraband or

evidence of a crime. See United States v. Miller, 
24 F.3d 1357
, 1361 (11th Cir.

1994) (“[P]robable cause deals ‘with probabilities. These are not technical; they

are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable

and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’”) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S.

213
, 241, 
103 S. Ct. 2317
, 2333, 
76 L. Ed. 2d 527 
(1983)).




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      B.     Exigent Circumstances

      Next, Lockett argues that exigent circumstances did not exist because there

was no evidence that the occupants of the Property knew they were under

surveillance. (Appellant’s Br. 17–21.) Without such evidence, Lockett contends

that the officers and agents could only speculate that evidence would be destroyed,

and “[m]ere speculation about the occupants [sic] suspicions, without any factual

support, is not enough to overcome the warrant requirement.” (Id. at 20 (relying

on United States v. Lynch, 
934 F.2d 1226
, 1233 (11th Cir. 1991)).)

      As noted above, a warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable”

unless it is supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
Tobin,

923 F.2d at 1510
. While the mere presence of contraband does not create exigent

circumstances, such circumstances may arise when “there is danger that the

evidence will be destroyed or removed.” 
Id. The test used 
to determine whether

exigent circumstances exist is an objective one; “[t]he appropriate inquiry is

whether the facts . . . would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that

evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured.” 
Id. (internal

quotation marks 
omitted). “[T]he need to invoke the exigent circumstances

exception to the warrant requirement is ‘particularly compelling in narcotics cases’

because narcotics can be so quickly destroyed.” 

v.

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Young, 
909 F.2d 442
, 446 (11th Cir. 1990)). However, circumstances are not

normally considered exigent when the suspect is unaware of police surveillance.

Id. at 1511; see 
also 
Lynch, 934 F.2d at 1232–33 
(11th Cir. 1991) (finding exigent

circumstances did not exist where those inside the house were unaware of the

police surveillance).

      Here, exigent circumstances did exist because, under the circumstances, it

was objectively reasonable for the officers and agents to believe that Lockett was

aware of their surveillance after Wynn and Young’s arrest. First, officers

observed Lockett talking on the phone at approximately the same time that either

Wynn or Young made a call from the back of a patrol car. This fact distinguishes

the instant case from those where an officer’s determination of exigent

circumstances is unreasonable because the suspect was unaware of the police

surveillance. In United States v. Lynch, for example, this Court held that exigent

circumstances did not exist because the two suspects were arrested out of sight of

the defendant’s house, the arrestees were not expected to return to the house that

night, and there was no reason to believe that those who remained inside the house

knew of the officers’ 
presence. 934 F.2d at 1232–33
. Here, however, officers did

have reason to believe that Lockett knew of their surveillance, i.e., the phone call.

In particular, the circumstances giving rise to that call and its timing provided

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strong, circumstantial evidence that Lockett had knowledge of the police

surveillance.

       In addition to that phone call, the officers had probable cause to believe that

narcotics were on the Property and knew that such evidence could be quickly and

easily destroyed. They also knew that at least one individual remained on the

Property and reasonably concluded that this individual may have been instructed

to destroy or remove any evidence before police arrived. When these

circumstances are considered in conjunction with the phone call, a reasonable and

experienced agent could believe that Lockett knew of the surveillance and that he

would attempt to destroy any evidence of narcotics before a warrant could be

issued. Accordingly, exigent circumstances existed and, because probable cause

also existed, the officers’ initial, warrantless entry to secure the Property did not

violate the Fourth Amendment.

       C.       Probable Cause for a Search Warrant

       Finally, Lockett argues that the evidence discovered pursuant to the Search

Warrant should have been suppressed because (1) the Search Warrant was based,

in part, on evidence observed1 during the illegal warrantless entry, and (2) the


       1
         Lockett argues that this evidence was illegally seized during the warrantless entry.
However, there is no evidence that officers actually seized any evidence during the walk-through.
Rather, the parties’ stipulations and the district court’s findings of fact reflect that the cocaine

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              Case: 12-11991      Date Filed: 08/28/2013      Page: 21 of 27


Affidavit and application for the Search Warrant failed to establish probable

cause. (Appellant’s Br. 21–27.)

       Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when, under the totality of

the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a certain location. 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238
, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.

When evaluating the propriety of a search warrant, this Court must determine

“whether the [issuing judge] had sufficient material before him to permit an

independent judgment that there was probable cause to justify a search.” United

States v. Viera, 
644 F.2d 509
, 511 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). When a search is

conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden is on the defendant to show that the

warrant is invalid. United States v. Osborne, 
630 F.2d 374
, 377 (5th Cir. 1980).

       Lockett first contends that the Search Warrant is invalid because the cocaine

press, money counting machine, and drug packaging material were observed

during a warrantless entry that was unsupported by either probable cause or

exigent circumstances. As this Court has already determined that the warrantless

entry was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, this argument

has no merit. See United States v. Holloway, 
290 F.3d 1331
, 1338 (11th Cir.



press, money counting machine, and suspected drug packaging materials were simply observed in
plain view.

                                             21
             Case: 12-11991     Date Filed: 08/28/2013   Page: 22 of 27


2002) (finding seizure of evidence without a warrant was authorized because the

officer’s presence on the property was justified by the exigencies of the situation).

      Even if the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence

obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant would still be admissible because the

information contained in the Affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause

even without the items observed in plain view. When a government agent makes

an initial warrantless entry that arguably violates the Fourth Amendment and then

relies in part on what he saw during that entry to obtain a search warrant, this

Court applies a two-part test to determine whether evidence seized during the

execution of the warrant is admissible regardless of whether the initial entry

violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Noriega, 
676 F.3d 1252
, 1260

(11th Cir. 2012). First, the court must “excise from the search warrant affidavit

any information gained during the arguably illegal initial entry and determine

whether the remaining information is enough to support a probable cause finding.”

Id. If the remaining 
information is enough to support a probable cause finding, the

court must then “determine whether the officer’s decision to seek the warrant was

‘prompted by’ what he had seen during the arguably illegal entry.” 
Id. To

determine whether 
the officer’s decision to seek a warrant was prompted by what

he saw during the initial entry, courts ask “whether the officer would have sought

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               Case: 12-11991       Date Filed: 08/28/2013        Page: 23 of 27


the warrant even if he had not entered.” 
Id. at 1260–61. “If 
the officer would

have done so, his decision to seek the search warrant is supported by an

‘independent source,’ and the evidence seized under the warrant is admissible

regardless of whether the initial entry violated the Fourth Amendment.”2 
Id. at

1261.

        Here, 
Lockett argues that the Affidavit failed to establish probable cause

without the items observed in plain view because it contained only “rumors from

unreliable informants” and a mere “suspicion that Lockett may be involved in drug

activity.” (Appellant’s Br. 27.) When determining the existence of probable cause

from an informant’s tip, an issuing judge must consider the informant’s veracity or

reliability and basis of knowledge. See Ortega v. Christian, 
85 F.3d 1521
, 1525

(11th Cir. 1996) (noting that in assessing whether an informant’s tip rises to the

level of probable cause, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including

the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, as well as any

independent corroboration of the details of the tip). The informant’s “veracity” or


        2
         The independent source rule allows the admission of “evidence obtained from a lawful
source that is independent of any Fourth Amendment violation . . . , the rationale being that the
exclusionary rule should not put the government in a worse position than if the constitutional
violation had not occurred.” 
Noriega, 676 F.3d at 1260
; see also Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431
,
443, 
104 S. Ct. 2501
, 2509, 
81 L. Ed. 2d 377 
(1984) (“When the challenged evidence has an
independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than
they would have been in absent any error or violation.”).

                                                23
             Case: 12-11991     Date Filed: 08/28/2013    Page: 24 of 27


“reliability” and his “basis of knowledge” do not stand independent of one

another; rather, “they are better understood as relevant considerations in the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause

determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the

overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other

indicia of reliability.” 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 233
, 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (citations

omitted).

      Lockett accurately notes that the Affidavit does not contain any information

regarding the confidential source’s reliability or veracity apart from noting that he

had helped officers recover stolen equipment in the past. The Affidavit does not

state how the confidential source obtained his information, when he obtained it, or

his motivation for supplying it. The Affidavit’s reference to Tuff is likewise

limited; there is little information about where or when Tuff acquired his

information or his motivation for supplying it. As it would have been difficult for

the issuing judge to evaluate either the source’s or Tuff’s veracity, reliability, and

basis of knowledge, these tips, standing alone, would have been insufficient to

establish probable cause.

      However, the Affidavit contained more than uncorroborated tips. It also

recounted that officers had observed a suspicious amount of traffic coming and

                                          24
             Case: 12-11991     Date Filed: 08/28/2013    Page: 25 of 27


going from the Property, that officers had found cocaine in Wynn and Young’s

possession just after they left the Property, that officers had attempted to verify

Lockett’s ownership of the Property, that Lockett had a criminal history, including

previous violations of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and Agent Luke’s

sworn testimony that, based on his experience and training, he believed there was

sufficient probable cause to support a search of the Property for evidence relating

to ongoing violations of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. See United

States v. Robinson, 
62 F.3d 1325
, 1331 n.9 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that in

deciding whether to issue a search warrant, the issuing judge may properly rely

upon the opinions and conclusions of an experienced law enforcement agent);

United States v. Gonzalez, 
969 F.2d 999
, 1004 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Conduct

innocent in the eyes of the untrained may carry entirely different ‘messages’ to the

experienced or trained observer.”) (quoting United States v. Fouche, 
776 F.2d

1398
, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by California v. Hodari

D., 
499 U.S. 621
, 
111 S. Ct. 1547
, 
113 L. Ed. 2d 690 
(1991)). Thus, even if the

Affidavit is considered without the evidence observed during the walk-through, it

still establishes probable cause under the totality of the circumstances.

      Next, the court must “determine whether the . . . decision to seek the warrant

was ‘prompted by’ what [was] seen during the arguably illegal entry.” Noriega,

                                          25
             Case: 12-11991      Date Filed: 08/28/2013   Page: 26 of 
27


676 F.3d at 1260
. This is “a question of fact.” 
Id. at 1263. The 
parties’

stipulation of the facts underlying Lockett’s motion to suppress stated that the

officers and agents “decided to secure the residence to prevent the destruction of

evidence, and apply for a search warrant.” In light of this stipulation, it is

unnecessary to remand this matter to the district court for a factual finding on this

issue. The record clearly reflects that the officers decided to pursue a search

warrant before they entered the Property. Therefore, even if the warrantless entry

violated the Fourth Amendment as Lockett claims, the evidence seized under the

warrant is still admissible under the “independent source” exception to the Fourth

Amendment. 
Id. at 1260.

                           IV. 
  CONCLUSION

      Here, neither the warrantless entry nor the subsequent search pursuant to the

Search Warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against

unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrantless entry of Lockett’s residence

was supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances, and thus the

cocaine press, money counting machine, and drug packaging material observed in

plain view pursuant to that warrantless entry were admissible. Furthermore,

because this evidence created a valid basis for finding probable cause to issue the

Search Warrant, any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant after the

                                          26
             Case: 12-11991    Date Filed: 08/28/2013   Page: 27 of 27


warrantless entry was also admissible. However, even if the initial, warrantless

entry did violate the Fourth Amendment, the evidence obtained pursuant to the

Search Warrant would still be admissible under the “independent source”

exception to the Fourth Amendment.

      AFFIRMED.




                                        27