KELLER, J.
In this action arising from an arbitration dispute, the plaintiffs, Alfred Marulli and Barbara Marulli, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Wood Frame Construction Company, LLC. The plaintiffs claim that the court's judgment of April 23, 2013, which set forth the amount owed by the plaintiffs to the defendant, including interest and costs, should be set aside because (1) the court lacked the authority to grant the defendant's motion for a written and signed judgment, and (2) the court's award of postjudgment interest was improper on several grounds.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history may be gleaned from the record. In the summer of 2006, the defendant commenced arbitration proceedings against the plaintiffs pursuant to a construction contract that existed between the parties. The proceedings took place before Michael F. Giordano, an arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitration Association. On December 12, 2007, Giordano awarded the defendant $200,000 for breach of the contract.
Thereafter, in January, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an application in the Superior Court to vacate the award. In February, 2008, the defendant filed an application to confirm the award. On April 8, 2008, the court, Holzberg, J., denied the application to vacate the award and granted the application to confirm the award. On June 4, 2008, the court granted a motion to reargue brought by the plaintiffs, and vacated the arbitration award. On January 29, 2009, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the defendant's motion to reconsider its June 4, 2008 decision, thereby reaffirming the earlier ruling to vacate the award.
The defendant appealed from the court's decision to this court, which reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court "with direction to render judgment granting the defendant's application to confirm the arbitration award and denying the plaintiffs' application to vacate the award." Marulli v. Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC, 124 Conn.App. 505, 518, 5 A.3d 957 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 912, 13 A.3d 1102 (2011). On July 21, 2011, in response to a motion brought by the defendant, the court, Holzberg, J., rendered judgment in accordance with this court's decision. Neither party appealed from the court's judgment.
On April 4, 2013, more than twenty months after the trial court rendered its
On April 23, 2013, the court, Aurigemma, J., granted the defendant's motion and expressly overruled the plaintiffs' objection thereto. The court's dated and signed order states: "The arbitration award was issued on December 12, 2007, and awarded the defendant herein, Wood Frame Construction Company, LLC, the amount of $200,000, which included interest. General Statutes § 37-3a permits the award of up to 10 percent on judgment amounts. In Marulli v. Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC, [supra, 124 Conn.App. 505, 5 A.3d 957], the [Appellate Court] ordered this court to render judgment granting the defendant's application to confirm [the] arbitration award.
"The court awards interest pursuant to § 37-3a in the amount of $107,232.38 (10 percent per annum from December 13, 2007, through April 23, 2013). Interest continues to accrue on the judgment amount of $200,000 at the rate of $54.79 per diem.
"The court awards costs of $454.13.
"As of this date, the plaintiffs owe to the defendant the amount of $307,686.51."
The plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue the court's April 23, 2013 decision, which the court denied. This appeal from the judgment of April 23, 2013, followed.
First, the plaintiffs claim that the court lacked the authority to grant the defendant's motion for a written and signed judgment. We disagree.
Previously in this opinion, we have set forth the relief sought by way of the defendant's April 4, 2013 motion. This relief included a written determination of the
The plaintiffs have raised an issue related to whether the court possessed the authority to grant the relief occasioned by the defendant's motion. "Any determination regarding the scope of a court's subject matter jurisdiction or its authority to act presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.... Further, to the extent that we are required to construe the meaning of a court's order or to determine the applicability of a statutory provision, we also apply a plenary standard of review." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hogan v. Lagosz, 147 Conn.App. 418, 427, 84 A.3d 434 (2013).
The defendant argues, and we agree, that the court had the authority to take any action in enforcing its judgment confirming the arbitrator's award that it could take in relation to any judgment rendered in a civil action. Section 52-421(b) provides in relevant part: "The judgment or decree confirming, modifying or correcting an award shall be docketed as if it were rendered in a civil action. The judgment or decree so entered shall have the same force and effect in all respects as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment or decree in a civil action; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in a civil action in the court in which it is entered...." Although courts generally have viewed arbitration proceedings as distinct from civil actions, "whether an arbitration proceeding is a civil action turns on the purpose for which the legislature created the proceeding and the most efficacious way to carry out that purpose.... [T]he word action has no precise meaning and the scope of proceedings which will be included within the term ... depends upon the nature and purpose of the particular statute in question.... What the legislature may have intended to be a civil action for some purposes may not be a civil action for others." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fishman v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 4 Conn.App. 339, 344, 494 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 806, 807, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). This court has held that "under the plain language of § 52-421(b), the judgment confirming an arbitration award, in all respects, is to be treated as a civil judgment,
Contrary to the plaintiffs' characterization of the court's order, the court did not engage in a process of "finding facts" or "computing damages...." The court relied on the damage award of the arbitrator, which it previously had confirmed in its judgment of July 21, 2011. It provided the defendant with a written and signed order that set forth a total amount of damages owed to the defendant, including assessed costs
Next, the plaintiffs claim that the court's award of postjudgment interest was improper on several grounds. First, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly awarded postjudgment interest without conducting a hearing related thereto and that it "made no findings of any kind which would support the award of interest...." Second, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly exercised its discretion by awarding interest at a rate of 10 percent. Third, the plaintiffs argue that an award of postjudgment interest was not supported by the facts of the present case. Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that, even if such an award was proper, the court erroneously awarded interest from December 13, 2007. We agree with the plaintiffs only insofar as they argue that the court erroneously awarded interest from December 13, 2007.
As set forth previously, the court, in calculating an award of postjudgment interest under § 37-3a, stated that interest at a rate of 10 percent per year accrued on the judgment of $200,000 from December 13, 2007, the day after the arbitrator issued its decision, until April 23, 2013, the date on which the court granted the motion at issue in the present appeal. The court calculated a rate of interest that thereafter totaled $54.79 per day. The record does not reflect that the court held a hearing related to this matter.
Before addressing the various arguments advanced by the plaintiffs, we set forth some of the legal principles germane to the claim. Section 37-3a(a) provides in relevant part: "[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions or arbitration proceedings under chapter 909 [of our General Statutes] ... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable...."
Expanding on its interpretation of § 37-3a in Sosin, our Supreme Court, in DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 310 Conn. 38, 74 A.3d 1212 (2013), had occasion to further articulate the standard to determine an award of interest under § 37-3a. The court stated: "[I]nterest is authorized ... when the trial court determines, in its discretion, that considerations of fairness and equity warrant such an award." Id., at 47, 74 A.3d 1212. The court went on to explain: "[I]n the context of § 37-3a, a wrongful detention of money, that is, a detention of money without the legal right to do so, is established merely by a favorable judgment on the underlying legal claim, so that the court has discretion to award interest on that judgment, without any additional showing of wrongfulness, upon a finding that such an award is fair and equitable." Id., at 48-49, 74 A.3d 1212. The court observed that although relevant precedent had deemed postjudgment interest payable following a wrongful detention of money, "proof of wrongfulness is not required above and beyond proof of the underlying legal claim.... In other words, the wrongful detention standard of § 37-3a is satisfied by proof of the underlying legal claim, a requirement that is met once the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor on that claim." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 52, 74 A.3d 1212.
Beyond stating that an award of postjudgment interest is discretionary upon a showing that money has been detained after an adverse party has obtained a judgment in its favor on that claim, the court stated that interest is awarded under § 37-3a "when the court determines that such an award is appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of his or her money. Basically, the question is whether the interests of justice require the allowance of interest as damages for the loss of use of money....
"[Section 37-3a] does not identify the factors to be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion under the statute. Accordingly, the court is free to consider whatever factors may be relevant to its determination. Judicial discretion, however, is always a legal discretion exercised according to the recognized principles of equity.... Such discretion... imports something more than leeway in decision making and should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and should not impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice....
"Inherent [therefore] in the concept of judicial discretion is the idea of choice and a determination between competing considerations.... A court's discretion must be informed by the policies that the relevant statute is intended to advance.... As we have indicated, regardless of whether a statute provides for mandatory or discretionary postjudgment
First, we address the plaintiffs' argument that the court's award of postjudgment interest is improper because the court did not conduct "a hearing" related to postjudgment interest and failed to make required findings incident to its award. The plaintiffs have not drawn our attention to any authority for the proposition that a court must conduct a hearing, whether evidentiary or otherwise, before awarding interest under § 37-3a, and our research has not revealed the existence of any such authority.
Moreover, having set forth the relevant considerations pertaining to an award of postjudgment interest, we are not persuaded that pertinent facts relevant to the court's exercise of discretion in awarding postjudgment interest in the present case were not apparent from the record itself. The plaintiffs have not attempted to demonstrate the existence of any additional facts that would have been relevant to the court in exercising its discretion. The record before the court, which included the arbitrator's award, plainly reflected the procedural history of the case, including the dates of and the nature of the judgments that were relevant to a proper award. The plaintiffs submitted a written objection to the defendant's motion in which they challenged in general terms the court's authority to grant the motion. Although they were not precluded from doing so, they did not, in the alternative, make any arguments concerning a fair award of postjudgment interest or provide the court with any written submissions that were material to this issue.
Additionally, the plaintiffs baldly assert that "the court made no findings of any kind which would support the award of interest, the amount and the date when the wrongful detention began." "A trial court must make two determinations when awarding compensatory interest under § 37-3a: (1) whether the party against whom interest is sought has wrongfully detained money due the other party; and (2) the date upon which the wrongful detention began in order to determine the time from which interest should be calculated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 151 Conn.App. 638, 653, 97 A.3d 1 (2014).
We note that "[t]he interpretation of a trial court's judgment presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.... Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sosin v. Sosin, supra, 300 Conn. at 217, 14 A.3d 307. It is
Second, the plaintiffs argue that the court improperly exercised its discretion by awarding interest at a rate of 10 percent. The plaintiffs correctly assert that, under § 37-3a, the court may award a maximum rate of interest of 10 percent per year, but it has discretion to apply a lesser rate. See, e.g., Sosin v. Sosin, supra, 300 Conn. at 246-47 n. 26, 14 A.3d 307 ("this court repeatedly has recognized that the trial court has broad discretion under § 37-3a to determine ... the rate of interest [under § 37-3a]").
In their scant analysis of this aspect of their claim, the plaintiffs cite to precedent which stands for the proposition that a court may award postjudgment interest at a rate of 10 percent or less per year, and assert that "[e]ven the rate of interest is something which the trial court should not rubber stamp." The plaintiffs have not demonstrated, by reference to any facts in the record or any aspect of the court's order, that the court misinterpreted § 37-3a or that the court's order reflected an abuse of discretion. Absent any indication in the record, we decline to presume, as do the plaintiffs, that the court applied the interest rate that it did because it erroneously believed that it was obligated to do so. See, e.g., Acadia Ins. Co. v. O'Reilly, 138 Conn.App. 413, 419, 53 A.3d 1026 (2012) (appellate court will not presume error that is not apparent from record), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 904, 61 A.3d 1097 (2013).
Next, the plaintiffs argue that an award of postjudgment interest was not supported by the facts of the present case. The plaintiffs correctly acknowledge that awarding postjudgment interest is a discretionary, equitable determination. The plaintiffs argue, however, that the court
Previously, in part II A of this opinion, we explained that the court need not explicitly state findings in connection with the granting of a request for postjudgment interest. See Sosin v. Sosin, supra, 300 Conn. at 244 n. 25, 14 A.3d 307. Furthermore, in our preliminary remarks in part II of this opinion, we explained that an award of postjudgment interest need not be supported by any type of showing of blameworthiness or bad faith on behalf of a party retaining money, but merely by proof of the underlying legal claim — a requirement that is met once the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his favor on that claim. See DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 310 Conn. at 52, 74 A.3d 1212. Accordingly, we reject the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs that suggest (1) that the court erroneously failed to set forth necessary findings of "wrongfulness" and (2) that the award of postjudgment interest was improper because, in the plaintiffs' view, the evidence demonstrated that they set forth a nonfrivolous defense to the defendant's claims and, thus, they had not acted in bad faith or in a blameworthy manner in retaining the money at issue.
Finally, we address the plaintiffs' argument that, even if an award of postjudgment interest was proper in this case, the court abused its discretion by awarding interest from December 13, 2007. In a conclusory manner in their brief to this court, they assert: "To award postjudgment interest from the day after the notice of the award by the arbitrator cannot, under any circumstance, be upheld." Thereafter, the plaintiffs rely on authority for the proposition that the court was obligated to determine if and when retention of the money at issue was wrongful, but that the court failed to make factual findings in this regard.
A closer discussion of the relevant procedural history that we have discussed previously in this opinion is warranted. The trial court awarded postjudgment interest from December 13, 2007, thereby awarding interest from the day after the arbitrator issued his decision in favor of the defendant in the amount of $200,000. On January 7, 2008, the plaintiffs seasonably filed an application to vacate the arbitrator's award of December 12, 2007. See General Statutes § 52-420. Thereafter, the defendant, for its part, applied for an application to confirm the award. Thus, the arbitrator's award was the subject of judicial review by the Superior Court until January 29, 2009, at which time the court granted the plaintiffs' application to vacate the award. See Marulli v. Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC, supra, 124 Conn. App. at 508, 5 A.3d 957. As a result of a successful appeal by the defendant, on October 19, 2010, this court reversed the January 29, 2009 judgment of the trial court vacating the award. This court's rescript stated: "The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment granting the defendant's application to confirm the arbitration award and denying the plaintiffs' application to vacate the award." Id., at 518, 5 A.3d 957. It is undisputed, and the record reflects, that, on July 21, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with this court's remand order.
The trial court was asked to consider an award of postjudgment interest in April, 2013, and rendered judgment that awarded interest on April 23, 2013. In determining the appropriate date from which an award of postjudgment interest may run in the present case, in which an appeal has been taken, we are guided by our Supreme Court's analysis in Gary Excavating Co. v. North Haven, 163 Conn. 428, 311 A.2d 90 (1972), a decision brought to our attention by the defendant. The parties in Gary arbitrated a contractual dispute. Id., at 429, 311 A.2d 90. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $150,000, but the defendant obtained a judgment from the Superior Court vacating the award. Id. Following a successful appeal by the defendants in Gary, our Supreme Court on March 2, 1971, directed the trial court to set aside the judgment and "to render judgment confirming the award." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to confirm the original award in accordance with the remand order, and also claimed an entitlement to interest on the award. Id., at 429-30, 311 A.2d 90. On December 3, 1971, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the award, but declined to order the payment of interest. Id., at 430, 311 A.2d 90.
After concluding that the trial court properly declined to award interest because such an award was not part of its remand order, the Supreme Court in Gary determined that it should order interest nunc pro tunc. Id. The court went on to determine whether to order interest from June 23, 1969, the date of the arbitrator's original award or from March 2, 1971, the date of its mandate requiring the trial court to render judgment confirming the award. Id. The court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to interest "from the date of judgment on mandating that the Superior Court render judgment confirming the award. Id., at 432, 311 A.2d 90. The court, therefore, awarded interest from March 2, 1971, until the date of payment. Id.
As we seek to determine when the money at issue in the present case became
The judgment is reversed only with regard to the duration of the award of postjudgment interest and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
