Filed: Sep. 03, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-15655 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SEPTEMBER 3, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket Nos. 09-14067-CV-DLG, 04-14033-CR-DLG JAMES LEE SILLS, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (September 3, 2010) Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PE
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-15655 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SEPTEMBER 3, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket Nos. 09-14067-CV-DLG, 04-14033-CR-DLG JAMES LEE SILLS, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (September 3, 2010) Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15655 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 3, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket Nos. 09-14067-CV-DLG,
04-14033-CR-DLG
JAMES LEE SILLS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 3, 2010)
Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Sills, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
to overturn his criminal convictions on the theory that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel. In support of his motion, Sills noted that his trial attorney
had failed to preserve two objections to a wiretap warrant and that his appellate
counsel had failed to argue that the use of several intercepted conversations as
evidence violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses. The district court
denied the § 2255 motion on the ground that the attorneys’ alleged errors had
caused Sills no prejudice, and we agree.
I
Sills was indicted on federal drug and firearms charges after a state
investigation produced evidence that he had been involved in a conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. Before trial, Sills’s attorney, along with counsel for his
codefendants, moved to suppress a bevy of wiretap evidence on the ground that
the State’s application for the wiretap had been deficient. Specifically, the
defendants argued that the State had based its warrant application on stale
information and had failed to explain why a wiretap, in light of other possible
investigative techniques, was necessary. After a magistrate judge recommended
denying the motion to suppress, some of the other defendants objected before the
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district judge—who then denied the motion—but Sills’s attorney failed to preserve
the issues for appeal.
At trial, when the Government tried to introduce several recordings of
intercepted conversations involving Sills, his attorney objected on the ground that
admitting them into evidence would deny Sills his constitutional right to confront
the alleged co-conspirator heard on the tapes. The court overruled the objection,
and the jury found Sills guilty. On direct appeal, Sills’s appellate counsel did not
present the confrontation question to this court, and we affirmed his conviction.
United States v. Dennard, 258 Fed. Appx. 299 (11th Cir. 2007).
Sills filed a motion to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the
ground that the assistance he had received from his former attorneys was
constitutionally deficient. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s
recommendation to deny the motion on the ground that any unprofessional errors
of counsel had not prejudiced Sills’s case. The district court issued a certificate of
appealability, see Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1), and Sills, now pro se, appeals.
II
The Constitution guarantees the accused in any criminal prosecution “the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend
VI. “It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the
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effective assistance of counsel,” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970), and the requirements for effective trial assistance apply equally to a
defendant’s attorney on direct appeal, Johnson v. Alabama,
256 F.3d 1156, 1187
(11th Cir. 2001). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance at either stage, the
defendant must show that his attorney’s performance “fell below reasonable
professional standards” and that he suffered prejudice as a result.
Id. We review
ineffective-assistance claims de novo. Gomez-Diaz v. United States,
433 F.3d 788,
790 (11th Cir. 2005).
A. Trial Counsel’s Performance
By denying Sills the opportunity for further review of the suppression
issues, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2), his attorney’s failure to object to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation on the motion to suppress arguably fell short
of reasonable professional standards. But “[e]ven if a defendant shows that
particular errors of counsel were unreasonable,” he must still “show that they
actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 693 (1984). “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”
Id. at 694. In other words, if the arguments forsaken by
Sills’s attorney have no merit, there can be no prejudice.
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By failing to object to the magistrate’s recommendation, defense counsel
denied Sills the opportunity to raise two arguments before the district court and,
later, on appeal. First, Sills could have argued that the wiretap application was
defective because it was based on stale information. See United States v. Bervaldi,
226 F.3d 1256, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2000). But there is no reasonable probability
that the preservation of that argument would have led to a different result. For one
thing, the district court denied the motion to suppress over the objections of Sills’s
codefendants, who did raise the staleness argument. More important is that we
rejected the same argument in an appeal from one of the co-defendants’
convictions and concluded that “the district court properly denied the motion to
suppress.” Dennard, 258 Fed. Appx. at 302. Sills can therefore demonstrate no
prejudice, and his ineffective-assistance claim concerning this argument fails.
The second argument that Sills’s attorney failed to preserve concerns the
necessity of the wiretap. “Each application for an order authorizing or approving
the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication” must include “a full
and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have
been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1). Sills argues that the State’s
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warrant application ran afoul of this requirement by failing to explain why a
wiretap was necessary.
The underlying argument is that the State did not try hard enough to
investigate the suspected drug conspiracy through more conventional means. We
considered a similar argument in United States v. Suarez:
The affidavit in support of a search warrant “must simply explain the
retroactive or prospective failure of several investigative techniques
that reasonably suggest themselves.” United States v. Van Horn, 789
F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1986). However, a comprehensive
exhaustion of all possible investigative techniques is not necessary
before applying for a wiretap. United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862,
868 (11th Cir. 1984). The statute was not intended “to foreclose
electronic surveillance until every other imaginable method of
investigation has been unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform
the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of
conventional techniques.” Id.
601 F.3d 1202, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010).
Despite Sills’s contention that the State’s warrant application reflected
“impatience” rather than an honest attempt to explain the necessity of a wiretap,
the application’s supporting affidavits summarized a wide range of investigative
techniques that the State had either attempted or considered. The affidavits
revealed, for instance, that the State’s confidential informants had no information
on the conspiracy’s inner workings and that the drug organization comprised a
close-knit group of individuals unlikely to trust undercover agents. The State also
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explained its concern that search warrants and grand jury subpoenas would
frustrate its goals by alerting the conspirators to the criminal investigation. Given
these facts, we agree with the district court that the State’s application adequately
“‘inform[ed] the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of
conventional techniques.’” Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1214 (quoting
Alonso, 740 F.2d at
868). The alleged errors of Sills’s trial counsel caused him no prejudice.
B. Appellate Counsel’s Performance
Sills also argues that his appellate counsel should have raised the argument
that admitting the intercepted telephone conversations as evidence violated his
rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .”). Sills contends that the district court erred by
rejecting his Confrontation Clause argument at trial and that his attorney’s failure
to raise that argument on direct appeal caused him prejudice.
The question here is whether the statements contained in the intercepted
conversations were “testimonial” in nature. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 821 (2006) (“Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”). The Supreme Court has not
precisely defined the term “testimonial,” but in our circuit this much is clear:
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statements made in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy are not testimonial.
United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Giles
v. California,
128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“[A]n
incriminating statement in furtherance of the conspiracy would probably never
be[] testimonial.”). Nor are statements made by acquaintances during a private
conversation. United States v. US Infrastructure, Inc.,
576 F.3d 1195, 1209 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Brown,
441 F.3d 1330, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006)).
In light of this court’s binding precedent, Sills’s appellate counsel would not
have been able to convince us that the admission of the recordings violated his
rights under the Confrontation Clause. As a result, Sills cannot show that the
failure to raise that argument caused him any prejudice, and his claim for
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails.
III
Because there is no reasonable probability that Sills would not have been
convicted but for the alleged errors of his attorneys, the district court properly
denied his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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