Filed: Sep. 09, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-15796 SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00105-CV-1 JAMES B. HANNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (September 9, 2010) Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-15796 SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00105-CV-1 JAMES B. HANNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (September 9, 2010) Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. P..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-15796
SEPTEMBER 9, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00105-CV-1
JAMES B. HANNA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 9, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James B. Hanna appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s denial of Hanna’s application for disability insurance
benefits. Reversible error has been shown; we reverse and remand for additional
proceedings.
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether substantial
evidence supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Under this limited standard of
review, we may not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute our
judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
A person who applies for Social Security disability benefits must prove his
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512.1 The Social Security Regulations outline a
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Disability is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
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five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must evaluate (1) whether the claimant
engaged in substantial gainful work; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
impairment; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals an impairment in
the Listings of Impairments; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work; and (5) whether, in the light of
the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are other jobs the
claimant can perform. Id.
On appeal, Hanna argues that the ALJ erred in concluding, at step four, that
Hanna retained the RFC to return to his past relevant work as a packaging
supervisor. He contends that his hand tremors limited him to no more than
occasional fine and gross manipulation; and the testimony of the medical expert
(“ME”) and vocational expert (“VE”) -- which the ALJ relied on in making its
RFC determination -- supported these limitations.2 A claimant’s RFC is “that which
[the claimant] is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his . . .
impairments.” Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). In
making an RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all the record evidence,
2
Hanna originally sought disability benefits because of a brain tumor and seizure
disorder. But on appeal, his arguments are about only his hand tremors. So, we do not consider
the RFC restrictions stemming from his seizure disorder.
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including evidence of non-severe impairments. Id.
The ALJ determined that Hanna had the RFC to perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels but that he was limited to “occasional hand and finger
movements, overhead reaching, and occasional gross and fine manipulation.” In
making this determination, the ALJ relied, in part, on the testimony of the ME.
The ME, who considered all the medical evidence, initially stated that because of
Hanna’s tremors, his fingering/fine manipulation and handling/gross manipulation
would be impaired depending on the task. The ME later stated that “most”
fingering/fine manipulation activities would be limited and that handling/gross
manipulation activities would be limited to the extent they required steadiness.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment, as it was based on the ME’s testimony, is
problematic for many reasons. For instance, the ME did not specify whether the
stated limitations were based on the medical evidence before Hanna’s insured date
or also included evidence from after this date; so it is unclear whether the
assessment was significant to the relevant time period. See Moore, 405 F.3d at
1211 (a claimant is eligible for disability benefits where he demonstrates disability
on or before the last date for which he was insured).3 Also, given that the ME
opined only that Hanna’s manipulation limitations were task-based without
3
Hanna did submit evidence about treatment after his last insured date.
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specifying how often he could perform such tasks, it is unclear how the ALJ
concluded that Hanna could occasionally engage in all forms of hand and finger
movements, gross manipulation, and fine manipulation.4 The ME noted that
tremors could impair tasks such as handwriting and doing precise manipulative
work with the upper extremities. And the record indicated that Hanna did do some
writing and handling of small objects at his job as a packaging supervisor. See
Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1990) (the ALJ may make an
RFC determination only after considering the specific duties of claimant’s past
work and evaluating claimant’s ability to perform them in spite of his
impairments); see also Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20
(remand is necessary where the ALJ fails to evaluate properly the effect of medical
symptoms on claimant’s ability to work).
The ALJ also agreed with the VE’s testimony that, under the RFC
determination, Hanna could return to his past work. But this conclusion is not
clear from the record. The VE answered many hypothetical questions and initially
interpreted the ME’s assessment to mean that Hanna’s gross manipulation abilities
were unlimited and so, with only a restriction to fine manipulation, he could
perform his past relevant work. In a separate hypothetical, the VE stated that a
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The ME stated that, depending on the task, Hanna could face “frequent” to “constant”
restrictions.
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claimant could not return to his past work as a packaging supervisor if restricted to
occasional fingering, handling, and gross and fine manipulation. The ALJ also did
not include the ME’s steadiness restriction in the RFC assessment; and the VE
testified that a person restricted to handling that required steadiness would not be
able to return to Hanna’s past work.
The ALJ must state the grounds for his decision with clarity to enable us to
conduct meaningful review. Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir.
1984). The ALJ has not done so here. To the extent the ALJ based Hanna’s RFC
assessment on hearing testimony by the ME and VE, the assessment is inconsistent
with the evidence. The ALJ did not explicitly reject any of either the ME’s or
VE’s testimony or otherwise explain these inconsistencies, the resolution of which
was material to whether Hanna could perform his past relevant work. Absent such
explanation, it is unclear whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s
findings; and the decision does not provide a meaningful basis upon which we can
review Hanna’s case.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the district court’s decision with
instructions that it be returned to the Commissioner for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion. See Keeton v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21
F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (we must reverse when the ALJ has failed to
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“provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the
proper legal analysis has been conducted”).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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