Filed: Oct. 22, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 10-10308 OCT 22, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00020-RAL-AEP MARGETTA LANGLOIS, lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant, versus TRAVELER'S INSURANCE COMPANY, AMY MCGROTTY, Attorney, HOWARD GAYHEART, Attorney, lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Flor
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 10-10308 OCT 22, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00020-RAL-AEP MARGETTA LANGLOIS, lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant, versus TRAVELER'S INSURANCE COMPANY, AMY MCGROTTY, Attorney, HOWARD GAYHEART, Attorney, lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Flori..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-10308 OCT 22, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00020-RAL-AEP
MARGETTA LANGLOIS,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRAVELER'S INSURANCE COMPANY,
AMY MCGROTTY,
Attorney,
HOWARD GAYHEART,
Attorney,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees.
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 22, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Margetta Langlois, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a basis for federal jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Although her
appellate brief is extremely unclear, it appears that Langlois reasserts the factual
basis for her claims, then contends that the district court should not have dismissed
her claims and should have granted her motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Upon review of the record and Langlois’ appellate brief,1 we conclude that the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing Langlois’ complaint with
prejudice before providing her with an opportunity to amend her complaint.
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and a district court’s decision regarding
leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1259
(11th Cir. 2002). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement” of both (1) “the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and (2)
1
Defendants have not elected to file an appellate brief.
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“of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), district courts are directed to dismiss the
complaint of any plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines
that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by
the same standard as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, dismissal
of the complaint is appropriate if the facts as pled do not state a plausible claim for
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Unless a
court specifies otherwise, a dismissal based on a finding that the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted operates as an adjudication on the
merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
While we agree that Langlois’ complaint failed to state a basis for federal
jurisdiction and failed to state a claim under Rule 8(a), the district court should
have given Langlois an opportunity to amend these deficiencies before dismissing
her complaint with prejudice. “A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of
course within (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or
21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is
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earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires. Id. Thus, “[o]rdinarily, a party
must be given at least one opportunity to amend before the district court dismisses
the complaint.” Corsello v. Lincare, Inc.,
428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005).
“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there has been
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment would cause
undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.”
Bryant v. Dupree,
252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
At the time of the district court’s dismissal of Langlois’ complaint fewer
than 21 days had passed since Langlois filed her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a). Defendants had not yet been served with her complaint; thus, no responsive
pleading had been filed. See id. Moreover, none of the criteria excusing the
district court’s failure to allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint are present in
this case. See
Bryant, 252 F.3d at 1163. Given the short time span between the
filing of her complaint and the district court’s dismissal, there is no evidence of
undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on Langlois’ part. See
id. Because the
defendants have not yet been served, allowing Langlois to amend her complaint
4
would cause no undue prejudice. See id. There is also no evidence that
amendment would be futile. See
id. Langlois attached a large amount of
additional documentary evidence to her appellate brief, which, although not
properly before our Court, see Wilson v. Apfel,
179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir.
1999), suggests that there may be additional information that she could have
provided in her original complaint.
Thus, when the district court dismissed her complaint, Langlois still had the
right to amend as a matter of course, pursuant to Rule 15(a), and the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing Langlois’ complaint with prejudice. We reach
this conclusion despite the fact that Langlois did not seek leave to amend in the
district court. Our circuit has held that “[w]here a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to
amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.”
Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). We have
since overruled this holding with respect to counseled defendants who failed to
file a motion to amend or request leave to amend. Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy
Indus. Am. Corp.,
314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“A district court
is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when
the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor
5
requested leave to amend before the district court.”). However, our decision in
Wagner did not disturb our prior position with respect to pro se litigants like
Langlois. See id. at 542 n.1.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with
instructions for the district court to provide Langlois with an opportunity to
attempt to establish a basis for federal jurisdiction and to state a claim by filing an
amended complaint.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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