JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants' Amended Motion for Reconsideration (DE 104). The Court previously entered an Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part (DE 101). Upon reconsideration, the Court hereby vacates its previous Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part (DE 101), and substitutes this Order in its stead.
The Court concludes that, even after full consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, a substantial issue remains. That is the issue of Plaintiffs damages — which damages he has shown, which damages he may recover under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the effect of these determinations on the viability of his cause of action. Accordingly, this Order concludes by granting in part, and reserving ruling in part, on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the issues on which the Court reserves ruling, the Court will enter a separate Order directing the parties to brief the issues that pertain to Plaintiff's damages.
Plaintiff's claim for retaliation is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, under which employers may not "discharge
First, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim insofar as it seeks recovery based on the following alleged acts: (1) Plaintiff's hours were reduced; (2) Plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment; and (3) Plaintiff was tasked to work in the hot sun.
Plaintiff's objections (DE 96) to the R & R, as they relate to these three issues, consist of re-argument, and do not demonstrate any infirmities in Judge Torres's reasoning or his findings. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the parties' briefs and the R & R de novo. The Court concludes that the R & R contains well-reasoned recommendations for granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to these three issues, in that Plaintiff has failed to show enough evidence sufficient to sustain a prima facie case for retaliation. The Court will affirm and adopt the R & R, as an Order of this Court, with respect to these three issues.
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the similar anti-retaliation provision of Title VII "does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace." Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).
Id. In this case, Plaintiff relies almost exclusively on his affidavit to defend against summary judgment. He swears to the following:
DE 83-2, at 2-3. Thereafter, on May 15, 2015, Defendant Bums asked Plaintiff (and all other employees) to fill out an Employment Eligibility Verification USCIS Form 1-9 (DE 65-1, at 2 3), which form would have implicated Plaintiff's immigration status. Plaintiff swears that he told Defendants of his immigration status before Defendants hired him. DE 83-2, at 2-3.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff walked off the job, never to return, after Defendants demanded that he fill out the 1-9 form. It is undisputed that Defendants waited several weeks before officially terminating Plaintiff.
On summary judgment, the Court may not undertake the jury's function of weighing the evidence or undertaking credibility determinations. Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir.2010). If credited by the factfinder, Plaintiffs affidavit shows (1) that Defendants knew of Plaintiff's immigration status before he filed this FLSA action; (2) that approximately one month after service, Plaintiff's supervisor, at the instruction of Defendants, encouraged Plaintiff to settle the FLSA suit, which proposed settlement would include "a one-way ticket" to Mexico; (3) that thereafter Plaintiff's supervisor warned Plaintiff of Gregor's ability to have Plaintiff deported; and (4) that thereafter Defendants demanded Plaintiff fill out an I-9 form, which form would have implicated Plaintiffs immigration status. If credited by the factfinder, the above disputed facts are sufficient to sustain a finding that Defendants' actions "could well dissuade a reasonable worker" in Plaintiff's circumstances from
Defendants protest that there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's supervisor had authority to settle on behalf of the Defendants, or that Defendants had the "authority to deport Plaintiff." But the Court is unable to discern the legal relevance of these propositions, and Defendants cite no legal authority in connection therewith. First, it cannot be denied that Defendants had the ability to report Plaintiff to immigration authorities. That was the content of the alleged threat. Second, Beccari's alleged lack of authority to settle on behalf of Defendants has no legal relevance to the retaliation question where he, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, acted as Defendant's agent in a direct attempt to "dissuade" Plaintiff from pursuing his FLSA action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's evidence can sustain a prima facie case of retaliation.
The next step in the inquiry is for Defendants to proffer legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for their actions. First, Defendants proffer no legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons for the alleged acts of Plaintiff's supervisor — which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, were no less than threats to get Plaintiff in trouble with immigration authorities if he did not settle his FLSA case. As to these alleged actions, Defendants have failed in their burden of production.
Defendants have, however, proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for demanding that Plaintiff fill out an I-9 form — namely, that requiring employees to fill out an I-9 form is a perfectly legitimate legal requirement. Defendants have also proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory business reason for terminating Plaintiff — namely, that Plaintiff abandoned his job.
It seems that Defendants would have the inquiry end here, judging from their ardent protestations as to the legitimate character of their actions. "It is important to bear in mind, however, that the defendant's burden of rebuttal is exceedingly light.... At this stage of the inquiry, the defendant need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the defendant's burden is `merely one of production, not proof.'" Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.1983) (employing the McDonnell Douglas framework in a Title VII case) (quotation omitted).
After Defendants meet their exceedingly light burden of production, Plaintiff must, to create a triable issue as to Defendants' retaliatory intent, establish pretext. "To establish pretext," Plaintiff must "prove that `the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision ... either ... by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation [was] unworthy of credence.'" Raspanti v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc., 266 Fed. Appx. 820, 823-24 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir.2005)). "`Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it.'" Id. (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc)).
Plaintiff rebuts Defendants' proffered reason for requiring Plaintiff to fill out an 1-9 form by pointing to the behavior of his supervisor, and to the fact that Defendants knew of Plaintiff's immigration status even before hiring him. Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants waited until shortly after Plaintiff pursued his FLSA action to hold Plaintiffs immigration status over his head — by threatening him directly at first, and then indirectly through demanding he fill out the 1-9 a form.
Of course, "the `facts, as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the case.'" Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925, n. 3 (11th Cir.2000)). Whether Defendants knew of Plaintiffs immigration status before hiring him, whether or how Tony Beccari threatened Plaintiff, and the circumstances surrounding Defendants' demand that Plaintiff fill out the 1-9 form, are genuinely disputed. At this stage, Plaintiff has shown enough evidence, if credited, to sustain a finding of pretext.
This Court cannot underestimate the fear and intimidation that a person who is in this country illegally may experience at the prospect of being punished for his presence by lawful authorities. Neither can this Court underestimate the willingness of others to exploit these fears to their own advantage. It is upon reconsideration of these realities, and of the supported, conflicting evidence shown by both sides at this summary judgment stage, that the Court concludes Plaintiff has shown enough evidence to sustain a finding of pretext as to his termination.
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit have either assumed or decided that a constructive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of showing retaliation — under the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA and other statutes. See, e.g., Marshall v. Suicide Prevention of Florida, No. WPB-76-8339-CIV-CF, 1977 WL 1766, at *8 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 1, 1977) (concluding that "defendants... violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by constructively discharging Helen Uribe."); Barrera v. Valero Doral Inc., No. 10-cv-22982 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 11, 2012) (granting default judgment on Plaintiffs claims, which included a claim for retaliatory constructive discharge); Burnette v. Northside Hosp., 342 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1138 (N.D.Ga.2004) ("Assuming an adverse employment action can be based on a theory of constructive discharge" in a FLSA case); Nero v. Hosp. Auth. of Wilkes Cnty., 86 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1228 (S.D.Ga. 1998) (in a § 1983 action for First-Amendment-based retaliation, stating that "[a]n adverse employment action can also take the form of a constructive discharge where an employee resigns.").
Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1298-99 (internal citations and footnote omitted). The facts of this case, when "viewed in their proper context" and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that the threats and intimidation Plaintiff experienced, if not great in frequency, were sufficiently "severe" such that Plaintiff has shown enough evidence to sustain a claim for retaliation in the form of a constructive discharge. Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1297.
As set forth at the beginning of this Order, there remains at this stage of the proceedings substantial issues relating to Plaintiff's damages — namely, which damages he has shown, which damages he may recover under the FLSA, and the effect of these determinations on the viability of his cause of action. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to reserve ruling on portions of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pending further briefing on the damages issues. By separate Order the Court will establish a briefing schedule, and continue the pre-trial and trial dates.
Therefore, it is