Filed: Jun. 30, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-14853 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 30, 2011 _ JOHN LEY CLERK Agency No. A098-721-634 YURY MABEL ARCHAGA-PONCE, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent. _ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _ (June 30, 2011) Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KR
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-14853 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 30, 2011 _ JOHN LEY CLERK Agency No. A098-721-634 YURY MABEL ARCHAGA-PONCE, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent. _ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _ (June 30, 2011) Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRA..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14853 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 30, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
Agency No. A098-721-634
YURY MABEL ARCHAGA-PONCE,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(June 30, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yury Mabel Archaga-Ponce, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order dismissing her appeal
of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of withholding of removal. The BIA
determined that Archaga-Ponce was not eligible for withholding of removal
because she failed to demonstrate a nexus between any harm that she suffered or
might suffer and a statutorily protected ground. Because substantial evidence
supports that determination, we deny Archaga-Ponce’s petition.
Where the BIA issues its own opinion, we review only that opinion, except
to the extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s reasoning. Kazemzadeh v. U.S.
Att’y Gen.,
577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). We review the BIA’s
conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for substantial evidence.
Id.
Under substantial evidence review, we consider “‘the record evidence in the light
most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of that decision.’”
Id. at 1351 (quoting Adefemi v. Ashcroft,
386 F.3d 1022,
1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). Therefore, we will reverse the agency’s findings
only if the evidence compels us to do so.
Id.
“To obtain withholding of removal, an applicant must establish that her ‘life
or freedom would be threatened in [her country of removal] because of [her] race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
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opinion.’” Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
446 F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2006) (second
alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). An applicant may
satisfy her burden of proof in either of two ways: (1) by establishing past
persecution in her country based on a protected ground; or (2) by establishing that
it is more likely than not that she would be persecuted on account of a protected
ground upon removal to that country.
Id. A “particular social group” refers to
persons who share a common, immutable characteristic “that the members of the
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Castillo-Arias v. U.S.
Att’y Gen.,
446 F.3d 1190, 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing and adopting the BIA’s definition of “particular social
group”).
Archaga-Ponce is a victim of domestic violence, and she claims that she and
victims like her constitute a particular social group. She argues membership in
this social group, in turn, establishes the required nexus between the harm she
suffered or might suffer and a statutorily protected ground, such that withholding
of removal is appropriate.1 Based on our review of the record and the parties’
1
On appeal, Archaga-Ponce does not contest the BIA’s conclusion that her application
for asylum was time-barred, nor she does dispute the denial of Convention Against Torture relief;
therefore, she has abandoned those claims. See Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
514 F.3d 1168, 1173
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briefs, we agree with the BIA’s determination to the contrary and conclude that
substantial evidence supported its order dismissing Archaga-Ponce’s appeal.
Accordingly, we deny her petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
(11th Cir. 2008). Even if Archaga-Ponce had preserved her asylum claim, we lack jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s conclusion that her untimely application for asylum was not excused. See
Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
492 F.3d 1223, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007).
Additionally, although Archaga-Ponce focuses primarily on the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination in her brief, we decline to review that finding because the BIA did not review it.
See Ruiz v. Gonzales,
479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that this Court reviews only the
BIA’s findings and conclusions except those expressly adopted from the IJ’s order). Similarly,
we decline to address Archaga-Ponce’s claim that she was harmed on account of her political
opinion because she did not raised it before the IJ. See Galindo-Del Valle v. Att’y Gen.,
213 F.3d
594, 599 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in,
Balogun v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
425 F.3d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 2005); see also In re R-S-H, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 629, 638 (B.I.A. 2003) (holding an alien “waived his opportunity to pursue [an] issue on
appeal” by not raising the issue at the hearing before the IJ).
Finally, we will not address Archaga-Ponce’s claim that the immigration proceedings
violated her right to due process, or her passing statement that her brother was killed in the
United States and that his killers are now in Honduras, because these assertions are devoid of any
argument and, as such, are insufficient to be considered on appeal. See Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
605 F.3d 1138, 1145 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
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