Filed: Nov. 19, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11567 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cv-02437-ECS DONALD E. GRYDER, Plaintiff -Appellant, versus SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (November 19, 2013) Before PRYOR, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Donald Gryder
Summary: Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11567 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cv-02437-ECS DONALD E. GRYDER, Plaintiff -Appellant, versus SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (November 19, 2013) Before PRYOR, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Donald Gryder,..
More
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11567
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:00-cv-02437-ECS
DONALD E. GRYDER,
Plaintiff -Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 19, 2013)
Before PRYOR, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Gryder, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for
attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) in a Title VII action in
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 2 of 7
which he claimed to be the prevailing party. Having considered the parties’ briefs
and the record, we affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the underlying
facts of the case and recite only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.
In July 2000, Mr. Gryder sued, among other defendants, the Federal
Railroad Administration, a component of the Department of Transportation,
alleging unlawful retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
stemming from his having filed complaints with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. On May 19, 2003, following a favorable advisory jury
verdict for lost wages and benefits, Mr. Gryder filed a pro se motion for attorney’s
fees and costs that was accompanied by a non-verified list of fees, expenses, and
other monetary losses purportedly incurred from his participation in the litigation.
The magistrate judge 1 denied this motion as premature and then—rejecting the
jury’s advisory verdict—denied Mr. Gryder equitable relief on the merits. Mr.
Gryder appealed.
On November 12, 2003, Mr. Gryder filed a first amended motion for
attorney’s fees and costs and incorporated similar unsigned documentation as he
1
The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.
2
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 3 of 7
had attached to his initial fees and costs motion. Mr. Gryder subsequently
supplemented this motion with invoices from his attorneys for purported fees and
expenses; this documentation, however, included no sworn testimony verifying the
number of hours worked or opining on the reasonableness of the hourly rate he was
charged. On January 4, 2004, the magistrate judge deferred ruling on the first
amended motion pending our resolution of the appeal that Mr. Gryder had filed on
the merits. We reversed the magistrate judge’s order on the merits and remanded
for the award of equitable relief in an unpublished opinion on April 14, 2005. See
Gryder v. Mineta, 143 F. App’x 297 (11th Cir. 2005) (Table).
On remand, the magistrate judge awarded Mr. Gryder reinstatement and
back pay in an order and judgment entered on September 15, 2010. In the
judgment, the magistrate judge cautioned Mr. Gryder that any motion for
attorney’s fees should comport with the requirements of Federal Rule 54 and the
district court’s local rules.
On August 21, 2012, following a second appeal,2 Mr. Gryder—represented
by counsel—filed a second amended motion for attorney’s fees, which he
contended constituted a timely amendment to his November 12, 2003 first
amended motion on which the magistrate judge had previously reserved judgment
but not yet ruled. The magistrate judge denied the second amended motion,
2
See Gryder v. Dennin, 427 F. App'x 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
3
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 4 of 7
finding that Mr. Gryder had not properly perfected his 2003 first amended motion
because he had submitted no affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of the hourly
rate, the number of hours billed, or the veracity of his purported expenses within
30 days of filing the motion as required under Northern District of Georgia Local
Rule 54.2. The magistrate judge concluded, in the alternative, that the second
amended motion was also untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).
Mr. Gryder now appeals.
II
“We review the denial of a motion for attorney’s fees and costs for abuse of
discretion.” Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 678 F.3d
1199, 1201 (11th Cir. 2012). We similarly accord “great deference to a district
court's interpretation of its local rules and review a district court's application of
local rules for an abuse of discretion.” Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc.,
588 F.3d 1291,
1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion
occurs “only when a decision is in clear error, the district court applied an incorrect
legal standard or followed improper procedures, or when neither the district court's
decision nor the record provide sufficient explanation to enable meaningful
appellate review.” Friends of the
Everglades, 678 F.3d at 1201.
Title VII permits the district court, “in its discretion, [to] allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Where,
4
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 5 of 7
as here, neither the district court nor a statute provides otherwise, a motion for
attorney’s fees must “be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment[.]”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i).
III.
Mr. Gryder argues that the magistrate judge erred in ruling that his 2012
second amended motion did not constitute a timely amendment to his 2003 first
amended motion. Although we are mindful that the magistrate judge reserved
judgment and did not rule on the first amended motion until Mr. Gryder brought
the second amended motion, we need not decide whether the second amended
motion related back as a timely amendment because the magistrate judge properly
exercised his discretion in finding that the first amended motion was not properly
perfected.
Rule 54.2 of the Civil Local Rules for the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia provides that, where a final judgment does
not determine the amount of attorney's fees, a party must (1) file a written motion;
(2) specifying the amount (or a fair estimate of the amount) of fees and expenses
sought; and (3) "file and serve a detailed specification and itemization of the
requested award, with appropriate affidavits and other supporting
documentation" within 30 days after filing the motion. See N.D. Ga. Civ. L.R.
54.2(A)(1)-(2).
5
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 6 of 7
Mr. Gryder filed the first amended motion on November 12, 2003, but
submitted no affidavits supporting the sufficiency and propriety of the attorney’s
fees and expenses he sought within 30 days thereafter as Local Rule 54.2 requires.
Viewing the second amended motion as a supplement to the first amended motion,
as Mr. Gryder urges, the magistrate judge acted well within his discretion in
concluding that the first amended motion was never perfected. See Clark v. Hous.
Auth. of City of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1992) (district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion for attorney's fees as untimely under local
rule). Noncompliance with Local Rule 54.2 rendered the first amended motion
fatally defective 30 days after it was filed and a nullity by the time Mr. Gryder
filed the second amended motion nearly nine years later. See N.D. Ga. Civ. L.R.
54.2(A)(1)-(2).
We reach the same result even if we view the second amended motion as a
free-standing request for fees and costs. The magistrate judge entered judgment on
September 15, 2010. The second amended motion, filed just under two years later,
came well after the 14-day post-judgment timeframe for filing a motion for
attorney’s fees under Rule 54. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i).
To the extent that Mr. Gryder seeks costs that fall beyond the scope of Local
Rule 54.2, the magistrate judge would have been within his discretion to deny such
a claim. In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1924 provides that “[b]efore any bill of costs
6
Case: 13-11567 Date Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 7 of 7
is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an
affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having
knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred
in the case and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually
and necessarily performed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1924. Mr. Gryder did not accompany the
first amended motion with such an affidavit. Although he did attach an affidavit to
the second amended motion, the motion and affidavit were filed well beyond the
30-day post-judgment deadline set forth in Civil Local Rule 54.1. See N.D. Ga.
Civ. L.R. 54.1 (“bill of costs must be filed by the prevailing party within thirty (30)
days after the entry of judgment. A bill of costs which is not timely filed will result
in the costs not being taxed as a part of the judgment.”). See generally Big Top
Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[W]e can affirm on any ground that finds support in the record.”).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion.
We therefore affirm the denial of Mr. Gryder’s motions for attorney’s fees and
costs.
AFFIRMED.
7
