Filed: Apr. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-13849 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 1 of 11 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-13849 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-00100-ACC-DAB MEDICOMP, INC., a foreign profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE CO., a foreign corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, a foreign profit corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICE, LLC, a foreign profit corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a fo
Summary: Case: 13-13849 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 1 of 11 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-13849 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-00100-ACC-DAB MEDICOMP, INC., a foreign profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE CO., a foreign corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, a foreign profit corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICE, LLC, a foreign profit corporation, UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., a for..
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Case: 13-13849 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13849
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cv-00100-ACC-DAB
MEDICOMP, INC.,
a foreign profit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE CO.,
a foreign corporation,
UNITED HEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK,
a foreign profit corporation,
UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICE, LLC,
a foreign profit corporation,
UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.,
a foreign profit corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 1, 2014)
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Before HULL, MARCUS, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The summary judgment entered in favor of the appellees is affirmed for the
reasons set forth in the Order of the district court, dated July 22, 2013.
AFFIRMED.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
MEDICOMP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:12-cv-100-Orl-22DAB
UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE
COMPANY, UNITED HEALTHCARE OF
NEW YORK, UNITED HEALTHCARE
SERVICE, LLC, UNITED HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on the Motion of the Defendants, various entities of
United Healthcare Insurance Company (collectively, “Defendants”), for Judgment on the
Pleadings, or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 73). Plaintiff Medicomp, Inc.,
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. No. 77), to which Defendants replied
(Doc. No. 80). This is the third time the Court has been asked to address the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, (see Doc. Nos. 42, 53), but it is the Court’s first opportunity to consider
the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. The Court will grant summary judgment because Plaintiff has
failed to submit any evidence to meet its statutory burden of establishing its standing to sue.
I. BACKGROUND
For purposes of the Motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court continues to accept
as true the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, as discussed in this Court’s prior
Order (Doc. No. 42). Plaintiff originally brought five claims, but only one remains viable:
Case: 13-13849 Date Filed: 04/01/2014 Page: 4 of 11
Defendants’ alleged failure to reimburse Plaintiff for its wireless monitoring device in violation
of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). In
the dismissal Order, the Court assumed, based on the liberal pleading standard and Defendant’s
failure to raise the issue, that “Plaintiff ha[d] derivative standing to sue under ERISA’s civil
enforcement provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006), as an apparent third-party assignee of
ERISA plan beneficiaries (here, presumably the patients who received the Wireless Device),”
and cited Cagle v. Bruner,
112 F.3d 1510, 1515 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), for support. (Doc.
No. 42 at 3.) Defendants now assert that the Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiff had any such
assignments, and they seek judgment on the pleadings as a remedy.
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of any valid assignments of benefits. The parties
conducted discovery on this and other issues for approximately six months, the discovery period
has ended, and the deadline for filing dispositive motions has passed. Defendants filed the
deposition of one of Plaintiff’s executives, Dr. Daniel Balda, in support of their Motion for
Summary Judgment; in response, Plaintiff submitted numerous examples of identical, redacted
forms, purportedly signed by beneficiaries of Defendants’ plans, authorizing Plaintiff to appeal
Defendants’ denial of benefits for the wireless monitoring device at issue in this litigation.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
Rule 12(c) permits a motion for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed[,] but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings
is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered by
considering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Hawthorne v. Mac
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Adjustment, Inc.,
140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). As with a motion to dismiss, the Court
accepts all of the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Northlake Foods, Inc.,
715 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant must satisfy this initial burden by “identifying those
portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Norfolk S. Ry. v. Groves,
586 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). However, the movant is entitled to summary
judgment where “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
When it conflicts, the court presumes the nonmoving party’s evidence to be true and will draw
all reasonable inferences in its favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation,
344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir.
2003). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court explained that the standard for
summary judgment is “whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.”
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). However, “[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Id. at 255.
III. ANALYSIS
A. ERISA Standing
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The civil enforcement provision of ERISA permits a participant or beneficiary to bring
suit “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). The
standing issue presented in this case is not of the “subject-matter-jurisdictional doctrine of
justiciability which considers injury, traceability to the defendant, and redressability.” Physicians
Multispecialty Grp. v. Health Care Plan of Horton Homes, Inc.,
371 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). Instead, § 1132 functions as a statutory standing provision that “sets
forth those parties who may bring civil actions under ERISA and specifies the types of actions
each of those parties may pursue.” Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold,
809 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir.
1987). The language in the statute is clear: the only “parties who have independent standing to
sue an ERISA plan” are participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor.
Cagle,
112 F.3d at 1514. However, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that Congress “did not intend to alter
the general rule that an assignee of a right has the same standing to sue as the assignor,” so a
party may obtain “derivative standing based upon an assignment of rights from an entity listed
in” § 1132(a).1
Id. at 1515.
1
The Eleventh Circuit also provided a policy rationale for its decision that primarily
focused on the typical ERISA assignment, from a plan beneficiary to his or her physician:
If provider-assignees cannot sue the ERISA plan for payment, they will bill the
participant or beneficiary directly for the insured medical bills, and the participant
or beneficiary will be required to bring suit against the benefit plan when claims
go unpaid. On the other hand, if provider-assignees can sue for payment of
benefits, an assignment will transfer the burden of bringing suit from plan
participants and beneficiaries to providers[, who] are better situated and financed
to pursue an action for benefits owed for their services. For these reasons, the
interests of ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries are better served by
allowing provider-assignees to sue ERISA plans.
Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1515 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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The Cagle panel did not “decide what constitutes a valid assignment of medical benefits
covered by ERISA,”
id. at 1516 n.3, but a subsequent panel has shed at least some light on that
question. In Hobbs v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, two physician assistants sued an
ERISA plan for its alleged failure to “include a provision in its health insurance policies for the
payment of medical or surgical services provided by licensed physician assistants in violation of”
a certain provision of Alabama law.
276 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). In order to decide
whether that claim was completely preempted and thus removable to federal court, the court had
to determine that the physician assistants had standing to sue under ERISA; otherwise, their
claim could not have arisen under federal law.
Id. at 1240. The physician assistants were
obviously not beneficiaries, participants, or fiduciaries under § 1132(a), so the only way they
could have had standing to sue under ERISA was if they received a valid assignment of that right
from an individual enumerated in the statute.
Id. at 1241 (citing
Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1512–16.)
The Hobbs panel thus affirmed the Cagle holding, but clarified that derivative standing was
available only “when the healthcare provider had obtained a written assignment of claims from a
patient who had standing to sue under ERISA as a ‘beneficiary’ or ‘participant.’”
Id. (citations
omitted). Because the ERISA plan administrator in Hobbs “failed to present proof of an
assignment, its reliance on Cagle . . . [was] misplaced.”
Id. at 1242.
Subsequent Eleventh Circuit cases have confirmed the Hobbs panel’s reliance on written
assignments from patients with standing to sue. In Connecticut State Dental Association v.
Anthem Health Plans, Inc., the plaintiff-dentists were found to have standing where the
defendant-insurer seeking removal cited the claim forms that the plaintiffs submitted for
reimbursement for medical services rendered to the defendants’ beneficiaries.
591 F.3d 1337,
1351 (11th Cir. 2009). Each claim form included the following sentence: “I hereby authorize
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payment of the dental benefits otherwise payable to me directly to the below named dental
entity.”
Id. Although the forms did not contain the names and signatures of the patients, the
plaintiffs represented that the signatures were on file in their offices and the forms matched the
assigning patients with the relevant ERISA plans from which the plaintiffs sought benefits.
Id. at
1351 n.11.
Numerous district courts have applied the doctrine laid out in Cagle and Hobbs, including
this one. In Adventist Health System/Sunbelt Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.,
the undersigned approved a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation determining that the
plaintiff-provider lacked standing to sue, despite having “submitted copies of some . . . claim
forms,” because the provider failed to “submit copies of any written assignment of benefits
signed by [the relevant plan’s] subscribers.” No. 6:08-cv-1706-Orl-22KRS,
2009 WL 722303, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2009). This Court’s approach to derivative standing via assignment is
consistent with that of other judges in this district. See, e.g., C.N. Guerriere, M.D., P.A. v. Aetna
Health, Inc., No. 8:07-cv-1441-T-27MAP,
2007 WL 3521369, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15,
2007) (refusing to find standing without “a written assignment of claims from a patient with
standing,” despite submission of “electronic claim form” stating that patient “authorized payment
of member benefits by having a ‘Signature on file’ stamp indicated on the claim form”); Current
Wave Med. Sys., Inc. v. Cigna Corp., No. 8:07-cv-1102-T-26EAJ,
2007 WL 5389120, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2007) (finding standing only where the plaintiff provided a sample of its
assignment of benefits form and stated in the complaint that its subscribers executed such
assignments with their patient data forms).
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
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Although the Complaint does not specifically allege that Plaintiff received written
assignments from the beneficiaries of Defendants’ plans, this issue is better resolved on summary
judgment. Defendants’ failure to raise this issue until now allowed the Court to infer, despite the
inartful pleading, that Plaintiff had met the requirements for standing.2 In any event, the issue is
moot. The litigation has reached the close of discovery, (see Doc. Nos. 66, 72), and the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an issue of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment on the question of standing.
C. Summary Judgment
Under clear Eleventh Circuit precedent and consistent district court interpretation,
Plaintiff must have received written assignments of benefits from ERISA plan beneficiaries in
order to have derivative standing to sue. Plaintiff does not submit, nor claim to have received,
such assignments from any actual beneficiaries. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that it is entitled to
standing because plan beneficiaries assigned their rights to their physicians, who then
“transfer[red]” those assignments to Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n (Doc. No. 77) 8 (quoting Balda
Dep. (Doc. No. 74-2) 56:2–7).) Plaintiff does not submit any legal authority for this proposition,
but misconstrues Connecticut State Dental to suggest that “the possibility of direct payment” for
medical services, regardless of the existence of an actual assignment, is sufficient to establish
standing to sue. As previously discussed, the plaintiffs in Connecticut State Dental possessed
written assignments of benefits from their patients; where that case discussed the “possibility of
2
The Amended Complaint states the following: “Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary to
such insurance policy benefits as the contracts between Defendants and their insureds evince a
clear and manifest intent to primarily and directly benefit medical service providers such as the
Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Although Plaintiff obviously did not claim an assignment, the
pleading error was not so substantial that the Court felt compelled to dismiss on its own
initiative.
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direct payment,” it was referring to the merit of the underlying claims for benefits, not the
plaintiffs’
standing. 591 F.3d at 1351, 1353.
Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts that it has standing because it received authorization from
some beneficiaries to appeal unfavorable benefits determinations on their behalf. (See Pl.’s Mem.
Opp’n Ex. A (Doc. No. 77-1).) After carefully considering these forms, it is clear to the Court
that the beneficiaries did not assign their rights to reimbursement or to sue. The only obvious
agreement is to allow Plaintiff to pursue an appeal and to communicate with Defendants in
conjunction therewith. These forms do not create a material issue of fact with respect to
Plaintiff’s receipt of written assignments of benefits, especially when Plaintiff has admitted that
it never received an actual assignment from the beneficiaries.
Defendants point, convincingly, to the deposition of Plaintiff’s executive, Dr. Daniel
Balda. Plaintiff’s business model does not emphasize contact with the patient, and it appears that
in most cases, the physician’s office fills out the paperwork to enroll the patient in Plaintiff’s
cardiac monitoring service. (Balda Dep. 51:5–16.) The patient does not have to sign the
enrollment form. (Id. at 52:15–17.) The form does not require the patient to make any
representations or warranties. (Id. at 54:18–22.) When asked if patients ever sign a document that
“[s]pecifically names Medicomp and assigns Medicomp the benefits of that patient’s insurance
policy,” Dr. Balda answered, “No.” (Id. at 60:15–20.) Finally, Dr. Balda admitted that Plaintiff
never received permission from the patients to bill on their behalf, only from their physicians.
(Id. at 68:17–24.) Based on this uncontradicted evidence, the Court concludes that there are no
facts supporting Plaintiff’s assertion that it possessed valid assignments of benefits from ERISA
plan participants or beneficiaries. As a result, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
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The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of Plaintiff’s claim – it may well be that
Defendants are obligated to pay for Plaintiff’s cardiac monitoring service under the various
ERISA plans. The Court is mindful of the policy considerations underlying the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision to extend derivative standing to medical providers, but the
controlling precedent on the subject only allows a narrow extension of standing where there is
evidence of a valid assignment from a plan participant or beneficiary. Absent such evidence,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered as follows:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, alternatively, for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 73), filed April 1, 2013, is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
2. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED; however, the Motion
for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
3. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Orlando, Florida on July 22, 2013.
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