Filed: Apr. 23, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11145 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00034-LGW-JEG YVONNE HICKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus NATHANIEL HICKMAN, NATALIE THOMAS, JASON R. CLARK, Attorney, JEFFREY BERRY, Attorney, in his individual and official capacities, JOHN WETZLER, Attorney, in his individual and official capacities, CARLTON GIBSON, Attorney, in his individual and offi
Summary: Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11145 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00034-LGW-JEG YVONNE HICKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus NATHANIEL HICKMAN, NATALIE THOMAS, JASON R. CLARK, Attorney, JEFFREY BERRY, Attorney, in his individual and official capacities, JOHN WETZLER, Attorney, in his individual and official capacities, CARLTON GIBSON, Attorney, in his individual and offic..
More
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11145
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00034-LGW-JEG
YVONNE HICKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NATHANIEL HICKMAN,
NATALIE THOMAS,
JASON R. CLARK,
Attorney,
JEFFREY BERRY,
Attorney, in his individual and official capacities,
JOHN WETZLER,
Attorney, in his individual and official capacities,
CARLTON GIBSON,
Attorney, in his individual and official capacities,
STEVE QUEEN,
d.b.a. Sentinel Offender Services,
GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA,
a.k.a. Glynn County Georgia,
Defendants-Appellees,
C. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 2 of 6
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 23, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Yvonne Hickman, appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal with prejudice of
her civil complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, false
imprisonment, conspiracy, and malicious abuse of process. The district court
dismissed her complaint for failure to comply with the court’s orders, pursuant to
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, Hickman raises
numerous claims in her initial brief, but does not directly address the reasons for
the district court’s dismissal of her complaint. In her Reply, she maintains that her
complaint was not a shotgun pleading and she should not have been ordered to
amend.
We review a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for
abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns,
178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th
Cir. 1999). Unless the court specifies otherwise, an involuntary dismissal under
Rule 41, other than dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or lack of an
indispensable party, is with prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Although dismissal
2
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 3 of 6
with prejudice is a drastic remedy, “[t]he court’s power to dismiss is an inherent
aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition of
lawsuits.” Goforth v. Owens,
766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). Moreover
while dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, “dismissal upon disregard of an order,
especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of
discretion.” Moon v. Newsome,
863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
We construe pleadings filed by pro se parties liberally. Alba v. Montford,
517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). This liberal construction, however, “does
not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty.
of Escambia, Fla.,
132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),
overruled on other grounds, as stated in Randall v. Scott,
610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th
Cir. 2010). Moreover, pro se litigants still are required to conform to procedural
rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though there is no required technical
form, “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”
Id. at 8(d)(1). All that
is required of the statement is that it “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89,
3
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 4 of 6
93,
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (alteration in original). Additionally, each
separate claim is required to be presented in a separate numbered paragraph, with
each paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)); see Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll.,
77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that multiple claims should be presented
separately in adherence to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) “and with such
clarity and precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff is
claiming and to frame a responsive pleading”).
When a complaint fails to follow Rules 8 and 10, it may be classified as a
shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading is a pleading that “incorporate[s] every
antecedent allegation by reference into each subsequent claim for relief or
affirmative defense.” Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp.,
464 F.3d 1273, 1279
(11th Cir. 2006). As a result, it is “virtually impossible to know which allegations
of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”
Anderson, 77 F.3d at
366. We have repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings. See Davis v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. Consol.,
516 F.3d 955, n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (providing a long list of
cases in which we have rejected shotgun pleadings). When confronted with a
shotgun pleading, the court is supposed to order repleading for a more definite
statement of the claim.
Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1280.
4
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 5 of 6
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Hickman’s complaint for failure to properly respond to the court’s August 14,
2012, order. The district court correctly concluded that Hickman’s complaint was
a shotgun pleading because it repeated, re-alleged, and incorporated by reference
all allegations, facts, and information about the parties in each subsequent
allegation of her complaint.1 After concluding that Hickman’s complaint
constituted a shotgun pleading, the court was correct in ordering her to amend and
re-file a more definite complaint. See Wagner, 464 at 1280. The district court was
also correct in dismissing Hickman’s complaint when she failed to comply with
this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b);
Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
Despite the fact that dismissal is a drastic remedy, the record shows that a
lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice. The court granted
Hickman’s untimely request for more time. After being granted this extension,
Hickman chose to attack the underlying motion on which the court’s order was
based and declared her refusal to file a new complaint. Moreover, as it is within
the court’s discretion to ensure compliance with the rules of procedure,
Brown, 430
F.2d at 1216, and “dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the
1
Hickman’s complaint named eight defendants in the caption, several others in the
complaint, and was 38 pages long. It consisted of 23 numbered paragraphs describing the
parties, 39 paragraphs of facts, 128 paragraphs listing fourteen counts of allegations, and 55
pages of various documents as exhibits attached. Each count “repeats and . . . incorporates by
reference the allegations” set forth in each preceding count. Also, Hickman’s complaint
incorporated by reference every named party and each fact set forth in the complaint into each
count. This is, by definition, a shotgun complaint. Wagner , 464 F.3d at 1279.
5
Case: 13-11145 Date Filed: 04/23/2014 Page: 6 of 6
litigant has been forewarned,” as Hickman was here, “is not an abuse of
discretion.”
Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Hickman’s complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hickman’s
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
6