Filed: Jul. 02, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-15055 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:05-cr-00020-MP-WCS-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LAMAR SINTEL PRINGLE, Defendant - Appellant. _ No. 13-15056 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:06-cr-00013-MP-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 2 of 9 versus LAMAR SIN
Summary: Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-15055 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:05-cr-00020-MP-WCS-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LAMAR SINTEL PRINGLE, Defendant - Appellant. _ No. 13-15056 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:06-cr-00013-MP-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 2 of 9 versus LAMAR SINT..
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Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15055
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:05-cr-00020-MP-WCS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAMAR SINTEL PRINGLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
No. 13-15056
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:06-cr-00013-MP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
Case: 13-15055 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 2 of 9
versus
LAMAR SINTEL PRINGLE,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
No. 13-15101
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00018-MP-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAMAR SINTEL PRINGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(July 2, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lamar Sintel Pringle appeals his sentence of 87 months of imprisonment
after pleading guilty to one count of health care fraud and one count of conspiracy
to defraud a health care benefit program. In his previous appeal, we vacated
Pringle’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing where the
government could present evidence regarding Pringle’s role in the offense. United
States v. Pringle, 525 F. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). After being
resentenced, Pringle now challenges the district court’s application of a two-level
role enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 3B1.1(c).
He also argues that the district court did not consider evidence of his post-
sentencing rehabilitation before imposing the sentence. After careful review, we
affirm.
I.
On April 24, 2012, a grand jury in the Northern District of Florida indicted
Pringle, charging him with conspiracy to defraud a health care benefit program
(Count 1) and two counts of health care fraud (Counts 2 and 3). Several months
later, Pringle pleaded guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment pursuant to a
written plea agreement.
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR),
which summarized Pringle’s criminal conduct. According to this report, Pringle
participated in a scheme to defraud the Department of Labor’s Office of Worker’s
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Compensation (OWC) by creating fake medical service providers that billed the
OWC for services that were never rendered to patients. Payments from the OWC
were deposited in 11 bank accounts at 5 different banks. The money was then
transferred to other accounts before being withdrawn in the form of checks, ATM
withdrawals, and point of sale purchases.
At his resentencing, the government called Agent Robert Torelli, who had
interviewed Pringle’s codefendant, Raymond Alexander, about his role in the
offense. Alexander told Agent Torelli that Pringle had recruited him by promising
a scheme that would allow both of them to make some money. After Alexander
agreed, the two of them went to a bank to set up an account in Alexander’s name.
From that point onward, whenever money was deposited into Alexander’s account,
Pringle would instruct Alexander to withdraw a specific sum of money that would
be shared between the two of them.
Alexander claimed that Pringle showed him how to withdraw the money
from his account by giving him sample withdrawal slips that he could copy. Later
on, Pringle also gave Alexander a debit card so he could withdraw cash from
ATMs. Throughout the course of the conspiracy, Alexander stated that he would
make withdrawals before meeting with Pringle to give him a portion of the
proceeds. On occasion, Pringle would also call Alexander and instruct him to
withdraw a sum of money to keep for himself. Alexander emphasized, however,
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that he never opened any accounts on his own or transferred money from one bank
account to another. In fact, he claimed that he did not even know how to do any of
these things. Based on this testimony and the other evidence in the record, the
district court concluded that Pringle served as an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of the conspiracy. After applying a two-level enhancement on this basis
and hearing from Pringle about his post-sentencing rehabilitation, the district court
sentenced Pringle to 87 months of imprisonment.
II.
We first consider Pringle’s argument that his two-level role enhancement
was improper because the government failed to present sufficient and reliable
evidence demonstrating that he directed at least one of his codefendants. Pringle
complains that the government largely relied on hearsay because Agent Torelli
simply repeated statements made by Alexander, and even Agent Torelli had no
way of knowing whether this information was truthful.
We review a district court’s determination that a defendant was a leader or
organizer for clear error. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam). To qualify for a role enhancement under § 3B1.1, the
defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or
more other participants. United States v. Williams,
527 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir.
2008). In evaluating whether this enhancement applies, the district court should
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consider: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices;
(4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; (5) the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the
illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others.
Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1355; USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). The government must
prove the existence of a leadership role by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Yates,
990 F.2d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
In making this determination, the district court may rely on hearsay,
provided that the information is reliable. United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750,
759 (11th Cir. 2000). So long as the hearsay statements are consistent with other
evidence of the defendant’s role in the conspiracy, the district court commits no
clear error in considering them. See
id. at 760. In Gordon, for example, we held
that hearsay statements made by codefendants were reliable because the defendant
could have discredited their statements by calling them as witnesses at sentencing.
Id. More important, the co-defendants’ statements were consistent with each other
and the defendant’s role and conduct in the offense.
Id.
Against this legal backdrop, the district court did not err by relying on
Alexander’s statements to Agent Morelli to support a role enhancement under
§ 3B1.1(c). To the contrary, Alexander’s statements were reliable because they
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were corroborated by other evidence in the record. For example, the district court
heard evidence that Pringle had previously participated in a similar scheme to use
fraudulent medical providers to bill the OWC. Pringle also had intimate
knowledge of the OWC’s reimbursement system because he had been previously
employed by Affiliated Computer Systems, Inc., which served as OWC’s third-
party billing administrator. Agent Torelli also testified that Alexander was not the
only one who Pringle attempted to recruit into the conspiracy. Indeed, Pringle had
also asked at least two other people, including Pringle’s half-brother, to open
accounts where money from the conspiracy could be deposited. This evidence was
consistent with Alexander’s statements that the scheme was wholly Pringle’s idea,
and Pringle recruited him to participate in it.
Beyond that, the government also presented evidence that Pringle managed
the bills that were sent to the OWC and controlled the various accounts where
money was deposited. Pringle’s phone records contained hundreds of phone calls
to an OWC toll-free number for medical providers to check on the status of their
claims. Agent Torelli also testified that the IP addresses and e-mail addresses used
to open the vast majority of the fraudulent electronic billing accounts were linked
to Pringle and his home address. This evidence is consistent with Alexander’s
statements that he had no role in sending billing requests to the OWC. Rather,
Pringle would order Alexander to go to the bank after funds were deposited and
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tell him how much money to withdraw. Given the consistency between
Alexander’s statements and the other evidence in the record, the district court did
not err by relying on hearsay evidence to find that Pringle was a leader or organizer
of the conspiracy. Further, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the
government had proven Pringle’s leadership role by a preponderance of the
evidence.
II.
Pringle next argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because
the district court failed to consider evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitation at
his resentencing. We cannot agree. When a person is being resentenced, a court
“may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing.”
Pepper v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011)
(emphasis added). To say that a district court may consider post-sentencing
rehabilitation, however, is quite different from saying that a district court must
consider such evidence in every case. Because the district court has no such
obligation under our precedent, it did not err by failing to explicitly refer to
Pringle’s post-sentencing rehabilitation when it imposed its sentence. 1
1
Pringle also appeals the district court’s revocation of supervised release relating to his 2005
conviction for embezzlement and his 2006 conviction for bank fraud. See Nos. 13-15055, 13-
15056. His brief, however, does not address either of these judgments. Therefore, he has
abandoned any argument that the revocation of his supervised release relating to these
convictions was improper. See United States v. Woods,
684 F.3d 1045, 1064 n.23 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam).
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AFFIRMED.
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