Filed: Nov. 05, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-10303 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-10303 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00488-RAL-AEP-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMESHIA MACK, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (November 5, 2014) Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jameshia Alicia Mack appeal
Summary: Case: 14-10303 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-10303 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00488-RAL-AEP-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMESHIA MACK, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (November 5, 2014) Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jameshia Alicia Mack appeals..
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Case: 14-10303 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10303
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00488-RAL-AEP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMESHIA MACK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(November 5, 2014)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jameshia Alicia Mack appeals her total 75-month sentence, imposed after
she pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and
Case: 14-10303 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 Page: 2 of 7
one count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. On
appeal, Mack argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
district court erred in applying three guideline enhancements to her advisory
guidelines range. Because we conclude that Mack cannot show that her sentence
would have been shorter but for the alleged errors, we affirm.
I.
Mack was charged by information with wire fraud and aggravated identity
theft in connection with the filing of fraudulent tax returns in 2011 and 2012 and
placing the refunds on prepaid debit cards. In the factual basis, the government
alleged that Mack filed fourteen fraudulent returns, two in her name and twelve in
the names of other individuals, using names and social security numbers she found
on a county website. Mack waived indictment and agreed to plead guilty without a
plea agreement. At the change-of-plea hearing, Mack admitted the factual basis set
forth by the government. Mack also admitted that, by committing these offenses,
she violated the conditions of her supervised release, which she was subject to due
to prior fraud convictions. Mack later advised the court that she challenged
portions of the factual basis, specifically the number of returns filed and the
amount of loss. Because this was a sentencing issue, and Mack did not otherwise
challenge her guilt, the court accepted Mack’s guilty plea.
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The probation officer determined that the adjusted offense level for the wire
fraud count was 18. These calculations included an intended amount of loss of
approximately $120,000, an increase for the use of a victim’s social security
number under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i), 1 and an enhancement for the number
of victims. Mack had a criminal history category IV based on multiple prior
instances of fraud and identity theft, including bank fraud conspiracy and identity
theft convictions in Kentucky in 2007 for which Mack was currently on supervised
release. The resulting advisory guideline range for the wire-fraud count was 41 to
51 months’ imprisonment. The identity-theft count carried a mandatory
consecutive 24-month sentence.
Mack objected to the amount of loss, arguing that she had filed only four
returns, for a total of $36,948. She further stated that there was no evidence she
filed fraudulent returns in 2012, as the police had confiscated the prepaid debit
cards holding the refunds during a traffic stop in June 2011. At sentencing, the
investigating agent testified concerning the fraudulent returns filed in 2011 and
2012, and the use of prepaid debit cards. The agent stated that he had connected
the false returns to Mack based on a pattern in the filings in which Mack sought a
refund based on interest or dividends in whole dollar amounts, in large sums just
under the $10,000 mark. He also noticed the same spelling errors among the
1
The probation officer cited §2B1.1(b)(11)(B), but the parties agree that the correct citation is §
2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i).
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returns. He further explained that identity thieves prefer to use prepaid debit cards
because it is easy to transfer funds from one card to another if the card is lost or
stolen, or, as in this case, confiscated. He explained that not all of the fraudulent
returns were paid, thus although Mack filed returns for about $120,000, the IRS
actually paid only $100,135, and the debit cards found in Mack’s possession at her
arrest held $53,640.
The court overruled Mack’s objection to the amount of loss, and after
considering the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court sentenced Mack
to 51 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud, to be followed by the mandatory 24-
month sentence for aggravated identity theft. Discussing the sentencing factors,
the court stated that Mack was a “thief” and “a fraud,” and it was necessary to
protect the public from her schemes, promote respect for the law, and provide
deterrence. The court considered an upward variance based on these factors, but
ultimately determined that a sentence at the high end of the range was
substantively reasonable. The court then stated:
Further, I find I [sic] agreed with the defendant’s contention that the
total offense level should be lower, that I would still have imposed the
sentence I imposed as to count one. Although that would have been
an upward variance, it would have been supported by the evidence
and the statutory sentencing factors.
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Finally, the court revoked Mack’s supervised release and sentenced her to 14
months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to the rest of her sentence. This is
Mack’s appeal.
II.
Ordinarily, we review a district court’s interpretation and application of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo and accept the court’s factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz,
713 F.3d 600, 605 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 213 (2013). But an argument raised for the first time
on appeal is reviewed only for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Pantle,
637
F.3d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 2011).
Plain error review is “limited and circumscribed” and requires satisfaction of
four difficult-to-meet criteria: The defendant must first show that there is (1) error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Jones,
743
F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2014). Once these requirements are met, we may only
exercise our “discretion to notice a forfeited error” if the error (4) “seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id. An error
in the calculation of the guidelines range does not necessarily affect a defendant’s
substantial rights. See
Pantle, 637 F.3d at 1177-78. To show that an error affected
substantial rights, a defendant must show that there is a “reasonable probability”
that she would have received a lighter sentence but for the error. Jones,
743 F.3d
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at 830. This requires a defendant to “point to something in the record showing that
the most likely result on remand is for the sentencing judge to give [her] a shorter
sentence.”
Id.
Mack alleges that the district court (1) impermissibly double counted the
identity theft and number of victims in determining her guideline range for the wire
fraud offense because she was also charged with the substantive offense of identity
theft; (2) incorrectly determined the total number of victims because she admitted
filing only four false returns; and (3) improperly calculated the amount of loss
without taking into consideration the cash she turned in when she was stopped by
police in 2011.2
We conclude that Mack has not satisfied her burden to establish plain error. 3
Even if Mack could show an error that was plain in the district court’s calculation
of her guideline range for wire fraud, the court expressly stated that it would
impose the same sentence via an upward variance if it had calculated the guideline
range differently. Although Mack contends that the court’s statement refers only
2
Mack’s challenge to the amount of loss was not sufficient to preserve a challenge to the
number of victims or a credit for funds returned because she did not mention these objections
specifically. United States v. Zinn,
321 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States
v. Ramirez–Flores,
743 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that “[t]he defendant . . . fails to
preserve a legal issue for appeal if the factual predicates of an objection are included in the
sentencing record, but were presented to the district court under a different legal theory”
(alteration in original) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted)).
3
We need not determine whether the court committed an error if the defendant has not met the
third prong of plain-error review, that is, she has not shown that her sentence would have been
shorter. See
Pantle, 637 F.3d at 1177 (assuming plain error but concluding that the defendant
failed to show it affected his substantial rights).
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to the sentence it would have imposed had it agreed with Mack’s calculation of the
amount of loss, we disagree. Reading the court’s statement in context, the court
explained that the 51-month sentence was substantively reasonable given Mack’s
history and characteristics and the need to provide protection and deterrence, and,
had the guideline range been lower, the court would have imposed this sentence
using an upward variance. The burden is on Mack to meet this third prong of
plain-error review.
Pantle, 637 F.3d at 1177. Mack has failed to meet her burden
because she cannot show a reasonable probability that her sentence would have
been shorter with the lower guidelines range.
AFFIRMED.
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