Case: 15-12171   Date Filed: 10/02/2015   Page: 1 of 3


                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]




             IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                     FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                       ________________________

                             No. 15-12171
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                       ________________________

                 D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cr-80196-DTKH-1



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                               Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  versus

DAGO NOEL MEJIA-ANDRADE,
a.k.a. Richard Noel,

                                                         Defendant-Appellant.

                       ________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Florida
                      ________________________

                             (October 2, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
                 Case: 15-12171        Date Filed: 10/02/2015        Page: 2 of 3


       Dago Noel Mejia-Andrade, who pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

by illegally reentering the United States after deportation, appeals his 12-month-

and-1-day sentence. On appeal, Mejia-Andrade argues that his sentence is

substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed a five-month upward

variance from the guideline range of one to seven months based upon an improper

weighing of Mejia-Andrade’s criminal and immigration history. After review,1 we

affirm.

       During Mejia-Andrade’s sentencing, the district court considered and

discussed the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of Mejia-

Andrade’s offense, Mejia-Andrade’s history and characteristics, the need for a

sentence that provides deterrence and protects the public, the kinds of sentences

available, the applicable guideline range, pertinent policy, and the need to avoid

unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court

need do no more than weigh the § 3553(a) factors, consider the defendant’s

argument at sentencing, and apply its discretion to impose a reasonable sentence.

United States v. Clay, 

, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the

       1
         We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 

, 41 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence
bears the burden to show that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 

, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). A court may
abuse its discretion if it: (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight;
(2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 

,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We assess substantive reasonableness in light of the totality of
the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. 

.
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                  Case: 15-12171   Date Filed: 10/02/2015   Page: 3 of 3


weight to be accorded to the § 3552(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion

of the district court); see also United States v. Garza-Mendez, 

, 1290

(11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 

(2014) (holding that the district court

need not discuss each factor expressly).

       After consideration, the district court concluded that Mejia-Andrade’s

criminal history and multiple illegal entries into the United States merited an

upward variance sufficient to deter Mejia-Andrade and “get [his] attention that

[illegal reentry after deportation] really is serious.” While we require that a district

court provide a “sufficiently compelling” explanation for an upward variance from

the guideline range, we must give due deference to the district court’s decision that

the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. Gall, 552 U.S at 50, 51. As this Court

stated in Irey:

       We may not—it bears repeating—set aside a sentence merely because
       we would have decided that another one is more appropriate. A
       district court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need
       only be a reasonable one. We may set aside a sentence only if we
       determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing
       judge, that the sentence imposed truly is 

(citations and footnote omitted). Giving a full measure of

deference to the judgment of the district court, we cannot say that Mejia-Andrade’s

sentence is truly unreasonable.

       AFFIRMED.



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