Filed: Mar. 21, 2012
Latest Update: Apr. 11, 2017
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 11-14282 MARCH 21, 2012 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D.C. Docket No. 1:09-md-02036-JLK In Re: CHECKING ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT LITIGATION lllllllllllllMDL NO. 2036 _ MAXINE AARONS GIVEN, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee, versus M & T BANK CORPORATION, etc., et al., lllllllllllllllll
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 11-14282 MARCH 21, 2012 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D.C. Docket No. 1:09-md-02036-JLK In Re: CHECKING ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT LITIGATION lllllllllllllMDL NO. 2036 _ MAXINE AARONS GIVEN, Individually and on behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee, versus M & T BANK CORPORATION, etc., et al., llllllllllllllllll..
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-14282
MARCH 21, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-md-02036-JLK
In Re: CHECKING ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT LITIGATION
lllllllllllllMDL NO. 2036
____________________________________________
MAXINE AARONS GIVEN,
Individually and on behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
versus
M & T BANK CORPORATION, etc., et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant,
MANUFACTURERS AND TRADERS TRUST COMPANY,
a.k.a. M & T BANK,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 21, 2012)
Before CARNES, PRYOR, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maxine Given filed a putative class action against Manufacturers and
Traders Trust Company (M&T Bank), alleging that M&T Bank improperly
charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied
M&T Bank’s renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that Given’s claims
are not within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. The bank appeals
that denial, contending that the arbitration agreement explicitly assigns to an
arbitrator the decision about whether Given’s claims are within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
I.
M&T Bank provides debit cards or ATM cards to its checking account
customers. When one of those customers makes a debit card purchase or an ATM
withdrawal for an amount that exceeds the amount in the customer’s checking
account, the bank charges that customer an overdraft fee of $37.
2
Given, a Maryland resident, is one of M&T Bank’s checking account
customers. After she was charged overdraft fees of $370, she filed a putative class
action against M&T Bank in Maryland federal district court, alleging that the bank
had improperly “manipulate[d] and reorder[ed] debits and credits from highest to
lowest” to increase the bank’s revenue from overdraft fees. She seeks money
damages and injunctive relief for violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act, conversion, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
She also seeks relief under the theory of unjust enrichment, claiming she is entitled
to restitution, and she claims that the court should order M&T Bank to return the
overdraft fees under a theory of money had and received.
Given attached to her complaint her contract with M&T Bank that governs
her checking account. That contract includes an arbitration agreement that
obligates her to submit “[e]ach dispute or controversy that arises out of or is
related to [her checking] account . . . [to] binding arbitration.” The arbitration
agreement also provides: “Any issue regarding whether a particular dispute or
controversy is . . . subject to arbitration will be decided by the arbitrator. If any
part of the relief request is not expressly stated as a dollar amount, the dispute or
controversy will not be . . . subject to arbitration.”
M&T Bank filed a motion to compel arbitration. The case was transferred
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to the Southern District of Florida and consolidated with related cases for pretrial
purposes. The district court denied M&T Bank’s motion to compel arbitration,
finding that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable under Maryland law, and
M&T Bank appealed. After we heard oral argument, the Supreme Court decided
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). We then
vacated the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Concepcion decision. In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 425 F. App’x 857, 857 (11th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished).
Back in the district court, M&T Bank renewed its motion to compel
arbitration. The court again denied the motion but did not reach the issue of
whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. Instead, because Given
sought, in part, injunctive relief, the court found that her claims are not within the
scope of the arbitration agreement and therefore are not arbitrable. M&T Bank
then filed this appeal.
II.
M&T Bank contends that the district court erred by deciding whether
Given’s claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement, arguing that an
arbitrator should have decided that question. We review de novo the district
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court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v.
Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011).
“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract,” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,
__ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010), so “the interpretation of an arbitration
agreement is generally a matter of state law,” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., __ U.S. __,
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010). The Federal Arbitration Act,
however, “places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,
and requires courts to enforce them according to their terms.” Rent-A-Center, 130
S.Ct. at 2776 (citation omitted). M&T Bank and Given agree that the FAA and
Maryland law govern the arbitration agreement at issue in this case.
A.
The arbitration agreement provides that “[a]ny issue regarding whether a
particular dispute or controversy is . . . subject to arbitration will be decided by the
arbitrator.” That provision is an agreement to arbitrate the “gateway” question of
“whether [the arbitration agreement] covers a particular controversy.” Rent-A-
Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777. The agreement to arbitrate that gateway question,
which we will refer to as the “delegation provision,” “is simply an additional,
antecedent agreement” that “is severable from the remainder of the” arbitration
agreement. Id. at 2777–78 (quotation marks omitted).
5
Under the FAA, a delegation provision is valid, “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; see
Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2778. Courts should enforce valid delegation
provisions as long as there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties
manifested their intent to arbitrate a gateway question. Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct.
at 2777–78 & n.1 (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944,
115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995)).
The terms of the delegation provision in this case provide clear and
unmistakable evidence that M&T Bank and Given manifested their intent to
arbitrate whether Given’s claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
As we have mentioned, the delegation provision provides: “Any issue regarding
whether a particular dispute or controversy is . . . subject to arbitration will be
decided by the arbitrator.” Given’s claims for relief are “a particular dispute or
controversy,” and whether her claims are within the scope of the arbitration
agreement is an “issue regarding whether a particular dispute or controversy is
subject to arbitration.” Because the delegation provision encompasses any issue, it
encompasses Given’s claims for relief. See Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs.,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The agreement could not have been
broader. Any disputes means all disputes, because ‘any’ means all.” (some
6
quotation marks omitted)). An arbitrator, not the district court, must decide
whether those claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012)
(“[Section 2 of the FAA] requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate
according to their terms.”); Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2776.
Given makes two arguments against compelling arbitration of the gateway
question. Neither is persuasive. First, she argues that the delegation provision is
ambiguous because it is followed by this sentence: “If any part of the relief
request is not expressly stated as a dollar amount, the dispute or controversy will
not be . . . subject to arbitration.” According to Given, that sentence not only
excludes certain claims from the scope of the arbitration agreement but also
removes from an arbitrator the decision about whether certain claims are within
the scope of the arbitration agreement. In effect, Given asks us to rewrite the
beginning of the delegation provision from “Any issue” to “Any issue, except an
issue involving whether the relief request is not expressly stated as a dollar
amount” or to “Almost any issue.” That is something we cannot do. See, e.g.,
Clancy v. King, 954 A.2d 1092, 1101 (Md. 2008) (“Effect must be given to each
clause so that a court will not find an interpretation which casts out or disregards a
meaningful part of the language of the writing unless no other course can be
7
sensibly and reasonably followed.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted));
Calomiris v. Woods, 727 A.2d 358, 368 (Md. 1999) (“It is a fundamental principle
of contract law that it is improper for the court to rewrite the terms of a contract, or
draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms thereof are clear and
unambiguous.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Second, Given argues that, because the arbitration agreement is
procedurally unconscionable, there is not clear and unmistakable evidence that she
and M&T Bank agreed to arbitrate the gateway question. A delegation provision
is severable from the rest of the arbitration agreement and must be challenged
“specifically.” See Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777–79 (“[A] party’s challenge
to another provision of the contract, or to the contract as a whole, does not prevent
a court from enforcing a specific agreement to arbitrate [contained within the
challenged contract].” (quotation marks omitted)). Given did not challenge the
delegation provision with her unconscionability argument before the district court,
so we will not consider it on appeal. See Grigsby & Assocs., Inc. v. M Sec. Inv.,
664 F.3d 1350, 1352 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011). In any event, her argument, which “is
that it is not clear and unmistakable that [her] agreement to the text [of the
delegation provision] was valid[] because of the unconscionability” of the
arbitration agreement as a whole, “mistakes the subject of the . . . clear and
8
unmistakable requirement.” See Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777 n.1 (quotation
marks omitted). That requirement “pertains to the parties’ manifestation of intent,
not to the agreement’s validity.” Id.
Under the delegation provision, therefore, the decision of whether Given’s
claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement is a decision for an
arbitrator, and the district court erred in making that decision itself.1
B.
Given argues that we can affirm the district court’s denial of the renewed
motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground that the arbitration
agreement as a whole is unconscionable under Maryland law. When the district
court denied M&T Bank’s first motion to compel arbitration, it was without the
benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. Believing it was prudent
for the district court to reconsider its decision in light of Concepcion, we vacated
the court’s order and remanded for reconsideration. In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litig., 425 F. App’x at 857. We still believe it is prudent for the district
court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of Concepcion, so
1
In its order denying the renewed motion to compel arbitration, the district court
suggested that M&T Bank waived its argument that an arbitrator must decide whether Given’s
claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. But, as Given concedes, M&T Bank did
not waive that argument because the bank has raised it throughout the litigation.
9
at this time we will not reach whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
If the district court concludes that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable,
an arbitrator must decide whether Given’s claims are within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
III.
For the reasons we have discussed, we vacate the district court’s denial of
M&T Bank’s renewed motion to compel arbitration and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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