Filed: Dec. 15, 2010
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DEC 15, 2010 No. 10-11577 JOHN LEY Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00025-WCO-SSC-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee, versus SEVERIANO GOMEZ-PANTALEON, a.k.a. Thomas Diaz-Lopez, a.k.a. Carlos Humberto Castellanos-Leon, lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Nort
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DEC 15, 2010 No. 10-11577 JOHN LEY Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00025-WCO-SSC-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee, versus SEVERIANO GOMEZ-PANTALEON, a.k.a. Thomas Diaz-Lopez, a.k.a. Carlos Humberto Castellanos-Leon, lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the North..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DEC 15, 2010
No. 10-11577 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00025-WCO-SSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SEVERIANO GOMEZ-PANTALEON,
a.k.a. Thomas Diaz-Lopez,
a.k.a. Carlos Humberto Castellanos-Leon,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(December 15, 2010)
Before BLACK, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Severiano Gomez-Pantaleon appeals the 38-month sentence imposed by the
district court after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Gomez’s offense and criminal history
resulted in an applicable guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. The statutory
maximum sentence was 20 years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
Even though Gomez received a final sentence below the guidelines range
and well below the statutory maximum, he contends it is substantively
unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He argues that he had not committed any
crimes for the last 12 years and that he did not need deterrence, rehabilitation, or
removal as a danger to the public. He further argues that the district court violated
the “parsimony principle” by refusing to vary downward from the guidelines range
more than it already had.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). Our reasonableness review is guided by the factors provided by Congress
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1188–89 (11th Cir.
2008).
The district court is required to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That includes the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter
criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct,
and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or
medical care.
Id. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must also consider among other
factors the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics
of the defendant, the applicable guideline range, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. See
id. § 3553(a)(1), (4), (6). The district
court need not discuss each factor. United States v. Talley,
431 F.3d 784, 786
(11th Cir. 2005). The burden of establishing that a sentence is unreasonable lies
with the party challenging that sentence.
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189.
As an initial matter, we have disapproved of the use of the phrase
“parsimony principle” to describe the “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”
requirement of § 3553(a). See
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2010). That
phrase reflects only half of the congressional command—that the sentence not be
too long.
Id. at 1197. It leaves out the other, equally important half—that the
sentence not be too short. See
id. Under § 3553(a), Congress requires sentences
to be neither too long nor too short. See
id. (noting that “[a] more accurate term .
. . might be ‘the Goldilocks principle’”).
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Semantics aside, Gomez contends that his recent non-criminal conduct
warranted a downward variance greater than the 8-month reduction already meted
out by the district court. He argues that a greater reduction is required because he
has managed to stay out of trouble since his arrest for transporting cocaine 12
years ago. Gomez also asserts that he was minding his own business and keeping
his nose clean when law enforcement officers mistakenly arrested him, believing
Gomez to be his brother.
Gomez’s argument, however, misses a key point: when he illegally
reentered the United States after his last deportation, he broke the law every day
he remained here. After he was caught for that illegal conduct, he continued to
break the law by lying to law enforcement officers about his name and handing
over false identification documents. At the sentence hearing, the district court
expressly considered Gomez’s recent good conduct, his recent bad conduct, his
serious criminal history, his time already served for the related false identification
crimes, sentences imposed on other defendants for similar crimes in the district,
and the need to deter Gomez from illegally reentering the United States yet again.
After weighing those factors, the district court imposed a sentence below the
applicable guidelines range and well below the statutory maximum of 20 years.
That sentence is reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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