GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Bruce Larkin's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14),
This is a simple, single count case alleging several violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. ("ADA"). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant owns a public accommodation, Hiawassee Plaza in Orlando, Florida. The Complaint alleges that the plaza's parking, signage, and entrance access points/path of travel are not ADA compliant. The Defendant does not dispute that the plaza is ADA noncompliant, but asserts it is fixing the problems and that plaintiff does not intend to return. While a case typically progresses through discovery before summary judgment is appropriate, when the
Plaintiff is a disabled individual who is a resident of Orange County, Florida. On January 13, 2015 he visited Hiawassee Plaza at 6801 W. Colonial Drive, Orlando, Florida 32818 ("Plaza")
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the party can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Which facts are material depends on the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991).
When a party moving for summary judgment points out an absence of evidence on a dispositive issue for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thereafter, summary judgment is mandated against the nonmoving party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 322, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must rely on more than conclusory statements or allegations unsupported by facts. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985) ("conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value").
The general purpose of Title III of the ADA is to ensure "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of . . . accommodations of any place of public accommodation.
In this case, the Defendant admits ADA violations are present, are in need remediation, and are remediable: "Defendant does not challenge the need for ADA remediation. . . ." (Doc. 25 at 2). Further, the Defendant has not challenged that Plaintiff is disabled, that he traveled to the subject location, and encountered difficulty due to the ADA violations. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the material facts entitling him to relief under Title III are not disputed.
The Defendant's only responses to the Motion for Summary Judgment are that the dispute is mooted because the Plaza is presently working on fixing the ADA violations, the Plaintiff does not have sufficiently concrete intentions of returning to the Plaza to have standing, and Plaintiff did not include a prayer for attorney's fees and should, therefore, not receive an award of fees.
The fact that Defendant is in the process of fixing the violations does not render this case moot and Defendant has presented no authority to support this proposition.
Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir.2002). The Defendant admits there are still ADA violations at the Plaza, accordingly, the case is still a live controversy.
Defendant's central argument is that Plaintiff does not have sufficiently concrete plans of returning to the Plaza to justify an injunction. It is true that general allegations of an intention to return to a public accommodation at some indeterminate point in the future are not enough to establish standing for an injunction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ("Such `some day' intentions—without
The Court will address the issues of fees and costs after Judgment is entered.
It is therefore