Filed: Feb. 20, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT BURTON J. SHERWOOD a/k/a ) BURT SHERWOOD and ) JASON SHERWOOD, ) ) Appellants, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-3395 ) LEONARD SLAZINSKI; ) EVERCLEAR NETWORK, LLC; ) STAN LIPP; JOSEPH LASSITER; ) WILL SCOTT; and JUSTIN MATZ, ) ) Appellees. ) ) Opinion filed February 20, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Kimberly Bon
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT BURTON J. SHERWOOD a/k/a ) BURT SHERWOOD and ) JASON SHERWOOD, ) ) Appellants, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-3395 ) LEONARD SLAZINSKI; ) EVERCLEAR NETWORK, LLC; ) STAN LIPP; JOSEPH LASSITER; ) WILL SCOTT; and JUSTIN MATZ, ) ) Appellees. ) ) Opinion filed February 20, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Kimberly Bonn..
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
BURTON J. SHERWOOD a/k/a )
BURT SHERWOOD and )
JASON SHERWOOD, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D14-3395
)
LEONARD SLAZINSKI; )
EVERCLEAR NETWORK, LLC; )
STAN LIPP; JOSEPH LASSITER; )
WILL SCOTT; and JUSTIN MATZ, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed February 20, 2015.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. 9.130
from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County;
Kimberly Bonner, Judge.
Stacy D. Blank and Justin L. Dees of
Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa, and
Adolfo E. Jimenez of Holland & Knight
LLP, Miami, for Appellants.
Mary Fabre LeVine and Fred E. Moore of
Blalock Walters, P.A., Bradenton, for
Appellee Leonard Slazinski.
Hunter W. Carroll of Matthews Eastmore,
Sarasota, for Appellee Everclear Network,
LLC.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
LaROSE, Judge.
Burton J. Sherwood and Jason Sherwood appeal a nonfinal order denying
their motion to compel arbitration. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). The trial court correctly concluded that the matters about which the
Sherwoods sought arbitration were beyond the scope of the parties' arbitration
agreements. Accordingly, we affirm.
Burton J. Sherwood and Dr. Leonard Slazinski formed Everclear Network,
LLC, to purchase and develop a Miami-area television station. They later executed an
operating agreement and supplemental agreement to govern the business.
As the financial backer of the business, Dr. Slazinski grew concerned
about the Sherwoods' stewardship of Everclear. As a result, he sued them for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The Sherwoods moved to compel arbitration and to
stay the litigation pending arbitration. Dr. Slazinski responded with a motion to stay any
arbitration. The trial court denied the Sherwoods' motion and granted Dr. Slazinski's
stay motion, concluding that Dr. Slazinski's lawsuit presented no arbitrable issue.
On appeal, the Sherwoods argue that (1) the operating agreement and the
supplemental agreement contained enforceable arbitration clauses, (2) the question of
whether the Sherwoods satisfied the conditions precedent to arbitration should have
been submitted to an arbitrator, and (3) they satisfied all conditions precedent to
arbitration.
We review the trial court's interlocutory order denying arbitration de novo.
See MDC 6, LLC v. NRG Inv. Partners, LLC,
93 So. 3d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
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To compel arbitration, the Sherwoods had to demonstrate: (1) that a valid written
agreement to arbitrate existed, (2) that an arbitrable issue existed, and (3) that the right
to arbitrate had not been waived.
Id. Federal and Florida arbitration statutes demand
this analysis. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,
750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999). Only the
second prong—the existence of an arbitrable issue—is key to our analysis and
decision.1
Whether an arbitration agreement requires arbitration of a particular
dispute requires the court to discern the parties' intent. Id.; MDC
6, 93 So. 3d at 1146.
To find that intent, we look to the plain language of the arbitration agreement. Without
question, no party may be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration that the party did not
intend and agree to arbitrate.
Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636; Tubbs v. Hudec,
8 So. 3d
1194, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
The operating agreement addresses company formation, capital
contributions, profits/losses, distributions, management, compensation, bookkeeping,
and transfers. Section 4.4(e) of the operating agreement provides only for arbitration of
disputes relating to duties of Everclear's members.
The parties incorporated the supplemental agreement into the operating
agreement. In the event of any conflict between the two, the terms of the supplement
would prevail. Under paragraph ten of the supplemental agreement,
[i]n the event of any impasse in decision-making, not
otherwise capable of being decided according to the terms of
the Operating Agreement, the matter shall first be referred to
voluntary nonbinding mediation. In the event there is no
1
The parties present several additional issues that we do not address
because we conclude that the trial court ruled correctly on the central issue.
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satisfactory resolution after such mediation, it shall be
referred to arbitration . . . .
Because the parties executed both agreements on July 31, 2013, the
Revised Florida Arbitration Code, effective July 1, 2013, applies. §§ 682.01, .013(1),
Fla. Stat. (2013). A court decides the gateway issues of whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to arbitration. § 682.02(2). An arbitrator
decides the satisfaction of conditions precedent to arbitrability and whether an
arbitration agreement is enforceable. § 682.02(3). If a party to a judicial proceeding
challenges the existence of, or claims that, a controversy is not subject to arbitration, a
pending arbitration may proceed pending final resolution of the issue by the court,
unless the court orders otherwise. § 682.02(4). Section 682.03 addresses proceedings
to compel and to stay arbitration.
As previously noted, Dr. Slazinski's complaint sought declaratory and
injunctive relief. As did the trial court, we conclude that the dispute framed by Dr.
Slazinski did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses in the operating or
supplemental agreements. The arbitration clauses relate to member duties and
decision-making impasses. The arbitration clauses are narrowly drawn; they do not
extend to any and all claims that may arise or relate to the agreements governing the
business. The trial court correctly assessed the scope of the arbitration clauses. We
affirm the trial court order.
Affirmed.
SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
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