Filed: Nov. 08, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA WESLEY AARON PEASLEE, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D15-4059 VICKIE LYNN PERRINE, individually and o/b/o KAYLA D. and TORRIE L. CHRISMER, minors, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed November 9, 2016. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Lawrence P. Haddock, Judge. Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant. No a
Summary: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA WESLEY AARON PEASLEE, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED v. CASE NO. 1D15-4059 VICKIE LYNN PERRINE, individually and o/b/o KAYLA D. and TORRIE L. CHRISMER, minors, Appellee. _/ Opinion filed November 9, 2016. An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Lawrence P. Haddock, Judge. Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant. No ap..
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
WESLEY AARON PEASLEE, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D15-4059
VICKIE LYNN PERRINE,
individually and o/b/o KAYLA D.
and TORRIE L. CHRISMER,
minors,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed November 9, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Lawrence P. Haddock, Judge.
Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
No appearance for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Because Appellant’s Motion to Terminate/Vacate the Final Judgment of
Injunction was legally sufficient by alleging facts demonstrating “changed
circumstances” such that “the continuation of the injunction would serve no valid
purpose,” Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), we hold
that the trial court erred in not affording Appellant a meaningful opportunity to be
heard before summarily denying his motion. See Bennett v. Abdo,
167 So. 3d 522,
522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Carrozza v. Stowers,
153 So. 3d 340, 341 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014); Ramirez v. Teutsch,
134 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Goodwin v.
Whitley,
103 So. 3d 932, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Kugler v. Joosten,
58 So. 3d 323
(Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Colarusso v. Lupetin,
28 So. 3d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
“‘[D]ue process requires that [the movant] be given [an] opportunity to be heard on
his request . . . .”
Carrozza, 153 So. 3d at 341 (quoting Reed v. Reed,
816 So. 2d
1246, 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
LEWIS, WETHERELL, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
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