Supreme Court of United States.
*569 Messrs. B.R. Curtis and J.G. Abbott, for the company, plaintiff in error.
*572 Mr. Charles Allen, Attorney-General of Massachusetts, contra.
*571 *573 Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The case of Paul v. Virginia,[*] decided that the business of insurance, as ordinarily conducted, was not commerce, and that a corporation of one State, having an agency by which it conducted that business in another State, was not engaged in commerce between the States.
It was also held in that case that a corporation was not a citizen within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution, which declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and that a corporation created by a State could exercise none of the functions or privileges conferred by its charter in any other State of the Union, except by the comity and consent of the latter.
These propositions dispose of the case before us, if plaintiff is a foreign corporation, and was, as such, conducting business in the State of Massachusetts, and we proceed to inquire into its character in this regard.
The institution now known as the Liverpool and London Life and Fire Insurance Company, doing an immense business *574 in England and in this country, was first organized at Liverpool by what is there called a deed of settlement, and would here be called articles of association.
It will be seen by reference to the powers of the association, as organized under the deed of settlement, legalized and enlarged by the acts of Parliament, that it possesses many, if not all, the attributes generally found in corporations for pecuniary profit which are deemed essential to their corporate character.
1. It has a distinctive and artificial name by which it can make contracts.
2. It has a statutory provision by which it can sue and be sued in the name of one of its officers as the representative of the whole body, which is bound by the judgment rendered in such suit.
3. It has provision for perpetual succession by the transfer and transmission of the shares of its capital stock, whereby new members are introduced in place of those who die or sell out.
4. Its existence as an entity apart from the shareholders is recognized by the act of Parliament which enables it to sue its shareholders and be sued by them.
The subject of the powers, duties, rights, and liabilities of corporations, their essential nature and character, and their relation to the business transactions of the community, have undergone a change in this country within the last half century, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated.
They have entered so extensively into the business of the country, the most important part of which is carried on by them, as banking companies, railroad companies, express companies, telegraph companies, insurance companies, &c., and the demand for the use of corporate powers in combining the capital and the energy required to conduct these large operations is so imperative, that both by statute, and by the tendency of the courts to meet the requirements of these public necessities, the law of corporations has been so modified, liberalized, and enlarged, as to constitute a branch *575 of jurisprudence with a code of its own, due mainly to very recent times. To attempt, therefore, to define a corporation, or limit its powers by the rules which prevailed when they were rarely created for any other than municipal purposes, and generally by royal charter, is impossible in this country and at this time.
Most of the States of the Union have general laws by which persons associating themselves together, as the shareholders in this company have done, become a corporation.
The banking business of the States of the Union is now conducted chiefly by corporations organized under a general law of Congress, and it is believed that in all the States the articles of association of this company would, if adopted with the usual formalities, constitute it a corporation under their general laws, or it would become so by such legislative ratification as is given by the acts of Parliament we have mentioned.
To this view it is objected that the association is nothing but a partnership, because its members are liable individually for the debts of the company. But however the law on this subject may be held in England, it is quite certain that the principle of personal liability of the shareholders attaches to a very large proportion of the corporations of this country, and it is a principle which has warm advocates for its universal application when the organization is for pecuniary gain.
So also it is said that the fact that there is no provision either in the deed of settlement or the act of Parliament for the company suing or being sued in its artificial name forbids the corporate idea. But we see no real distinction in this respect between an act of Parliament, which authorized suits in the name of the Liverpool and London Fire and Life Insurance Company, and that which authorized suit against that company in the name of its principal officer. If it can contract in the artificial name and sue and be sued in the name of its officers on those contracts, it is in effect the same, for process would have to be served on some such officer even if the suit were in the artificial name.
*576 It is also urged that the several acts of Parliament we have mentioned expressly declare that they shall not be held to constitute the body a corporation.
But whatever may be the effect of such a declaration in the courts of that country, it cannot alter the essential nature of a corporation or prevent the courts of another jurisdiction from inquiring into its true character, whenever that may come in issue. It appears to have been the policy of the English law to attach certain consequences to incorporated bodies, which rendered it desirable that such associations as these should not become technically corporations. Among these, it would seem from the provisions of these acts, is the exemption from individual liability of the shareholder for the contracts of the corporation. Such local policy can have no place here in determining whether an association, whose powers are ascertained and its privileges conferred by law, is an incorporated body.
The question before us is whether an association, such as the one we are considering, in attempting to carry on its business in a manner which requires corporate powers under legislative sanction, can claim, in a jurisdiction foreign to the one which gave those powers, that it is only a partnership of individuals.
We have no hesitation in holding that, as the law of corporations is understood in this country, the association is a corporation, and that the law of Massachusetts, which only permits it to exercise its corporate function in that State on the condition of payment of a specific tax, is no violation of the Federal Constitution or of any treaty protected by said Constitution.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY:
Whilst I agree in the result which the court has reached, I differ from it on the question whether the company is a corporation. I think it is one of those special partnerships which are called joint-stock companies, well known in England for nearly a century, and cannot maintain an action or be sued as a corporation in this country without legislative *577 aid. But as it is a company associated under the laws of a foreign country, it comes within the scope of the Massachusetts statute, and cannot claim exemption from its operation for the causes alleged in that behalf. It could not have been the intent of the treaty of 1815 to prevent the States from imposing taxes or license laws upon either British corporations or joint-stock companies desiring to establish banking or insurance business therein. And certainly these companies cannot be exempted from such laws on the ground that citizens of other States have chosen to take some of their shares.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
[*] 8 Wallace, 168.
