Petitioner's position is that the room he maintains in Ms. Cleckley's two-bedroom apartment constitutes a household. Petitioner cited no authority for his position. Petitioner testified that he rented one room in the two-bedroom apartment for himself and Fatimah for $ 175 a month. Petitioner testified that he could not use the telephone or kitchen without permission. Other than the $ 175 per month allegedly paid, petitioner incurred no additional expenditures for utilities, repairs or any other household expenses. We find that the one room allegedly lived in by petitioner and Fatimah in the two-bedroom apartment owned by Fatimah's mother, without use of a kitchen or telephone, does not constitute a separate household.

Additionally, petitioner failed to prove that he paid $ 175 a month or, if paid, that it constituted more than half the cost of maintaining a household as his home. Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. Ms. Cleckley, Fatimah's mother, was the owner of1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 66">*72 the two-bedroom apartment. Ms. Cleckley apparently paid all expenses of maintaining the household to which petitioner allegedly contributed only $ 175 per month.

Based on the record, we find that petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proof. Rule 142(a). We are unconvinced that petitioner provided more than half of the cost of maintaining a principal place of abode for his daughter. Accordingly respondent is sustained on this issue.

The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to a credit for child and dependent care in the amount of $ 560.

On petitioner's 1992 Federal return, he claimed a credit under section 21 for child and dependent care expenses in the amount of $ 560. Pursuant to section 21(a)(1), petitioner is entitled to a credit for such expense if he "maintains a household which includes as a member one or more qualifying individuals". As relevant herein, the term "qualifying individual" is defined in section 21(b)(1) as a dependent who is under the age of 13 and with respect to whom the taxpayer is entitled to an exemption. The Court's previous determination that petitioner did not maintain a household for his daughter precludes petitioner 1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 66">*73 from claiming a credit for child and dependent care expenses for 1992. Accordingly, respondent is sustained on this issue.

Thirdly, we must consider whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income credit in the amount of $ 1,597.

Pursuant to section 32, certain low-income individuals with a child residing in the taxpayer's household may qualify for the earned income credit. Section 32(c)(1)(A)(i) provides that to qualify for the earned income credit an "eligible individual" is an individual who has a "qualifying child" for the taxable year. A "qualifying child" is defined as the taxpayer's child, under the age of 19, who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year. Additionally, the taxpayer must identify the child by name, age, and Social Security number. Sec. 32(c)(3). However, if more than one individual constitutes an "eligible individual" with respect to the same "qualifying child" for the same taxable year, then only the individual with the highest adjusted gross income for such taxable year shall be treated as an "eligible individual" for purposes of the earned income credit. Sec. 32(c)(1)(C).

The record reflects that1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 66">*74 Ms. Cleckley, Fatimah's mother, also constitutes an "eligible individual" for purposes of the earned income credit. Furthermore, Ms. Cleckley's adjusted gross income for the taxable year in issue is $ 16,205 and higher than petitioner's adjusted gross income. ³ Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to the earned income credit, and respondent is sustained on this issue.

Finally, we must consider whether petitioner is liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty in the amount of $ 448. Section 6662(a) imposes a 20-percent penalty on the portion of the underpayment attributable to negligence. Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related penalty imposed by section 6662(a), and that the entire underpayment of tax was due to negligence. "Negligence" includes a failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the preparation of a tax1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 66">*75 return. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. "Disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(c); sec. 1.6662-3(b)(2), Income Tax Regs.

However, section 6664(c)(1) provides that the penalty under section 6662(a) shall not apply to any portion of an underpayment, if it is shown that there was reasonable cause for the taxpayer's position with respect to that portion and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to that portion. Sec. 6664(c)(1). The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith within the meaning of section 6664(c)(1) is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his proper tax liability for the year. Id. Reliance by the taxpayer on the advice of a qualified adviser will constitute reasonable cause and good faith, if, under all of the facts and circumstances, the reliance by the taxpayer was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Id.

Petitioner had his 1992 Federal return prepared1996 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 66">*76 by a paid tax preparer and electronically timely filed based on information provided by petitioner. There is no evidence before us that petitioner's negligence was a result of his reasonable reliance on a qualified adviser. At trial, petitioner made no attempt to substantiate the amounts disallowed as required by section 6001. Furthermore, petitioner's testimony was vague and inconsistent. Based on the record, we find that petitioner failed to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws. Petitioners's lack of substantiation and the unexplained inconsistency in his testimony about the child care expenses claimed compel us to find petitioner liable for the accuracy-related penalty. Accordingly, respondent will be sustained on this issue.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.