1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*463 [EDITOR'S NOTE: PART 3 OF 3. THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN SPLIT INTO MULTIPLE PARTS ON LEXIS TO ACCOMMODATE ITS LARGE SIZE. EACH PART CONTAINS THE SAME LEXIS CITE.]
Decisions in all dockets will be entered under Rule1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*464 155.
ISSUE 35. WHETHER KANTER IS LIABLE FOR
OPINION
[1,301]
[1,302] The term "understatement" means the excess of the tax required to be shown on the return over the amount of tax imposed which is shown on the return.
[1,303] In notices of deficiency for 1982 through 1984 and 1986 through 1988, respondent determined that the Kanters' entire underpayment for each year was a substantial understatement within the meaning of
[1,304] In amendments to answers for 1982 through 1984 and 1986 through1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*468 1988, respondent asserted the
[1,305] As his Federal income tax returns show, Kanter did not adequately disclose the relevant facts concerning the tax treatment of the various items at issue in these cases. There is and was no substantial authority for his tax treatment of such issues. He had no reason to believe that his treatment of tax shelter items was more likely than not the correct treatment. In this regard, the assignment of income adjustments (Prudential, Century Industries, Hi-Chicago Trust, CMS Investors), Bea Ritch Trusts adjustments, Cashmere adjustments, Schedule E computer leasing adjustments, and the adjustments disallowing losses on sales of notes receivable and stock to Windy City and MAF for nominal consideration are items attributable to tax shelters because they involve entities and arrangements the principal purpose of which was avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax. See1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*469
ISSUE 36. WHETHER KANTER IS LIABLE FOR
OPINION
[1,306] For the year at issue,
[1,307] In notices of deficiency for 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1987, respondent determined that the Kanters' entire underpayment was a substantial1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*471 underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions within the meaning of
[1,308] In the answer to docket No. 1350-87 involving 1982, respondent affirmatively alleged that the entire underpayment was a substantial underpayment attributable to tax-motivated transactions under
[1,309] This Court has held that an underpayment attributable to the taxpayer's failure to report income that was assigned to a fraudulent or sham trust is an underpayment attributable to tax- motivated transactions. See 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*472
[1,310] With respect to 1980, as previously indicated with respect to negligence, Kanter conceded the investment interest expense deduction of $ 26,647 from SLG Partners through K & D Associates and introduced no evidence regarding his liability for additions to tax or the increased interest rate of
[1,311] With respect to 1983 and 1986, Kanter introduced no evidence that respondent erred in determining that the underpayments resulting from the Schedule E computer adjustment of $ 83,333 for 1983 and Schedule E interest expense adjustment of $ 50,380 for 1986 were attributable to tax-motivated transactions. Therefore, any underpayments resulting from these adjustments are attributable to tax-motivated1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*474 transactions within the meaning of
[1,312] The capital gains and losses adjustment of $ 569,555 for 1983 relates to the sham transaction involving Cashmere. In the Cashmere transaction, Kanter's liability for the increased interest rate is established essentially by the sham nature of the scheme wherein his primary objective was to sell his real estate partnership interests and receive cash therefor while, at the same time, escaping the recognition of gains associated with the negative capital accounts inherent in such interests.
[1,313] With respect to the 1987 capital gains and losses adjustment of $ 3,097,750, included therein is the disallowance of losses claimed on the sale of notes receivable, stock, and partnership interests to Windy City and MAF for nominal consideration. Kanter admitted that the purpose of these sales was to establish losses for tax purposes. As discussed in the disallowance of these losses, the claimed losses were based on sham transactions wholly lacking in economic substance. Consequently, any underpayments resulting from these adjustments are attributable to tax-motivated transactions within the meaning of
ISSUE1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*475 37. WHETHER IRA IS LIABLE FOR THE
OPINION
[1,314] In the notice of deficiency, respondent determined that IRA was liable for an addition to tax under
[1,315]
[1,316] IRA failed to file timely its Federal income tax return for 1980. Although the due date for IRA's filing of its 1980 return had been extended to September 15, 1981, the return was not received by the Internal Revenue Service until on or about November 21, 1981. See Issue 30. IRA has not shown that such failure1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*476 to file timely the return was due to reasonable cause and was not due to willful neglect. Therefore, we hold that IRA is liable for the
ISSUE 38. WHETHER IRA IS LIABLE FOR THE
OPINION
[1,317] In the notices of deficiency to IRA for 1980 and 1982 through 1988, respondent determined that all of the underpayments for each year were attributable to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations under
[1,318] IRA contends that it is not liable for the
[1,319] Respondent, on the other hand, contends that IRA failed to establish that it is not liable for the
[1,320] We conclude that IRA is liable for the addition to tax under
[1,321] We also conclude that IRA failed to establish that it acted reasonably1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*479 and in good faith in claiming the disallowed 1985 capital losses (Issue 25) from its purported sales of various assets to Kanter and Holding Co. As discussed previously, IRA failed to show that section 267 was inapplicable or that the sales were bona fide. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for the addition to tax under
[1,322] We also conclude that IRA failed to establish that it was not negligent in claiming (1) the disallowed 1987 bad debt deductions (Issue 26), (2) the disallowed 1987 ordinary losses (Issue 27), and (3) the disallowed 1987 capital losses (Issue 28). IRA claimed the bad debt deductions with respect to the promissory notes of Ballard and Lisle. There was no showing that these debts were worthless. Moreover, IRA later pursued collection efforts upon these notes, with the result that it obtained payment from Ballard upon his notes and received Lisle's renewed promise to pay his notes. Also, as to IRA's claimed losses, IRA failed to show a reasonable basis for treating as bona fide its purported sales of various assets to MAF. Consequently, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*480 we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for the addition to tax under
[1,323] Lastly, we conclude that IRA failed to establish that it was not negligent in claiming the disallowed 1988 $ 1,073,835 Decision Holdings Form 4797 loss (Issue 23). IRA failed to show that it was reasonable to claim that the TG limited partnership had a basis of $ 1,091,641 in the assets that it transferred to Decision Holdings in a purported section 351 transaction. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for the addition to tax under
ISSUE 39. WHETHER IRA IS LIABLE FOR THE
OPINION
[1,324] Consistent with the previous discussion with respect to Issues 22 and 23, a portion of each of the underpayments in income tax for 1982 and 1983 is attributable to gross overstatements by IRA as to the valuation of computer equipment and the attempt to structure a transaction under section 351 to realize a loss. 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*481 In both instances, the transactions were factual and legal shams, lacked economic substance, and lacked a profit motive as well as a business purpose. See Rose v. Commissioner, supra. In the section 351 situation, the transactions, under section 357(b) and (c) had no bona fide business purpose, were purposely intended to avoid Federal income tax, and the liabilities to which the properties were subject exceeded the adjusted bases of the properties. IRA presented no meaningful evidence relating to the valuation of the computer equipment nor evidence relating to the inapplicability of section 357(b) and (c) in the section 351 transaction.
[1,325] In our view, the underpayments of taxes shown on IRA's income tax returns for the years in question are attributable to the prohibited conduct; i.e. the deliberate overvaluations. In each of the transactions the indebtedness incurred by IRA/Cedilla for purchase of the equipment greatly exceeded the amounts paid by prior owners of the equipment, and no evidence was presented to establish the reason for such increases in cost. IRA's overvaluations with respect to the computer equipment are inseparable from the transactions' lack of economic1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*482 substance and profit motive and their sham character. The same rationale applies to the section 351 transaction. Accordingly, we sustain respondent's determination that a portion of the underpayment for each of the years 1982 and 1983 is attributable to a valuation overstatement involving the equipment leasing transactions.
ISSUE 40. WHETHER IRA IS LIABLE FOR THE
OPINION
[1,326] This issue relates to the addition to tax under
[1,327] In the notices of deficiency issued to IRA for 1983 through 1988, respondent determined that the entire deficiency for each year was a substantial understatement of tax for which IRA was liable for the addition to tax under
[1,328] IRA contends that it is not liable for the
[1,329] Respondent, to the contrary, contends that IRA failed to meet its burden of establishing that it was not liable for the
[1,330] We agree with respondent. IRA failed to establish that substantial authority existed supporting its position on the disallowed equipment leasing transaction items. (Issue 22). In sustaining respondent's disallowance of the credits and deductions claimed by IRA, we note that IRA failed to offer probative evidence (1) that the equipment leasing transactions had economic substance, and (2) that the long-term notes issued were valid recourse indebtedness. Among other things, we did not accept Mallin's conclusory opinions concerning the transactions' profit potential and the reasonably expected residual value of the equipment. Examinations into the economic substance of leasing transactions are inherently factual, and, in conducting the economic substance inquiry, significant objective factors include the reasonableness of the income projections and residual value projections. See
[1,331] In addition, IRA did not show that (1) the disallowed leasing transaction items were not tax shelter items, and (2) it reasonably believed, at the time its returns were filed, that its treatment of the items was more likely than not the proper treatment. See
[1,332] Similarly, we conclude that IRA failed to establish that it had substantial authority for its treatment of the disallowed 1985 capital losses (Issue 25). In sustaining respondent's disallowance of the losses, we found that IRA made no showing that section 267 was inapplicable or that the losses were bona fide. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for an addition to tax under
[1,333] The Court concludes that IRA failed to establish that it had substantial authority for its treatment of (1) the disallowed bad debt deductions (Issue1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*485 26), (2) the disallowed ordinary losses (Issue 27), and (3) the disallowed capital losses (Issue 28). As previously discussed, IRA failed to show that the debts, in fact, became worthless during 1987. With respect to the 1987 ordinary and capital loss items, IRA failed to make any showing that (1) the purported sales were bona fide transactions, and/or (2) that section 267 was inapplicable. Moreover, with respect to the purported sales of certain assets made to MAF, IRA also failed to show that (1) the loss items were not tax shelter items, and (2) it reasonably believed that its treatment of the items was more likely than not the proper treatment. Consequently, we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for an addition to tax under
[1,334] Finally, we conclude that IRA failed to establish that it had substantial authority for its treatment of the disallowed 1988 Decision Holdings Form 4797 loss (Issue 23). IRA did not show that the TG limited partnership had an adjusted basis of $ 1,091,641 in the assets it transferred to Decision Holdings. 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 463">*486 Moreover, IRA did not show that (1) this loss item was not a tax shelter item, and (2) it reasonably believed its treatment of the item was more likely than not the proper treatment. Therefore, we sustain respondent's determination that IRA is liable for an addition to tax under
ISSUE 41. WHETHER IRA IS LIABLE FOR THE SECTION 6662(a) ACCURACY- RELATED PENALTY FOR 1989
OPINION
[1,335] In the notice of deficiency for 1989, respondent determined that IRA was liable for an accuracy-related penalty of $ 175,780 due to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and a substantial understatement of tax. IRA had the burden of proving that the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty was erroneous. It failed to do so. Therefore, we sustain respondent's determination.
CONCLUSION
[1,336] To reflect our disposition of the issues in controversy and those settled or conceded by the parties,
[1,337] Decisions in all dockets will be entered under Rule 155.
1. Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 712-86; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 45273-86; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 1350-87; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 31301-87; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 33557-87; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 3456-88; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 30830-88; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 32103- 88; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 27444-89; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 16421-90; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 25875-90; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 26251-90; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 20211-91; Estate of Robert W. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co- executors, and Estate of Donna M. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, docket No. 20219-91; Estate of Robert W. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, and Estate of Donna M. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co- executors, docket No. 21555-91; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 21616-91; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 23178-91; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 24002- 91; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 1984-92; Estate of Robert W. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, and Estate of Donna M. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, docket No. 16164-92; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 19314-92; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 23743- 92; Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 26918-92; Estate of Robert W. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, and Estate of Donna M. Lisle, Deceased, Thomas W. Lisle and Amy L. Albrecht, Independent Co-executors, docket No. 7557-93; Claude M. and Mary B. Ballard, docket No. 22884-93; Investment Research Associates, Ltd., and Subsidiaries, docket No. 25976-93; and Burton W. and Naomi R. Kanter, docket No. 25981-93.↩