Judges: "Ruwe, Robert P."
Attorneys: Robert Francis Bitzberger, Jr., and Samantha J. Bitzberger, Pro sese. Carol-Lynn E. Moran , for respondent.
Filed: Nov. 30, 2009
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-178 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ROBERT FRANCIS BITZBERGER, JR. AND SAMANTHA J. BITZBERGER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 6592-08S. Filed November 30, 2009. Robert Francis Bitzberger, Jr., and Samantha J. Bitzberger, pro sese. Carol-Lynn E. Moran, for respondent. RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b),
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-178 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ROBERT FRANCIS BITZBERGER, JR. AND SAMANTHA J. BITZBERGER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 6592-08S. Filed November 30, 2009. Robert Francis Bitzberger, Jr., and Samantha J. Bitzberger, pro sese. Carol-Lynn E. Moran, for respondent. RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), t..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-178
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROBERT FRANCIS BITZBERGER, JR. AND SAMANTHA J. BITZBERGER,
Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 6592-08S. Filed November 30, 2009.
Robert Francis Bitzberger, Jr., and Samantha J. Bitzberger,
pro sese.
Carol-Lynn E. Moran, for respondent.
RUWE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions
of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the
petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are
to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Respondent
determined a $1,495 deficiency in petitioners’ 2006 Federal
income tax. The issues for decision are: (1) Whether
petitioners are entitled to a dependency exemption deduction
under section 151(a) and (c), and (2) whether petitioners are
entitled to a child tax credit under section 24(a).
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated. The stipulation of
facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this
reference. At the time the petition was filed, petitioners
resided in New Jersey.
Petitioners timely filed their 2006 Federal income tax
return. On the return petitioners claimed a dependency exemption
deduction and a child tax credit for B.B.2 B.B. is the child of
petitioner Robert Francis Bitzberger (Mr. Bitzberger) and
Catherine Bitzberger (Catherine), Mr. Bitzberger’s ex-wife.
Mr. Bitzberger and Catherine divorced in 1995. A final
judgment of dissolution of marriage (final judgment) was rendered
by the Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, in and for
Marion County, Florida, dated March 28, 1995. In the final
judgment the court ordered and adjudged that “The Wife, Catherine
2
The Court refers to minor children by their initials. See
Rule 27(a)(3).
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Bitzberger, shall have primary physical residency of the minor
children, E.B. (born: April 4, 1991) and B.B. (born: July 28,
1992).” Notably, however, the court further ordered and adjudged
that “[Mr. Bitzberger] shall be entitled to claim one of the
minor children as a dependent for the purposes of filing his
state/federal income taxes. * * * [Catherine] shall execute the
necessary authorization for * * * Mr. Bitzberger to make such
claim.”
In spite of the court’s order, both Catherine and
petitioners claimed an exemption for B.B. in 2006. Moreover,
Catherine did not execute a Form 8332, Release of Claim to
Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents, to allow
petitioners to claim B.B. as a dependent for 2006. Consequently,
petitioners did not attach a Form 8332 to their 2006 Federal
income tax return.
Discussion
Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations in the notice
of deficiency are presumed correct and the taxpayer bears the
burden of proving error in the determinations. See Rule 142(a);
Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111 (1933). Pursuant to section
7491(a) the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner where a
taxpayer has introduced credible evidence regarding factual
issues relevant to ascertaining his tax liability. Rule
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142(a)(2). Petitioners have neither claimed nor shown
eligibility for a shift in the burden of proof.
Dependency Exemption Deduction
Section 151(a) and (c) provides that a taxpayer may claim a
deduction for each individual who is a dependent of the taxpayer
as defined in section 152, provided that the dependent’s
identifying number is included on the return. See secs. 151(e),
7701(a)(41), 6109. Section 152(a) defines the term “dependent”
in pertinent part to include a “qualifying child”. The child of
a taxpayer is a qualifying child if that child has the same
principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half
of the taxable year and meets certain age and self-support
restrictions not at issue here. Sec. 152(c). The record,
however, is devoid of any evidence that B.B. and petitioners
shared the same principal place of abode.
Section 152(e) provides a special rule for divorced parents.
In pertinent part, section 152(e)(1) provides that if a child
receives over one-half of the child’s support during the calendar
year from the child’s parents, who are divorced, and the child is
in the custody of one or both parents for more than one-half of
the calendar year, then the child is treated as being the
qualifying child of the noncustodial parent for the calendar year
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if certain other requirements are met.3 These other requirements
are met if: (1) The custodial parent signs a written declaration
(in such manner and form as the Secretary may by regulations
prescribe) that the custodial parent will not claim the child as
a dependent for the taxable year; and (2) the noncustodial parent
attaches the written declaration to the noncustodial parent’s
return for the taxable year.4 Sec. 152(e)(2); sec. 1.152-4T(a),
Q&A-3, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34459 (Aug. 31,
1984).
The written declaration may be made on a form provided by
the Internal Revenue Service or a document that conforms to the
substance of such form. Miller v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 184,
3
We assume without deciding that Mr. Bitzberger and
Catherine together provided more than half of B.B.’s support
during 2006.
4
In 2004 Congress considered, but promptly rejected, a rule
that would have treated a State court order as a sufficient basis
for claiming the dependency exemption. See Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA), Pub. L. 108-311, sec. 201, 118 Stat.
1169 (amending sec. 152(e)(2), effective for taxable years
beginning after Dec. 31, 2004, to provide that a noncustodial
parent is entitled to the dependency exemption deduction for a
child supported by the divorced parents together if “a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance or written separation agreement
* * * provides that * * * the noncustodial parent shall be
entitled to any deduction allowable under section 151 for such
child”). However, Congress promptly reconsidered and
retroactively repealed the 2004 change before the end of 2005, so
that it had no effect. See Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-135, sec. 404, 119 Stat. 2632 (retroactively amending
sec. 152(e)(2), effective as if included in the WFTRA, to
eliminate the noncustodial parent’s entitlement to a dependency
exemption deduction pursuant to a State court decree).
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191 (2000). The written declaration is embodied in Form 8332,
and it incorporates the requirements of section 152(e). Miller
v. Commissioner, supra at 190.5
We infer from petitioners’ assertion that “I sent a copy of
[the final judgment] with my * * * [2006] returns [sic]-as I do
every year” to suggest that the copy of the final judgment of
dissolution of marriage conforms to the substance of Form 8332.
It is beyond debate, however, that neither Catherine nor Mr.
Bitzberger signed the final judgment.
This Court has held that section 152(e)(2) clearly and
unambiguously requires the custodial parent to sign a written
declaration releasing the dependency exemption for his or her
child to the noncustodial parent. Miller v. Commissioner, supra
at 193. In rejecting a noncustodial parent’s claim to the
dependency exemption deduction where the custodial parent failed
to sign a written declaration, this Court stated:
Even where a State court judge has entered an order
“granting” the noncustodial parent the right to claim
the Federal dependency exemption for his child and the
noncustodial parent attached a copy of the order to his
tax return, we have rejected the noncustodial parent’s
claim to the dependency exemption where the custodial
5
Form 8332 requires a taxpayer to furnish: (1) The names
of the children for whom the exemption claims are released; (2)
the years for which the claims are released; (3) the signature of
the custodial parent confirming his or her consent; (4) the
Social Security number of the custodial parent; (5) the date of
the custodial parent’s signature; and (6) the name and the Social
Security number of the parent claiming the exemption. Miller v.
Commissioner,
114 T.C. 184, 190 (2000).
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parent failed to sign a written declaration as required
by section 152(e). * * *
Id. at 193-194 (citing Neal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-97).
In this case we find that the final judgment does not
conform to the substance of Form 8332, and we further note that a
State court cannot determine issues of Federal tax law. See
Kenfield v. United States,
783 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1986); Miller
v. Commissioner, supra at 196; White v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-438 (citing with approval Commissioner v. Tower,
327 U.S.
280 (1946)). Consequently, the final judgment does not vest
petitioners with a right to claim B.B. as a dependent absent
compliance with the requirements of section 152(e).
In sum, while the parties agree that B.B. is Mr.
Bitzberger’s daughter, the final judgment awards Catherine
custody of B.B.; and there is no evidence in the record nor any
dispute to suggest that Catherine did not have custody during
2006. Consequently, we find that Catherine was the custodial
parent of B.B. for 2006 as defined in section 152(e)(4)(A).
Moreover, petitioners did not attach to their 2006 return a Form
8332 or a written declaration conforming to the substance of Form
8332. See sec. 152(e)(2). Accordingly, we hold that petitioners
are not entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for B.B. for
2006.6
6
Petitioners also assert that both before and after 2006
(continued...)
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Child Tax Credit
Subject to income limitations not pertinent here, a child
tax credit is allowed with respect to each qualifying child of
the taxpayer. Sec. 24(a) and (b). For this purpose, section
24(c)(1) defines “qualifying child” as a qualifying child of the
taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has not attained age
17. Because petitioners failed to establish that B.B. was a
qualifying child under either section 152(c) or the exception of
section 152(e)(2), they have not satisfied the “qualifying child”
requirement of the child tax credit under section 24. See Walker
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-194. Accordingly, we sustain
respondent’s determination and hold that petitioners are not
entitled to the child tax credit claimed with respect to B.B. for
2006.
6
(...continued)
they claimed the dependency exemption deduction for B.B. and the
IRS allowed those deductions. Petitioners’ position is in the
nature of an argument for equitable estoppel. However, each tax
year stands on its own and must be separately considered. Haeder
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-7 (citing United States v.
Skelly Oil Co.,
394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969)). Furthermore, it is
well settled that the Commissioner cannot be estopped from
correcting a mistake of law, even where a taxpayer may have
relied to his detriment on that mistake. Dixon v. United States,
381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner,
353 U.S. 180, 183-184 (1957); see also Massaglia v. Commissioner,
286 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1961), affg.
33 T.C. 379 (1959);
Zuanich v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 428, 432-433 (1981).
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In reaching our decision, we have considered all arguments
made, and to the extent not mentioned, we conclude they are
irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.