Judges: "Cohen, Mary Ann"
Attorneys: Ronald F. Hood , for petitioners. Daniel P. Ryan , for respondent.
Filed: Nov. 25, 2009
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2009-269 UNITED STATES TAX COURT VINCENT & GINA DEAN, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent VINCENT DEAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 20812-07L, 20943-07L. Filed November 25, 2009. Ronald F. Hood, for petitioners. Daniel P. Ryan, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION COHEN, Judge: This proceeding was commenced in response to two Notices of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2009-269 UNITED STATES TAX COURT VINCENT & GINA DEAN, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent VINCENT DEAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 20812-07L, 20943-07L. Filed November 25, 2009. Ronald F. Hood, for petitioners. Daniel P. Ryan, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION COHEN, Judge: This proceeding was commenced in response to two Notices of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 ..
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T.C. Memo. 2009-269
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
VINCENT & GINA DEAN, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
VINCENT DEAN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 20812-07L, 20943-07L. Filed November 25, 2009.
Ronald F. Hood, for petitioners.
Daniel P. Ryan, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
COHEN, Judge: This proceeding was commenced in response to
two Notices of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s)
Under Section 6320 and/or 6330. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) sent a notice of determination to Vincent Dean (petitioner)
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for his income tax liabilities for 2001, sustaining the proposed
levy with respect to his unpaid taxes for 2001. The case at
docket No. 20943-07L arises from a petition filed in response to
the notice sent to petitioner for 2001. The IRS sent a separate
notice of determination to Vincent and Gina Dean (petitioners)
with respect to their outstanding joint income tax liabilities
for 2002, 2003, and 2004, sustaining the proposed levy for the
unpaid taxes for these years. The case at docket No. 20812-07L
arises from a petition filed in response to this notice sent to
petitioners. The cases were consolidated for trial, briefing,
and opinion.
The issue for decision is whether the IRS Appeals Office
abused its discretion by rejecting offers-in-compromise (OICs)
made by petitioners and in determining that proposed levies on
petitioners’ property were appropriate.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated
facts are incorporated in our findings by this reference.
Petitioners resided in St. Louis County, Minnesota, at the time
the petitions were filed.
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On April 3, 2006, the IRS sent petitioner a Letter 1058,
Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing, under section 6330 with respect to his Federal income
taxes for 2001. Attached to the Letter 1058 was an account
summary showing that petitioner’s liability for 2001 consisted of
an assessed balance of $53,008.19 plus interest of $2,135.89 and
a late payment penalty of $1,254.44, for a total of $56,398.52.
On April 3, 2006, the IRS sent petitioners a Letter 1058
with respect to their Federal income taxes for 2002, 2003, and
2004. Attached to the Letter 1058 was an account summary showing
that petitioners’ liabilities were as follows:
Year Assessed Balance Interest Penalty Total
2002 $37,715.89 $1,572.43 $1,353.44 $40,641.76
2003 27,318.16 1,138.92 1,045.22 29,502.30
2004 21,032.22 642.83 391.72 22,066.77
On May 3, 2006, the IRS received timely Forms 12153, Request
for a Collection Due Process Hearing, from petitioners’ attorney,
Ronald Hood (Hood), in response to the Letters 1058--one for
petitioner and one for petitioners. On the Forms 12153,
petitioners did not challenge the underlying tax liabilities but
stated their desire for OICs or installment agreements.
Petitioners’ collection due process (CDP) hearings were
assigned to the same settlement officer in the Appeals Office.
On November 4, 2006, petitioners, through Hood, sent to the
settlement officer one Form 656, Offer in Compromise, on the
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basis of doubt as to collectibility regarding the outstanding tax
liabilities for 2001-04. (The Form 656 also included tax years
2000 and 2005). With their OIC petitioners submitted financial
information about themselves on Form 433-A, Collection
Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed
Individuals, and about petitioner’s business on Form 433-B,
Collection Information Statement for Businesses. In response to
a phone conversation between the settlement officer and Hood,
additional information regarding petitioner’s business was
submitted on November 16, 2006.
The settlement officer and Hood subsequently had several
telephone conversations. In one of these telephone
conversations, the settlement officer conveyed to Hood that the
monthly housing and utilities expenses of $2,511 petitioners
claimed on the Form 433-A exceeded the IRS Local Standard for
Housing and Utilities which, for a family of five in St. Louis
County, Minnesota, was a maximum of $1,115.
On December 23, 2006, Hood sent a letter to the settlement
officer that she perceived as possibly threatening. She
discussed it with her manager, who referred the letter to the IRS
Office of Professional Responsibility.
In her research to verify the information petitioners
provided on the submitted Form 433-A and determine the reasonable
collection potential (RCP), the settlement officer concluded that
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she needed clarification regarding the real property that
petitioners owned. On their Form 433-A, petitioners listed two
parcels of real property that they owned with a total current
value of $250,500. However, the settlement officer’s online
research of the St. Louis County public records revealed
additional parcels of real property listed in petitioners’ names.
Thus, on January 8, 2007, the settlement officer sent a letter to
petitioners requesting that they provide information to her by
January 31, 2007, regarding their real property.
On January 30, 2007, Hood sent a letter on petitioners’
behalf to the settlement officer providing information regarding
their real property ownership. Hood noted that “Some of the
parcels * * * are in fact Contracts for Deed, in which either
Vincent and/or Gina Dean are only the buyers/purchasers and these
parcels are still owned by the seller.” Petitioners submitted
documentation regarding the real property that they owned through
warranty deeds that had been included on Form 433-A. Petitioners
also submitted the documents for two real property parcels
showing that contracts for deed had been executed.
One contract for deed was executed August 9, 2001, for
property described as “Lot 8, Block 2, Dorem, St. Louis County,
Minnesota, except the Easterly 40 feet thereof” (parcel No. 317-
0075-00160). The purchase price was $36,000, and there was an
initial $10,000 downpayment. Another contract for deed was
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executed May 17, 2002, for property described as “Lot 2, Block 1,
Plat of Dorem” (parcel No. 317-0075-00020). The purchase price
was $75,000, and there was an initial $2,000 downpayment. In the
documents petitioners submitted to the settlement officer, they
included information that identified the outstanding balances
that remained on both contracts for deed: $424.02 for parcel No.
317-0075-00160 and $68,335.29 for parcel No. 317-0075-00020. The
contracts for deed provided that the purchasers were to pay all
real estate taxes and maintain liability insurance.
On April 4, 2007, the settlement officer sent petitioners a
letter summarizing her analysis of their financial information
for the purpose of calculating the RCP and stated that the
“figures listed were calculated using the information received as
of 4/3/2007 and the information is provided to allow you to
discuss collection alternatives in resolving your outstanding
personal income tax liabilities.”
In her analysis, the settlement officer prepared an asset
equity table that included the two parcels with the contracts for
deed/dissipated assets and noted:
The taxpayers entered into contracts for deed for
Parcel # 317-0075-00020 and Parcel # 317-0075-00160 in
Ely [sic] County, MN. Since they entered into these
contracts, the taxpayers paid $42,340.69 towards the
contracts that could have been paid towards their
outstanding income tax liabilities for the years 2000
through 2005 inclusive.
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In calculating the RCP, the settlement officer used the amounts
petitioners had paid, not the assessed values of the land.
Additionally, using information petitioners provided, the
settlement officer identified the actual monthly housing and
utilities expenses as $2,364 consisting of: A monthly mortgage
payment of $1,753, which included taxes and insurance; average
monthly electricity expense of $384; telephone expense of $103;
trash collection of $69; and $55 for DirectTV. The settlement
officer further explained the housing and utilities expenses she
allowed according to the IRS local standards:
Maximum allowable amount for a family of 5 in St. Louis
County, MN is $1,115. I allowed $300 more a month than
the allowable amount due to the fact that there are 5
living in the house and the electricity and water bills
may be higher due to their being a family of 5.
They have presented no special circumstances, such
as the need for handicapped accessible housing, as to
why the $2,511 in actual amount of housing expenses,
which are $1,249 over the allowable amount, should be
allowed, other than that the amounts listed are what
they are actually paying to meet their basic living
expenses.
Based on the information received from petitioners, the
inclusion of the properties with executed contracts for deed, and
the use of the local standard for housing with her $300 addition,
the settlement officer calculated the RCP to be $137,308 (if the
offered amount were to be paid in 5 months or less, or $147,124
if the offered amount were to be paid in more than 5 months but
less than 60 months). In her letter, the settlement officer gave
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petitioners until May 3, 2007, to submit an acceptable collection
alternative and noted that failure to do so would result in the
issuance of the notices of determination.
On May 2, 2007, Hood sent a letter to the settlement officer
on petitioners’ behalf with a proposed OIC. In this OIC
submitted for years 2000 through 2006, petitioners offered to pay
$102,350. In the OIC, petitioners stated:
We disagree with the IRS analysis regarding the
allowances for housing and utilities, transportation
and the issue of dissipated assets. As a consequence
of our disagreement on these issues, our offer of
$102,350.00 is less than the IRS’s reasonable
collection potential (RCP) amount of which we disagree.
* * *
On May 7, 2007, the settlement officer sent a letter to
petitioners informing them that they needed to submit two OICs--
one in petitioner’s name for 2000 and 2001 and a second in
petitioners’ names for 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. On May 29,
2007, petitioners submitted two OICs, both based on doubt as to
collectibility. In the OIC submitted for his 2000 and 2001
income tax liabilities, petitioner offered to pay $33,775, to be
paid over 115 months in monthly payments of $294. In the OIC
submitted for their 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 income tax
liabilities, petitioners offered to pay $68,575, to be paid over
115 months in monthly payments of $596. The offered amounts were
less than the RCP as calculated by the settlement officer, and in
both OICs it was noted that there was disagreement with the
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settlement officer’s analysis regarding the allowance for housing
and utilities, the allowance for transportation expenses, and the
issue of dissipated assets.
On August 14, 2007, the IRS sent two separate Notices of
Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320
and/or 6330. The notices of determination were both signed by
the same Appeals team manager and each contained a “Summary of
Determination” stating:
Based on the information in the case file, the
Notice of Intent to Levy was appropriate at the time it
was issued. No acceptable collection alternatives
could be agreed to. Collection action would be
appropriate to collect this debt. This analysis
indicates that this action is now necessary to provide
for the efficient collection of the taxes despite the
potential intrusiveness of enforced collection.
Petitions were timely filed with the Court in response to the
notices.
At trial respondent’s counsel objected to petitioner’s
testimony as outside the administrative record, arguing that
petitioner’s testimony would not add to or explain anything
regarding the administrative record or the CDP hearing because
petitioner had counsel--and did not participate himself--in the
CDP hearing. The Court reserved ruling on this objection.
OPINION
Section 6330 provides for notice and opportunity for a
hearing before the IRS may levy upon the property of any person.
Under section 6330(c)(3), the determination to proceed with a
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collection action “shall take into consideration * * * whether
any proposed collection action balances the need for the
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the
person that any collection action be no more intrusive than
necessary.”
This Court has jurisdiction to review the collection
activities of the Commissioner only with respect to tax
liabilities for which a valid notice of determination has been
issued. Sec. 6330(d)(1). Valid notices of determination were
issued as to collection of petitioner’s income tax liability for
2001 and petitioners’ income tax liabilities for 2002, 2003, and
2004, and petitions were filed identifying those years. However,
the OICs submitted to the IRS included proposed compromises for
years not subjects of the notices of determination.
The Court lacks jurisdiction to review collection of the
liabilities for the years not included in the notices of
determination. See Sullivan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-4.
In determining whether the rejection of the OICs and the
collection of the years included in the notices of determination
is appropriate, this Court is authorized (as the settlement
officer was required) to consider “any relevant issue relating to
* * * the proposed levy”. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A), (d). Therefore,
we evaluate the settlement officer’s exercise of discretion in
rejecting the OICs, taking into account all the liabilities that
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were proposed to be compromised, even though we do not have
jurisdiction to review the collection of all those liabilities.
See, e.g., Orum v. Commissioner,
123 T.C. 1 (2004) (reviewing an
OIC that covers income tax liabilities for tax years that are
both within and outside of this Court’s jurisdiction), affd.
412
F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2005).
Petitioners have not challenged their underlying
liabilities. Accordingly, we review the Appeals Office’s
determination for abuse of discretion. See Sego v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). An action constitutes an abuse of
discretion if it is arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis
in fact or law. Giamelli v. Commissioner,
129 T.C. 107, 111
(2007).
The parties agree that these cases are appealable to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court has held
that judicial review of nonliability issues under section 6330(d)
is limited to the administrative record, subject to exceptions
that are not applicable here. Robinette v. Commissioner,
439
F.3d 455, 461-462 (8th Cir. 2006), revg.
123 T.C. 85 (2004); see
also Fifty Below Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. United States,
497 F.3d
828, 829-830 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the review of a CDP
decision rendered by an Appeals officer under section 6330 is
limited to the administrative record before the Appeals officer).
See generally Murphy v. Commissioner,
469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.
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2006) (listing exceptions to administrative record rule), affg.
125 T.C. 301 (2005). The administrative record consists of the
case file, including the taxpayer’s written request for a
hearing, written communications or information submitted in
connection with the CDP hearing, IRS notes of any oral
communications with the taxpayer, IRS memoranda in connection
with the hearing, and any other documents or materials used by
the IRS Appeals officer or employee in making a determination
under section 6330(c)(3). See Robinette v. Commissioner, supra
at 461-462.
Respondent asserts that petitioner’s testimony should be
disregarded because it is outside the administrative record.
Petitioner’s attorney--not petitioner--participated in the CDP
hearing. Thus, petitioner’s testimony is not relevant in
determining whether the Appeals Office’s refusal to accept the
OICs was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in law or
fact. See Murphy v. Commissioner, supra at 31; Robinette v.
Commissioner, supra at 461. Therefore, we sustain respondent’s
objection regarding the consideration of petitioner’s testimony.
Section 7122(a) authorizes compromise of a taxpayer’s
Federal income tax liability. The grounds for compromise of a
tax liability include doubt as to collectibility. Sec. 301.7122-
1(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Petitioners based both of their
most recently submitted OICs on doubt as to collectibility, which
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“exists in any case where the taxpayer’s assets and income are
less than the full amount of the liability.”
Id. Generally,
under the Commissioner’s administrative guidelines, an offer to
compromise based on doubt as to collectibility will be acceptable
only if it reflects the RCP. See Internal Revenue Manual (IRM),
pt. 5.8.1.1.3(3) (Sept. 1, 2005); see also Rev. Proc. 2003-71,
sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517 (stating that an offer will be
considered acceptable if it reflects the taxpayer’s RCP). Where
the Appeals officer has followed the IRS guidelines to ascertain
a taxpayer’s RCP and has rejected the taxpayer’s collection
alternative on that basis, we generally have found no abuse of
discretion. See McClanahan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-161;
Lemann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-37.
Petitioners contend that in determining the RCP, the
settlement officer reached an unrealistic result by: (1) Using
the local standard allowance for monthly housing and utilities
expenses and (2) including the contracts for deed, because
petitioners claim these were not property that petitioners
“owned”.
Although petitioners stated on their Forms 656 that they
also disagreed with the transportation expense allowance, they
did not raise this issue in their petition or at trial. A
petition for review of a collection action must clearly specify
the errors alleged to have been committed in the notice of
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determination, and any issues not raised in the assignments of
error are deemed conceded by the taxpayer. Rule 331(b)(4); see
Goza v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000). The
transportation expense allowance issue is deemed conceded.
Local Standard Allowance for Housing and Utilities Expenses
Respondent asserts that
Petitioners erroneously argue that the issue in
this case is whether the local standards for housing
and utilities accurately reflect the costs for a family
to reside in St. Louis County, Minnesota. Instead, the
issue to be decided by the Court is whether * * * [the
settlement officer] abused her discretion in applying
the local standards for housing and utilities rather
than petitioners’ claimed expenses in determining an
acceptable OIC amount.
Petitioners’ disagreement is, in essence, with the
settlement officer’s use of the local standards for housing and
utilities expenses as published by the IRS for St. Louis County,
Minnesota. Petitioners do not contend that the settlement
officer misapplied these standard allowances. They challenge the
legitimacy of the IRS prescribed county-by-county standard
allowances and argue that the IRS guidelines are “clearly”
arbitrary on their face and do not follow the congressional
mandate of section 7122 because counties in the United States
vary in size and population and it would be more equitable for
the local standards to be issued on a city and town level.
In 1998 Congress directed the Secretary to prescribe
guidelines for calculating allowable living expenses when
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determining the taxpayer’s current financial condition and
ability to pay delinquent taxes. See Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3462,
112 Stat. 764; sec. 7122(d) (enacted as sec. 7122(c)). The
Secretary was also directed to “develop and publish schedules of
national and local allowances designed to provide that taxpayers
entering into a compromise have an adequate means to provide for
basic living expenses.” Sec. 7122(d)(2)(A). The IRS has thus
developed collection financial standards that include national
standards for general living expenses and local standards for
housing, utilities, and transportation. Local standards for
housing are established for each county within a state. See IRM
pt. 5.15.1.7 (May 1, 2004).
Petitioners argue that the use of local standards is a
violation of their “fundamental rights of procedural due process”
and that respondent should have been required to present expert
testimony about the manner in which the standards were developed.
Petitioners’ rights to a precollection hearing and to compromise
their undisputed tax liability are privileges created by
Congress, subject to conditions established by Congress. They
have no constitutional right to avoid payment of their admitted
tax liabilities and, absent the 1998 legislation, had no rights
to precollection procedures. Their attempt to raise the dispute
to constitutional levels is unpersuasive.
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When section 7122 was amended in 2006 to add provisions
governing the submission and evaluation of OICs, Congress did not
question the promulgated local standards, thus lending support to
the IRS local standards as developed and in use at that time.
See Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub.
L. 109-222, sec. 509(a), (b), (d), 120 Stat. 362-364 (2006).
Congress also signaled its support for the IRS standards as
developed by referring to “amounts specified under the National
Standards and Local Standards” in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, sec. 102, 119
Stat. 27, and used to determine allowable living expenses of
above-median income debtors. See 11 U.S.C. secs. 707(b)(2)(A),
1325(b) (2006). Petitioners’ argument that the local standards
should not be determined on a county level is not persuasive in
the light of the actions of Congress.
This Court has sustained use of the IRS published national
and local allowances as guidelines for basic monthly living
expenses in evaluating the adequacy of proposed installment
agreements and OICs. See, e.g., Speltz v. Commissioner,
124 T.C.
165, 179 (2005), affd.
454 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2006); Fernandez v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-210 (no abuse of discretion found
when the taxpayer argued that the local standard allowance for
monthly housing and utilities expenses would make it “almost
impossible to own a family size house” in South Florida).
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Generally, this Court has found no abuse of discretion where
Appeals officers used the housing and utilities standard
allowances rather than the taxpayer’s actual expenses. See Marks
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-226; Diffee v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-304; cf. Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-
163 (holding that an Appeals officer abused his discretion in
determining, on the basis of the standard allowance guidelines,
that the taxpayer could not live as cheaply as they had claimed
and so could not afford their proposed installment payments).
Petitioners identified their actual monthly housing and
utilities expenses as $2,511. The settlement officer applied the
published local standards for housing and utilities expenses of
$1,115 for St. Louis County, Minnesota and added $300 because of
the size of petitioners’ family, resulting in a total monthly
allowance of $1,415.
Petitioners contend that the settlement officer should have
conducted research to show the availability of less expensive
housing in St. Louis County for petitioners, presented an
analysis showing the costs for petitioners to move, and performed
research on the tax consequences of such a move. The taxpayer
has the burden to submit information to Appeals to justify a
departure from the local standards. See Lindley v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2006-229 (no abuse of discretion to use local
standards when taxpayer does not make showing that he will be
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unable to provide for basic living expenses), affd. sub nom.
Keller v. Commissioner,
568 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2009). No
evidence concerning the alleged cost of moving to a new residence
was presented during the CDP hearing, and it was not the burden
of the settlement officer to secure evidence supporting
petitioners’ position.
Petitioners have not shown that the settlement officer did
not properly apply the provisions of the Code, the regulations,
or the IRM with respect to the local standard allowance for
monthly housing and utilities expenses. There was, therefore, no
abuse of discretion in regard to that element of the
determination.
Dissipated Assets
Where a taxpayer has dissipated assets in disregard of the
taxpayer’s outstanding Federal income taxes, the dissipated
assets may be included in the calculation of the minimum amount
that is to be paid under an acceptable OIC. See IRM pt.
5.8.5.4(5) (Sept. 1, 2005). A dissipated asset is defined as any
asset (liquid or not liquid) that has been sold, transferred, or
spent on nonpriority items and/or debts and is no longer
available to pay the tax liability. See Samuel v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-312; IRM pt. 5.8.5.4(1) (Sept. 1, 2005).
Petitioners assert that they have no equity in two parcels
of real property in Minnesota for which they entered contracts
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for deed. In a letter dated January 30, 2007, sent to the
settlement officer on petitioners’ behalf, Hood stated that the
parcels were not listed on their Form 433-A because petitioners
were required to list all real estate that they “own”. Thus,
petitioners contend that the settlement officer erred by
including those two properties to calculate the RCP.
The settlement officer included the amounts petitioners had
already paid on the contracts for deed when calculating the RCP,
not the assessed value of the real properties. The purchase
price of parcel No. 317-0075-00160 was $36,000, and an
outstanding balance of $424.02 remained; thus, the settlement
officer determined petitioners had paid $35,575.98. The purchase
price of parcel No. 317-0075-00020 was $75,000, and an
outstanding balance of $68,335.29 remained; thus, the settlement
officer determined petitioners had paid $6,664.71. When these
amounts were paid, petitioner had outstanding tax liabilities
going back to 2000. Petitioners have offered no evidence
contradicting the reasonable assumptions of the settlement
officer.
We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
settlement officer to include the amounts petitioners had paid on
the parcels of real property with executed contracts for deed
when calculating the RCP. We need not address the arguments of
the parties about whether petitioners had an equity interest in
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the parcels because the settlement officer included only the
amounts paid and not the assessed values of the parcels.
Appeals Office Impartiality Requirement
Finally, petitioners argue that the CDP hearing failed to
satisfy the impartiality requirements under section 6330(b)(3).
Petitioners base their argument on the referral to the IRS Office
of Professional Responsibility of a letter written by Hood to the
settlement officer. The letter was intemperate and was
reasonably perceived as possibly threatening. We are unpersuaded
that the referral was an inappropriate or excessive response or
that the ultimate determination to reject petitioners’ OICs was
affected by counsel’s letter or the referral based on it.
For purposes of section 6330(b)(3), an “impartial” officer
is one “who has had no prior involvement with respect to the
unpaid tax specified in subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first
hearing under this section or section 6320.” See Perez v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-274. Petitioners have presented no
evidence that either the settlement officer or the Appeals team
manager was involved in their cases before the first hearing
under section 6330. We conclude that the section 6330(b)(3)
impartiality requirement was satisfied.
Ultimately, the issue in this proceeding is whether there
was an abuse of discretion when the Appeals Office refused
petitioners’ requested collection alternatives and subsequently
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determined that the proposed levy should proceed. The settlement
officer followed applicable procedures in considering
petitioners’ request for a collection alternative, and rejection
of the OICs was not arbitrary, capricious, or without sound
basis. Further, the Appeals team manager did not act in an
arbitrary or capricious way, or in an unlawful or unreasonable
manner, in sustaining respondent’s proposed collection action
and, accordingly, did not abuse his discretion. In sum, we
conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the Appeals
Office in rejecting the OICs and in sustaining the levy.
In reaching our decisions, we have considered all arguments
made by the parties. To the extent not mentioned or addressed,
they are irrelevant or without merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decisions will be entered
for respondent.