Respondent argues that there has been no determination with respect to either of petitioner's claims because the information provided was not used to detect underpayments of tax or to collect proceeds. Respondent argues that there can be a determination 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*44 on which an appeal to the Tax Court can be based only if the Whistleblower Office undertakes an administrative or judicial action and thereafter determines to make an award.

We recently decided this issue in Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70">135 T.C. 70 (2010). Faced with identical arguments from the Commissioner in Cooper, we held that a letter rejecting a whistleblower claim constitutes a determination within the meaning of section 7623(b)(4) because it is a final administrative decision. We see no reason not to follow our holding in Cooper. Here the denial letter from the Whistleblower Office states that petitioner is not entitled to an award. It is a final administrative decision. Accordingly, we find that each of the June 19, 2009, denial letters constitutes a determination within the meaning of section 7623(b)(4).

In 2006 the Tax Court was given jurisdiction to hear appeals of determinations under the whistleblower statute (section 7623(b)(4)) and the lien and levy statute (section 6330(d)). Both statutes use similar language to describe the period within which a person may appeal an adverse determination to the Tax Court. Section 7623(b)(4) provides that an appeal must be filed 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*45 "within 30 days of such determination", while section 6330(d) provides that an appeal must be filed "within 30 days of a determination under this section". Neither statute expressly provides that the determination must be communicated to the person subject to the determination. Yet Congress clearly intended to provide a whistleblower with due process; i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard. Requiring the Whistleblower Office to provide the whistleblower with notice of the determination is the logical first step to establish the starting date for the period of appeal.⁴ Otherwise, the IRS could delay notifying the claimant until 30 days after the determination is issued and thereby deprive a claimant of any appeal rights.

When considering notice requirements in lien and levy cases, we have held in Weber v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 258">122 T.C. 258, 122 T.C. 258">261-262 (2004):

Although 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*46 section 6330(d) does not specify the means by which the Commissioner is required to give notice of a determination made under sections 6320 and 6330, we conclude that the method that Congress specifically authorized for sending notices of deficiency in section 6212(a) and (b) certainly should suffice. Accordingly, we hold that a notice of determination issued pursuant to sections 6320 and/or 6330 is sufficient if such notice is sent by certified or registered mail to a taxpayer at the taxpayer's last known address. * * *

137 T.C. 37">*43 In contrast, for whistleblower cases, 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*47 the IRS issued internal guidance governing the Whistleblower Office's operations. Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), pt. 25.2.2, Whistleblower Awards. IRM pt. 25.2.2.13 (Dec. 30, 2008), in effect for the date the denial letters were issued in this case, stated:

Once the Whistleblower Office has made a final determination regarding a claim, the Whistleblower Office will communicate the determination, in writing, to the claimant. Final Whistleblower Office determinations regarding awards under section 7623(b) may, within 30 days of such determination, be appealed to the United States Tax Court. In accordance with section 7623(b)(4), decisions under section 7623(a) may not be appealed to the Tax Court.

We hold that the Commissioner must demonstrate either mailing or personal delivery of a denial letter to the whistleblower's last known address.

The denial letters are dated June 19, 2009. Petitioner filed his petition with the Court on June 14, 2010, 360 days later. Petitioner's petition references only the denial letter for the CEO claim. Petitioner argues that he did not receive a denial letter in reference to the corporate claim. Petitioner further argues that he did not receive a denial letter in reference to the CEO claim until May 24, 2010, when the Whistleblower Office sent him a copy of the June 19, 2009, letter in response to his request for information on the status of his whistleblower claim. Accordingly, petitioner 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*49 argues that his petition with respect to the CEO claim is timely and that he has yet to receive a determination with respect to the corporate claim.

137 T.C. 37">*44 Respondent argues that the denial letters were mailed to petitioner on June 19, 2009, the date they were prepared, and, therefore, petitioner's 30-day window to appeal the denial letters began on that date. Because no appeal was filed as to the corporate claim and the appeal on the CEO claim was filed outside the 30-day period, respondent argues that we are without jurisdiction to review the determinations.

The Government is generally entitled to a rebuttable presumption of delivery upon presentation of evidence of proper mailing. See Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427">285 U.S. 427, 285 U.S. 427">430, 52 S. Ct. 417">52 S. Ct. 417, 76 L. Ed. 861">76 L. Ed. 861 (1932); Godfrey v. United States, 997 F.2d 335">997 F.2d 335, 997 F.2d 335">338 (7th Cir. 1993); Doolin v. United States, 918 F.2d 15">918 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1990). Although the Whistleblower Office did not have a certified mailing requirement at the time the denial letters were issued, respondent argues there is a strong inference of delivery when it is shown that the Whistleblower Office complied with its internal procedures for mailing of the denial letters in the regular course of 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*50 its operations. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cy. Inc., 171 F.3d 1197">171 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1999); 997 F.2d 335">Godfrey v. United States, supra; Gonzales Packing Co. v. East Coast Brokers & Packers, Inc., 961 F.2d 1543">961 F.2d 1543, 961 F.2d 1543">1545 (11th Cir. 1992); McClaskey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-147. A strong inference must arise from more than unsupported conclusory statements of an individual based on his assumption of how mail was handled in the normal course of business in his office. See Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174">450 F.2d 174, 450 F.2d 174">178 (8th Cir. 1971); 961 F.2d 1543">Gonzales Packing Co. v. East Coast Brokers & Packers, Inc., supra at 1545.

Respondent argues that the standard operating procedures within the Whistleblower Office were followed to prove that the denial letters were mailed. The Whistleblower Office's e-trak system was described. The e-Trak system is a computer record which indicates that a denial letter was sent but does not confirm where it was sent, to whom it was sent, or whether it was a part of the Whistleblower Office's outgoing mail.

137 T.C. 37">*45 Nor was there a mailing log. In McClaskey v. Commissioner, supra, we held that mailing logs showing a taxpayer's name and last known address, confirmation 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*51 that the log was reviewed for accuracy, and the testimony of an agent familiar with the IRS' mailing procedures were sufficient to prove that a notice of beginning of administrative proceeding had been mailed. Respondent has not presented similar mailing logs or any other direct evidence that the denial letters were properly mailed to petitioner on June 19, 2009.

Although evidence of standard practice will be afforded appropriate weight as the circumstances of each case require, we cannot find that compliance with standard practices within the Whistleblower Office, standing alone, permits a finding that the denial letters in question were mailed to petitioner on June 19, 2009. The date a determination is mailed is of critical importance to establish our jurisdiction to review a taxpayer's case. We will hold we do not have jurisdiction when a taxpayer does not meet the 30-day requirement. And as we have emphasized in cases involving our jurisdiction: "In this setting, we must require * * * [the Commissioner] to prove by direct evidence the date and fact of mailing the notice to a taxpayer." Magazine v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 321">89 T.C. 321, 89 T.C. 321">326 (1987).

We hold that the 30-day period of section 7623(b)(4)2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*52 within which a whistleblower must file a petition in response to a Whistleblower Office determination begins on the date of mailing or personal delivery of the determination to the whistleblower at his last known address. We further hold that the Commissioner must prove by direct evidence the date and fact of mailing or personal delivery of the notice to the whistleblower. Respondent failed to prove that the denial letters were properly mailed to petitioner on June 19, 2009. The denial letter for the CEO claim, however, was mailed on May 24, 2010. Petitioner filed his petition with the Court on June 14, 2010. Accordingly, petitioner timely filed his petition with respect to the CEO claim.⁷

In reaching these holdings, the Court has considered all arguments made and, to the extent not mentioned, concludes that they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

137 T.C. 37">*46 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny respondent's motion to dismiss as to the CEO claim.

An appropriate order 2011 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 36">*53 will be issued.