PURSUANT TO
Decision will be entered for petitioners.
ARMEN,
Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' 2008 Federal income tax of $2,138. The issues for decision are whether petitioners must recognize cancellation of indebtedness (COI) income in 2008 and, if so, in what amount. Because we hold that petitioners did not have COI income in 2008, we need not and do not discuss the subsidiary issue.
Some of the facts have been stipulated, and they are so found. We incorporate by reference the parties' stipulation of facts and accompanying exhibits. Petitioners resided in the State of Illinois when the petition was filed.
On 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*44 October 22, 1994, David Scott Stewart (petitioner) incurred a credit card obligation to Maryland Bank National Association (MBNA). Petitioner defaulted on his obligation to MBNA at some time between October 22, 1994, and September 6, 1996. Petitioner made no payments on the debt after the default. MBNA charged off the debt on September 12, 1996. At some point between September 12, 1996, and December 28, 2007, NCO Portfolio Management, Inc. (NCO), acquired petitioner's defaulted account from MBNA.
On December 28, 2007, Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (PRA), acquired petitioner's defaulted account from NCO. Although aware that a State statute of limitations period for commencing collection activity in regard to the debt had expired on February 15,2001, PRA began making automated attempts to collect payments from petitioner.
On April 14, 2008, PRA received a letter from petitioner (2008 letter) that demanded PRA cease its automated collection activities. Once PRA received the 2008 letter, the company stopped its automated attempts at collection and took no other collection-related action. PRA subsequently issued to petitioner a Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, which reported $8,570.71 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*45 in COI income for the taxable year 2008.
Petitioners timely filed a joint Federal income tax return for 2008 but did not include the purported COI income on the return.
In a notice of deficiency respondent increased petitioners' income by the amount reported on the Form 1099-C. Petitioners subsequently filed a timely petition with this Court to contest the deficiency determined by respondent.
Pursuant to section 6201(d), if an information return, such as a Form 1099-C, serves as the basis for the determination of a deficiency, the burden of production may shift to the Commissioner.
Petitioners raise a reasonable dispute with respect to the accuracy of 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*46 the information return. Petitioners contend that the indebtedness at issue in this case was actually discharged long before 2008. Petitioners further contend that the amount of income reported on the Form 1099-C is incorrect. 3 There is no evidence in the record to suggest that petitioners failed to cooperate with respondent. Thus, under section 6201 (d), the burden is on respondent to produce reasonable and probative information concerning the information return issued by PRA as well as the deficiency in this case.
Respondent provided account reports from PRA in order to satisfy his burden of production. The account reports include the date PRA acquired petitioner's defaulted account, the original account balance received by PRA, and a timeline of PRA's automated collection activity. Therefore, we hold that the information provided by respondent concerning the information return is sufficient to satisfy his burden of production under section 6201(d).
The term "gross income" is defined in the Internal Revenue 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*47 Code as "all income from whatever source derived". Sec. 61(a). It includes income from the discharge of indebtedness, commonly referred to as CO1 income. Sec. 6 l(a)(12). The rationale of this principle is that the cancellation of indebtedness provides the debtor with an economic benefit that is equivalent to income.
The question as to the year for which a taxpayer realized COI income is one of fact to be determined based on the evidence.
We have acknowledged that it is often impossible to find only one event that clearly establishes the moment at which a debt is discharged, such as pinpointing the moment when property has been abandoned.
We have held that a rebuttable presumption arises that an identifiable event occurred in a calendar year if, during a testing period ending at the close of such year, the creditor has received no payments from the debtor.
The presumption that an identifiable event has occurred upon expiration 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*49 of the 36-month nonpayment testing period may be rebutted in two specific ways.
Second, the presumption may be rebutted "if facts and circumstances existing as of January 31 of the calendar year following expiration of the 36-month period indicate that the indebtedness has not been discharged."
Petitioner defaulted on his credit card account with MBNA sometime after October 22, 1994. 4 On September 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*50 12, 1996, MBNA charged off petitioner's debt. 5 Petitioner made no payments on the defaulted account after the chargeoff. Thus, we find on the basis of the record that the 36-month nonpayment testing period expired in 1999. Accordingly, a rebuttable presumption exists that an identifiable event indicating that the debt was discharged occurred in that year.
There is no evidence that MBNA, NCO, or PRA engaged in "significant, bona fide collection activity" at any time after MBNA charged off petitioner's debt in 1996.
Respondent contends that petitioner's debt was discharged in 2008 when PRA issued Form 1099-C. A decision by a creditor to discontinue collection activity may require that creditor to issue a Form 1099-C.
Therefore, on the basis of the record and 2012 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 43">*54 after a practical assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the likelihood of repayment, we hold that petitioners did not have any COI income from PRA in 2008.
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by respondent, and, to the extent not addressed herein, we conclude that those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or meritless.
To give effect to the foregoing,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue.↩
2. Given the record as well as our discussion
3. Petitioner does not deny that he incurred a credit card obligation to MBNA.↩
4. The parties stipulate that petitioner defaulted on the debt sometime between October 22, 1994, and September 6, 1996.↩
5. Although petitioner contends that the discharge of indebtedness occurred when MBNA charged off his debt, we have held that a mere bookkeeping entry by a creditor does not necessarily result in COI income at the time of such entry.
6. In general, a State statute of limitations does not extinguish an underlying debt obligation, but simply provides an affirmative defense to an action by the creditor.
7. Petitioner was unable to provide evidence that any COI income was reported in an earlier year. Income realized by a taxpayer in an earlier year, however, is not deemed realized in some later year simply because there is no evidence that the income was reported in an earlier year.