T.C. Summary Opinion 2017-53



                         UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                    MARK S. SIEGEL, Petitioner v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



      Docket No. 2009-16S.                         Filed July 17, 2017.



      Mark S. Siegel, pro se.

      Eric O. Young, for respondent.



                                SUMMARY OPINION


      GERBER, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section

7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1



      1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue.
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Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any

other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

      Respondent determined an $11,637 income tax deficiency and additions to

tax for failure to timely file, failure to pay timely, and failure to pay estimated tax

for petitioner’s 2012 tax year, as follows:

                               Additions to tax

             Sec. 6651(a)(1)      Sec. 6651(a)(2)     Sec. 6654

                $2,618.33           $1,687.37           $208.64

Petitioner does not dispute that he received the income on which the deficiency is

based and that he did not timely file a return or pay tax or make estimated tax

payments. Instead, petitioner contends that he is not liable for income tax. The

issue for our consideration is whether petitioner is liable for Federal income tax.

                                     Background

      Petitioner resided in Florida when his petition was filed. He did not file a

2012 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, before respondent issued

the notice of deficiency on October 26, 2015. During 2012 petitioner received $28

of interest income and $50,789 of self-employment income, and he made no

payments toward his 2012 income tax liability. Petitioner believes that he is not
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legally obligated to pay tax. His belief is based on his personal research of the tax

laws and cases.

                                     Discussion2

      Respondent has characterized petitioner as a tax protester and further

contends that his position is frivolous. Respondent stated an intention to move for

a section 6673 penalty, but he made no formal motion. Petitioner believes and

contends that “there is no statute which plainly and clearly lays liability for the tax

on * * * [him] for that year 2012.” He argues that the tax liability “must be plainly

and clearly * * * [stated] and any ambiguity must be resolved against the

Government.” Petitioner notes that the “Internal Revenue Code contains over 3.4

million words, most of which are incomprehensible to average Americans.”

      In general, petitioner’s premises are based on his research in which various

courts have stated that “strict construction applies to issues of not only what is

taxed, and how the amount of tax is calculated, but to who is liable for its payment

as well * * * [and] in statutes levying taxes, the literal meaning of the words

employed is most important”. Petitioner contends that a “search of the Internal

Revenue Code reveals many references to liability, and every single tax in the


      2
      No issues were raised by the parties concerning the burden of proof or
production.
                                         -4-

Code has a specific section usually titled Liability for Tax, or Persons Liable, that

clearly and plainly identifies all those who are liable for that particular tax.” He

concludes: “[N]owhere in any of the dozens of sections in the Code can be found

* * * [a] statute or law that plainly and clearly imposes liability for the Federal

income tax on the average American worker.”

      Petitioner cites numerous example of specific text such as: section 4401,

which levies a tax on each person who is engaged in the business of accepting

wagers; section 4972, tax on contributions to qualified employer pension plans

imposing a tax on “the employer making the contributions”; and section 5703,

excise tax on manufactured tobacco products stating that manufacturers and

importers of tobacco products “shall be liable for the taxes imposed” by this

section.

      The sections petitioner cites involve excise taxes. When asked whether any

income tax sections have similar text, petitioner indicated that section 1461

“makes the withholding [tax] agent for non-resident aliens and foreign

corporations liable for the income tax.” In essence, petitioner’s argument is that

there is no specific provision directing him to pay or stating that he is liable for

income tax. When asked what particular words should be included in an income

tax statute that would make him liable, petitioner was unable to provide any
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examples; and he reiterated that the existing income tax statutes are ambiguous

and not sufficiently direct to cause his liability or require his payment of tax.

However, he contends that calling an individual a “taxpayer” does not make him

or her liable for the tax.

       Petitioner has been formulating his position with respect to the income tax

laws over a period of years on the basis of his personal research. Each time he

approaches respondent with his ideas, his position is perfunctorily labeled

“frivolous” and he receives no response. Petitioner believes that average

American citizens should be able to question their Government about the tax laws,

and he refuses to give up merely because he did not receive a response to his

questions.

       Initially, respondent counters petitioner’s position by stating that section

1(c) imposes a tax on the taxable income of every individual. Respondent

continues that section 6012 requires that a return “shall be made by” every

individual having gross income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount.

Finally, section 61(a) provides that “gross income means all income from

whatever source derived” and then it goes on to provide examples of income.

Respondent cited the following cases in his pretrial memorandum: Commissioner
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v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 

 (1955) and Reading v. Commissioner, 

, 733-734 (1978), aff’d per curiam, 

 (8th Cir. 1980).

      Petitioner, however, continues to argue that the law is ambiguous and that

an individual is not necessarily a taxpayer and makes other similar sophistical

semantic distinctions. His arguments derive from analyses lifted out of context

from Supreme Court cases generally involving excise tax. One such case, United

States v. Calamaro, 

, 351 (1957) (the most current of the cases he

references) involved “whether the * * * [defendant], a so-called ‘pick-up man’ in a

type of lottery called the ‘numbers game,’ is subject to the annual $50 special

occupational tax enacted by Subchapter B of Chapter 27A (Wagering Taxes) of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 65 Stat. 530, 26 U.S.C. § 3285 et seq.” The

Supreme Court held that the words of the statute did not include a “pick-up man”

and that the Government’s attempt to include such individuals was overreach. Id.

at 356-357. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the plain language of

the statute. Petitioner interprets that case to require Congress to specifically

designate individuals and to specifically require them to pay tax.

      More than 100 years of tax jurisprudence refute petitioner’s position that he

is not a taxpayer who is required to file a return and/or pay tax. We quote the
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apropos language of this Court in Reading v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 733, as

follows:

              It is difficult, if not impossible, to respond to arguments such as
      petitioners have put forth without becoming embroiled in a game of
      semantics. The logical force requiring rejection of their arguments--
      apart from their assertions of personal political philosophy which do
      not provide a basis for us, a Court sitting to interpret the law, to
      decide the questions dispositive of this case--is essentially a matter of
      the definition of terms. Thus, should we hold that “gain” is an
      essential element of income, compare Conner v. United States, 303 F.
      Supp. 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd., revd., and remanded 

      (5th Cir. 1971), with McGuire v. United States, an unreported case
      (N.D. Cal. 1970, 25 AFTR2d 1127, 70-1 USTC par. 9384), we would
      still face the problem of defining what constitutes “gain.” Compare
      Conner v. United States, supra, with McCabe v. Commissioner, 

, 1748 (1970). It is in situations like this that one can truly
      admire the wisdom of Mr. Justice Holmes, in particular, as he
      expressed in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 

 (1931),
      “We see nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial
      definitions.” [Fn. ref. omitted.]

      Petitioner has not made his argument in Court before. He admits receiving

the income, failing to file a return and to pay tax timely, and failing to make

estimated payments of tax. He was forewarned that he could be subject to a

penalty under section 6673 if he instituted or maintained this proceeding primarily

for delay or if his position is frivolous or groundless. In spite of the warning,

petitioner wanted his day in court and an opportunity to present the arguments that

respondent had summarily rejected. We believe that petitioner’s research,
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concerns, and intentions were not to delay and that he honestly presented them

because he believed it was his right as a citizen.

      Petitioner has been given an opportunity to present his position in court, and

we hold that it is without support in the cases or statutes proffered. We hold that

respondent’s determination was not in error and that petitioner is liable for the

income tax deficiency and section 6651 and 6654 additions to tax as determined.

We caution petitioner that future advancement of this or similar arguments may

well result in penalties of up to $25,000 under section 6673.

      To reflect the foregoing,


                                               Decision will be entered for

                                        respondent.