STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
KING ROYER, INC., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 75-1339
) DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings at One Southeast First Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, on April 12 and 13, 1976, and June 28, 29, and 30, 1976.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: John F. Roscow, III, Esquire
Post Office Drawer C Gainesville, Florida 32602
For Respondent: John A. Barley, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General Room 115, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
FINDINGS OF FACT
King Royer, Inc., the Petitioner, and the State of Florida, Department of General Services, entered into a contract dated October 15, 1974, for the construction of vocational facilities at the Union Correctional Institution at Raiford, Florida. A copy of the contract agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, the plans for the project are Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, and the specifications for the project are Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, all admitted into evidence. The contract has been completed and a certificate of contract completion issued by the Department of General Services as reflected in the copy of that certificate which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 18, admitted into
evidence. The certificate of contract completion is attended by a letter of explanation from the architectural firm in charge of the project which letter is Respondent's Exhibit No. 19, admitted into evidence. This certificate of contract completion makes reference to change order No. 2, and a copy of change order No. 2 has been admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4.
This cafe is brought pursuant to Article 8.5 of the contract document, Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Owner for Construction of Buildings, which calls for claims and disputes to be appealed to the Department of General Services for hearing. Those specific claims of appeal are promoted by two documents.
The first document is the letter of July 16, 1975, by King Royer as president of the Petitioner corporation. This letter is addressed to the Director of the Department of General Services and is treated as the appeal document. There are five items within this element of the appeal which are listed as follows:
"(1) Extension of tire for completion of the project, due to late delivery of the engineered metal building, and delays in completing corrective work of which we were informed only a few days before scheduled completion of the project.
Removal of concrete floor which we believed to be 4" thick on the plans, but for which the Architect contends 6" thickness is required.
Removal of approximately 2,500 square feet of slab which we contend was substantially in accordance with the contract and adequate for the intended purpose.
Temporary bracing for the building, not necessary for any possible loads on such bracing, during removal of the concrete slab.
Painting of interior metal structure, not required by the plans and specifications."
Paragraphs one and four of this letter/petition will not be considered in substance, for reasons which will be set forth in the section of this recommended order, entitled Conclusions of Law. The second element of the appeal concerned an amendment to the appeal for purposes of considering change order No. 2, which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. This amendment was entered into by
stipulation and agreement of counsel for the parties. The stipulation and agreement, indicated that the appeal could consider the elements of the change order to this extent: (1) The element on extension of time due to inclement weather; (2) liquidated damages, only those elements where the liquidated damages pertain to delays associated with the removal of the concrete floor slabs reflected in paragraphs two and three of the original appeal and the painting of interior metal structures as indicated in paragraph five of the original appeal; (3) additional testing shown in the change order; (4) additional services of the structural engineer shown in the change order; and (5) additional services, of the architects and engineering firm, shown in the change order.
The first it ruled to be a proper subject for consideration in this appeal, was item two of the July 16, 1975, appeal. As mentioned before this item deals with the removal of a concrete floor which the Petitioner contends was supposed to be 4" thick in accordance with the plans and for which the architect in speaking for the Respondent claims should have been 6" thick to comply with the plans. This area is shown at page 2 of 27 in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which is to plan of the project. The area is found between column line A as a southern boundary and it's northern boundary is a common line extended from the northern wall of the auto mechanics shop. Its eastern boundary runs along column line 5, than proceed through an area approximately 4' 10" wide from column line 5, west to the eastern most wall of classroom 1, and then inset to the eastern wall of the instructor's office No. 1, and then inset to the small closet like area identified as No. 1, these latter dimensions making up the western boundary of the disputed area. In the initial pour of the concrete in that area, the depth of the pour was 4" and was so intended by the Petitioner. The architect of the project discovered that the depth was 4" and not 6" and ordered that this section of the concrete slab be removed. The removal was effected and the cost of that removal and reinstallation is at issue in the appeal. Sheet 5-2, which is at page 14 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, calls for a 6" concrete slab in the auto mechanics shop and this auto mechanics shop is that area identified on Sheet
2 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, and includes the disputed area previously described before. Since the initial pour was 4" instead of 6" in the area as described, the Petitioner was not in compliance with the plans and the architect was correct to cause the removal of the initial pour and the substitution of the 6 " pour.
Item three in the appeal, set forth on July 16, 1975, questions the requirement for the removal of approximately 2500 square feet of slab which the Petitioner contended was in substantial compliance with the contract and adequate for the intended purpose. This area would be constituted of the remaining aspect of the auto mechanic shop which has not previously been identified in discussing item No. 2. Its southern boundary begins at the intersection of column line A and 1, thence along column line A to the intersection with column line five; go dawn column line 5 from that point to the intersection with the first wall encountered to locate the western boundary; then along that wall east to an intersection of the wall and column line 1 to locate the northern boundary; and then south along column line 1, to the intersection of column line 1 and column line A, to locate the eastern boundary. When the Petitioner initially poured the concrete slab in this area it placed the welded wire fabric by such a method that fabric sunk to the bottom or near bottom of the concrete slab, in violation of Division 3.2C. of the specifications, which call for the welded wire fabric to be placed in the center of the slab. Approximately a week after the floor was poured a Case No. 584 diesel forklift which weighs 10,000 pounds was driven onto the newly poured slab in the auto mechanics area, 100 to 150 times carrying approximately 1500 pounds of structural members on each run. Subsequent to the time that the mesh sunk to the bottom or the near bottom of the concrete floor slab, cracks were discovered in the surface of the floor of the auto mechanics shop and these cracks are determined to be structural cracks. These structural cracks were promoted in part by the location of the mesh in the concrete slab and by the traffic of the fork lift. The location of the mesh may be seen in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11 which is a photograph of the auto mechanics slab when it was being removed and also in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 9 which is a core sample taken from the auto mechanics area. The nature of the structural cracks is shown by hand drawn lines placed on number 5-2, at page 14 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, the pencil lines being drawn by Villany Hausner, the structural engineer on the project and the red lines being drawn by Jeff Hoxie, the project architect. This floor slab in the auto mechanics area was also dusted in contravention of Division 3.11A of the specifications which prohibits dusting of the exposed slab. The Petitioner tried to demonstrate that the cracks found on the surface of the concrete slab in the auto mechanics shop were not structural in nature by driving a 38,000 pound concrete truck onto the slab in the auto mechanics area in excess of two months after the pour. This test is found to be inadequate to overcome the conclusion that the cracks were structural in nature in that the test was not properly
designed. The Petitioner was offered an opportunity for utilizing a properly designed test at its expense, as prescribed by the architect but the Petitioner did not respond to this offer.
There was conflicting evidence about the depth of the initial pour in the area of the 2500 square feet. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 seems to indicate that a test performed by the Petitioner showed the depth to be substandard but other Exhibits by the Petitioner, namely Petitioner's Exhibits No. 11 and No. 12 show photographs of the concrete slab being torn out indicating that the depth approximated 7". There is also an Exhibit, Respondent's No. 9 which was a core sample taken from the auto mechanics area, but it is not clear what section of the auto mechanics area it was taken from, whether in the 2500 square foot area or in the narrow area 4' X 10" which was mentioned in the point No. 2 of the appeal of July 16, 1975. After reviewing the evidence on the depth of the slab, it is not clear what the true depth was on an average, in the 2500 square foot section. Nonetheless, based on the structural cracks, as explained by the mesh location and to a lesser extent by the driving of the fork lift truck onto the slab, the initial pour of to 2500 square feet was not in compliance with the contract and tie architect was correct in having the slab removed when the Petitioner failed to respond to his offer to have the slab tested. Item No. 5 in the July 16, 1975 appeal pertains to the painting of the interior metal structures and the Petitioner claims that these metal structures are not required by the plans and specifications to be painted. The Petitioner promotes his argument by reference to Division No. 9 of the specifications, particularly 3.7A of Section 9F, which is found on page 9F-8. This part, 3.7A says, "do not paint . . . pre-finished item as specified under Division 13- special construction." Therefore, it is the Petitioner's contention that any item found in Division 13 should not be painted. However, Division 13 in its Section 13B, 3.1C found at page 13B-2, says, "give one shop coat of paint as specified herein to all steel surfaces . . ." This statement is further supported by Division 9, Section 9F, 3.6B(3) at page 9F-7, which says that ferrous metals, including shop painted items will have one coat of rust inhibiting primer and one coat of interior gloss oil house paint. Therefore, the reference 3.7A in Section 9-F of Division 9 does not exclude all so called pre-finished items as specified under Division 13 from painting and the architect was correct in insisting that all interior metal structures which were not in fact pre-finished be given a shop coat, one coat of rust inhibiting primer, and one coat interior gloss oil house paint, as necessary. The second aspect of the appeal concerns change order No. 2. The parties agreed that the 20 day extension of time due
to inclement weather should be awarded to the Petitioner at $50 a day for a total amount of $1,000. The second item of the change order concerning liquidated damages in the amount of $1,800 is sustained in view of the fact that only those items pertaining to the removal of the floor slab and painting of the structural members could be considered in addressing the liquidated damages, because of the prior stipulation. Therefore, the architect being found correct in his actions, the liquidated damages should stand. Items 3-5 in the change order concerning additional testing, additional services of the structural engineer and additional services of the architect and engineering firm are proper cost items in view of the problems associated with the floor slab and the appeal of their assessment should be rejected.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In the course of its presentation, the Petitioner offered Exhibits 6-8, No. 6 being the cost receipt of the water placed in the cement truck driven onto the slab, and 47 and 8 being photos of the truck while on the slab. These exhibits are rejected as being irrelevant. In addition Exhibit No. 14 which is a Department of Transportation book on bridge construction is rejected as being irrelevant.
Exhibit No. 7 by the Respondent is not admitted because an insufficient predicate was established for its admission.
By its appeal letter of July 16, 1975, the Petitioner offered as part of that appeal, items (1) and (4). These items were not considered because the appeal of those items was not timely, in that it was not in accordance with Article 8.5 of the contract, Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Owner for Construction of Building. The appeal was filed later than 30 days as mandated by Article 8.5.
For the reasons set forth in the findings of fact the Respondent, through its project architect was correct in causing the removal of the concrete floor slab in the area which is approximately 4' 10", as identified in item (2) of the appeal and in the removal of the 2500 square feet which is item (3) of the appeal, and in causing the painting of the interior metal structures found in item (5) of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal of items (2), (3), and (5) of the July 16, 1975 appeal fails.
For the reasons set forth in the findings of fact, the amendment to the appeal which is found in change order No. 2, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, an award of $1,000 to the Petitioner
for the extension of time to complete the project due to inclement weather is proper. The amount of liquidated damages stands at
$1,800, the additional testing in the amount of $700 stands, the additional services of the structural engineer in the amount of
$95 stands, and the additional services of the architect and engineering firm in the amount of $192.50 stands. The Petitioner's appeal of the items in the amendment to the appeal is rejected, with the exception of the $1,000 award due to inclement weather.
It is recommended that those items found in the July 16, 1975 letter of appeal offered by the Petitioner not be allowed. It is further recommended that the matters as set forth in the amendment to the petition as found in change order No. 2 be allowed only to the extent of an award of $1,000 for extension of time due to inclement the technique considered acceptable far reimbursement of the amount of $1,000, regardless of the decision on the other matters of the appeal.
DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida.
CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
(904) 488-9675
COPIES FURNISHED:
John A. Barley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Room 115, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
John F. Roscow, III, Esquire Post Office Drawer C Gainesville, Florida 32602
================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
KING ROYER, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs. CASE NO. 75-1339
DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings at One Southeast First Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, on April 12 and 13, 1976, and June 28, 29, and 30, 1976.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: John F. Roscow, III, Esquire
Post Office Drawer C Gainesville, Florida 32602
For Respondent: John A. Barley, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General Room 115, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
FINDINGS OF FACT
King Royer, Inc., the Petitioner, and the State of Florida, Department of General Services, entered into a contract dated October 15, 1974, for the construction of vocational facilities at the Union Correctional Institution at Raiford, Florida. A copy of the contract agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, the plans for the project are Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1,
and the specifications for the project are Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, all admitted into evidence. The contract has been completed and a certificate of contract completion issued by the Department of General Services as reflected in the copy of that certificate which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 18, admitted into evidence. The certificate of contract completion is attended by a letter of explanation from the architectural firm in charge of the project which letter is Respondent's Exhibit No. 19, admitted into evidence. This certificate of contract completion makes reference to change order No. 2, and a copy of change order No. 2 has been admitted into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4.
This cafe is brought pursuant to Article 8.5 of the contract document, Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Owner for Construction of Buildings, which calls for claims and disputes to be appealed to the Department of General Services for hearing. Those specific claims of appeal are promoted by two documents.
The first document is the letter of July 16, 1975, by King Royer as president of the Petitioner corporation. This letter is addressed to the Director of the Department of General Services and is treated as the appeal document. There are five items within this element of the appeal which are listed as follows:
"(1) Extension of tire for completion of the project, due to late delivery of the engineered metal building, and delays in completing corrective work of which we were informed only a few days before scheduled completion of the project.
Removal of concrete floor which we believed to be 4" thick on the plans, but for which the Architect contends 6" thickness is required.
Removal of approximately 2,500 square feet of slab which we contend was substantially in accordance with the contract and adequate for the intended purpose.
Temporary bracing for the building, not necessary for any possible loads on such bracing, during removal of the concrete slab.
Painting of interior metal structure, not required by the plans and specifications."
Paragraphs one and four of this letter/petition will not be considered in substance, for reasons which will be set forth in the section of this recommended order, entitled Conclusions of Law. The second element of the appeal concerned an amendment to the appeal for purposes of considering change order No. 2, which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. This amendment was entered into by stipulation and agreement of counsel for the parties. The stipulation and agreement, indicated that the appeal could consider the elements of the change order to this extent: (1) The element on extension of time due to inclement weather; (2) liquidated damages, only those elements where the liquidated damages pertain to delays associated with the removal of the concrete floor slabs reflected in paragraphs two and three of the original appeal and the painting of interior metal structures as indicated in paragraph five of the original appeal; (3) additional testing shown in the change order; (4) additional services of the structural engineer shown in the change order; and (5) additional services, of the architects and engineering firm, shown in the change order.
The first it ruled to be a proper subject for consideration in this appeal, was item two of the July 16, 1975, appeal. As mentioned before this item deals with the removal of a concrete floor which the Petitioner contends was supposed to be 4" thick in accordance with the plans and for which the architect in speaking for the Respondent claims should have been 6" thick to comply with the plans. This area is shown at page 2 of 27 in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which is to plan of the project. The area is found between column line A as a southern boundary and it's northern boundary is a common line extended from the northern wall of the auto mechanics shop. Its eastern boundary runs along column line 5, than proceed through an area approximately 4' 10" wide from column line 5, west to the eastern most wall of classroom 1, and then inset to the eastern wall of the instructor's office No. 1, and then inset to the small closet like area identified as No. 1, these latter dimensions making up the western boundary of the disputed area. In the initial pour of the concrete in that area, the depth of the pour was 4" and was so intended by the Petitioner. The architect of the project discovered that the depth was 4" and not 6" and ordered that this section of the concrete slab be removed. The removal was effected and the cost of that removal and reinstallation is at issue in the appeal. Sheet 5-2, which is at page 14 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, calls for a 6" concrete slab in the auto mechanics shop and this auto mechanics shop is that area identified on Sheet
2 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, and includes the disputed area previously described before. Since the initial pour was 4"
instead of 6" in the area as described, the Petitioner was not in compliance with the plans and the architect was correct to cause the removal of the initial pour and the substitution of the 6 " pour.
Item three in the appeal, set forth on July 16, 1975, questions the requirement for the removal of approximately 2500 square feet of slab which the Petitioner contended was in substantial compliance with the contract and adequate for the intended purpose. This area would be constituted of the remaining aspect of the auto mechanic shop which has not previously been identified in discussing item No. 2. Its southern boundary begins at the intersection of column line A and 1, thence along column line A to the intersection with column line five; go dawn column line 5 from that point to the intersection with the first wall encountered to locate the western boundary; then along that wall east to an intersection of the wall and column line 1 to locate the northern boundary; and then south along column line 1, to the intersection of column line 1 and column line A, to locate the eastern boundary. When the Petitioner initially poured the concrete slab in this area it placed the welded wire fabric by such a method that fabric sunk to the bottom or near bottom of the concrete slab, in violation of Division 3.2C. of the specifications, which call for the welded wire fabric to be placed in the center of the slab. Approximately a week after the floor was poured a Case No. 584 diesel forklift which weighs 10,000 pounds was driven onto the newly poured slab in the auto mechanics area, 100 to 150 times carrying approximately 1500 pounds of structural members on each run. Subsequent to the time that the mesh sunk to the bottom or the near bottom of the concrete floor slab, cracks were discovered in the surface of the floor of the auto mechanics shop and these cracks are determined to be structural cracks. These structural cracks were promoted in part by the location of the mesh in the concrete slab and by the traffic of the fork lift. The location of the mesh may be seen in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11 which is a photograph of the auto mechanics slab when it was being removed and also in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 9 which is a core sample taken from the auto mechanics area. The nature of the structural cracks is shown by hand drawn lines placed on number 5-2, at page 14 of 27 of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, the pencil lines being drawn by Villany Hausner, the structural engineer on the project and the red lines being drawn by Jeff Hoxie, the project architect. This floor slab in the auto mechanics area was also dusted in contravention of Division 3.11A of the specifications which prohibits dusting of the exposed slab. The Petitioner tried to demonstrate that the cracks found on the surface of the concrete
slab in the auto mechanics shop were not structural in nature by driving a 38,000 pound concrete truck onto the slab in the auto mechanics area in excess of two months after the pour. This test is found to be inadequate to overcome the conclusion that the cracks were structural in nature in that the test was not properly designed. The Petitioner was offered an opportunity for utilizing a properly designed test at its expense, as prescribed by the architect but the Petitioner did not respond to this offer.
There was conflicting evidence about the depth of the initial pour in the area of the 2500 square feet. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 seems to indicate that a test performed by the Petitioner showed the depth to be substandard but other Exhibits by the Petitioner, namely Petitioner's Exhibits No. 11 and No. 12 show photographs of the concrete slab being torn out indicating that the depth approximated 7". There is also an Exhibit, Respondent's No. 9 which was a core sample taken from the auto mechanics area, but it is not clear what section of the auto mechanics area it was taken from, whether in the 2500 square foot area or in the narrow area 4' X 10" which was mentioned in the point No. 2 of the appeal of July 16, 1975. After reviewing the evidence on the depth of the slab, it is not clear what the true depth was on an average, in the 2500 square foot section. Nonetheless, based on the structural cracks, as explained by the mesh location and to a lesser extent by the driving of the fork lift truck onto the slab, the initial pour of to 2500 square feet was not in compliance with the contract and tie architect was correct in having the slab removed when the Petitioner failed to respond to his offer to have the slab tested. Item No. 5 in the July 16, 1975 appeal pertains to the painting of the interior metal structures and the Petitioner claims that these metal structures are not required by the plans and specifications to be painted. The Petitioner promotes his argument by reference to Division No. 9 of the specifications, particularly 3.7A of Section 9F, which is found on page 9F-8. This part, 3.7A says, "do not paint . . . pre-finished item as specified under Division 13- special construction." Therefore, it is the Petitioner's contention that any item found in Division 13 should not be painted. However, Division 13 in its Section 13B, 3.1C found at page 13B-2, says, "give one shop coat of paint as specified herein to all steel surfaces . . ." This statement is further supported by Division 9, Section 9F, 3.6B(3) at page 9F-7, which says that ferrous metals, including shop painted items will have one coat of rust inhibiting primer and one coat of interior gloss oil house paint. Therefore, the reference 3.7A in Section 9-F of Division 9 does not exclude all so called pre-finished items as specified under Division 13 from painting and the architect was correct in
insisting that all interior metal structures which were not in fact pre-finished be given a shop coat, one coat of rust inhibiting primer, and one coat interior gloss oil house paint, as necessary. The second aspect of the appeal concerns change order No. 2. The parties agreed that the 20 day extension of time due to inclement weather should be awarded to the Petitioner at $50 a day for a total amount of $1,000. The second item of the change order concerning liquidated damages in the amount of $1,800 is sustained in view of the fact that only those items pertaining to the removal of the floor slab and painting of the structural members could be considered in addressing the liquidated damages, because of the prior stipulation. Therefore, the architect being found correct in his actions, the liquidated damages should stand. Items 3-5 in the change order concerning additional testing, additional services of the structural engineer and additional services of the architect and engineering firm are proper cost items in view of the problems associated with the floor slab and the appeal of their assessment should be rejected.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In the course of its presentation, the Petitioner offered Exhibits 6-8, No. 6 being the cost receipt of the water placed in the cement truck driven onto the slab, and 47 and 8 being photos of the truck while on the slab. These exhibits are rejected as being irrelevant. In addition Exhibit No. 14 which is a Department of Transportation book on bridge construction is rejected as being irrelevant.
Exhibit No. 7 by the Respondent is not admitted because an insufficient predicate was established for its admission.
By its appeal letter of July 16, 1975, the Petitioner offered as part of that appeal, items (1) and (4). These items were not considered because the appeal of those items was not timely, in that it was not in accordance with Article 8.5 of the contract, Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Owner for Construction of Building. The appeal was filed later than 30 days as mandated by Article 8.5.
For the reasons set forth in the findings of fact the Respondent, through its project architect was correct in causing the removal of the concrete floor slab in the area which is approximately 4' 10", as identified in item (2) of the appeal and in the removal of the 2500 square feet which is item (3) of the appeal, and in causing the painting of the interior metal
structures found in item (5) of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal of items (2), (3), and (5) of the July 16, 1975 appeal fails.
For the reasons set forth in the findings of fact, the amendment to the appeal which is found in change order No. 2, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, an award of $1,000 to the Petitioner for the extension of time to complete the project due to inclement weather is proper. The amount of liquidated damages stands at
$1,800, the additional testing in the amount of $700 stands, the additional services of the structural engineer in the amount of
$95 stands, and the additional services of the architect and engineering firm in the amount of $192.50 stands. The Petitioner's appeal of the items in the amendment to the appeal is rejected, with the exception of the $1,000 award due to inclement weather.
AGENCY ACTION
CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the relief requested in the July 16, 1975, letter of appeal submitted by Petitioner be in the same is hereby denied, and it is further
CONSIDERED, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the further relief requested in Petitioner's Amended Claim be and the same is hereby denied, except to the extent that relief is requested for diminution of liquidated damages in the amount of $1,000 to compensate Petitioner for its loss of time resulting from inclement weather, as provided in Change Order No. 2, for which relief is hereby granted.
DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida, pursuant to action taken by the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Board heading the State of Florida Department of General Services on December 7, 1976, in a duly scheduled and noticed public meeting.
JACK D. KANE, Executive Director
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to John A. Barley, Assistant Attorney General, Room 110 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 by hand delivery and to John F. Roscow, III, Esquire, Post Office Drawer C, Gainesville, Florida 32602 by U.S. Mail this 4th day of May, 1977.
JACK D. KANE, Executive Director Department of General Services Room 115, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-2786
Issue Date | Proceedings |
---|---|
Oct. 05, 1977 | Final Order filed. |
Aug. 12, 1976 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
May 04, 1977 | Agency Final Order | |
Aug. 12, 1976 | Recommended Order | Allow pre-petition award for delay caused by inclement weather. |
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. DAVID J. QUIGLEY, JR., 75-001339 (1975)
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. RICHARD T. WARNKY, 75-001339 (1975)
PINELLAS COUNTY CONSTRUCTION LICENSING BOARD vs BRET HILL, 75-001339 (1975)
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS vs. SHYAMIAL B. VIRANI, 75-001339 (1975)