STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, ) DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, ) CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 83-1942
)
STEVEN K. SMITH, individually and as ) general partner, SMITH AND SMITH, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On June 17, 1985, this case was heard in Daytona Beach, Florida before Donald D. Conn a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented as follows:
Petitioner: Thomas A. Bell, Esquire
Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Respondent: Robert E. Austin, Esquire
Post Office Drawer 1930 Leesburg, Florida 32748
The Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, issued a Notice of Violation against Respondent, Steven K. Smith, individually and as general partner, Smith and Smith, charging that he failed to comply with Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), in acquiring an interest in Daytona Sands Beach Club, a/k/a The Sands Beach Club. At the hearing Petitioner introduced three exhibits and called Respondent to testify and Respondent called one witness. The Respondent moved to dismiss the case after Petitioner's case in chief, and a ruling was reserved on that motion to allow review of the evidence presented and also to allow incorporation of the ruling in this Recommended Order. A transcript of the hearing has been filed.
The parties were allowed to submit posthearing proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact which was filed has been made either directly or indirectly in the Recommended Order, except when such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On or about December 4, 1981, Respondent executed an Agreement with Daytona Sands Beach Club, Inc. (Beach Club), the developer of the project, which
was back-dated to August 14, 1981. By the terms of this Agreement, Beach Club sold its interest in thirty-four units of a forty unit condominium time share development having a retail value of $150,000, to Respondent for fifteen percent of the retail value. Respondent testified that the Agreement was simply a financing arrangement whereby Beach Club assigned time-share periods in thirty- four units as collateral for a loan made by Respondent. He stated he received none of the indicia of ownership. However, this is not confirmed by the terms of the Agreement which specifically refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to Respondent, and an arrangement by which Beach Club would then market and sell the units which Respondent had purchased from them. The Agreement also expressly provides that it "constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and there are no other terms, conditions, or agreements which are not set forth herein or referred to herein." Additionally, it was Respondent who had used this form Agreement previously in other projects and who provided this Agreement for execution by Beach Club.
Of the thirty-four units involved in Respondent's Agreement with Beach Club time-share purchasers had acquired time-share periods in twenty-eight units prior to the execution of this Agreement.
An Addendum to the Agreement expresses the intention of Beach Club and Respondent that "the present structure of the Sands Beach Club, Inc., contemplates right to use only and not fee simple title." This was a "right to use project" whereby time-share purchasers acquired no interest in the underlying real property and were simply leasing the right to use particular units for a specified number of weeks each year. Thus, Beach Club had an ownership interest in the project at the time the Agreement was executed with Respondent despite the fact that time-share purchasers had already acquired a right to use twenty eight of the thirty-four units referenced in the Agreement. Respondent knew this was a "right to use" project at the time the Agreement was executed.
Several months after the execution of this Agreement and Addendum, Respondent had an Assignment prepared which he executed with Beach Club. Although this later executed Assignment specifically acknowledges the prior executed Agreement and Addendum, Respondent contends that this Assignment was prepared and executed for the sole purpose of providing him with additional security for his purported financing arrangement with Beach Club. However, by acknowledging the prior executed Agreement and Addendum which, by their terms refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to Respondent, the Assignment confirms that Respondent was not simply providing financing in this transaction.
Respondent did not execute any additional agreement in association with the transaction other than as set forth above. Specifically, there is no evidence that Respondent agreed in writing to honor fully the rights of time- share purchasers to occupy and use the facilities and to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds, nor did Respondent agree in writing to comply with Chapter 721 or to assume all obligations of the seller to these purchasers. There is no evidence that notice of Respondent's Agreement with Beach Club was mailed to each purchaser.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties of this case. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties agree that the applicable law in this case is Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981) which states:
Transfer of seller's interest to third party.--No seller shall sell lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise transfer the seller's interest in the accommodations or facilities of a time sharing plan to a third party, unless:
The third party agrees in writing to honor fully the rights of purchasers of
the time-sharing plan to occupy and use the accommodations or facilities.
The third party agrees in writing to honor fully the rights of purchasers of
the time-sharing plan to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds, as provided in this chapter.
The third party agrees in writing to comply with the provisions of this chapter for as long as the third party continues
to sell the time-sharing plan or for as long as purchasers of the time-sharing plan are entitled to occupy the accommodations or use the facilities, whichever is longer in time.
The third party agrees to assume all obligations of the seller to purchasers.
Notice is mailed to each purchaser of the time-sharing plan affected thereby within 30 days of the sale, lease, assignment, or other transfer.
Persons who hold mortgages on the property constituting a time-sharing plan before the public offering statement of such plan is approved by the division shall not be considered third parties for the purposes of this section.
The time-share purchasers were "purchasers" for purposes of this statue, notwithstanding the fact that they acquired a leasehold rather than a fee simple interest in these units. Section 721.05(11), (13), and (14), Florida Statutes (1981). Beach Club was a "seller" under the terms of this statute. Section 721.05(12), Florida Statutes (1981). Respondent was a third party purchaser for purposes of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), who was required by the terms of that statute to agree, in writing, to certain enumerated guarantees and protections for the purchasers upon the execution of his Agreement with Beach Club.
Respondent argues that the obligation under Section 721.17, Florida Statutes was solely on Beach Club, the seller, to insure that the required third-party agreements were made, and notice provided to the purchasers, before
they executed their Agreement. Further, he argues that even if he shared in the obligation to comply with Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), no penalty or method of enforcement is provided for failure to comply with its provisions. It is urged by Respondent, as evidence of this lack of penalty or enforceability,
that the Legislature substantially amended Section 721.17 in 1983 with the passage of Chapter 83-264, Laws of Florida, and in so doing provided that the guarantees and protections set forth therein "shall be presumed to be a part of the transfer and shall be deemed to be included in the instrument of transfer" which any seller and third-party purchaser execute. Respondent contends that since this provision was not in the 1981 Statute that is applicable here, his Agreement with Beach Club was valid and he is not obligated in any way by the terms of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981).
In enacting Chapter 721, Florida Statutes, in 1981 the Legislature declared its purpose in Section 721.02 to:
Give statutory recognition to real property time-sharing in this state.
Establish procedures for the creation, sales and operation of time-sharing plans.
Require every time-sharing plan offered for sale or created and existing in this
state to be subjected to the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that a broad application of the provisions of Chapter 721 designed to protect the rights of time-share purchasers was intended. The Petitioner was given enforcement power in Section 721.26, Florida Statutes (1981) which included the authority to impose a civil penalty of up to $10,000 "against any developer, exchange program, seller, managing entity, association, or other person for a violation of this chapter." (Emphasis supplied) Section 721.26(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1981). This authority is not contingent or dependent upon remedies being available to purchasers, but allows enforcement by Petitioner against any person who violates any provision of Chapter 721.
Respondent argues that Chapter 721 with its regulatory and enforcement provisions is a penal statute, and as such should be strictly construed. When there is doubt as to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a penal statute, he argues, doubt should be resolved in favor of the person against whom penalties are sought.
Yet, penal statutes should not be so strictly construed as to emasculate the statute and defeat an obvious legislative intent. State v. Hooten 122 So.2d 336 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1960); Martin v. state; 367 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). Statutes enacted for the public benefit should, in fact, be liberally construed in favor of the public even though they contain penal provisions. Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1971); State v. Hamilton,
338 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1980). The legislative intent to broadly apply the provisions of Chapter 721 to protect the public, and particularly time-share purchasers, is clears and as such should not be thwarted by the strict construction urged by Respondent that ignores the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.
In order to give meaning to the broad legislative purpose behind Chapter 721, Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), is construed in pari materia with Section 721.26(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1981), to authorize Petitioner to impose a civil penalty on any person who violates Section 721.17 by executing an agreement, either as seller or third-party purchasers without the written guarantees and protections required thereby of the third-party purchaser. Respondent did not provide the required written assurances to time- share purchasers who had previously acquired interests in twenty-eight of the
units referred to in his Agreement with Beach Club, and he therefore was in violation of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981).
Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing a $5,000 civil penalty against Respondent.
DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of September, 1985, at Tallahassee Florida.
DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September, 1985.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business
Regulation
725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Robert E. Austin, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 1930 Leesburg, Florida 32748
Richard B. Burroughs, Jr. Secretary
Department of Business Regulation
725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales
Condominiums & Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 83-1942
DOCKET NO. 83101TSC
STEVEN K. SMITH, individually and as general partner,
SMITH & SMITH,
Respondents.
/
FINAL ORDER
This order is entered by the Director of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida, pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, following a review of the entire record, including the Recommended Order entered in this cause by Donald D. Conn, Hearing Officer, on September 10, 1985.
Respondents Steven K. Smith, individually, and as general partner, Smith and Smith filed certain Exceptions to Recommended Order which includes exceptions both to the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. In accordance with Rule 28-5.404, Fla. Admin. Code, parties may only file exceptions to the findings of fact and, accordingly, those exceptions concerning conclusions of law will not be addressed.
In paragraph 1 of its exceptions, respondents appear to be challenging a conclusion of law by the hearing officer as to the interpretation of the term "seller's interest". To the extent that such exception deals with conclusion of law, it will not be addressed. If in fact respondents are challenging the finding by the hearing officer that Beach Club sold its interest in the thirty- four units by December 4, 1981, such finding of fact is adequately supported by petitioners' exhibits 1, 2, and 3. See also Transcript pages 67 and 68.
In paragraph 2 of its exceptions, respondents apparently take exception to the finding by the hearing officer concerning the execution by respondents of the later assignment. In its finding, the hearing officer correctly points out that respondents prepared and executed a later assignment (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). That assignment contains the following language:
... That for and in consideration of the matters aforesaid, and the benefits
to be derived by both FIRST PARTY and SECOND PARTY under the terms of the above described Contract dated August 14, 1981, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged....
Thus, the hearing officer was correct in his finding that the assignment containing the above language reaffirmed the terms of the initial August 14, 1981 contract. That August 14, 1981 contract was clearly, by its terms, a contract to sell Beach Club's interest to respondents. The hearing officer's finding is adequately supported by the record.
In paragraph 3 of its exceptions, respondents appear to challenge the conclusion of law which is inappropriate pursuant to Rule 28-5.404, Fla. Admin. Code.
In paragraph 4 of its exceptions, respondents challenge the hearing officer's conclusions of law, which challenge is inappropriate pursuant to Rule 28-5.404, Fla. Admin. Code.
In paragraph 5 of its exceptions, respondents challenge the hearing officer's conclusions of law, which challenge is inappropriate pursuant to Rule 28-5.404, Fla. Admin. Code.
In paragraph 6 of its exceptions, respondents challenge the hearing officer's conclusions of law, which challenge is inappropriate pursuant to Rule 28-5.404, Fla. Admin. Code.
The hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the Recommended Order, and reproduced in their entirety below, are hereby adopted.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On June 17, 1985, this case was heard in Daytona Beach, Florida, before Donald D. Conn, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented as follows;
Petitioner: Thomas A. Bell, Esquire
Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Respondent: Robert E. Austin, Esquire
Post Office Drawer 1930 Leesburg, Florida 32748
The petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, issued a Notice of Violation against respondent, Steven K. Smith, individually and as general partner, Smith and Smith, charging that he failed to comply with Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), in acquiring an interest in Daytona Sands Beach Club, a/k/a/ The Sands Beach Club. At the hearing petitioner introduced three exhibits and called respondent to testify and respondent called one witness. The respondent moved to dismiss the case after petitioner's case in chief, and a ruling was reserved on that motion to allow review of the evidence presented and also to allow
incorporation of the ruling in this Recommended Order. A transcript of the hearing has been filed.
The parties were allowed to submit posthearing proposed findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact which was filed has been made either directly or indirectly in the Recommended Order, except when such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnessary.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On or about December 4, 1981, respondent executed an Agreement with Daytona Sands Beach Club, Inc. (Beach Club), the developer of the project, which was back-dated to August 14, 1981. By the terms of this Agreement, Beach Club sold its interest in thirty-four units of a forty unit condominium time share development, having a retail value of $150,000, to respondent for fifteen percent of the retail value. Respondent testified that the Agreement was simply a financing arrangement whereby Beach Club assigned time-share periods in
thirty-four units as collateral for a loan made by respondent. He stated he received none of the indicia of ownership. However, this is not confirmed by the terms of the Agreement which specifically refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to respondent, and an arrangement by which Beach Club would then market and sell the units which respondent had purchased from then. The Agreement also expressly provides that it "constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and there are no other terms, conditions, or agreements which are not set forth herein or referred to herein." Additionally, it was respondent who had used this form Agreement previously in other projects and who provided this Agreement for execution by Beach Club.
Of the thirty-four units involved in respondent's Agreement with Beach Club, time-share purchasers had acquired time-share periods in twenty-eight units prior to the execution of this Agreement.
An Addendum to the Agreement expresses the intention of Beach Club and respondent that "the present structure of the Sands Beach Club, Inc., contemplates right to use only and not fee simple title." This was a "Right to use project" whereby time-share purchasers acquired no interest in the underlying real property and were simply leasing the right to use particular units for a specified number of weeks each year. Thus, Beach Club had an ownership interest in the project at the time the Agreement was executed with respondent despite the fact that time-share purchasers had already acquired a right to use twenty eight of the thirty-four units referenced in the Agreement. Respondent knew this was a "right to use" project at the time the Agreement was executed.
Several months after the execution of this Agreement and Addendum, respondent had an Assignment prepared which he executed with Beach Club. Although this later executed Assignment specifically acknowledges the prior executed Agreement and Addendum, respondent contends that this Assignment was prepared and executed for the sole purpose of providing him with additional security for his purported financing arrangement with Beach Club. However, by acknowledging the prior executed Agreement and Addendum which, by their terms refer to a sale of Beach Club's interest to respondent, the Assignment confirms that respondent was not simply providing financing in this transaction.
Respondent did not execute any additional agreement in association with the transaction other than as set forth above. Specifically, there is no
evidence that respondent agreed in writing to honor fully the rights of time- share purchasers to occupy and use the facilities and to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds, nor did respondent agree in writing to comply with Chapter 721 or to assume all obligations of the seller to these purchasers. There is no evidence that notice of respondent's Agreement with Beach Club was mailed to each purchaser.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties of this case. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties agree that the applicable law in this case is Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981) which states:
721.17 Transfer of seller's interest to third party.--No seller shall sell, lease, assign, mortgage, or otherwise transfer
the seller's interest in the accommodations or facilities of a time-sharing plan to
a third party, unless:
The third party agrees in writing to honor fully the rights of purchasers of
the time-sharing plan to occupy and use the accommodations or facilities.
The third party agrees in writing to honor fully the rights of purchasers of
the time-sharing plan to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds, as provided in this chapter.
The third party agrees in writing to comply with the provisions of this chapter for as long as the third party continues
to sell the time-sharing plan or for as long as purchasers of the time-sharing plan are entitled to occupy the accommodations or use the facilities, whichever is longer in time.
The third party agrees to assume all obligations of the seller to purchasers.
Notice is mailed to each purchaser of the time-sharing plan affected thereby within 30 days of the sale, lease, assignment, or other transfer.
Persons who hold mortgages on the property constituting a time-sharing plan before the public offering statement of such plan is approved by the division shall not be considered third parties for the purposes of this section.
The time-share purchasers were "purchasers" for purposes of this statute, notwithstanding the fact that they acquired a leasehold rather than a fee simple interest in these units. Section 721.05(11), (13), and (14), Florida Statutes (1981). Beach Club was a "seller" under the terms of this statute. Section 721.05(12), Florida Statutes (1981). Respondent was a third-party purchaser for
purposes of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), who was required by the terms of that statute to agree, in writing, to certain enumerated guarantees and protections for the purchasers upon the execution of his Agreement with Beach Club.
Respondent argues that the obligation under Section 721.17, Florida Statutes, was solely on Beach Club, the seller, to insure that the required third-party agreements were made, and notice provided to the purchasers, before they executed their Agreement. Further, he argues that even if he shared in the obligation to comply with Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), no penalty or method of enforcement is provided for failure to comply with its provisions. It is urged by Respondent, as evidence of this lack of penalty or enforceability, that the Legislature substantially amended Section 721.17 in 1983 with the passage of Chapter 83-264, Laws of Florida, and in so doing provided that the guarantees and protections set forth therein "shall be presumed to be a part of the transfer and shall be deemed to be included in the instrument of transfer" which any seller and third-party purchaser execute. Respondent contends that since this provision was not in the 1981 Statute that is applicable here, his Agreement with Beach Club was valid and he is not obligated in any way by the terms of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981).
In enacting Chapter 721, Florida Statutes, in 1981 the Legislature declared its purpose in Section 721.02 to:
Give statutory recognition to real property time-sharing in this state.
Establish procedures for the creation, sale, and operation of time-sharing plans.
Require every time-sharing plan offered for sale or created and existing in this state to be subjected to the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that a broad application of the provisions of Chapter 721 designed to protect the rights of time-share purchasers was intended. The petitioner was given enforcement power in Section 721.26, Florida Statutes (1981) which included `the authority to impose a civil penalty of up to $10,000 "against any developer, exchange program, seller, managing entity, association, or other person for a violation of this chapter." (Emphasis supplied) Section 721.26(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1981). This authority is not contingent or dependent upon remedies being available to purchasers, but allows enforcement by petitioner against any person who violates any provision of Chapter 721.
Respondent argues that Chapter 721 with its regulatory and enforcement provisions is a penal statute, and as such should be strictly construed. When there is doubt as to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a penal statute, he argues, doubt should be resolved in favor of the person against whom penalties are sought.
Yet, penal statutes should not be so strictly construed as to emasculate the statute and defeat an obvious legislative intent. State v. Hooten, 122 So.2d 336 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1960); Martin v. State, 367 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). Statutes enacted for the public benefit should, in fact, be liberally construed in favor of the public even though they contain penal provisions.
Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1971); State v. Hamilton, 338 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1980). The legislative intent to broadly apply the provisions of Chapter 721 to protect the public, particularly time-share purchasers, is clear, and as such should not be thwarted by the strict construction urged by respondent that ignores the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.
In order to give meaning to the broad legislative purpose behind Chapter 721, Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), is construed in pari materia with Section 721.26(5)(d)1., Florida Statutes (1981), to authorize petitioner to impose a civil penalty on any person who violates Section 721.17 by executing an agreement, either as seller or third-party purchaser, without the written guarantees and protections required thereby of the third party purchaser.
Respondent did not provide the required written assurances to time-share purchasers who had previously acquired interests in twenty-eight of the units referred to in his Agreement with Beach Club, and he therefore was in violation of Section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981)."
In addition to the Division's power pursuant to Section 721.26(5)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1981), to impose a civil penalty for any violation of Chapter 721, Florida Statutes (1981), the Division also has authority pursuant to Section 721.26(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), as follows:
(b) The division may issue an order requiring a developer, exchange program, seller, managing entity, association, or other person, or other assignees, or agents, to cease and desist from an unlawful practice under this chapter
and take such affirmative action as in the judgment of the division will carry out the purposes of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, since respondents, contrary to law, failed to execute the necessary document required by section 721.17, Florida Statutes (1981), respondents should be ordered to undertake the obligations they would otherwise have incurred by the execution of that document, as well as the payment of the civil penalty for, their failure to do so.
Based upon the record, the Recommended Order, and this Final Order, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
Respondents shall remit to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within twenty (20) days of rendition of this Final Order a civil penalty in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000), as proposed by the hearing officer.
Respondents shall within ninety (90) days of rendition of this Final Order do all of the following:
Contact all purchasers of the time-share
plan known as the Sands Beach Club who are either listed on petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2 or 3 or who acquired their interest after December 4, 1981.
Advise all such purchasers that pursuant to this Final Order, respondents are required to
honor fully the rights of those purchasers to cancel their contracts and receive appropriate refunds as provided in Chapter 721, (1981).
Provide refunds to all purchasers electing to receive refunds.
Notify the Division of all contacts made, refunds requested and refunds made.
This Final Order may be appealed pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Fla. R. App. P., by filing a notice of appeal conforming to the requirements of Rule 9.110(d), Fla. R. App. P., both with the appropriate district court of appeal, accompanied by the appropriate filing fees, and with this agency within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Final Order.
DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of December, 1985.
E. JAMES KEARNEY, DIRECTOR Division Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation State of Florida
COPIES FURNISHED:
Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation
Robert E. Austin, Jr., Esquire Post Office Drawer 1930 Leesburg, Florida 32748
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Sep. 30, 1985 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 17, 1985 | Agency Final Order | |
| Sep. 30, 1985 | Recommended Order | Third-party purchaser of time-sharing plan who does not provide written assurances required by statute should be imposed a $5,000 civil penalty. |
