STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CURTIS A. GOLDEN, STATE )

ATTORNEY, FIRST JUDICIAL )

CIRCUIT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 84-2957

) FAIRFIELD MOTORS, INC. and PEARL )

ALLEN, as its President, )

Director, and Shareholder, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This matter came on for hearing in Pensacola, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Robert T. Benton, II, on March 11, 1985. The parties were represented by counsel:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: William P. White, Jr., Esquire

Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501

For Respondent: Paul A. Rasmussen, Esquire

Eggen, Bowden, Rasmussen & Arnold 4300 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 13

Pensacola, Florida 32503

By complaint issued August 16, 1984, Petitioner alleged that Respondents do business in Pensacola, in a single judicial circuit, and, that they "sell used automobiles and finance such sales . . . utiliz[ing] a contract form which . . . is deceptive, unfair, confusing, and/or unconscionable . . . especially in relationship to authorization of repossession and addition of charges for repossession and late fee"; that Respondents "sometimes accept late payments . .

. then repossess the automobile"; that Respondents' "contact form requires that the consumer waive notice of any . . . intention to repossess the automobiles'; that Respondents "on occasion lead the [owner of a repossessed car] to believe that he or she can reinstate the contract and redeem the automobile by . . . additional payments and then refuse or fail to honor such representations"; that they "fail to give adequate notice of intended sales of repossessed automobiles and otherwise fail to comply with statutory requirements for such sales"; that they "on occasion, give inaccurate notice of the dates on which sales of repossessed automobiles will occur . . . [and] fall or refuse to provide adequate accounting of payments, in writing, to consumers"; that Respondents "procure the repossession of automobiles when the factual situation does not warrant such repossession and then fail or refuse to promptly return the

automobile without charge"; that they "on occasion, . . . fail or refuse to promptly return personal property contained in the [repossessed] automobile"; that they "on occasion, cause a breach of the peace, or damage to private property in the course of repossession . . . [and] employ coercive or abusive practices toward consumers . . . [and] fail to properly account to the purchaser debtors as to the proceeds of the disposition of repossessed motor vehicles."

The complaint alleges that these practices "violate the law and public policy of the Unites States and the State of Florida as established in Section(s) 501.204 and 679.501-67[9].507, Florida Statutes common law and/or case law," and that they "constitute unfair and/or deceptive trade practices" in that they are unlawful, "unethical, immoral or unscrupulous . . . and . . . have damaged consumers, competitors or other businessmen," all in violation of Part II, Chapter 501, Florida Statutes.

Both parties filed posthearing submissions on March 25, 1985. To the extent proposed findings of fact have not been adopted, they have been deemed cumulative, subordinate, or immaterial; and, to the exent proposed findings of fact conflict with the findings of fact below they have been rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence.

ISSUE

Whether there is probable cause for Petitioner to bring an action against Respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondents sell used cars in Pensacola, about 500 a year. On or about June 19, 1981, when Fannie Mae Tunstall bought a '76 Buick LeSabre from Fairfield Motors, Inc. (Fairfield), she dealt with Elaine Owens Atkins, who is Fairfield's general manager, secretary-treasurer and a six-year employee. The installment sales contract specified an annual percentage rate of 29.64 percent, and was stamped with the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Ms. Tunstall told Ms. Atkins the payments were too much but signed the papers anyway, and did so without reading them, although Ms. Atkins had told her to read them. The payments did indeed prove too much and Ms. Tunstall fell behind. She was 13 days late with a payment in November of 1981, but Ms. Tunstall and Ms. Atkins had discussed the matter and Fairfield agreed to accept the payment late. Fairfield accepted other payments late, but arranged to have Willie Easley (formerly a singer and now a minister as well as a repossessor of cars) take possession of the Quick early in the morning of January 10, 1983, and drive it away. Ms. Tunstall had failed to make the monthly payment due December 30, 1982. Ms. Atkins had telephoned her once and gotten no answer. Later on January 10, 1983, Fairfield agreed to return the car in exchange for December's payment, another payment in advance, a six dollar late fee and a $100 repossession fee. Ms. Tunstall paid the entire balance Fairfield claimed to be owed and retrieved the car.

   
   

2. Linda Louise LaCoste and her husband Ronnie have bought several cars from Fairfield, including a 1976 Chevrolet Suburban Mr. LaCoste bought on February 7, 1983, under an installment agreement calling for interest at an annual percentage rate in excess of 30 percent. The "cash price" was $3,459.75, and the "total sale price" was $4,613.15. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. The LaCostes understood from prior dealings that their agreement required Mr. LaCoste to maintain insurance on the vehicle, and Mr. LaCoste contracted with

   Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for appropriate coverage. Allstate sent Fairfield a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium effective 12:01

   A.M. April 4, 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. At 11:25 A.M. on April 4, 1983, Allstate accepted the premium Ronnie LaCoste offered in order to reinstate the policy, No. 441361747, and Allstate's Chirstine Smith also wrote a new policy to be sure there would be coverage. Ms. Smith told Fairfield that insurance was in force on April 4, 1983. On April 20, 1983, Allstate issued another notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium on policy No. 441361747, effective 12:01 A.M. May 4, 1983. At ten minutes past three o'clock on the afternoon of May 4, 1983, Mr. LaCoste's Chevrolet Suburban was repossessed at Fairfield's instance on account of the apparent lapse of insurance. Mrs. LaCoste and here sister appeared promptly at Fairfield's place of business and tendered payment due that day. All prior payments to Fairfield were current. When Mrs. Atkins refused payment, Mrs. LaCoste and here sister protested with such vehemence that a Fairfield employee called the sheriff's office. According to Fairfield's contemporaneous records, Fairfield employees ("we") tried to give Mrs. LaCoste a letter "advising vehichle [sic] would be held for 10 days" (i.e., that it would be sold thereafter) but "she refused to accept a copy." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. At hearing, Ms. Atkins conceded that she had not mailed a copy of the letter to Mr. LaCoste but testified that Mrs. LaCoste accepted a copy after refusing to take it initially. Mrs. LaCoste denied that she ever received the letter, and her version has been credited. On May 7, 1983, Fairfield received another communication from Allstate. Whether insurance coverage in fact lapsed on May 4, 1983 was not clear from the record. On May 17, 1983, Fairfield sold the Chevrolet Suburban for $2,050.00.

   
   

3. Carolyn V. Kosmas purchased a 1978 Ford LTD II from Fairfield and made a downpayment of $550.00 on June 2, 1983. Under the terms of the installment sale contract, which called for an annual percentage rate in excess of 29 percent, she was to begin seventy dollar ($70.00) biweekly payments on June 22, 1983. At the time of the sales of the Ford to Ms. Kosmas on June 2, 1983, Fairfield asked for credit information about her fiance as well as about herself. On June 24, 1983, she appeared at Fairfield's place of business and tendered not only the payment due June 22 but also the payment due July 6, a total of $140.00 in cash. Ms. Atkins refused to accept the money, telling her that her references had not panned out, and asked her to surrender the keys to the car and gather up her personal effects. Ms. Kosmas made no secret of her opinion that she was not being treated fairly, but, crying and afraid, eventually agreed to treat the transaction as a rental and accepted a refund of

   $104.39 on that basis. Ms. Atkins "advised if she gave me another background sheet, that I could verify, I would renegotiate with her," Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, but Ms. Kosmas told Ms. Atkins that she had lost her job at West Florida Hospital and the renegotiation eventuated in the retroactive lease. Respondent Pearl Allen was present on June 24, 1983, and took the car keys from her. It was also he who wrote her on June 27, 1983 that the 1978 Ford LTD II would be privately sold on July 6, 1983. She did not appear when and where she was told the sale would occur. The Ford was in fact sold at auction in Montgomery, Alabama, on July 19, 1983. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5.

   
   

4. Mary Lee Hobbs' husband Forace paid Fairfield $800.00 down on a 1977 Oldsmobile 98 on February 27, 1982, agreeing to maintain insurance on the car until paid for, and to pay the unpaid principal balance of $4134.25 over a two and a half year period together with interest at an annual percentage rate of

   29.79. Stamped on the contract was the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." In part, the installment sale contract read:

   * NOTE: DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW, Respondent's

   Exhibit No. 6 (reduced in size), has been omitted from this ACCESS Document. For review, contact the Division's Clerk's Office.

   
   

   All payments were current when, at about half past five o'clock on the morning of November 1, 1983, Fairfield's agents used a wrecker to remove the Oldsmobile, damaging the Hobbses' porch in the process.

   
   

5. Fairfield acted because it received notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of the insurance policy that Hobbs maintained on the car. Typed on the form notice as the effective date of cancellation was November 29, 1983. Someone has written in ink "should be 10-29." In fact the insurance policy never lapsed. According to Fairfield's records, they received conflicting information, on October 29, 1983, about whether an insurance premium had been paid. The Hobbses' 27-year old "daughter said they p[ai]d--Conway Spence said they did not pay." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. This was the same day Mr. Spence, an insurance agent, erroneously informed Fairfield that the effective date of expiration "should be 10-29." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Even after Mr. Spence's error was known to it, Fairfield refused to return the car without payment of a $75.00 "repossession fee," and also refused to let the Hobbs children return with the laundry they were sent to fetch from the trunk of the car. It was the refusal to give up the dirty laundry that sent Mrs. Hobbs to the authorities.

   
   

6. Karel Jerome Bell bought a 1977 Delta 88 Oldsmobile from Fair field on July 22, 1982, under an installment sale contract calling for two "pick up notes" to be paid in August of 1982 and biweekly payments of $125.00 thereafter until payments reached a total of $4161.212. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. The "pick up notes," each for $220.00 were due August 7 and 21, 1982, and were not treated as down payments on the installment sale form. After reducing his indebtedness to $1221.21, Mr. Bell fell two payments behind, and Fairfield repossessed the Oldsmobile on July 7, 1983. The same day Fairfield wrote Mr. Bell that it intended to sell his car, but not time or date was specified. On July 8, 1983, Mr. Bell called and asked whether he could continue making payments while the car on the lot. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Fairfield's Ms. Gilstrap accepted $100.00 from Mr. Bell on July 12, 1983, which she applied to satisfy a reposession fee of $100.00. On the Bell contract, too, had been stamped, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Ms. Gilstrap "told him as long as he paid something something regularly on the account, I felt sure we would hold it for him." Mr. Bell indicated he would pay an additional $125.00 the following Friday and Ms. Gilstrap made a notation to this effect in his file, where she also wrote, "Pls. don't sell he intends to pay for." Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. Bell had not made any further payment when, on July 30, 1983, without notice to Mr. Bell, Fairfield sold the car for $1,000.00 to a wholesaler.

   
   

7. Respondents use form installment sale contracts. A blank form like the one in use at the time of the hearing was received as Respondent's Exhibit No.

1. This was the form used in the Kosmas and LaCoste transactions. The predecessor form used in the Bell, Hobbs and Tunstall transactions was similar in many respects. The earlier form provided, "LATE CHARGES: Buyer(s) hereby

   agrees to pay a late charge on each installment in default for 10 days or more in an amount of 5 percent of each installment or $5.00 whichever is less." On the reverse, the form provided:

   
   

   ACCELERATION AND REPOSSESSION. In the event

   any Buyer(s) or Guarantor of this Contract

   1. fails to pay any of said installments, including any delinquency charges when due or

   2. defaults in the performance of any of the other provisions of this Contract or (c) in case Buyer(s) or Guarantor becomes insolvent or (d) institutes any type of insolvency proceedings or (e) has any thereof instituted against him, or (f) has entered against him any judgment or filed against him any notice of lien in case of any Federal tax or has issued against him any distraint warrant for taxes, or writ of garnishment, or other legal process, or (g) in case of death, adjudged incompetency, or incarceration of the Buyer(s) or Guarantor or (h) in case the seller or the holder of this Contract, upon reasonable cause, determines that the prospect of payment of said sums or the performance by the Buyer(s) or his assigns of this Contract is impaired, then, or in such event, the unpaid portion of the balance hereunder shall, without notice, become forthwith due and payable and the holder, in person or by agent, may immediately take possession of said property, together with all accessions thereto, or may, at first, repossess a part and later, if necessary, the whole thereof with such accessions, and for neither or both of these purposes may enter upon any premises where said property, may

be and remove the same with or without process of law. Buyer(s) agrees in any such case to pay said amount to the holder, upon demand, or, at the election of the holder, to deliver said property to the holder. If, in repossessing said property, the holder inadvertently takes possession of any other goods therein, consent is hereby given to such taking of possession, and holder may hold such goods temporarily for Buyer(s), without responsibility of liability therefor, providing holder returns the same upon demand. There shall be no liability upon any such demand unless the same be made in writing within 48 hours after such inadvertent taking of possession. Should this contract mature by its term or by acceleration, as hereinabove provided, then, and in either such event, the total

principal amount due hereunder at that time shall bear interest at the rate of 10 percent

per annum, which principal and interest, together with all costs and expenses incurred in the collection hereof, including attorneys fees (to be not less than 15 percent of the amount involved), plus appellate fees, if any, and all advances made by Seller to protect the security hereof, including advances made for or on account of levies, insurance, repairs, taxes, and for maintenance or recovery of property shall be due the Holder hereof and which sums Buyer(s) hereby agrees to pay.

* * *

LIABILITIES AFTER POSSESSION. Seller, upon

obtaining possession of the property upon default, may sell the same or any part thereof at public or private sale either with or without having the property at the place of sale, and so far as may be lawful. Seller may be a purchaser at such sale. Seller shall have the remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code (Florida) and any and all rights and remedies available to secured party under any applicable law, and upon request or demand of Seller, Buyer(s) shall, at his expense, assemble the property and make it available to the Seller at the Seller's address which is designated as being reasonably convenient to Buyer(s).

Unless the property is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, Seller will give Buyer(s) reasonable notice of the time and place of any public or private sale thereof. (The requirement of reasonable notice shall be met if such notice is mailed, postage prepaid, to Buyer(s) at address shown on records of Seller at least five (5) days before the time of the sale or disposition) Expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for the sale, selling, attorneys' fees, supra, incurred or paid by Seller shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale and the balance applied on the Buyer(s) obligation hereunder. Upon disposition of the property after default, Buyer(s) shall

be and remain liable for any deficiency and Seller shall account to Buyer(s) for any surplus, but Seller shall have the right to apply all or any part of such surplus against (or to hold the same as a reverse against) any and all other liabilities of Buyer(s) to Seller.

Similarly, the more recent form provides, on the obverse,

Late Charge: If a payment is received more than ten (10) days after the due date, you will be charged $5.00 or five (5 percent) of the payment, whichever is less.

and on the reverse, has identical provisions on "Acceleration and Repossession" and "Liabilities After Repossession."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Sections 501.201, et seq., Florida Statutes (1981), an "enforcing authority" is authorized to bring an action "to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates [Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes (1981)]," Section 501.207(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), or an "action on behalf of one or more consumers for . . . damages . . . ," Section 501.207(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1981). Before instituting judicial proceedings for declaratory judgment or for damages, however, "the enforcing authority shall, pursuant to an administrative hearing, determine that there is probable cause to bring the action." Section 501.207(2), Florida Statutes (1981).

   
   

2. The "enforcing authority" is the Department of Legal Affairs when a violation "occurs in or affects more than one judicial circuit or if the Office of State Attorney fails to act upon a violation within 90 days after a written complaint has been filed with the State Attorney." Section 501.203(4), Florida Statutes (1981). Where the violation occurs solely within or affects only a single judicial circuit, as here, the Office of the State Attorney is the "enforcing authority," whether the complaint is filed directly with the Office of the State Attorney or whether it is referred by the Department of Legal Affairs.

   
   

3. On the merits, the question is whether there has been "adequate proof of probable cause for the institution of a civil suit." Kasha v. Department of Legal Affairs, 375 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. There must be a showing only that there is reason that Respondents have been guilty of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Section 501.204(1), Florida Statutes (1981). This language has been held not to apply to real estate transactions, State ex rel. Herring v. Murdock, 345 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and certain provisions have been limited to "consumer transactions." Black v. Department of Legal Affairs, 353 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Neither of these limitations pertain here. The Black court recogized an "express limitation in the . . . definition of

   `consumer transaction' which limits the business opportunity within the protection of the act to one in which the consumer `has not been previously engaged.'" 353 So. 2d at 656. (emphasis supplied) In the present case, each of the automobile sales in question was "to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household." In construing the language "unfair or deceptive acts or practices,"

   
   

   due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.

   Section 501.204(2), Florida Statutes (1981).

   
   

   The United States Supreme Court quoted with approval the following formulation by the Federal Trade Commission:

   
   

   1. Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise--whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some

      common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive , or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen). Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Fed Reg 8355 (1964). FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405

      v. S. 233, 244 n. 5 (1972). (quotation marks omitted).

      
      

      The Department of Legal Affairs has adopted Rule 2-19.05, Florida Administrative Code, which proscribes any "activity that is misleading or deceptive." Rule 2- 19.05(21), Florida Administrative Code. Section 501.203(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Respondent has filed no challenge to any portion of Rule 2-19.05, Florida Administrative Code.

      
      

4. By request for judicial notice filed April 3, 1985, Petitioner has requested that notice be taken of the findings of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to its adoption of the Federal Trade Regulation's rule on credit practices, as published in Volume 49, No. 42 of the Federal Register. Pursuant to Rule 22I-6.20, Florida Administrative Code, official recognition may be had "of any matters which may be judicially noticed by the courts of this state." Section 90.202(3), Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes the taking of judicial notice of the "[c]ontents of the Federal Register." Respondents have interposed no objection, and official recognition is accordingly granted.

   
   

5. Respondents' counsel asserts that there "was no evidence presented by any of the State's witnesses to show that Pearl Allen as an individual, acted outside his capacity as a corporate officer of the Respondent, Fairfield Motors, Inc.," and the record bears this out. Its does not follow, however, that the complaint should be dismissed against Pearl Allen as Fairfield's "President, Director and Shareholder."

   
   

6. The contract provision for a "minimum" $25 repossession fee has the capacity or tendency to deceive customers into believing that routine repossession fees would be less than $75 or $100 the evidence showed them to be.

   
   

7. The acceleration and repossession clause contains oppressive and unconscionable provisions which the evidence showed them to be.

   
   

8. The acceleration and repossession clause contains oppressive and unconscionable provisions which the evidence showed Respondents were not adverse

   to invoking. Fairfield is authorized to make the unilateral determination, albeit "upon reasonable cause," that "the prospect of payment" by one of its customers "is impaired," in which event it may "without notice . . . immediately take possession" of the car and its contents, even though all of the buyer's payments are current. Fairfield has also reserved unto itself the right to invoke this drastic remedy in the event an installment buyer receives any "legal process." The buyer whose spouse sues for divorce and perhaps the buyer subpoenaed as a witness are at risk of having a car whisked away in the middle of the night on that account.

   
   

9. There is probable cause to believe that Fairfield does not always give adequate notice of the sales of cars it repossesses, and that it did not give adequate notice in the LaCoste and Bell cases. The evidence does not suggest, however, that Respondents accept payments late then rely on the lateness as grounds for acceleration and repossession.

   
   

10. Respondents contend that Section 501.212, Florida Statutes (1983), insulates them from proceedings under the Little FTC Act by making it inapplicable to "[a]n act or practice required or specifically permitted by federal or state law." Section 501.212(1), Florida Statutes (1983). They point to Section 679.503, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides:

    
    

    Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral . . . without judicial

    process of this can be done without breach of the peace. . . .

    
    

    But neither Section 679.503, Florida Statutes (1983), nor any other provision of law authorizes repossession of an automobile by the seller when the buyer is not in default as there is probable cause to believe occurred with respect at least to the Hobbs car.

    
    

11. The late fee called for in the form contracts is specifically authorized by Section 520.07(6), Florida Statutes (1983), but when the seller routinely initiates repossession within hours of a missed payment, inclusion of the late fee provision has the "capacity" or "tendency," to deceive buyers, see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965), into believing, for example, that showing up two days late with a payment as Ms. Kosmas did would not be seized upon as the basis for repudiating the agreement to sell the car. There is probable cause to believe that this practice is "unfair" and that the late fee provision, although unobjectionable in itself, makes the practice "deceptive." The form contracts authorize repossession for failure to make installment payments "including any delinquency charges when due," and late charges are not authorized until an installment has gone unpaid for ten days.

    
    

12. Petitioner has contended that the interest rates Fairfield charges violate the Little FTC Act because, it is alleged, they exceed those allowed under Section 520.08, Florida Statutes (1983). With respect to Forace Hobbs, for example, Petitioner alleged that the annual percentage rate of 29.79 percent exceeded the statutory finance charge limitation of "$17 per $100 per year." Section 520.08(1), Florida Statutes. But the statute specifies:

1. Such finance charge shall be computed on the amount financed as determined under

   s. 520.07(2) on contracts payable in successive monthly payments substantially

   equal in amount. Such finance charge may be computed on the basis of a full month for any fractional-month period in excess of 10 days. A minimum finance charge of $25 may be charged on any retail installment transaction.

2. When a retail installment contract provides for unequal or irregular installment payments, the finance charge may be at a rate which will provide the same yield as permitted on monthly payment contracts under subsections (1) and (2) having due regard for the schedule of payment.

Section 520.08, Florida Statutes (1983).

A finance charge of $1796.40 on an amount financed of $4134.25 over a period of two years, six months and 14 days as contemplated by the portion of Fairfield's agreement with Hobbs covering "monthly payments substantially equal in amount" amounts to less than $17 per $100 per year within the meaning of Section 520.08(1), Florida Statutes. The principal amount of $380 was omitted from the "amount financed" and interest totalling $6.51 was not included as part of the "finance charge," but the inclusion of these sums would not make the Hobbs contract in violation of the finance charge limitation. There is probable cause to believe their exclusion amounted to a technical disclosure violation, however.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED:

That Petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against Respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981).

DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT T. BENTON, II

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904)488-9675

FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985.

COPIES FURNISHED:

William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney

Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501

Paul A. Rasmussen, Esquire Eggen, Bowden, Rasmussen & Arnold 4300 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 13

Pensacola, Florida 32503

Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726

190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501

Docket for Case No: 84-002957

Orders for Case No: 84-002957