STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MELODIE K. MOOREHEAD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 85-0707RX

) DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ) REGULATION, BOARD OF )

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINERS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held on August 8, 1985, in Tallahassee Florida before William R. Cave, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine the validity of Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code. The parties were represented as follows:

For Petitioner: Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Esquire

Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom & Kitchens Post Office Box 1170

Tallahassee Florida 32302-1170

For Respondent: Randall A. Holland, Esquire and

Deborah Hart, Esquire Room 1601, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Melodie K. Moorehead, Ph.D., applied to the Board of Psychological Examiners ("Board") for certification to take the psychology licensure examination pursuant to Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983).

The Board refused to certify the Petitioner to take the examination on the grounds that Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)1., Florida

Administrative Code, requires accreditation of the institution granting Petitioner's degree.

Petitioner timely requested a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1984) hearing following the Board's decision and filed a challenge to Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)1., Florida Administrative Code, under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1983). The two actions were consolidated by Order to the Hearing Officer dated March 20, 1985.

In an effort to settle the case, Petitioner appeared before the Board on June 23, 1985, on a reconsideration of its decision to deny Petitioner's certification to take the psychology licensure examination. Petitioner so informed the Hearing Officer in a Motion for Continuance filed on April 8, 1985, and the Hearing Officer granted the Motion for Continuance.

On June 23, 1985, the Board reconsidered the Petitioner's application for certification and denied certification based upon the grounds that the Union Graduate School's ("Union") doctoral psychology program did not meet the requirements of Rule 21U- 11.06(1)(b)1. and 5., Florida Administrative Code. The Board's action on June 23, 1985 reaffirmed its previous action that Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)1., Florida Administrative Code barred Petitioner from taking the examination and raised the additional issue that Petitioner did not meet the requirements of Section 21U- 11.06(1)(b)5., Florida Administrative Code.

Petitioner then filed a Motion to Amend Petition To Convene Formal Hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes and a Motion to Amend Petition for Determination of the Invalidity of Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)1. and 5. Florida Administrative Code which were granted on July 24, 1985.

At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Dr. William F. Benjamin, Dr. Donald E. Crawford, Dr. Ted Aidman (by deposition) and Petitioner. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-7, 7A, 9- 12, 16-18 and Joint Exhibits 1 and 2 were received into evidence. The Board presented the testimony of Dr. Louis D. Cohen and Dr.

Phillip C. Boswell. The Board's Exhibits 1 and 2 were received into evidence.

The parties submitted posthearing Proposed Findings of Fact.

A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made as reflected in the Appendix to this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is a longtime Florida resident, having moved to the state when she was five, and thereafter was reared and educated in Dade County Florida.

   
   

2. Petitioner received an AA degree from Dade County Junior College, a BA from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida, and a Masters Degree from Lone Mountain College in San Francisco, California via an external program based in the Miami/Dade area.

   
   

3. In pursuit of a Ph.D. in psychology, Petitioner applied to Union was accepted and matriculated there from 1981 through 1953, and received her Ph.D. in psychology on June 29, 1953.

   
   

4. Upon receipt of her Ph.D. degree in psychology, Petitioner was required to fulfill a one-year post-doctoral supervision prior to applying for certification to take the psychology licensure examination. Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1953). Petitioner satisfied this requirement from June 30, 1953 to June 30, 1954 by engaging in psychotherapy under the supervision of Dr. Ted Aidman. Petitioner then applied to the Board for certification to take the psychologist licensure examination.

   
   

5. Petitioner applied to take the examination under the provisions of Section 490.OO5(1), Florida Statutes (1953) and in pertinent part is quoted below:

   
   

   1. Any person desiring to be licensed as a psychologist shall apply to the

      department to take the licensure examination. The department shall license each applicant who the board certifies has:

      * * *

      (b) Submitted proof satisfactory to the Board that he has received a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a

      university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or that he has received a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to the standards of training

      of those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological

      Association or the doctoral psychology programs of the state universities.

      
      

6. The Board adopted Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code, to implement Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983) and essentially codified the criteria for American Psychological Association (APA) approved programs for the first time in this rule. The rule took effect on April 5, 1984. The pertinent part of the rule is quoted below:

   
   

   1. In order to be certified by the

      Board as eligible for examination pursuant to Section 490.005(1), Florida Statutes, an applicant must:

      * * *

      1. Submit proof of the completion of a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association. For the purpose of determining whether an applicant's doctoral degree in psychology was received from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association the Board will apply the following criteria:

         (emphasis supplied)

         1. Education and training in psychology must have been received in an institution

      of higher education accredited by one of the regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Counsel on Postsecondary Accreditation.

      * * *

      5. The doctoral program must be an organized, integrated sequence of study designed by the psychology faculty responsible for the program.

      
      

7. The American Psychological Association Accreditation Handbook, Criteria For Accreditation of Doctoral Training Program

   and Internship in Professional Psychology (Handbook), adopted in January 1979 and amended in January 1950, sets out criteria that the doctoral programs must meet to be eligible for accreditation by APA and in pertinent part are listed below:

   
   

   A. Training in professional psychology is doctoral training offered in an institution of higher education accredited by one of the six regional accrediting bodies recognized by the Council of Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA).

   * * *

   1. The faculty of the program must have clear authority and primary responsibility for all aspects of the program (even if the program cuts across institutional administrative lines).

   2. The program must include an integrated, organized plan of study and must ensure a breadth of exposure to the field of psychology.

   
   

8. In the Introduction of A Handbook of Accreditation (Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 1) accreditation is defined as both a process and a result and in pertinent part is quoted below:

   
   

   As a process, it is a form of peer review in which educational institutions establish a set of criteria and procedures by which they and their fellows are judged. As a result, it is a form of certification by which the qualify of an educational institution, as defined by the accrediting body's criteria, is affirmed.

   
   

9. The forms of Affiliations are discussed in A Handbook of Accreditation and in pertinent part quoted below:

   
   

   Postsecondary educational institutions may be affiliated with the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education, and through it with the Association, in either two ways. One is membership, which is synonymous with accreditation; the other is candidacy, a preaccreditation status.

   [page 3]

   . . . an institution continues its candidacy for accreditation for a fixed period of

   time - usually no longer than six years - until it either fulfills the Criteria for Accreditation or has its affiliation with the Commission terminated. [page 3]

   
   

   . . . Candidacy indicates that an institution meets the Criteria for Candidacy for Accreditation and is progressing toward accreditation; it does not, however, auto- matically assure eventual accreditation . . . [page 3, 4]

   
   

10. The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools' evaluative criteria for candidacy highlight that such standards differ from accreditation standards. A Handbook of Accreditation explains the second evaluation criteria as follows:

    
    

    This criteria differs from the second evaluative criterion for accreditation in that it speaks of a candidate's accomplishing its immediate purposes. The difference is meant to acknowledge that a candidate is not yet fully developed to the point at which it has the ability to accomplish all of its purposes. [page 19]

    
    

11. The fourth criteria for candidacy status indicates that candidacy status is not equivalent to accreditation. The fourth evaluative criteria reads in pertinent part:

    
    

    4. The institution has the potential to achieve accreditation within the candidacy period. In making this judgment, the candidate's present condition, its plans and its timetable for developing to the point where it meets the Criteria for Accreditation must be examined. Candidacy is of a limited duration, and the Commission seeks to determine through this criterion that the candidates current plans are likely to allow it to achieve accreditation within this limited period. [page 20]

    
    

12. Union received formal accreditation on February 25, 1985 by the North Central Association for Colleges and Schools, Commission on Institution of Higher Education ("Commission"), a regional accrediting body recognized by the Counsel on Postsecondary Accreditation. During Petitioner's matriculation at Union, and at the time she graduated, Union was in a candidacy status or a preaccreditation status. Union was in candidacy status from 1979 to 1985, a period of six (6) years which is considered the maximum period without special Commission action for extension.

    
    

13. Union had to satisfy all thirteen (13) general institutional requirements and all four (4) evaluative criteria to be granted candidacy status. To achieve accreditation, Union had to sustain and maintain the same thirteen (13) institutional requirements and satisfy a similar, but different group of four

    (4) evaluative criteria.

    
    

14. The same general institutional requirements and basically the same evaluative criteria are required for both candidacy status and accreditation but candidacy and accreditation are not the same. In candidacy status the institution is trying to assure the Commission of its ability, financial and otherwise to maintain a viable program. In accreditation the certification has been affirmed.

    
    

15. No evidence was presented to show that APA, in its approval process, would substitute candidacy status for accreditation status. In fact the evidence was conclusive that regional accreditation was an important standard and a reasonable criterion in the evaluation and approval of psychology programs by the APA.

    
    

16. The evidence is clear that the accreditation requirement of the rule in question is comparable to the requirement of regional accreditation by APA in its approval process.

    
    

17. To demonstrate that a program is able to produce qualified health professionals the APA requires that a program must articulate what the program is and what that program requires. A pertinent section in the Handbook under Training Models and Curricula, page 5, is quoted below:

    
    

    C. The foundation of professional practice in psychology is the evolving body of know- ledge in the discipline of psychology. While

    programs will vary in emphasis and in available resources, sound graduate education in general psychology is therefore essential in any program. The curriculum shall encompass the equivalent of a minimum of three academic years of full-time resident graduate study. Instruction in scientific and professional ethics and standards, research design and methodology, statistics, psychological measurement, and history and systems of psychology must be included in every doctoral program in professional psychology. . . (emphasis supplied)

    
    

18. The requirement of a sequenced course of study is an important and essential criteria of the APA in the training of a psychologist.

    
    

19. The evidence is clear that the requirements of Rule 21U- 11.06(1)(b)5., Florida Administrative Code, are comparable to the standards for APA approval of a doctoral program with regard to the design of study by the faculty even though the language "sequence of study" does not appear in the APA standards.

    
    

20. Dr. Charles A. Brownfield graduated from Union, Antioch College receiving his Ph.D. in psychology on October 1, 1971 and was licensed by the Florida State Board of Examiners in 1973 under a statute with language similar to that of Section 490.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983).

    
    

21. The evidence is insufficient to show that APA was approving doctoral psychology programs in 1971 or, if it was, whether the standards used at that time were the same as those standards adopted by APA in 1979 and amended in 1980.

    
    

22. The statute under which Dr. Brownfield was licensed was repealed, effective July 1, 1979, by Chapter 77-457, Section 1, Laws of Florida and he was then licensed by exception under the new statute in 1982.

    
    

23. The evidence is insufficient to show that any person graduating from Union between 1979 when APA adopted its standards for approving doctoral psychology programs and the effective date of the rule on April 5, 1984 was permitted by the Board to take the examination for licensure.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

24. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, this proceeding. Section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1983).

    
    

25. The Petitioner has standing to challenge Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code because the effect of this rule on her has been real and immediate, and represents an "injury in fact." Petitioner has been denied licensure by examination because Respondent determined that she did not meet the requirements of this rule. As such, Petitioner's injury is real, immediate and specific and she is clearly within the zone of interest protected by the statutes. See Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230, 1235-1236, (1 DCA Fla. 1978), cert.den. 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978); All Risk Corporation of Florida v. State, Department of Labor and Employment Security, 413 So.2d 1200, 1202 (1 DCA Fla. 1982); Montgomery v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 468 So.2d 1014 (1 DCA Fla. 1985).

    
    

26. The validity of rules normally will be sustained as long as they are reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and are not arbitrary or capricious. Florida Beverage Corporation v. Wynne 306 So.2d 200 (1 DCA Fla. 1975); Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation; 365 So.2d 759 (1 DCA Fla. 1978), cert.den 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979); Jax Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, et al., 388 So.2d 1306 (1 DCA Fla. 1980); Grove Isle Ltd. v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 454 So.2d 571 (1 DCA Fla. 1985). As stated by the Court in Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Duranni, 455 So.2d 515 (1 DCA Fla. 1984):

    
    

    The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. Florida Commission on Human Relations v. Human Development Center, 413 So.2d 1251 (Fla.

    1st DCA 1982). An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous.; Barker v. Board of Medical Examiners, 428 So.2d 720 (Fla.

    1st DCA 1983). Where as here, the agency s

    interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. Agrico Chemical Co. v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations.

    Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Wright, 439 So.2d 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)(Ervin, C. J., dissenting); Department of Administration v. Nelson, 424 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.

    Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) . . .

    
    

    See also General Telephone Co. of Florida v. Florida Public Service Commission 446 So.2d 1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984).

    
    

27. The party contesting the validity of a rule carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged rule is without authority arbitrary and capricious. Humana, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,

    469 So.2d 889 (1 DCA Fla. 1985); Department of Natural Resources

    v. Sailfish Club of Florida Inc. 473 So.1d 261 (1 DCA Fla. 1985). In this case, Petitioner has failed to meet this burden.

    
    

28. Acting on the authority granted the Board by the legislature in Section 490.004(5), Florida Statutes (1983) to "adopt rules to implement the provisions of" Chapter 490, Florida Statutes (1983), the Board promulgated Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code which implements Section 490.005, Florida Statutes (1983) that provides in pertinent part as follows:

    
    

    1. Any person desiring to be licensed as a psychologist shall apply to the

       department to take the licensure examination. The department shall license each applicant who the board certifies has:

       * * *

       (b) Submitted proof satisfactory to the board that he has received a doctoral degree with a major in psychology from a university or professional school that has a program approved by the American Psychological Association or that he has received a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to the standards of training of those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association or the doctoral psychology programs of the state universities.

       
       

29. Petitioner contends that using identical or substantially identical standards for the purpose of determining that a non-APA approved program is comparable with an APA approved program as set forth in Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b), Florida Administrative Code, specifically subsections (b)1. and 5., is inconsistent with the language "or that he has received a doctoral degree in psychology from a university or professional school maintaining a standard of training comparable to the standards of training of those universities having programs approved by the American Psychological Association" found in Section 490.005(1)(b) Florida Statutes (1983).

    
    

30. The legislature did not define the term "comparable" in Section 490.003, Florida Statutes (1983) the definition section, but Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition, defines comparable as: "capable of being compared or equaled; worthy of comparison; being of equal regard." The Board's definition of "comparable" comports with the above definition and the Petitioner has proffered no better or alternate definition of "comparable." Pursuant to Rule 21U-11.06, Florida Administrative Code, if a program, from which an applicant received his degree, includes the salient features of APA's standard for approval, then the program is comparable.

    
    

31. Considering that the legislative intent set forth in Section 490.002 Florida Statutes (1953) is to preserve the health, safety and welfare of the public, then the more reasonable interpretation of Section 490.005(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1953)

    is that the legislature intended that the widely accepted standards for approval of APA programs were to be the model for approval of programs not approved by the APA.

    
    

32. Where, as here, an agency construes the statute in its charge in a permissible way, that interpretation must be sustained through another may be possible or even, in the view of some, preferable. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 235, 241 (1 DCA Fla. 1981); Pan American Word Airways, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission and Florida Power and Light Co. 427 So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1983). Petitioners have failed to show that the Board's interpretative rule is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. See Department of Revenue v. Skop, 383 So.2d 678 (5 DCA Fla. 1980); ABC Liquors, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 397 So.2d 696, 697 (1 DCA Fla. 1981).

    
    

33. Petitioner contends that Rule 21U-11.06(1)(b)1., Florida Administrative Code is arbitrary and capricious in that by requiring accreditation as an absolute standard in comparing non- APA approved programs with APA approved programs, graduates of Union, graduating after the effective date of the rule but before Union received accreditation would be denied the right to take the licensure examination. And, that this interpretation is contrary to an earlier Board's interpretation of similar language found in Section 490.19(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1972) on similar facts.

    
    

34. A rule which did not require accreditation of the institution granting the doctoral degree or accreditation, not as an absolute standard but allowing an applicant to take the examination if the applicant's doctoral degree was conferred during the period of candidacy status and the institution was subsequently granted accreditation provided the institution and applicant was otherwise qualified, would be preferred by the Petitioner. However, the evidence shows that the Board's decision to require accreditation of the institution at the time the doctoral degree is conferred was a rational decision taken after thought and reason and is supported by facts and logic. See Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (1 DCA Fla. 1978).

    
    

35. Petitioner's argument that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because there was no showing of changed facts or circumstances to justify this Board's departure from an earlier Board's previous existing policy which had assessed Union's program and found it comparable to APA approved programs is not supported by the evidence. Namely, the statute was repealed, the

Board "sunsetted", Dr. Brownfield was then licensed by exception under different statutory language and the APA standards for approval were revised in 1979. A shift in policy unrelated to any change in rule or statute, resulting in a different disposition of the same licensure application has been upheld. McDonald v.

Department of Banking and Finance, 361 So.2d 199 (1 DCA Fla. 1978). The instant rule, promulgated before the application of Petitioner and based on changed circumstances, is valid.

Petitioner's reliance on State Department of Insurance v. Insurance Services Offices 434 So.2d 905 (1 DCA Fla. 1983) is misplaced in that this case dealt with the existence of statutory authority for the rule or its absence, not the arbitrariness or capriciousness of the rule. There is statutory authority for Rule 21U-11.06 Florida Administrative Code. Rule 21U- 11.06(1)(b)1., Florida Administrative Code is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED,

That the Petitioner has failed to establish that Rule 21U-

1. Florida Administrative Code, effective April 5, 1984, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and the relief sought by the Petitioner is DENIED.

   DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of January, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County Florida.

   
   

   
   

   WILLIAM R. CAVE

   Hearing Officer

   Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

   2009 Apalachee Parkway

   Tallahassee, Florida 32301

   (904) 488-9675

   
   

   Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1986.

   
   

   APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER, CASE NO. 85-O7O7R

   
   

   The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case.

   
   

   Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner

   
   

   1. Accepted in Finding of Fact 1 with last sentence rejected as unnecessary.

   2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2 with last two (2) sentences rejected as unnecessary.

   3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3.

   4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4.

   5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 with the quoted language of subsections 1(a)(c)(d) deleted as unnecessary and the last sentence rejected as a legal argument.

   6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6.

   7. Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence. There was no evidence in the record that April 5, 1954 was the first time accreditation was an absolute prerequisite to taking the examination or that prior to that time applicants from schools in candidacy status were allowed to take examinations.

   8. Adopted, but clarified in Finding of Fact 12.

   9. Sentence 1-3 rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Sentence 4 adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Sentence 5 rejected because the more competent evidence shows 6 years as maximum period of candidacy (Petitioner's Exhibit 7, page 22). Sentences 6-7 adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Sentences 5-10 adopted but

      clarified in Findings of fact 10 and 14. Sentence 11 rejected as unnecessary and immaterial.

   10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10 and 14 but clarified.

   11. Rejected as cumulative immaterial and unnecessary.

   12. Sentence 1 adopted in Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 12 but clarified. Sentences 2 and 3 rejected as legal argument.

   13. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence.

   14. The first paragraph rejected partly as hearsay and partly as not supported by substantially competent evidence. The second paragraph rejected partly as hearsay and partly as immaterial.

   15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6.

   16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7.

   17. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence.

   18. Sentence 1 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The evidence was insufficient to prove "established policy of the Board." Sentence 2 adopted in Finding of Fact 20 but clarified to show Brownfield's graduation from Union, Antioch College not as Union exists presently. Sentence 3 rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence. No evidence that Union Antioch College was not accredited, only that Union, in its status before February 25, 1985, was not accredited.

   19. Sentences 1 and 2 and the quoted statutory language not listed as a finding of fact but covered in the conclusion of law and mentioned as language similar to the present statute in Finding of Fact 20. Sentence 3 rejected as immaterial due to repeal of statute and changed facts.

   20. Sentence 1 rejected as immaterial because of changed fact. Sentences 2 and 3 rejected as arguments. Graduates from schools other than Union may also be denied on same circumstances.

Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent

1. Covered in Background and in Findings of Fact 4 and 5.

2. Covered in Background.

3. Covered in Background.

4. Covered in Background.

5. Covered in Background.

6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6.

7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6.

8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7.

9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12.

10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15.

11. There are two paragraphs numbered "11". The first

COPIES FURNISHED:

Linda Biedermann, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Psychological Examiners

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Fred Roche, Secretary

Department of Professional Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Randall A. Holland, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Melissa Fletcher Allaman, Esquire Post Office Box 1170

Tallahassee Florida 32302-1170

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.65, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEDURES ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

Docket for Case No: 85-000707RX

Orders for Case No: 85-000707RX