STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ) REGULATION, FLORIDA REAL )

ESTATE COMMISSION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 87-3059

)

JERRY L. ARMSTRONG and )

EGLIN REALTY, INC., )

)

Respondents. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This matter came on for hearing in Shalimar, Florida, before Robert T. Benton, II, Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on November 19, 1987. The Division of Administrative Hearings received the hearing transcript on December 22, 1987. Respondent Armstrong filed a proposed recommended order on January 19, 1988, which respondent Eglin Realty, Inc., adopted by letter received January 20, 1988. Proposed findings of fact are addressed by number in the attached appendix.

The parties are represented by counsel: For Petitioner: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire

400 W. Robinson Street

Orlando, Florida 32801

For Respondent: Michael W. Mead, Esquire Jerry L. Armstrong Post Office Drawer 1329

Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-1329

For Respondent: Richard H. Powell, Esquire Eglin Realty, Inc. Post Office Drawer 2167

Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-2167

By administrative complaint dated June 22, 1987, petitioner Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) alleges that respondents Jerry L. Armstrong and Eglin Realty, Inc. at one time held Florida licenses as real estate brokers or, as regards Mr. Armstrong at certain times, as a broker-salesman. The administrative complaint alleges that respondent Armstrong "was licensed and operating as the sole qualifying broker for" Eglin Realty, Inc. (Eglin) until March 31, 1982, when both respondent Armstrong's license and Eglin's "real estatelicense/registration" expired; that Eglin's president and sole owner, Leon Bishop, has never been licensed "in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes"; that on "or about July 2, 1982, Leon Bishop solicited and obtained William D. Permenter as a purchaser who entered into a sales contract on or about July 2, 1982 for the purchase of certain real property owned by Charles J. King, Jr., and Hubert Bell . . . . listed for sale by A. G. Douglass, Jr., t/a

Douglass Realty;" that on "or about July 2, 1982, the Respondents via Leon Bishop did enter into an agreement to share the real estate brokerage commission with Douglass Realty in the event the sales transaction closed"; that the "sales transaction did close on July 28, 1982 . . . [and] upon the requests and demands of the Respondents, the Respondents and Douglass Realty did receive their respective shares of the total real estate brokerage commission"; that respondents "knew or should have known of the acts and services of Leon Bishop and . . . did approve and consented thereto"; that both respondents were, therefore, "guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction all in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes"; that both respondents "shared a commission with, or paid a fee or other compensation to Leon Bishop a person not properly licensed . . . in violation of subsection 475.01(1)(c), Florida Statutes and therefore in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(h), Florida Statutes"; that both respondents operated as real estate brokers without valid licenses in violation of Sections 475.25(1)(h) and 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes; and that both respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes, by employing Leon Bishop, an unlicensed person, as a salesman.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondents, or either of them, for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent Eglin Realty, Inc., holds a real estate broker's license, No. M14 0024352, last renewed before the hearing on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. A Florida corporation, Eglin was originally licensed in 1971, (T. 47) or, at least, has been "in business since 1971." (T. 22) Seventy-two years old at the time of hearing, Eglin's president, Leon F. Bishop, has never held a real estate license but he has developed several subdivisions (T. 50) and "was buying and selling land all of [his] life." (T. 51) In 1982, Mr. Bishop, his wife and daughter owned stock in Eglin. Of 50 shares authorized and outstanding, he owned one share; his wife owned ten; and his daughter owned the remaining 39.

   
   

2. In July of 1982 and for some time before, respondent Jerry L. Armstrong, himself in the real estate business for 25 years, believed he was registered as the "active broker" (T. 231), for Eglin Realty, Inc., and as a qualifying real estate broker for Armstrong and Associates, Inc.; and, he was "fairly certain . . . [that he] had an individual license at that time also." (T. 234) Arguably, nobody was registered as Eglin's "active broker" in July of 1982, because Eglin's real estate broker's license expired, at least by its own terms, on March 31, 1982. Apparently through oversight, Eglin had not renewed the license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. For four or five (T. 24) years before, however, Mr. Armstrong had indeed been registered as Eglin's qualifying broker.

   
   

3. On December 10, 1982, Mr. Armstrong, who is now a "broker-salesman with Coldwell-Banker Deep South Realty Corporation," (T. 230) resigned as "vice president director and active real estate broker for Eglin Realty, Inc., effective December 19, 1982," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which resignation Mr. Bishop and his wife Dorothy, then Eglin's other two officers and directors, duly accepted. Id.

4. Only the following August, after Eglin chose Joan A. Ritteman to succeed Mr. Armstrong, did Eglin learn that its license was to have expired in March of the preceding year. On October 13, 1983, Eglin made application for "late renewal," tendering a $15 late fee in addition to the $40 renewal fee. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. With the grant of this application, Eglin has been registered with DPR as a real estate broker, Ms. Ritteman being the firm's sole qualifying broker since then.

   
   

   King's Lake Property

   
   

5. When Mr. Bishop met Dr. and Mrs. William D. Permenter at a land auction in Walton County in early 1982, he gave them a business card like the one that came in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10. (T. 93) "Eglin Realty, Inc." appears in the center of the card above the phrase "Land and Farm Broker." The upper right corner bears the Realtor logo under the words "Reg. Real Estate Broker." The lower left corner reads "Leon Bishop President." The upper left corner has telephone numbers, and the remaining corner gives a mailing address. The Permenters mistook Mr. Bishop for a registered real estate broker, when he introduced himself.

   
   

6. Some days after the auction, Mr. Bishop arranged to show one or both of the Permenters a large tract he owned, but failed to interest them in it. It occurred to him that they might be willing to invest instead in the 1,527-acre parcel that Hubert Alberton Bell and C. J. King, Jr. of Defuniak Springs owned jointly in Walton County, property which the owners had listed for sale with Angus Guinness Douglass, Jr. of Douglass Realty, Inc. Mr. Bishop may have learned of this parcel's availability from Mr. Douglass at the very auction at which he met the Permenters. Under the terms of the listing agreement, Douglass Realty was entitled to a ten percent commission if a sale of the whole parcel could be arranged, at $1,000 per acre, within 100 days of May 3, 1982. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7.

   
   

7. Before showing the Permenters the land Messrs. Bell and King hoped to sell (the King's Lake property), Mr. Bishop approached Mr. Douglass, and proposed that Douglass Realty, Inc. share with Eglin any commission arising from a sale of the King's Lake property to buyers Mr. Bishop or Eglin might procure. In a letter dated July 4, 1982, and signed by respondent Armstrong, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 3 and 11, Eglin's share of the anticipated commission was specified. The letter concluded:

   
   

   The undersigned [Jerry L. Armstrong] agrees by this letter to authorize Leon Bishop, as president of Eglin Realty, Inc., to personally deliver this agreement and to accept on my behalf, as the active licensed Florida real estate broker. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3.

   
   

   Mr. Douglass felt free to deal with Mr. Bishop with regard to the commission both because of Mr. Armstrong's letter and because he knew of no "real estate law that said [he] had to ask, or say, let me see his license before I talk to him." (T. 209) At no time did Mr. Douglass speak to Mr. Armstrong about the transaction. (T. 211)

   
   

8. Agreement as to the commission split having been reached, Mr. Bishop showed the Permenters the King's Lake property, and, in early July, Dr. Permenter offered to buy it. After "Mr. Bishop told [Dr. Permenter that his

   offer] had been accepted," (T. 97) the transaction closed on July 28, 1982, in a lawyer's office in Defuniak Springs. Present were the lawyer, Mr. Bishop, Mr. Douglass, Mrs. Douglass, Mrs. Permenter and the principals. In exchange for a deed in favor of Dr. William Permenter and assigns, the vendors received a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $1,275,000, together with the balance of the $1,425,000 sales price, less various transaction costs, notably a $25,000 initial payment toward a brokerage commission totalling $118,587. Eglin's Exhibit No. 3. At no time before the final hearing in the present case did Dr. Permenter ever see Mr. Armstrong. (T. 97)

   
   

9. In accordance with a revised commission agreement dated July 6, 1982, and executed by Messrs. King, Bell, Douglass and (on behalf of Eglin) Bishop, Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, and consistently with the earlier agreement between Eglin and Douglass, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, Mr. Douglass drew a $10,000 commission check in favor of Eglin, keeping $15,000 as Douglas Realty, Inc.'s share of the initial commission payment. (T. 212) Also in keeping with Eglin's Exhibit No. 2, Messrs. King and Bell each executed a promissory note in favor of Eglin in the amount of $21,682, bearing interest at ten percent, payable in three annual installments. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 8 and 9. These notes represented the remainder of the commission owed Eglin. (The vendors also made and delivered notes payable to Douglass for unpaid commission owed Douglas Realty, Inc.)

   
   

   Sharing The Commission

   
   

10. Mr. Bishop was Eglin's only salaried employee, (T. 50) and also sometimes borrowed money from the corporation. Although a monthly salary of

    $1,000 was authorized "[i]n the minutes," (T. 57) "[t]here was never no set amount of salary that [Mr. Bishop] would get," Id. from Eglin in 1982.

    Sometimes he drew no "money for a few months, and then . . . would get a large sum." (T. 57) "Whenever [he] wanted to get money from the corporation, [he] asked for it, and . . . got it." (T. 58) He "didn't make a request to Mr.

    Armstrong." (T. 61)

    
    

11. His wife had authority to write checks against the Eglin account into which the $10,000 commission check delivered at the King's Lake property closing was deposited. (T. 62) After the deposit, Mr. Bishop asked his wife or daughter for some of the money, and Mrs. Bishop drew a check in her husband's favor for $5,000 or thereabouts on the Eglin account. The totality of the evidence makes it clear that this payment, whether characterized as salary or not, was compensation for his procuring Dr. Permenter as a buyer and otherwise facilitating the sale of the King's Lake property. For one thing, "[t]he only transaction [Eglin] had during that period of time was the King's Lake [property]." (T. 254)

    
    

12. Mr. Bishop and Mr. Armstrong "had an agreement from the start that anything [Bishop] bought and sold would go through [E]glin Realty, due to the fact that there would be a commission there, and [Armstrong] would be entitled to some of the commission." (T. 250) Mr. Armstrong professed to believe that Mr. Bishop "was operating as an owner" (T. 236) when Messrs. King and Bell sold the King's Lake property. Mr. Armstrong also testified, falsely but under oath, that he, not Mr. Bishop, negotiated the commission sharing arrangement with Mr. Douglass, the implication being that he thereby earned a portion of the commission Eglin received. In any event, Mr. Armstrong believed himself entitled to a share of the King's Lake property commission. He directed that his share be applied against outstanding loans totaling $3,500 to $4,000 which Eglin had made to him. (T. 248)

    Ten Percent

    
    

13. Dr. Permenter, who has abandoned the practice of medicine in order to devote more time to real estate development, acquired the King's Lake property planning to subdivide it and sell lots. First, he caused the property to be divided into several large tracts, some of which he conveyed into trust. One tract, dubbed King Lake Estates, was conveyed to a partnership Dr. and Mrs. Permenter entered into with each other. Much, if not all of this tract, was subdivided into lots.

    
    

14. At some point, Mr. Bishop agreed to sell the lots, and to assist development in other ways. To that end, he and his daughter spent time in a trailer on the property. The Permenters agreed to pay Mr. Bishop ten percent of the sales price of any lot he sold. In keeping with this agreement, Mrs. Permenter wrote him several checks on behalf of the partnership. On August 29, 1983, Mr. Bishop and the Permenters executed a written agreement memorializing their arrangement, reciting that some 83 lots had already been sold under it, and conveying to Mr. Bishop "a $2500.00 life interest" in the Kings Lake Estates tract. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2.

    
    

15. A purpose of this agreement was to create a legally enforceable right in Mr. Bishop to the ten percent share of sales proceeds the Permenters were then regularly paying him as lots were sold. Mr. Bishop never had any ownership interest of any kind in any portion of the King's Lake property other than the King Lake Estates tract. When Dr. Permenter sold a Kings Lake Estates lot himself, Mr. Bishop did not receive ten percent of the proceeds. (T. 100)

    
    

    Notes Discounted

    
    

16. After he began selling lots for the King Lake Estates partnership, Mr. Bishop told the Permenters he needed money, and asked if they would take the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin for the remainder of the commission, in exchange for undertaking monthly payments to Eglin. Some time remained before the next annual payments called for in the notes which King and Bell had executed in favor of Eglin when they sold the King's Lake property.

    
    

17. The Permenters were agreeable, what with the substantial sums Dr. Permenter still owed the notes' makers. In order to transform annual payments into monthly payments, Mr. Bishop, on behalf of Eglin, endorsed the notes Messrs. King and Bell had given Eglin, in favor of Dr. and Mrs. Permenter. In return, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter executed a promissory note with specified amounts payable monthly to Eglin.

    
    

18. It was after this had been accomplished that an investigator from the Division of Land Sales of the Florida Department of Business Regulation advised the Permenters that they were required to register their subdivision with the Department. He also informed them that Mr. Bishop was not licensed as a real estate broker, which came as a surprise to them.

    
    

19. Apparently on the theory that the promissory notes they had received in exchange for theirs represented legally unenforceable obligations to pay real estate commissions to an unlicensed entity, Dr. and Mrs. Permenter stopped making payments on their promissory note to Eglin. When Eglin sued on the note, the Permenters filed a counter-complaint alleging that "on July 27, 1983, . . . [Eglin] was not a registered real estate broker and was not entitled to be paid fees." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The litigation eventuated in an amended

    final judgment awarding Eglin the unpaid balance of the note. Eglin Realty, Inc. vs. William D. Permenter and Elizabeth A. Permenter, No. 85-718-CA (Fla. 1st Cir.; Mar. 30, 1987). An appeal was pending at the time of final hearing in these proceedings.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

20. The Florida Real Estate Commission "may deny an application for licensure, registration . . . or renewal thereof; may suspend . . . [or] revoke a license . . . impose an administrative fine not to exceed $1,000 for each count or separate offense; and may issue a reprimand, or any or all of the foregoing, if it finds the licensee . . . or applicant," Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes (1987)

    
    

    1. Has violated any provision of s. 475.42 or of s. 455.227(1).

       
       

    2. Has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in this state or any other state, nation, or territory; has violated a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract, written, oral, express, or implied, in a real estate transaction; has aided, assisted, or conspired with any other person engaged in any such misconduct and in furtherance thereof; or has formed an intent, design, or scheme to engage in any such misconduct and committed an overt act in furtherance of such intent, design, or scheme. It is immaterial to the guilt of the licensee that the victim or intended victim of the misconduct has sustained no damage or loss; that the damage or loss has been settled and paid after discovery of the misconduct, or that such victim or intended victim was a customer or a person in confidential relation with the licensee or was an identified member of the general public.

       
       

    3. Has advertised property or services in a manner which is fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading in form or content.

       
       

       (h) Has shared a commission with, or paid a fee or other compensation to, a person not properly licensed as a broker, broker-salesman, or salesman under the laws of this state, for the

       referral of real estate business, clients, prospects, or customers, or for any one or more of the services set forth in s. 475.01(1)(c). For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial that the person to whom such payment or compensation is given made the referral or performed the service from within this state or elsewhere; however, a licensed broker of this state may pay a referral fee or share a real estate brokerage commission with a broker licensed or registered under the laws of a foreign state so long as the foreign broker does not violate any law of this state.

       Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes (1987)

       
       

       Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), makes it unlawful for any person to "operate as a broker or salesman without being the holder of a valid and current license therefor." Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1987) forbids any broker to employ any person as a salesman who is not the holder of a valid and current license."

       
       

21. For purposes of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes (1987), in particular, a "broker" is defined as

    
    

    a person who, for another, and for a compensation or valuable consideration directly or indirectly paid or promised, expressly or impliedly, or with an intent to collect or receive a compensation or valuable consideration therefor, appraises, auctions, sells, exchanges, buys, rents, or offers, attempts or agrees to appraise, auction, or negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, or rental of business enterprises or business opportunities or any real property or any interest in or concerning the same, including mineral rights or leases, or who advertises or holds out to the public by any oral or printed solicitation or representation that he is engaged in the business of appraising, auctioning, buying, selling, exchanging, leasing, or renting business enterprises or business opportunities or real property of others or interest therein, including mineral rights, or who takes any part in the procuring of sellers, purchasers, lessors, or lessees of business enterprises or business opportunities or the real property of another, or leases, or interest therein, including mineral rights, or who directs

    or assists in the procuring of prospects or in the negotiation or closing of any transaction which does, or is calculated to, result in a sale, exchange, or leasing thereof, and who receives, expects, or is promised any compensation or valuable consideration, directly or indirectly therefor; and all persons who advertise rental property information or lists. The term "broker" also includes any person who is a partner, officers or director of a partnership or corporation which acts as a broker. Section 475.01(c), Florida Statutes (1987).

    
    

    This definition dates to April 21, 1982 Chapter 82-179, Section 18, Laws of

    Florida (1982).

    
    

22. License revocation proceedings have been said to be "'penal' in nature." State ex rel. Vining vs. Florida Real Estate Commission, 281 So.2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1973); Kozerowitz vs. Florida Real Estate Commission, 289 So.2d

    391 (Fla. 1974); Bach vs. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 378 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (reh. den. 1980). Strict procedural protections apply in disciplinary cases, and the prosecuting agency's burden is to prove its case clearly and convincingly. Ferris vs. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

    See Addington vs. Texas, 441 U.S. 426 (1979); Ferris vs. Austin, 487 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. vs. Department of Business Regulation,

    393 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Walker vs. State Board of Optometry, 322 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975); Reid vs. Florida Real Estate Commission, 188 So.2d 846, 851 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966). A licensee's breach of duty justifies revocation only if the duty has a "substantial basis," Bowling vs. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165, 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) in the evidence, unless applicable statutes and rules create a clear duty, which the evidence shows has been breached.

    
    

23. On account of his dealings with Dr. and Mrs. Permenter and Mr. Douglass, as well as because of his "operating " as an officer or director of Eglin, Leon Bishop was, at all pertinent times, a "broker" as defined by the statute, notwithstanding his never having been licensed as such in Florida. On this account, Mr. Bishop violated Section 475.42, Florida Statutes (1987). What is pertinent here is that Mr. Bishop also acted as a real estate salesman in facilitating the sale of the King's Lake property to Dr. Permenter and assigns.

    
    

24. Eglin violated Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1987) in employing Mr. Bishop as a real estate salesman, thereby also running afoul of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). Even though Mr. Armstrong was a vice-president and director of Eglin at the time, the evidence did not establish that he, as opposed to the corporation, "employed" Mr. Bishop. Nor was either respondent shown to be culpable with regard to or in any way connected with Mr. Bishop's lot sales on behalf of the Permenters' partnership.

25. Clear and convincing evidence established that Eglin "shared a commission with, or paid a fee or other compensation to, a person [Leon Bishop] not properly licensed . . . for the referral of real estate business, clients, [or] prospects," Section 475.25(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1987), and for his direction or assistance "in the procuring of prospects or in the negotiation or closing of any transaction," Section 475.01(c), Florida Statutes (1987), namely the sale by Messrs. Bell and King of the King's Lake property to Dr. Permenter and assigns.

    
    

26. Mr. Armstrong's complicity in sharing the commission with an unlicensed person is clear, even though Armstrong neither disbursed nor authorized disbursal of any moneys to Mr. Bishop, the unlicensed person; as a technical matter, it was unclear whether he was the qualifying broker for Eglin, at any time after March 31, 1982. But he knowingly accepted the use and benefit of a $3,500 to $4,000 share of the same commission in which Mr. Bishop shared, when he authorized use of the money to repay debts he owed. In doing so, he violated Section 475.25(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1987).

    
    

27. The administrative complaint alleges that Mr. Armstrong also violated Section 475.25(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1987) by sharing the commission with Eglin itself since, the administrative complaint alleges, Eglin's registration had expired on March 31, 1982. But, as far as the evidence showed here, Mr. Armstrong was unaware that Eglin had not made application for renewal when he authorized repayment of his indebtedness. When Eglin did apply, moreover, DPR accepted a "late renewal" fee. Particularly in light of cases holding that "refusal to renew a license to a person who has once demonstrated that he possesses the statutory prerequisite to licensure cannot be used as a substitute for a license revocation proceeding," Dubin vs. Department of Business Regulation, 262 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); see Wilson vs. Pest Control Commission, 199 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), the precise status of Eglin's license in July of 1982 is open to question. On this count, the evidence is less than clear and convincing.

    
    

28. Finally, the evidence as a whole established that Mr. Armstrong was "guilty of . . . dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device," Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) in aiding and abetting Mr. Bishop's acting as a broker or salesman in the sale of the King's Lake property by Messrs. King and Bell.

    
    

29. A recent case teaches that a respondent's apparently perjurious testimony is an improper basis on which to enhance disciplinary action. Bernal vs. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 517 So.2d 113 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). Here DPR proved in aggravation that respondent Armstrong had previously been disciplined on an unrelated matter, however, and nothing of significance was proven in mitigation.

It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED:

1. That the Florida Real Estate Commission revoke Eglin's registration as a real estate broker, and impose an administrative fine of $1,000.

   
   

2. That the Florida Real Estate Commission suspend Jerry Armstrong's license for five years, and impose an administrative fine of $1,000.

DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT T. BENTON, II

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1988.

APPENDIX

Respondent Armstrong's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2, 5, 6 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material.

With respect to respondent Armstrong's proposed finding of fact No. 1, it is immaterial whether Bishop had a genuine ownership interest in King's Lake Estates since neither Eglin nor Armstrong were involved in the lot sales. He had no ownership interest in the remainder of the King's Lake property.

With respect to respondent Armstrong's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the preponderance of the evidence did not establish that Mr. Armstrong never encouraged Mr. Bishop to act as a broker or that Mr. Bishop was not compensated for brokering real estate sales.

With respect to respondent Armstrong's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4 and 9, the judgment may be grounded on the view that the Permenters lacked standing to question the validity of promissory notes the makers themselves did not disavow.

With respect to respondent Armstrong's proposed finding of fact No. 7, it is true that Mr. Bishop never represented to Mr. Bell that he was licensed as a real estate broker or salesman.

Respondent Armstrong's proposed finding of fact No. 8 pertains to subordinate matters.

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

ARTHUR R. SHELL, JR., ESQUIRE

400 W. ROBINSON STREET ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32801

MICHAEL W. MEAD, ESQUIRE

P. O. DRAWER 1329

FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA 32539-1329

RICHARD H. POWELL, ESQUIRE

P. O. DRAWER 2167

FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA 32549-2167

DARLENE F. KELLER

ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE

400 W. ROBINSON STREET ORLANDO, FLORIDA

Docket for Case No: 87-003059

Orders for Case No: 87-003059