STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GEORGE V. SMITH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 87-3612

) SYCOMM SYSTEMS CORPORATION, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, final hearing in the above-styled case was held on December 17, 1987, in Orlando, Florida, before Robert E. Meale, Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

The representatives of the parties were as follows:

For Petitioner: George Smith, pro se

713 Calabria Drive

Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714

For Respondent: Jack L. Goodsitt, Esquire

Office of General Counsel Cap Gemini America

Lincoln Center III, Suite 200 10150 West National Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53227

By Petition for Relief dated August 11, 1987, Petitioner alleged that he had been employed by Respondent and had suffered discrimination by reason of race during the course of this employment. Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief after the Florida Commission on Human Relations, on May 22, 1987, entered a Notice of Determination: No Cause.

At the commencement of the hearing, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate an earlier order entered December 8, 1987, that granted Respondent's Motion to Extend Time in Which to Answer. Respondent moved, ore tenus, to renew its earlier motion to dismiss, which was contained in its Answer. As grounds, Respondent asserted that Petitioner had not complied with a portion of the December 8 order requiring him to provide a more definite statement of the specific relief that he sought. Petitioner also moved, ore tenus, for a continuance on the grounds that he was unaware, until he received the December 8 order, that the final hearing previously scheduled would in fact take place.

After considerable argument, the Motion to Vacate and motion for a continuance were denied. The undersigned reserved ruling on the renewed motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the December 8 order and gave Petitioner another opportunity to file a more definite statement. Following the hearing, Petitioner filed a supplemental statement requesting an order prohibiting the

unlawful employment practices and granting such affirmative relief as may be just and equitable. By separate order, the renewed motion to dismiss was denied.

At the hearing, Petitioner presented one witness, himself. Respondent presented two witnesses. Petitioner offered into evidence two exhibits. Both were admitted. Respondent offered into evidence 14 exhibits. (The last exhibit was incorrectly referred to by the undersigned as Exhibit "15.") All were admitted except for a document containing employment statistics of Respondent pertaining to 1984--a year not in issue.

By agreement, Petitioner and Respondent were each given the opportunity to file one exhibit following the hearing. Petitioner's late-filed exhibit, which has been designated Petitioner's Exhibit Number Three and admitted into evidence, consists of a copy of a Confidential Sycomm Systems Corporation Review Package for George Smith dated December 1, 1985. Respondent's late-filed exhibit, which has been designated Respondent's Exhibit Number 15 and admitted into evidence, consists of an affidavit containing portions of the deposition of William Daniel Burgess taken on September 21, 1987, in connection with Orange County Court Case Number CO86-1637 and styled identically to the above-styled case.

Following the hearing, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen Hearing on January 20, 1988. Petitioner requested that the hearing be reopened on the basis of new facts, which were uncovered during the course of discovery In the County Court action. On January 25, 1988, Respondent filed a Motion to Deny Petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing. By separate order, Petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing was denied and Respondent's responsive motion was rendered moot.

The transcript was filed on February 1, 1988. Petitioner and Respondent each filed proposed findings of fact. Treatment accorded the proposed findings is detailed in the Appendix.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner is a black male. He was employed by Respondent, which is now known as Cap Gemini America, from December 3, 1984, through February 5, 1986. At all material times, Respondent has been an employer employing 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks.

   
   

2. Respondent hired Petitioner to provide computer programming and data processing services as an independent consultant or contractor to third parties who entered into short- term contracts for such services with Respondent. Respondent regularly hired such professional employees to be placed as data processing consultants with its customers in their offices. Respondent was engaged in this business at various locations around the country. Petitioner was hired to work out of Respondent's Orlando office.

   
   

3. Immediately after hiring Petitioner, Respondent assigned him to a company known as System Corporation, which was in the Orlando area. The assignment ended abruptly when in June, 1985, Petitioner was summarily removed from this job at the request of System. Respondent gave Petitioner what he called a "subpar evaluation" in connection with this assignment, although little, if any, evidence was presented at the hearing concerning the basis for the customer's dissatisfaction with Petitioner.

4. Respondent thereafter placed Petitioner "on the beach." This status was reserved for employees for whom Respondent had no assignment. Respondent continued to pay employees while they were "on the beach." Such employees performed in-house research while Respondent attempted to place them.

   Petitioner remained "on the beach" at this time for one to two months.

   
   

5. On or about July 22, 1985, Respondent placed Petitioner with The Charter Company. Petitioner performed general data processing duties for Charter and its affiliates. This assignment required Petitioner to commute from Orlando to Charter's office in Jacksonville.

   
   

6. While working at Charter, Petitioner had to work closely with Charter employees in the operations department, including one by the name of Cathy Barton. Petitioner and Ms. Barton had two confrontations near the end of September or beginning of October, 1985. In one case, Petitioner left Ms. Barton a note reprimanding her for not performing her duties properly or not being on duty at a time that he felt she should have been. In the other case, Petitioner used the wrong procedures for entering the final system data backup for the day, and Ms. Barton became angered as a result of Petitioner's error. All of this culminated in Petitioner and Ms. Barton generally not speaking to each other, although Petitioner, acknowledging this fact, insisted that there was "no problem" between him and Ms. Barton.

   
   

7. Petitioner's working relationship with Ms. Barton caused her to complain to her supervisor at Charter who in turn brought this matter to the attention of the Charter project manager, William Daniel Burgess. At a meeting with Petitioner and his supervisor, Myril Shaw, who was Respondent's project manager in charge of the Charter account, Mr. Burgess expressed his displeasure at the "unprofessional" tone of the note that Petitioner left for Ms. Barton. After the meeting, Mr. Burgess told Mr. Shaw that he thought the reason that Charter hired Respondent was to avoid personnel problems of this type.

   
   

8. Customer satisfaction was a prime concern of Respondent. Petitioner was Respondent's only employee assigned to Charter at the time. Respondent's employee handbook prohibited Respondent's employees from making critical comments about the customer or its staff or even insinuating or implying that the customer's staff lacked competence or judgment. Charter had been either the first or second customer of Respondent in Jacksonville, where Respondent had just opened a new office. Competition in the data processing consultation business had recently increased. Confrontations between Respondent's consultants and customers' employees were rare. Petitioner's confrontations jeopardized the ability of Respondent to maintain Charter's business.

   
   

9. Petitioner's work was not exemplary while at Charter. Toward the end of 1985, an employee in Charter's operations department inadvertently destroyed important financial data of two affiliates of the company. As the end of the year approached, Charter found that the lost data prevented it from closing its books. Charter gave Petitioner two weeks to recover the data and generally correct the problem. Petitioner asked for help from Mr. Shaw, and possibly another employee, but when they were unavailable, Petitioner rejected offers of help from other employees of Respondent.

   
   

10. The day prior to the deadline, Petitioner left a note for his Charter supervisor stating that he had worked his 37 1/2 hours that week and would not be in the following day, which was a Friday. Accompanying the note was a copy of a report, which was part of the corrective work that he had been assigned. The note explained that the report was still in error but he thought he knew why

    and he would be in the next Monday to fix it. The note added that if the work really needed to be done by the next day, Mr. Shaw could be summoned to do it. At Charter's urgent request, Mr. Shaw went to Charter's office on the following day and corrected the report.

    
    

11. Another part of the corrective work regarded the loss of all data concerning the November transactions for one affiliate. Petitioner for some reason did not report to work on a Friday. A Charter supervisor, upset that Petitioner had not resolved this problem for two weeks, complained to Mr. Shaw. Mr. Shaw immediately began to reenter the data and completed the task by the middle of the following week.

    
    

12. After these incidents, a representative of the client informed Mr. Shaw that Petitioner was not doing them any good and should be removed if possible. To avoid negative publicity, Charter did not insist on Petitioner's immediate removal.

    
    

13. Petitioner candidly admitted to these substantive problems with his work, but objected to the manner in which they were handled. He testified:

    
    

    I realize that quite possibly the customer . . . was going to my supervisors and saying we needed this report faster. And this one, he did not spend as much time on. But nobody came to me and gave me a chance to correct this problem and make the customer happy.

    
    

    T. 259.

    
    

    Later, he testified:

    
    

    If Charter felt I was not doing the job properly, I probably was not doing the job properly. What should have been done though it should have been brought to my attention that Charter was unsatisfied with what I was doing, so that I could have had some opportunity to correct the performance and come up with what Charter would like for me to have been doing. No one communicated this to me.

    
    

    T. 296.

    
    

14. Toward the end of December, 1985, Mr. Shaw noted on an Account Manager Status Report for Petitioner that the customer had authorized Respondent to remove Petitioner from the assignment "immediately." The report noted that since the middle of December Petitioner had become "increasingly combative" with the customer and Mr. Shaw and his work performance was not satisfactory. Mr. Shaw testified that Petitioner's technical skills were "a little light." He also testified that a major part of being a successful consultant was developing a "close working relationship" with a customer and having the right temperament.

15. On January 16, 1986, Mr. Shaw completed an Account Manager's Consultant Appraisal Form on Petitioner. Petitioner's attitude was described generally as "hard on client peers." "Client peers" were employees of Charter in this case. Mr. Shaw noted Petitioner's quick temper, as well as his desire to get by with as little as possible. Mr. Shaw stated that Charter became irritated with Petitioner's slow pace and was "generally dissatisfied with his overall performance." Mr. Shaw concluded that Petitioner "failed to live up to his promises [and] was unable to live up to his promises." In sum, "[h]is overall performance was generally unsatisfactory."

    
    

16. Charter's displeasure with Petitioner's work performance was documented when, subsequent to Petitioner's separation from Charter, Mr. Burgess executed a Confidential Employee Performance Rating Form on January 22, 1986.

    He rated Petitioner's performance unsatisfactory--the lowest category--in nine of 18 categories. He rated Petitioner borderline unsatisfactory in another three categories. The remaining ratings were average.

    
    

17. On January 22, 1986, Mr. Shaw completed a Management Post Assignment Review Form on Petitioner. Summarizing the problems noted above, he concluded that "[Petitioner] probably should not be placed at another client site, based on his performance [at Charter]."

    
    

18. Petitioner relied upon a Confidential Sycomm Systems Corporation Review Package for George Smith bearing the date of December 1, 1985. In this evaluation given to him by Sheila Burkhardt, supervisor of Mr. Shaw, he received two overall ratings for his work at System and Charter. These were both borderline between "good" and "average." These ratings were exactly in the middle of the available ratings. Other ratings of more specific performance factors were slightly better. However, Ms. Burkhardt noted that Petitioner was so upset with what he later called a "subpar" evaluation, coupled with the disclosure that he would be receiving a minimal $1500 increase in annual salary, that he announced that he would be looking for employment elsewhere. Petitioner testified that he informed Ms. Burkhardt at this time that he believed that Respondent was guilty of racial discrimination in employment.

    
    

19. Petitioner's separation from Charter occurred in late December, 1985, while he was on vacation. During this period, Mr. Shaw and Petitioner's supervisor at Charter removed Petitioner's personal belongings from his desk and placed them in an envelope. At the same time, Charter personnel deactivated Petitioner's magnetic access card to the Charter offices where Petitioner had worked. A representative of Respondent later gave Petitioner all of his belongings.

    
    

20. After his separation from Charter, Petitioner remained "on the beach" until February 6, 1986. During this time, he informed Respondent that he would be filing a claim of employment discrimination. Petitioner was laid off because of the absence of assignments for which he was qualified.

    
    

21. In its Equal Employment 0pportunity Employer Information Report (EEO-

    1) dated July 30, 1985, Respondent reported nine black male professional employees and four black female professional employees. There was also one black female official or manager. These were all of the black employees of Respondent nationwide. Respondent employed nationally a total of 231 professionals among its 305 overall employees. In its Equal Employment Opportunity Employer Information Report (EEO-1) dated July 17, 1986, Respondent reported a total of six black males and three black females among its 214 professional employees nationwide. There was also one black female official or

    manager, as well as two black female clerical employees out of a total of 36. Total employment for that year was 294 persons.

    
    

22. During the period of Petitioner's employment with Respondent, the black professional employees working out of Petitioner's Orlando office were Emmett Williams and Pat Hall. The evidence was unclear whether a fourth black, Virginia Wright, was employed by Respondent in Florida at this time. A fifth black professional employee, Allan Sylvan, worked for Respondent in Florida until 1985. There were approximately 35 professional employees working out of the Orlando office during this period.

    
    

23. Mr. Williams took a leave of absence for personal reasons on or about December 16, 1985. He later requested a transfer to the Chicago office of Respondent, but never obtained a placement from this office. He never asked to return to Florida. Respondent would have accommodated him if he had.

    
    

24. Mr. Hall was terminated on August 19, 1985. He was maintained "on the beach" for one month prior to termination. Respondent was unable to find any requirements for his background. However, Respondent assisted Mr. Hall in finding permanent employment with one of Respondent's customers.

    
    

25. No information was available concerning Ms. Wright, except that Joanna Ellis, Director of Human Resources for Respondent, recalled that Ms. Wright had resigned.

    
    

26. Mr. Sylvan was terminated on August 2, 1985, after he caused technical problems for the customer to which he had been assigned. Respondent lost the customer as a result of Mr. Sylvan's mistakes.

    
    

27. Petitioner had little, if any, evidence to offer concerning the circumstances surrounding the employment and departures of Messrs. Sylvan, Hall, and Williams and Ms. Wright. In fact, he knew nothing about Mr. Sylvan and Ms. Wright and appeared at the hearing initially to have forgotten Mr. Williams' last name.

    
    

28. Professional employees who were placed "on the beach" and later terminated for lack of work generally were left "on the beach" for four to five weeks prior to termination.

    
    

29. At the time Petitioner was hired, white and black professionals were hired at salaries in the same range as Petitioner's salary. Respondent based each employee's rate of pay solely on the marketability of his skills. Petitioner's initial annual salary was $24,000, which matched his rate of pay at his previous job. Petitioner used an employment agency in finding the job with Respondent, which paid the agency's $4800 fee. Petitioner's last job had been as a systems analyst/programmer with Residential Communities of America where he had been employed for about 2 1/2 years. His starting salary there had been

    $21,000 per year. His only prior programming experience was with Winter Park Software, Inc. where he had worked only eight months. Seven years' previous experience with IBM involved no data processing or programming, according to Petitioner's resume which he used to obtain the job with Respondent. Although Petitioner testified that this job involved programming, Ms. Ellis testified that she was familiar with the job and that it required no programming or data processing. On the bases of the resume, Ms. Ellis's testimony, the relatively low starting salary at Respondent, the use of an employment agency to maximize employment prospects, and the fact that Petitioner had been out of work for two

    or three months prior to being hired by Respondent, it is unlikely that the IBM job gave Petitioner any substantial programming or data processing experience.

    
    

30. Respondent experienced considerable turnover in personnel during the time in question. Mr. Shaw worked for Respondent from late 1984 until late 1986. During the term of Petitioner's employment, there appear to have been two or three managers of the Orlando office. Respondent's Composite Exhibit Number

    12 indicates that, during 1985, about 29 employees, with an average duration of employment with Respondent of less than 10 months, left their jobs in the Orlando office. Likewise, during 1986, the document indicates that 12 employees, with an average term of employment of less than 12 months, left their jobs in the Orlando office. Respondent failed to provide any testimony concerning the professional and nonprofessional mix of these employees, although the EEO-1 forms for 1985 and 1986 disclose a national ratio of about 3:1 professionals to total employees. Also, no evidence explained the impact of the opening of the Jacksonville office on the Orlando employees or the meaning of the code that appears to represent the employee's reason for leaving. The exhibit is useful, however, to corroborate other evidence of employee turnover during this period of time at the Orlando business office.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

31. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

    
    

32. It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race or color. Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes. It is also an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any person because that person opposes an unlawful employment practice or has filed a charge of an unlawful employment practice. Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes.

    
    

33. The Florida Commission on Human Relations is vested with jurisdiction to enforce the law prohibiting employment practices involving unlawful discrimination. Section 760.06(5), Florida Statutes. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the statute and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Section 760.02(6) , Florida Statutes.

    
    

34. The provisions of Chapter 760 are analogous to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et seq. Cases interpreting Title VII are therefore applicable to Chapter 760. School Board of Leon County v. Hargis, 400 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

    
    

35. In a case involving allegations of racial discrimination in employment, Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If Petitioner meets this burden, Respondent then has the burden to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action or failure to act. If Respondent meets this burden, then Petitioner has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by Respondent were not the true reasons but only a pretext for discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed. 2d 207 (1981).

    
    

36. A prima facie case is made out in a case of this type by the complainant showing: a) he is a member of a protected class; b) he was discharged from a job for which he was qualified; and c) he was treated

    differently from similarly situated employees outside of the protected class. Jackson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1980). Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973)

    
    

37. Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. He proved of course that he is black and that he was terminated by Respondent. However, he never proved that he met the qualifications for the data processing job that he was assigned or that he was treated differently than white employees. The greater weight of the evidence proved to the contrary that he lacked the necessary qualifications for the programming and data processing work required by his job.

    
    

38. Petitioner had little programming or data processing experience when he was hired by Respondent. He had worked at one job for 2 1/2 years and another for only eight months. Using an employment agency, Petitioner presumably explored fully his professional options for the two or three months that he was unemployed. After this effort, he was only able to find a job that paid what he had been making at his prior job.

    
    

39. For largely unexplained reasons, his first assignment ended at the customer's request after only about six months. Respondent showed good faith when it paid him for a month or two while finding him a new assignment.

    
    

40. At his next assignment, Petitioner displayed not only marginal skills but an inability or unwillingness to do what was necessary to complete the work assigned to him by the customer in a timely and accurate fashion. At the same time, Petitioner's inability to get along with one of Charter's data processing employees further impaired his value as a consultant. The customer naturally questioned the importance of Petitioner's contribution and, thereby, the value of Respondent's services. From Petitioner's point of view, it was not unreasonable to ask for a chance to correct his deficiencies. However, Charter paid Respondent for, among other things, freedom from personnel problems; if one data processor fails to work out, Charter simply gets another. The same philosophy could be applied to Respondent; if it failed to correct the problem quickly, Charter could easily hire another data processing consultant company.

    
    

41. There was absolutely no evidence that any of Respondent's employment decisions was motivated by race or color or retaliation for complaints concerning racially discriminatory employment practices. The circumstances surrounding the departures of the other black professional employees in the Orlando office permit no inference of racial discrimination, especially in view of the high turnover rate in the office. If the 3:1 ratio of professionals to total employees applied to the Orlando office during 1985, 21 of the 29 employees departing in 1985 would have been professionals. This would amount to an annual turnover rate of 60%. Petitioner's 14-month tenure plus five weeks of "beach" time prior to termination were slightly better than average.

    
    

42. Evidence of Respondent's transparent attempt to leave a "paper trail" after deciding to terminate Petitioner and its awkward handling of his separation from Charter does not, under all of the circumstances, support the inference of racial discrimination. It is far more likely that Respondent was guilty of nothing more than poor personnel practices in the face of high employee turnover.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed.

ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT E. MEALE

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1988.

APPENDIX

Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings Proposed Findings 1 through 3 - adopted.

Proposed Findings 4 through 6 - rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Proposed Findings 7 and 8 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Finding 9 - rejected as legal argument.

Proposed Findings 10 through 11, and 14 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 12, and 15 through 17 - rejected as unsupported by the evidence.

Proposed Findings 13, 18 through 19 - adopted.

Proposed Findings 20 through 21 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 22 and 24 - rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Proposed Finding 23 - rejected as legal argument.

Proposed Findings 25 and 26 - rejected as unnecessary. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings

Proposed Findings 1 and 2 - rejected as legal argument and unnecessary. Proposed Findings 3 and 4 - adopted.

Proposed Finding 5 - adopted in substance.

Proposed Finding 6 - rejected as unnecessary and repetitious. Proposed Findings 7 and 8 - adopted.

Proposed Finding 9 - rejected as unnecessary. Proposed Finding 10 - adopted in substance.

Proposed Findings 11 through 13 - adopted, except Respondent's charge to Charter rejected as irrelevant.

Proposed Finding 14 - adopted in substance. Proposed Finding 15 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 16 through 18, and 21 - adopted in substance. Proposed Findings 19 and 20, 22 and 23 - adopted.

Proposed Findings 24 and 25 - rejected a unnecessary.

Proposed Finding 26 - rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence.

Proposed Findings 27 through 30 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 31 and 21 - adopted, except marketing of Petitioner rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 33 and 34 - adopted in substance. Proposed Findings 35 through 38 - rejected-as unnecessary. Proposed Findings 39 through 43, and 46 - adopted.

Proposed Finding 44 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 45 and, 47 through 54 - adopted in substance. Proposed Findings 55 through 58 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Findings 59 through 60 - adopted.

Proposed Finding 61 - rejected as unsupported by the evidence. The reference in the letter to whom Petitioner explained these matters is unclear.

Proposed Findings 62 through 64 - omitted from Respondent's findings. Proposed Findings 65 and 70 - rejected as unnecessary.

Proposed Finding 66 - adopted.

Proposed Findings 67 through 69, 71 and 73 - adopted in substance.

Proposed Findings 70, 72, and 74 through 77 - rejected as unnecessary.

COPIES FURNISHED:

GEORGE SMITH, PRO SE 713 CALABRIA DRIVE

ALTAMONTE SPRINGS, FLORIDA 32714

JACK L. GOODSITT, ESQUIRE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL CAP GEMINI AMERICA

LINCOLN CENTER III, SUITE 200 10150 WEST NATIONAL AVENUE MILWAUKEE, WI 53227

DONALD A. GRIFFIN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1925

DANA BAIRD GENERAL COUNSEL

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1925

SHERRY B. RICE, CLERK

FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1925

Docket for Case No: 87-003612

Orders for Case No: 87-003612