STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CARL B. CRIBBS, et al, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 88-0288RX

) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case on February 22, 1988, at Baker Correctional Institution, Olustee, Florida, before Michael M. Parrish, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Appearances for the parties at the hearing were as follows

For Petitioners: Carl B. Cribbs, Number 036458

Louis Pacheco, Number 080296 Joel Estremera, Number 097824 Luis Peterssen, Number 181279

James Gordon Smith, Number 038797 John M. Cox, Number 474253

Luis Rivera, Number 108785 all pro se

Baker Correctional Institution Post Office Box 500

Olustee, Florida 32072

For Respondent: Ann Cocheu

Assistant Attorney General Suite 1603, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 ISSUES AND INTRODUCTION

Petitioners, inmates at Baker Correctional Institution, filed a petition pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), challenging the validity of Respondent's Rules 33-3.002, 33-3.0025, 33-3.0275, 33-3.0045, and 33-3.006,

Florida Administrative Code, as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. Additionally, Petitioners have challenged a December 29, 1987, memorandum issued by O. J. Phillips, Superintendent of Baker Correctional Institution, as an unpromulgated rule.

Respondent filed a Motion to Strike portions of the Petition and a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. By order of February 18, 1988, the Hearing Officer reserved ruling on the motions until after the February 22, 1988, hearing.

At the hearing, several of the Petitioners testified as witnesses. The Petitioners also presented the testimony of several other witnesses and offered

several exhibits that were received in evidence. The Respondent presented the testimony of one witness and did not offer any exhibits.

Subsequent to the hearing, a transcript of the proceedings was filed on March 14, 1988, and by agreement of the parties, their proposed final orders were due to be filed by no later than fifteen days thereafter. All parties filed timely proposed final orders on March 29, 1988. The findings of fact proposed in those documents are specifically addressed in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the stipulations of the parties and on the evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact.

1. All seven Petitioners are prisoners at Baker Correctional Institution and are subject to the rules of Respondent.

   
   

2. Petitioners' Exhibit One, a memorandum of December 29, 1987, was issued by O. J. Phillips, Superintendent of Baker Correctional Institution.

   
   

3. By incorporation into Rule 33-3.0045(9), Florida Administrative Code, a new package permit became effective January 1, 1988, but according to the December 29, 1987, memorandum, Baker Correctional Institution would not begin using the new package permit until February 1, 1988. The old and new package permits, Petitioners' Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively, differ somewhat in the quantity and types of items the inmates are permitted to possess. The new package permit also lists a dollar amount limit on the value of each item.

   
   

4. As alleged in paragraphs I(1), (3), (5), (7), (8), (9), and (11) of the petition, each Petitioner has property in excess of that provided for on the new package permit.

   
   

5. Al Cook, Assistant Superintendent at Baker Correctional Institution, drafted the December 29, 1987, memorandum for O. J. Phillips' signature. The memorandum was the result of a rule change. He was uncertain of the date Baker Correctional Institution received the new rule. Since the new package permit was not available before Christmas, Baker Correctional Institution used the old permit. When the new one arrived, the institution decided to give the inmates a grace period until February 1 before implementing the new permit. The memorandum was to advise everyone of the change.

   
   

6. When a proposed rulemaking package is received by Baker Correctional Institution, the Superintendent's secretary copies and distributes the proposed rules for posting on inmate bulletin boards.

   
   

7. Mr. Cook believes his institution received the proposed rulemaking package for the rules challenged in this action in August 1987. He saw a document signed by Sergeant Flores, whose responsibility it was to distribute and post the proposed rules, attesting to the fact the challenged proposed rules were posted.

   
   

8. According to the State Fire Marshal's codes, prisoners must keep all their personal items in a metal locker. Due to storage limitations at Baker Correctional Institution, inmates can have only one small locker. It is each inmate's choice as to what items he can fit into that locker and what items to mail out to his family.

9. Petitioner Pacheco was a law clerk in the prison library. He did not see the notice of change in rules in the library. He saw the new package permit on the dormitory bulletin board but did not see a proposed rulemaking package. There have been occasions what he has witnessed inmates ripping memorandums off the bulletin boards.

   
   

10. Although he has not had any property confiscated, Petitioner Pacheco has excess property. He has funds to mail the items home, but does not feel he should have to do so.

    
    

11. Petitioners Smith, Cox, and Estremera did not see any proposed rule changes in the package permit posted on the bulletin boards during the last six months.

    
    

12. Petitioner Cox had excess property but mailed it out.

    
    

13. Petitioner Estremera has not had any property confiscated.

    
    

14. Petitioner Peterssen understands little or no English; he is Spanish- speaking. The memorandum and rules in question were not published or posted in Spanish, and Peterssen became aware of the change only from talking with other Spanish-speaking inmates.

    
    

15. Petitioner Cribbs did not see a rule change notice. He had personal and legal items seized from him on February 14, 1988. This is the subject of a pending disciplinary hearing. The reason given for the seizure is that the items seized were not stored in his locker due to lack of room. Petitioner Cribbs has no money to mail his excess property home.

    
    

16. Richard Kirkland, formerly the security administrator for Respondent, was involved in changing the package permit. The reasons for the change were fourfold:

    
    

    1. The Fire Marshal mandated that items

       in institutions had to be stored in metal lockers.

    2. During a year's time, the Department transfers over 27,000 inmates in 15-passenger buses. There is little room in the buses to move personal property.

    3. Inmates moving from institutions more liberal in storage space to institutions with less space often have property seized. The change provides uniformity so that inmates and staff will know the property limitations.

    4. Without dollar valuations established, the Division of Risk Management had had to pay out what it considered excessive claims for such items as a "gold chain." By establishing dollar value limitations, the state can more fairly

       assess dollar losses for stolen or missing property.

       
       

17. The rule change to establish a fair value, number, and type of acceptable items of personal property was promulgated after a year's work by a committee from around the state. Since four permits are allowed each year, inmates will be able, in most instances, to replace those items that wear out rather quickly.

18. The challenged rules do not address religious or legal materials since those property items are covered by other rules. Additional property for valid medical conditions can be approved by medical staff.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

    Based on the foregoing facts and on the applicable statutes, rules, and court decisions, I make the following conclusions of law.

    
    

19. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987).

    
    

20. The sole statutory authority for a rule challenge to an existing rule is Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Subsection (1) of the statute provides as the sole basis for a rule challenge a showing that the challenged rule is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority." That statutory term is defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1987), as follows:

    
    

    1. "Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislature authority if any one or more of the following apply:

       1. The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in s. 120.54;

       2. The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

       3. The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

       4. The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or

       5. The rule is arbitrary or capricious.

    
    

21. The term "rule" is defined at Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes (1987), which reads as follows; in pertinent part: "'Rule' means each statement general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy

    ... The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule." And, as noted in Florida Aquatic Weed Control, Inc., v. Department of Natural Resources, 6 FALR 3972 (1984), at pages 3975-77:

    
    

    In McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the court amplified this statutory definition by holding that a rule is a statement of general applicability, which is intended, by its own effect, to create rights, or to require compliance, or to otherwise have the direct and consistent effect of law. Agency

    statements which are rules but have not been adopted as rules according to the rulemaking procedure of Section 120.54 are invalid or illicit rules--and subject to invalidation in Section 120.56 proceedings. State Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In deciding whether an agency statement is a rule, the agency's characterization of the statement is not controlling. State Department of Adminis- tration v. Harvey, 356 So.2d 323, 325 (Fla.

    1st DCA 1977)("The breadth of the [statutory] definition ... indicates that the legislature intended the term to cover a

    great variety of agency statements regardless of how the agency designates them.")

    
    

    Agencies are entitled to some leeway in formulating policy through agency orders. McDonald, supra. But that latitude does not permit them to, in effect, adopt a rule without complying with rulemaking procedures. Gulfstream Park v. Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering, 407 So.2d 263, 265 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981). When an agency statement interprets a statute or rule in a way not readily apparent from the language--or which is not derived directly or indirectly from the language--and that interpretive statement has the consistent effect of law, it is a rule within the meaning of Section 120.52[16]--and must be adopted as one. See, e.g., Gulfstream Park, supra; Department of Revenue v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 388 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d 43 (Fla.

    1st DCA 1983).

    
    

22. The Division of Administrative Hearings lacks jurisdiction to dispose of constitutional issues in a Section 120.56 proceeding. State Department of Administration v. Harvey, supra; Cook v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 415 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

    
    

23. The challenged memorandum of O. J. Phillips (Petitioners' Exhibit 1) does not meet the criteria of a rule nor does it appear to be a statement of general applicability. At best, the memorandum simply explained newly promulgated Rule 33-3.0045, Florida Administrative Code. Even if considered as an unpromulgated internal' operating procedure, prisoners may not challenge I.O.P.'s as unpromulgated rules. Adams v. Barton, 507 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) and the cases cited therein. The memorandum further gave Petitioners additional time to divest themselves of excess property. Because Petitioners benefited from this, they have not provided sufficient facts to show injury from this memorandum. All Risk Corporation of Florida v. State, 413 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); cert. den., 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1979).

24. The burden is on the Petitioners to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each challenged rule or its requirement is arbitrary or capricious, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), or an abuse of administrative discretion, Island Harbor v. Department of Natural Resources, 495 So.2d 209, 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Further, the Petitioners must demonstrate that the agency exceeded the authority delegated by the Legislature, that the requirements of each challenged rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the statute, and that those requirements are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers v. Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, 425 So.2d 939, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Petitioners have not met their burden to show that Rules 33-3.002, 33-3.0025, 33-3.0275, 33-3.0045, and 33-3.006, Florida Administrative Code, are "not supported by fact or logic, [were] adopted without thought or reason, or [were] otherwise not based upon competent, substantial evidence." Humana, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,

    469 So.2d 889, 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Instead, the rules were adopted, after nearly a year's consideration by Respondent's officials, to comply with the Fire Marshal's rules which protect inmates and employees, to provide uniformity among institutions and prevent inmates from having property arbitrarily seized upon transfer to certain institutions, to provide for some personal property in spite of overcrowding and severe space limitations, and to provide Risk Management with a fair method for placing a value on inmates' lost property.

    
    

25. Respondent has enacted Rule 33-12.01, Florida Administrative Code, on the subject of Notice of Proceedings and Proposed Rules. In part this rule requires posting of notices of proposed changes in rules on inmate bulletin boards. Testimony from Al Cook revealed that personnel at Baker Correctional Institution understood and followed this rule. That inmates sometimes tear down memoranda from the bulletin boards does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate any failure on behalf of Respondent to follow Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987). The Department of Corrections properly noticed the rule change in Florida Administrative Weekly and supplied the various institutions with the new rule and package permits. That individual inmates did not specifically receive notice does not render the change invalid. See Wouland v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 426 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Adams v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 422 So.2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) pet. for rev. den.

    430 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1983); Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Baranko, 407 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

    
    

26. All of the challenged rules have as their legislative authority Section 944.09, Florida Statutes (1987), which in part states:

    
    

    (1) The department shall adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system and the operation of the department, which rules shall relate to:

    1. The rights of inmates.

    2. The rules of conduct to be observed by inmates and the categories of violations according to degrees or levels of severity, as well as the degrees of punishment applicable and appropriate to such violations.

    3. Disciplinary procedures and punishment.

    * * *

    (e) The operation and management of the correctional institution or facility and its personnel and functions.

    * * *

    (g) Mail to and from the state correctional system.

    * * *

    (i) Uniforms for inmates and custodial personnel.

    * * *

    1. Mail to and from inmates.

    2. The feeding of prisoners, including diet and menus, and the furnishing of health and comfort items to indigent prisoners.

    3. Such other rules as in the opinion of the department may be necessary for the efficient operation and management of the correctional system.

    
    

27. Rule 33-3.0045, which addresses package permits, has as additional authority Sections 944.47 and 945.04, Florida Statutes (1987), which provide in part:

    
    

    944.47 Introduction, removal, or possession of certain articles unlawful; penalty.

    
    

    (1)(a) Except through regular channels as authorized by the officer in charge of the correctional institution, it is unlawful to introduce into or upon the grounds of any state correctional institution, or to take or attempt to take or send or attempt to send therefrom, any of the following articles which are hereby declared to be contraband for the purposes of this section, to wit:

    * * *

    1. Any article of food or clothing given or transmitted, or intended to be given or transmitted, to any inmate of any state correctional institution.

    2. Any intoxicating beverage or beverage which causes or may cause an intoxicating effect.

    3. Any controlled substance as defined in s. 893.02(3) or any prescription or nonprescription drug having a hypnotic, stimulating, or depressing effect.

    4. Any firearm or weapon of any kind or any explosive substance.

    1. It is unlawful to transmit or attempt to transmit to, or cause or attempt to cause to be transmitted to or received by, any inmate of any state correctional institution any article or thing declared by this subsection to be contraband, at any place which is outside the grounds of such institution except through regular channels as

       authorized by the officer in charge of such correctional institution.

    2. It is unlawful for any inmate of any state correctional institution or any person while upon the grounds of any state correctional institution to be in actual or constructive possession of any article or thing declared by this section to be contraband, except as authorized by the officer in charge of such correctional institution.

    
    

    1. Department of Corrections; general function; seal; use of inmate labor.

       
       

       1. The Department of Corrections shall be responsible for the inmates and for the operation of, and shall have supervisory and protective care, custody, and control of, all buildings, grounds, property of, and matters connected with, the correctional system.

    
    

28. Rule 33-3.006, involving control of contraband, also has as legislative authority Sections 944.47 and 945.215, Florida Statutes (1987), the latter of which states in part:

    
    

    (c) Any contraband found upon, or in the possession of, any inmate in any institution under the jurisdiction of the department shall be confiscated and liquidated, and the proceeds thereof shall be deposited in the Inmate Welfare Trust Fund of the department.

    
    

29. It is clear from the foregoing that the Legislature has delegated broad discretionary rulemaking authority to the Department of Corrections. When an agency has such broad discretionary authority, "... the validity of regulations promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as they are reasonably elated to the purposes of the enabling legislation and are not arbitrary or capricious..." Florida Beverage Corporation v. Wynne, 306 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); General Telephone Company of Florida v. Florida Public Service Commission, 6 FALR 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1984). Further, where an agency has responded to rulemaking incentives and adopted as rules its policy statements of general applicability, "... [p]ermissible interpretations of statutes must and will be sustained, though other interpretations are possible and may even seem preferable according to some views..." Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In light of the broad rulemaking authority quoted above, and in light of the absence in this record of any evidence up which it can be concluded that the challenged rules are either arbitrary or capricious, it is specifically concluded as a matter of law that the challenged rules constitute permissible interpretations of the Respondent's enabling legislation, and that the Petitioners have failed to establish any grounds for holding the challenged rules invalid. See, also, the following cases which have reached similar conclusions regarding other aspects of some of these same rules. Douglas L. Adams, et al. v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case No. 83-3329R (Final Order, April 23, 1984); Lonnie Walker, et al. v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case

No. 84-0657R (Final Order, May 7, 1984); James Frederick et al. v. Department of Corrections, DOAH Case No. 86-4420R (Final Order, February 12, 1987).

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED

That the petition in this case is hereby dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida.

MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1988.

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-0288RX

The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties.

Findings proposed by Petitioners

Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3: Accepted in substance.

Paragraph 4: Second sentence accepted in substance. First and third sentences rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details.

Paragraph 5: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as unnecessary.

Paragraph 6: Rejected as unnecessary or as argument. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 10: Accepted in substance.

Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13: Accepted in substance with a number of subordinate and unnecessary details omitted.

Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance.

Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance, with exception of last sentence.

Last sentence rejected as unnecessary editorial comments.

Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23: Rejected because part of this

Paragraph constitutes subordinate and unnecessary details and part of it is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence.

Paragraphs 24 and 25: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 26 and 27: Accepted in substance.

Paragraph 28: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 29 and 30: Accepted in substance.

Paragraph 31: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details.

Paragraphs 32 and 33: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details.

Paragraph 34: Rejected as constituting unnecessary discussion about excluded evidence.

Paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39: Accepted in substance, but with a number of unnecessary or irrelevant details omitted.

Paragraph 40: First sentence accepted in substance. Remainder rejected as unnecessary or irrelevant details.

Paragraph 41: Rejected as covered by other findings to the extent relevant; portions also rejected as constituting argument rather than facts.

Paragraph 42: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details.

Paragraph 43: Accepted in substance, with some unnecessary or irrelevant details omitted.

Paragraphs 44 and 45: Rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details addressed by other rules.

Paragraph 46: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details.

Paragraphs 47, 48, and 49: Rejected as constituting primarily argument rather than proposed findings. Such findings as are proposed are irrelevant or subordinate.

Findings proposed by Respondent

Each of the findings proposed by the Respondent has been accepted in whole or in substance.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Carl B. Cribbs, Number 036458 Louis Pacheco, Number 080296 Joel Estremera, Number 097824 Luis Peterssen, Number 181279

James Gordon Smith, Number 038797 John M. Cox, Number 474253

Luis Rivera, Number 108785 Baker Correctional Institution Post Office Box 500

Olustee, Florida 32072

Ann Cocheu

Assistant Attorney General Suite 1603, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Louis A. Vargas General Counsel

Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Richard Duggar, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code Room 1802, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250

Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDING ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION

=================================================================

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

CARL BRUCE CRIBBS, LOUIS NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO PACHECO, JOEL ESTREMERA, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND LUIS PETERSSEN, JAMES DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. GORDON SMITH, JOHN M. COX

and LUIS RIVERA, CASE NOS. 88-1883, 88-1884, 88-1885 88-1886,

vs. 88-1887, & 88-1888

DOAH CASE NO. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

/ Opinion filed July 14, 1989.

Appeals from orders of the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings.

Carl Bruce Cribbs, Baker Correctional Institution, Olustee, for appellants. Ann Cocheu, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, WIGGINTON and NIMMONS, JJ., CONCUR.

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer. WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

CARL B. CRIBBS, et al

v. Case No. 88-1883

Your Case No. 88-0288R

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

LUIS PETERSSEN

v. Case No. 88-1884

Your Case No. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer. WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

LUIS RIVERA

vs. Case No. 88-1885

Your Case No. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer. WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

JOEL ESTREMERA

vs. Case No. 88-1886

Your Case No. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer. WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

LUIS PACHECO

vs. Case No. 88-1887

Your Case No. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Michael M. Parrish, Hearing Officer. WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

JAMES GORDON SMITH

vs. Case No. 88-1888

Your Case No. 88-0288RX

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

The attached opinion was rendered on July 14, 1989.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Douglass B. Shivers

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 1st day of August, 1989.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

Docket for Case No: 88-000288RX

Orders for Case No: 88-000288RX