STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ROBERT MOTES, MACHIKCO MOTES, ) MADGE CHESSER AND CHRISTIANE )

1. DRISCOLL, )

   )

   Petitioners, )

   )

   vs. )

   )

   DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND ) FINANCE, DIVISION OF FINANCE, )

   )

   Respondent, ) CASE NO. 89-4274 and )

   ) RICHARD S. RUCKI, ALTHEA M. ) RUCKI, AUDREY M. HAHN, MAURICE ) GANTZ, LLOYD E. ROBERTS, )

   JOSEPHINE K. ROBERTS, ) GERALDINE M. CARMEN, MATTHEW C. ) RESICK, LOVINA S. RESICK, AND ) JAMES E. ANDERSON, )

   )

   Intervenors. )

   )

   
   

   RECOMMENDED ORDER

   
   

   Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander, on November 9, 1989, in Titusville, Florida.

   
   

   APPEARANCES

   
   

   For Petitioners: Carl W. Pearson, Esquire Motes and Post Office Box 1048

   Chesser Titusville, Florida 32781-1048

   
   

   For Petitioner: Nicholas F. Tsamoutalas, Esquire Driscoll 1900 Palm Bay Road, North East, Suite G

   Palm Bay, Florida 32905

   
   

   For Respondent: Paul F. Stadler, Esquire

   Suite 1302, The Capital Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

   
   

   For Intervenors: Steven A. Brewer, Esquire Rucki, Hahn, 1209 South Washington Avenue Roberts, Gantz, Titusville, Florida 32780 and Carmen

   For Intervenors: Walter C. Shepard, Esquire Resick and Post Office Drawer 250

   Anderson Cocoa, Florida 32923-0250 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

   The issue is whether petitioners are entitled to participate in the distribution of moneys from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund.

   
   

   PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

   
   

   This matter began on June 21, 1989, when respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, issued a notice of intent to render a final order granting and denying certain claims for payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty bond. Such payments arose out of illicit conduct committed by a licensee, Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation. Thereafter, petitions for a formal hearing to contest the proposed agency action were filed on July 14, 1989 by petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, and by petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, on September 5, 1989. 1/ The matter was referred by respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 8, 1989 with a request that a hearing officer be assigned to conduct a formal hearing. By notice of hearing dated August 30, 1989, the matter was set for final hearing on November 9, 1989, in Titusville, Florida.

   
   

   At final hearing, through counsel, intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, Lloyd E. and Josephine K. Roberts, Audrey M. Hahn, Maurice Gantz, Geraldine M. Carmen, Matthew C. and Lovina S. Resick, and James M. Anderson, requested the right to participate as parties. Those unopposed requests have been treated as motions to intervene and are accordingly granted.

   
   

   At hearing, petitioner Driscoll presented the testimony of Rafael A. Burguet, an attorney, and Sandra A. Fernandez, a legal secretary. Also, the parties stipulated into evidence joint exhibits 1-3 and the testimony of Ruby Hawkins, an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office.

   
   

   There is no transcript of hearing. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by respondent and petitioners on November 23 and 27, 1989, respectively. A ruling on each proposed finding is made in the Appendix attached to this Recommended Order.

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:

   
   

   1. Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund (fund) codified in Sections 494.042 through 494.045, Florida Statutes (1987). Among other things, the Division processes claims for payment from the fund by persons who were parties to a mortgage financing transaction and who have suffered monetary damages as a result of a violation of the law by a licensed mortgage broker. In this case, the perpetrator was Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (Stackhouse), which held mortgage brokerage license number HB-0006527 from September 19, 1976 through August 31, 1986 and operated at least part of that time in the Brevard County area.

   2. In order to perfect a successful claim and be assured of participating in the distribution of moneys from the fund, a person must satisfy a number of statutory criteria within a specified time period after the first notice is filed. This proceeding involves a number of claims by various parties who suffered monetary damages as a result of the illicit acts of Stackhouse. The principal factual issues are whether petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes, Madge Chesser and Christiane E. Driscoll, all claimants, satisfied the required statutory criteria within the specified time period, and whether the first valid and complete notice of a claim was filed on January 20, 1987 as maintained by the Division, or occurred on a later date as urged by petitioners. These issues are crucial to petitioners' interests since the amount of money to be distributed from the fund for all claimants (on a pro rata basis) is $100,000, and all of that money has been proposed to be distributed to intervenors and other claimants because of the alleged untimeliness of petitioners' claims.

      
      

   3. The Stackhouse matter first came to the Division's attention on January 20, 1987 when it received by certified mail a letter containing a copy of a complaint filed against Stackhouse by intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, in the circuit court of the eighteenth judicial circuit in and for Brevard County. This filing constituted the first valid and complete notice of the matter. As such, it triggered a two year time period in which other claimants had to file such notice with the Division and then satisfy all statutory criteria in order to share in the first, and in this case the only, distribution of moneys from the fund. Intervenors eventually obtained a summary final judgment against Stackhouse on January 10, 1989 in the amount of $27,200 plus $1,972 in interest, $76 in court costs, and $2,000 in attorney's fees. Copies of the judgment, unsatisfied writ of execution and affidavit of diligent search were filed with the Division on January 19, 1989, or within two years from the date the first notice was filed.

      
      

   4. After the Rucki notice was filed, a number of claimants, including the other intervenors, filed their notices with the Division within the two year time period and thereafter satisfied all pertinent statutory criteria. Their names, dates of filing their final claims with the Division, and amounts of final judgment, including costs and fees, are listed below in the order in which the claimants filed their first notice with the Division:

      
      

      Claimant	Date of	Filing	Claim	Amount of judgment
      Roberts	January	19, 1989		$84,562.30
      Rucki	January	19, 1989		31,248.00
      Gantz	January	19, 1989		15,634.28
      Carman	January	19, 1989		48,767.87
      Thomas	July 21, 1988		40,103.22
      Hahn	January 19, 1989		14,165.14
      Ulriksson	January 18, 1989		14,497.00
      Choate	January 18, 1989		28,994.00
      Anderson	December 22, 1988		84,443.20
      Resnick	December 22, 1988		32,912.22

      
      

      It is noted that each of the foregoing claimants satisfied all statutory requirements prior to the date of the filing of their respective final claims with the Division. This included the obtaining of a judgment against the debtor, having a writ of execution issued upon the judgment which was later returned unsatisfied, and thereafter having made a reasonable search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possessed any property or other assets to be used in satisfying the judgment.

   5. Based upon the judgments obtained by the above claimants, those persons are entitled to distribution from the fund in the following pro rata amounts:

      
      

      Anderson claim	-	$10,950.00
      Resnick claim	-	10,950.00
      Carman claim	-	10,950.00
      Thomas claim	-	10,950.00
      Ulriksson claim	-	7,937.83
      Choate claim	-	10,950.00
      Roberts claim	-	10,950.00
      Gantz claim	-	7,697.63
      Hahn claim	-	7,714.54
      Rucki claim	-	10,950.00
      		$100.000.00

      
      

   6. On July 27, 1988 petitioners, Robert and Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, filed their notices with the Division. On August 2, 1988, they were advised by the Division that "the first time period for payment of the Guaranty Fund claims is `two years after the first claim.'" Even so, petitioners did not complete all required statutory steps and file their final claims with the Division until March 1, 1989, or after the two year period had expired. Petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, filed her notice, copy of complaint and final judgment on January 23, 1989. Thereafter, she completed all required statutory steps and filed her final claim with the Division on June 6, 1989. As a consequence, none of petitioners are entitled to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund.

      
      

   7. An attorney who once represented Driscoll, Rafael A. Burguet, made inquiry by telephone with a Division employee in either late December 1988 or early January 1989 concerning the steps required to process a claim on behalf of his client. It was his recollection that the Division employee did not advise him that the two year period for perfecting claims was triggered in January 1987. On January 20, 1989, Burguet sent a letter to the Division with a copy of the complaint and final judgment against Stackhouse. In the letter, he requested the Division to "please advise as to what further requirements you may have to file this claim." On January 23, 1989 a Division employee acknowledged by letter that the Division had received the complaint and judgment. The letter contained copies of the relevant portions of the Florida Statutes and advice that "claims for recovery against Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation are currently being forwarded to our Legal Department for the drafting of a Notice of Intent to either grant or deny payment from the Fund." There is no evidence that the Division made any positive representations to Burguet that either mislead him or caused him to delay in filing his claim. Similarly, the Division responded on August 2, 1988 to the initial filing of the Motes and Chesser notices with advice that the time period for complying with the statutory criteria was "two years after the first claim." Although there were subsequent telephone conversations (but no written communications) between their attorney and the Division, there was no evidence that the Division made any positive representations that would mislead petitioners or otherwise cause them to delay processing their claims.

      
      

   8. Petitioners Motes and Chesser contend that the first valid and complete notice was not received by the Division until May 20, 1987 when intervenor Carman filed a complaint against Stackhouse in circuit court and also filed her claim and copy of the complaint with the Division the same date. Under this theory, the two year period would not expire until May 19, 1989. This

      contention is based on the fact that the Rucki complaint was filed in circuit court on January 9, 1987 but the claim and copy of the complaint were not filed with the Division until January 20, 1987. Petitioners contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e) requires both acts to be accomplished the same date. However, this construction of the statute is contrary to the manner in which it has been construed by the Division.

      
      

   9. According to the stipulated testimony of an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office, if the property to be levied on is not listed on the instructions to levy, the sheriff's office requires a court order prior to filing a return nulla bona. In this case seven claimants obtained such a court order directing the sheriff to furnish a return nulla bona as to the writ of execution. However, petitioners Motes and Chesser did not do so until after the two year time period had expired.

      
      

   10. The records received in evidence reflect that the initial inquiry made by Robert and Virginia R. Enteen was never pursued and therefore their claim should be denied.

       
       

       CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       
       

   11. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1987).

       
       

   12. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes (1987) provides the conditions precedent for recovery from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund. It reads in relevant part as follows:

       
       

       1. Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the (fund) if:

          1. The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction ...

          2. The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor can be found ...

             The person has made all reasonable

             searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property or other assets ... and has discovered no property and assets

             * * *

             1. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause;

                * * *

                (Emphasis added)

                In addition, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes (1987) prescribes the manner in which payment from the fund shall be made. It reads in pertinent part as follows:

                
                

                1. Any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in s. 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the (fund) in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, ... As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recover from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate ... (Emphasis added)

             
             

             Thus, once a complete and valid notice is filed with the Division, all persons wishing to participate in the distribution of moneys must file their notices and meet the conditions precedent for recovery within two years from the date of that notice. Failing this, they can only recover from any remaining portion of the $100,000 limitation per licensee after the timely claimants are paid. In this case, because of the size of the judgments and number of claimants, no money is left after the first distribution.

             
             

   13. The evidence reflects that only those persons identified in finding of fact 4 are entitled to participate in the first distribution of moneys. As to petitioners Motes and Chesser, they did not meet the conditions precedent for recovery within the prescribed two year period. As to petitioner Driscoll, she failed to file her notice with the Division and meet the conditions precedent for recovery within the same time period. Therefore, their claims must be denied.

       
       

   14. In reaching the above conclusion, the undersigned has given thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by petitioners. First, the argument that the agency is estopped to deny the claim of Driscoll is deemed to be unavailing since the elements of estoppel have not been shown. To begin with, estoppel may be applied against the state only in the most exceptional circumstances. Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden, 76 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1954).

       In addition, it is necessary that a showing of the following elements be made:

       (a) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position; (b) reliance on that representation; and (c) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the representation and reliance thereon. See, e.g., Kuge v. State, Department of Administration, 449 So.2d 389, 391 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The evidence does not show that the agency made a material and positive representation to Driscoll (through her attorney) that was contrary to a later asserted position and which was relied upon by Driscoll to her detriment. Therefore, this contention must fail. Secondly, the Motes and Chesser contend that the first complete and valid notice was not filed until May 20, 1987. They rely upon Subsection 494.043(1)(e), Florida Statutes

       (1987) which provides that "(t)he person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail." (Emphasis added) Petitioners contend that the words "at the same time" must be strictly construed and thus the Rucki's complaint against Stackhouse should have been filed with the circuit court and the Division at the same time in order to constitute a "complete and valid notice." They go on to cite a number of cases which stand generally for the propositions that (a) statutes should be construed so as to achieve the intended purpose of the law, and (b) claim statutes should not be interpreted in a manner that would hamper the presentation of just claims. While the cited cases unquestionably stand for these propositions, the interpretation urged by petitioners would produce an illogical and absurd result since it would require the person to guess when the certified mail would be received by the Division so that the filing of the complaint in circuit court would be accomplished at the same time. It is well established that an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to great deference and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Department of Insurance v. Southeast Volusia Hospital District, 438 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1983).

       This is true even if it is not the exclusive or most desirable interpretation. See, e.g., State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In this case, the agency's interpretation is deemed to be a reasonable one, and petitioners' contention is hereby rejected. Finally, at hearing petitioners Motes and Chesser suggested that they were delayed in completing the conditions precedent for recovery because of difficulty in obtaining an unsatisfied writ of execution. This was because, in the absence of the judgment holder listing Stackhouse's property on the instructions to levy (which petitioners were apparently unable to do), the sheriff would not file a return nulla bona until a court order directing him to do so was obtained. This argument is deemed to be unavailing since the record shows that at least seven claimants obtained such an order prior to the expiration of the two year period and thus were not delayed by this requirement.

       
       

   15. In summary, it is concluded that the persons identified in finding of fact 4 should participate in the first distribution of moneys from the fund in the amounts shown in finding of fact 5. It is further concluded that the requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order distributing the moneys

from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund in a manner consistent with its proposed agency action entered on June 21, 1989. The requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

DONALD R. ALEXANDER

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1989.

ENDNOTE

1/ Although Driscoll did not request a hearing within twenty-one days after the entry of the proposed agency action, and therefore may have waived her point of entry, no party has objected to her failure to timely request a hearing. The undersigned has accordingly treated Driscoll as a full party.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4274

Petitioners Motes and Chesser:

1-2. Adopted in finding of fact l.

3-14. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.

15. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. 16-25. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.

1. Partially-adopted in finding of fact 6.

2. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7.

3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6.

4. Partially adopted in findings of fact 7 and 9. 30-33. Partially adopted in finding of fact 9.

34. Rejected as being unnecessary.

35-36. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7.

1. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6.

2. Partially adopted in finding of fact 9.

3. Partially adopted in findings of fact 4 and 6.

4. Rejected as being unnecessary.

5. Rejected as being irrelevant. Note - Where proposed findings have been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, subordinate or contrary to the more persuasive evidence.

Petitioner Driscoll:

1. Adopted in finding of fact 1.

2(a)-(e) Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.

2(f) Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7.

2(g)-(1) Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Note - Where proposed

findings have been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, subordinate or contrary to the more persuasive evidence.

Respondent:

1. Adopted in preliminary statement.

2-3. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. 4-12. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.

13. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 7. 14-17. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4.

18. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10.

19-26. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Note - Where proposed findings have been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, cumulative, subordinate or contrary to the more persuasive evidence.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capital

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Carl W. Pearson, Esquire Post Office Box 1948

Titusville, Florida 32781-1048

Nicholas F. Tsamoutalas, Esquire 1900 Palm Bay Road, Suite G Palm Bay, Florida 32905

Paul F. Stadler, Esquire Suite 1302, The Capital

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Steven A. Brewer, Esquire 1209 South Washington Avenue Titusville, Florida 32780

Walter C. Shepard, Esquire Post Office Drawer 250 Cocoa, Florida 32923-0250

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE

DIVISION OF FINANCE

ROBERT MOTES, MACHIKO MOTES, MADGE CHESSER AND CHRISTIANE

E. DRISCOLL,

Petitioners, Administrative Proceeding No.: 1311-F-1/89

vs. DOAH CASE NO. 89-4274

DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DIVISION OF FINANCE,

Respondent,

and

RICHARD S. RUCKI, ALTHEA M. RUCKI, AUDREY M. HAHN, MAURICE GANTZ, LLOYD E ROBERTS, JOSEPHINE K. ROBERTS, GERALDINE M. CARMEN, MATTHEW

1. RESICK, LOVINA S. RESICK, AND JAMES E ANDERSON,

   
   

   Intervenors.

   /

   
   

   FINAL ORDER GRANTING OR DENYING PAYMENT FROM THE MORTGAGE BROKERAGE GUARANTY FUND RE

   STACKHOUSE MORTGAGE CORPORATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

   
   

   The State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (hereinafter Department), being authorized and directed to administer the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (hereinafter the Fund) codified in Sections 494.042, 494.043, 494.044 and 494.045, Florida Statutes, hereby enters this Final Order granting or denying the following applications for payment from the Fund arising from alleged violations of the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, by Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter Stackhouse).

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   1. Under the provisions of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, the Department is charged with the responsibility and duty of administering the Fund, which includes the duty to approve or deny applications for payment from the Fund, as set forth in Section 494.042(2), Florida Statutes.

   2. On or about June 21, 1989, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Render a Final Order Granting and Denying Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund re: Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation and Notice of Rights (hereinafter Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent was served by certified mail and advertised in the Florida Administrative Weekly on July 7, 1989. Subsequent to the receipt of petitions for hearing, this cause was referred to DOAH. Thereafter, on December 11, 1989, a Recommended Order was entered. No exceptions were filed by any party to the Recommended Order.

      
      

   3. The Department adopts and incorporates by reference the Findings of Fact contained in the Recommended Order as if set forth at length with the following modifications:

      
      

      1. The first two sentences of the Recommended Order of paragraph 8, page 8, are replaced with the following:

         
         

         Petitioners contend that the first complete and valid notice was not received by the Division on January 20, 1987.

         
         

      2. The fourth sentence of the Recommended Order of paragraph 8, page 8, is replaced with the following:

         
         

         Petitioners appear to contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires both acts be accomplished the same date or that the court filing and mailing must be contemporaneous.

         
         

         CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

         
         

   4. The Department adopts and incorporates by reference the Conclusions of Law contained in the Recommended Order as if set forth at length with the following modifications:

      
      

      1. Add after the sentence, "Therefore, this contention must fail," found in paragraph 5, page 11:

         
         

         Additionally, there is no evidence that the Department waived the requirement that the

         two-year period be timely satisfied. Similarly, the Motes and Chesser have failed to demonstrate estoppel and waiver based upon letters sent or because the Division continued to accept the filing of supporting documents after January 19, 1989.

         
         

      2. Add after the sentence, "In this case, the agency's interpretation is deemed to be a reasonable one, and petitioners' contention is hereby rejected," found in paragraph 5, page 12:

         
         

         Additionally, any contention that the court filing and the mailing must be effectuated on precisely the same day must similarly be rejected.

      3. Add to the end of paragraph 5 on page 13:

Furthermore, the statute expressly requires that the claimant obtain an unsatisfied writ.

FINAL ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE determined and ordered that:

1. The Anderson Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

2. The Resick Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

3. The Carman Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

4. The Thomas Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

5. The Ulriksson Claim is approved in the amount of $7,937.83.

   
   

6. The Choate Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00.

   
   

7. The Roberts Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

8. The Gantz Claim is approved in the amount of $7,697.63.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

9. The Hahn Claim is approved in the amount of $7,714.54, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

   
   

10. The Rucki Claim is approved in the amount of $10,950.00, provided that the assignment required by Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, is duly executed, recorded, and filed with the Department substantially in the form of Exhibit A.

    
    

11. As all monies available have been disbursed, all other claims are denied with prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of February, 1990.

GERALD LEWIS, as Comptroller and Head of the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance

COPIES FURNISHED:

Donald R. Alexander, Hearing Officer, DOAH Randy Holland, Director, Division of Finance Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Assistant General Counsel

NOTICE OF RIGHTS

The Petitioners are advised that within thirty (30) days of the date of this Final Order Petitioners may seek judicial review of the same by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Banking and Finance, Room 1302, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 and by filing a second copy of such Notice of Appeal together with the proper filing fee with the Clerk of the District Court of Appeal, First District, Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard at Pensacola and West Jefferson Streets, Tallahassee, Florida 32301 or with the District Court of Appeal wherein Petitioners reside.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the foregoing are furnished by U.S. Certified Mail, this 20th day February, 1990 to:

Walter C. Shepard, Esquire Rita H. Budnyk

P.O. Drawer 250 1900 Palm Bay Rd., N.E., Suite G Cocoa, Florida 32923-0250 Palm Bay, Florida 32905

Stephen M. Brewer, Esquire Robert Enteen

1209 S. Washington Avenue 6299 Hitchin Post Way Titusville, Florida 32780 Delray Beach, Florida 33445

Carl W. Pearson, Esquire William E. Weller, Esquire

P.O. Box 1048 P.O. Box 1255 Titusville, Florida 32781-1048 Cocoa Beach, FL 32931

Rafael A. Burguet, Esquire Russell E. Thomas

1900 South Hickory Street 4506 Hickory Hill Blvd. Melbourne, Florida 32901

H. RICHARD BISBEE Deputy General Counsel

Office of the Comptroller Legal Section, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 904/488-9896

Docket for Case No: 89-004274

Orders for Case No: 89-004274