STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ) REGULATION, DIVISION OF ) ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES )

AND TOBACCO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 90-1845

)

MR. POP'S, INC., d/b/a )

LYNDA'S LOUNGE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case on September 6, 1990, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Nancy C. Waller, Esquire

Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

For Respondent: Gary Popkin, President

Mr. Pop's Inc., d/b/a Lynda's Lounge 8007 Kimberly Boulevard

North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause issued by Petitioner?

   
   

2. If so, what disciplinary action should be taken?

   
   

   PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

   
   

   On January 9, 1990, Petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause why Respondent's alcoholic beverage license "should not have a civil penalty assessed against it or be suspended or revoked" based upon the following alleged misconduct:

   
   

   1. On or about July 19, 1989, you, Mr. Pop's, Inc., d/b/a Lynda's Lounge, or your agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, to wit: Gary Matthew

      Popkin, did unlawfully possess on your licensed premises a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, contrary to F.S.S. 893.13 (1)(a) within F.S.S. 561.29(1) (a).

   2. On or about July 19, 1989, you, Mr. Pop's, Inc., d/b/a Lynda's Lounge, or your agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, to wit: Gary Matthew Popkin, did unlawfully sell and deliver on your licensed premises a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, to Confidential Informant #Al4 contrary to F.S.S. 561.29(1) (a).

   3. On or about July 19-21, 1989, you,

Mr. Pop's, Inc., d/b/a Lynda's Lounge, or your agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, maintained your licensed premises as a place used for the illegal using, keeping, selling and delivering of substances controlled under Chapter 893, F.S.S. which renders the premises a public nuisance, in violation of Sections 823.01 and 823.10 within F.S.S. 561.29(1)(c).

Respondent denied the allegations of wrongdoing advanced in the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause and requested a formal hearing. On March 26, 1990, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct such a hearing.

The formal hearing in this matter was originally scheduled for June 27, 1990. At the request of Respondent, the hearing was continued and rescheduled for August 16, 1990. On August 3, 1990, Respondent filed a motion requesting a second continuance of the hearing. By order issued August 7, 1990, the motion was granted and the hearing was rescheduled for September 6, 1990.

The hearing was held as scheduled on September 6, 1990. At the outset of the hearing, Respondent requested a third continuance. The request was denied by the Hearing Officer. Four witnesses testified on behalf of Petitioner: C.G., the confidential informant referenced in the Notice to Show Cause; Sandy Lamar, a forensic chemist who works in the crime laboratory of the Broward Sheriff's Office; Sergeant Pat Roberts of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco; and Detective Gary Harris of the North Lauderdale Police Department.

In addition to the testimony of these witness, Petitioner offered seven exhibits into evidence. All seven exhibits were received by the Hearing Officer.

Respondent's case consisted exclusively of the testimony of its President, Gary Popkin.

At the close of the evidentiary portion of the hearing on September 6, 1990, the Hearing Officer advised the parties on the record that post-hearing submittals had to be filed no later than twenty-five days following the close of the hearing. On October 1, 1990, Petitioner filed a proposed recommended order and Respondent filed a letter, dated September 28, 1990, addressed to the Hearing Officer. Findings of facts proposed in these post-hearing submittals have been carefully considered and are specifically addressed in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent is a Florida corporation. Gary Popkin is its sole corporate officer and stockholder. He holds the positions of President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer.

   
   

2. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material hereto, the holder of alcoholic beverage license #16- 03 032 2-COP issued by Petitioner.

   
   

3. The licensed business is a bar that operates under the name of Lynda's Lounge. It is located at 8007-8009 Kimberly Boulevard in North Lauderdale, Florida.

1. C.G. is a paid confidential informant. The North Lauderdale Police Department is among the law enforcement agencies for whom he works.

   
   

2. On the afternoon of July 19, 1989, C.G. entered Lynda's Lounge, sat down and ordered a drink. While in the bar, C.G. was approached by Vinnie Lavarello, another of the bar's patrons. They were joined by Popkin. A conversation ensued.

   
   

3. Popkin advised C.G. that he had some "good pot" and asked him if he wanted to buy some. He suggested that C.G. act quickly because he only had a little left. Both Popkin and Lavarello told C.G. that there was no need to worry because everyone in the bar "smoked pot" and was "cool." C.G. informed Popkin that he would "let him know." He thereupon left the bar and paged Detective Gary Harris of the North Lauderdale Police Department. Harris instructed C.G. to meet him at the North Lauderdale police station, which is a short distance from the bar.

   
   

4. In accordance with Harris' instructions, C.G. went to the police station. He provided Harris with a description of Lavarello and Popkin, as well as their names. Harris searched C.G. and C.G.'s car for drugs and found none. He then gave C.G. $20.00 with which to purchase marijuana from Popkin.

   
   

5. C.G. drove back to the bar. He was followed by Harris in another vehicle. They arrived at the bar at approximately 5:55 p.m.. C.G. entered the bar, while Harris waited outside. Once in the bar, C.G. walked up to Lavarello and indicated that he was interested in consummating the deal they had discussed earlier that day. Popkin apparently overheard C.G. He gave C.G. a package containing marijuana (cannabis). In return, C.G. gave Popkin the $20.00 he had been given by Harris.

   
   

6. Following this transaction, there was a discussion concerning the possibility of C.G. purchasing additional drugs, including cocaine, from Popkin. Popkin quoted C.G. prices for various quantities of the drug and encouraged C.G. to come back and do business with him.

   
   

7. At approximately 6:10 p.m., fifteen minutes after he entered the bar,

   C.G. left and drove in his vehicle to a prearranged location to meet Harris. Harris observed C.G. leave the bar and followed C.G. in his vehicle to their predetermined meeting place. After they both exited their vehicles, C.G. handed Harris the marijuana he had purchased from Popkin and told Harris what had happened in the bar. Harris field tested the marijuana. It tested positive.

8. Harris placed the marijuana in a sealed bag and forwarded it to the crime laboratory of the Broward Sheriff's Office. Tests performed at the crime laboratory reflected that the substance that Popkin had sold C.G. was indeed marijuana.

   
   

9. After consulting with Harris regarding the matter, C.G. returned to Lynda's Lounge on July 21, 1989, to make arrangements to purchase an ounce of cocaine. As he had been told to do by Popkin, C.G. discussed the matter with Lavarello. C.G. and Lavarello agreed on a purchase price. C.G. then left the bar to get money to make the purchase.

   
   

10. After leaving the bar, C.G. went to the North Lauderdale police station and met with Harris. Harris searched C.G. and C.G.'s vehicle for drugs and found none. He then gave C.G. money with which to purchase an ounce of cocaine from Lavarello. Although C.G. and Lavarello had agreed upon a purchase price of $700.00, because it is a common practice of drug dealers to raise their prices immediately before the transaction is to take place, Harris gave C.G.

    $800.00 in the event Lavarello raised his price.

    
    

11. C.G. then drove back to the bar, followed by Harris in another vehicle. After parking, C.G. exited his vehicle and entered the bar. Harris remained outside, across the street from the bar.

    
    

12. C.G. approached Lavarello. It was too noisy inside the bar to talk so

    C.G. and Lavarello left and continued their conversation in C.G.'s vehicle, which was parked in the lot in front of the bar. Lavarello indicated to C.G. that he did not have the cocaine with him and needed to pick it up, but that

    C.G. would have to give him the entire purchase price before he did so. C.G. then excused himself. He thereupon contacted Harris and they both returned to the North Lauderdale police station.

    
    

13. Harris did not want C.G. to give Lavarello that much money and have to wait for the cocaine to be delivered. He therefore decided to have C.G. purchase an eighth of an ounce, instead of an ounce, of cocaine from Lavarello, the purchase price of which, C.G. had been told, was $150.00. Accordingly, Harris took back $600.00 of the $800.00 he had given C.G. earlier that day. Harris then again searched C.G. for drugs and found none.

    
    

14. C.G. thereupon headed directly back to the bar, with Harris following behind him in another vehicle. C.G. met with Lavarello at the bar. He told Lavarello that he wanted to purchase a eighth of an ounce, rather than an ounce, of cocaine. He gave Lavarello $200.00 and made arrangements to meet Lavarello later that day at the bar to receive delivery of the cocaine he had purchased.

    
    

15. At Lavarello's request, C.G. drove Lavarello to Lavarello's girlfriend's house. C.G. then returned to the North Lauderdale police station. At all times during this journey, C.G. and his vehicle were under Harris' observation. At the police station, Harris again searched C.G. for contraband and found none.

    
    

16. Later that day, C.G. and Harris went back to Lynda's Lounge in separate vehicles. Harris remained outside, as C.G. exited his vehicle and headed towards the front door of the bar, where he encountered Lavarello. C.G. and Lavarello then proceeded to C.G.'s vehicle, where Lavarello handed C.G. a package containing cocaine. Upon receiving the package, C.G. complained that it appeared that he had received less cocaine than he had been promised. Lavarello admitted that he had given his girlfriend some of the cocaine that originally

    had been intended for C.G. To compensate for the missing cocaine, Lavarello gave C.G. a package containing marijuana. In addition to the cocaine and marijuana, Lavarello also gave C.G. a $20.00 bill and a gas receipt reflecting the amount of money he had paid for gasoline during his trip to pick up the cocaine.

    
    

17. Following this transaction, C.G. and Lavarello went their separate ways. As he had done after the buy he had made on July 19, 1989, C.G. met Harris at a prearranged location. He handed Harris everything that Lavarello had given him. Harris searched C.G. and found no additional contraband. Harris then field tested both the cocaine and the marijuana. The test results were positive. After conducting these field tests, Harris placed the cocaine and marijuana in a sealed bag and forwarded the bag to the crime laboratory of the Broward Sheriff's Office. Tests performed at the crime laboratory reflected that the substances in question were indeed cocaine and marijuana.

    
    

18. Popkin and Lavarello were subsequently arrested by Harris. 1/

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

19. Petitioner is statutorily empowered to suspend or revoke an alcoholic beverage license, such as the one held by Respondent, based upon any of the grounds enumerated in Section 561.29(1), Florida Statutes.

    
    

20. The proof establishing the existence of these grounds for license suspension or revocation must be clear and convincing. See Evans Packing Company v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 550 So.2d 112, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

    
    

21. Subsection (1(a) of Section 561.29, Florida Statutes, authorizes Petitioner to suspend or revoke a license if it i established by clear and convincing evidence that "the licensee or his or its agents, officers, servants, or employees, on the licensed premises, or elsewhere while in the scope of employment, [has violated) any of the laws of this state or of the United States."

    
    

22. Paragraph 1 of the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause issued against Respondent in the instant case alleges that on or about July 19, 1989, "[Respondent) or [its) agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, to wit: Gary Matthew Popkin, did unlawfully possess on [its] licensed premises a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, contrary to F.S.S. 893.13(l) (a) within F.S.S. 561.29(1) (a)."

    
    

23. Section 893.13(1) (a), Florida Statues, the statutory provision alleged in paragraph 1 to have been violated, makes it unlawful to, among other things, possess marijuana (cannabis) with the intent to sell. A person who engages in such conduct is guilty of a third degree felony pursuant to this statutory provision.

    
    

24. The record evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Popkin is Respondent's sole corporate officer and stockholder and that on July 19, 1989, while in Lynda's Lounge, the licensed premises, he had in his possession marijuana that he intended to sell in violation of Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the Notice to Show Cause. In view of this violation of state law committed by Popkin on the licensed premises, Petitioner has sufficient cause, pursuant to Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida

    Statutes, to suspend or revoke the alcoholic beverage license held by Respondent, Popkin's alter ego. 2/ See Lash, Inc. v. State Department of Business Regulation, 411 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

    
    

25. Paragraph 2 of the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause issued against Respondent in the instant case alleges that on or about July 19, 1989, "[Respondent] or [its] agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, to wit: Gary Matthew Popkin, did unlawfully sell and deliver on [its] licensed premises a controlled substance, to wit: marijuana, to Confidential Informant #A14 contrary to F.S.S. 893.13(1)(a) within F.S.S. 561.29(1)(a)."

    
    

26. Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, the statutory provision alleged in paragraph 2 to have been violated, makes it unlawful, among other things, to sell or deliver marijuana. A person who engages in such conduct is guilty of third degree felony pursuant to this statutory provision.

    
    

27. The record evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that on July 19, 1989, while in the licensed premises, Popkin sold and delivered marijuana to

    C.G. in violation of Section 893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in paragraph 2 of the Notice to Show Cause. In view of this violation of state law committed by Respondent's sole corporate officer and stockholder on the licensed premises, Petitioner has additional cause to suspend or revoke Respondent's alcoholic beverage license pursuant to Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes.

    
    

28. Subsection (1)(c) of Section 561.29, Florida Statutes, authorizes Petitioner to suspend or revoke a license if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the licensee is "[m]aintaining a nuisance on the licensed premises."

    
    

29. An establishment may be deemed a nuisance, within the meaning of Section 561.29(1)(c), Florida Statutes, if it "is visited by persons for the purpose of unlawfully using any substance controlled under chapter 893 [including marijuana (cannabis) and cocaine]" or if it "is used for the illegal keeping, selling, or delivering of the same." Section 823.10, Fla. Stat.

    
    

30. Paragraph 3 of the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause issued against Respondent in the instant case alleges that on or about July 19-21, 1989, "[Respondent] or [its] agent, servant, employee(s) or all of the above, maintained [its] licensed premises as a place used for the illegal using, keeping, selling and delivering of substances controlled under Chapter 893,

    F.S.S. which renders the premises a public nuisance, in violation of Sections 823.01 3/ and 823.10 within F.S.S. 561.29(1)(c)."

    
    

31. The record evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that on July

    19 and 21, 1990, the licensed premises were used by Popkin, and by Lavarello, with Popkin's knowledge, approval and encouragement, to illegally keep, sell and deliver controlled substances. 4/ Respondent is therefore guilty of having maintained a nuisance on the licensed premises on those dates, as alleged in paragraph 3 of the Notice to Show Cause. This provides the Department with further cause, pursuant to Section 561.29(1)(c), Florida Statutes, to suspend or revoke Respondent's alcoholic beverage license.

    
    

32. Because the acts which give Petitioner cause to suspend or revoke Respondent's alcoholic beverage license involve intentional wrongdoing of a serious nature, rather than mere inattention or negligence, on the part of Respondent's sole corporate officer and stockholder, Petitioner should revoke, not simply suspend, Respondent's license.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations of Section 561.29(1), Florida Statutes, charged in the January 9, 1990, Notice to Show Cause and revoking alcoholic beverage license #16-03032 2- COP held by Respondent.

DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this & day of October, 1990.

STUART M. LERNER

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

ENDNOTES

1/ In making his factual findings concerning what occurred in and around Lynda's Lounge on July 19 and 21, 1989, the Hearing Officer has relied upon C.G.'s testimony, key portions of which were corroborated by the testimony of Harris, whom the Hearing Officer has found to be a credible witness motivated by purely legitimate considerations in testifying against Respondent.

Popkin's testimony, which was not corroborated by any other witness, that the drug-related activities described by C.G. never took place has been rejected as unpersuasive.

2/ See Ennis v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc., 203 So.2d 514, 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So.2d 870 (Fla.

1968)(corporation deemed the "alter ego" of its "sole owner;" not improper for "sole owner's" deposition "to be considered against the corporation"); Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff'd 875 F.2d 873 (11th Cir.

1989) (actual knowledge of sexual harassment could be imputed to corporate defendant, inasmuch as the perpetrator of the harassment was the president, director and majority shareholder of the corporation).

3/ Section 823.01, Florida Statutes, provides that "[a]ll nuisances which tend to annoy the community or injure the health of citizens in general, or to corrupt the public morals, are misdemeanors of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083."

4/ There is no evidence that any controlled substances were actually used on the licensed premises on these dates.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-1845

The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted in the instant case:

Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact

1. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order.

   
   

2. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.

3-17. Accepted and incorporated in substance.

1. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Third sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law than a finding of fact.

   
   

2. First sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.

   
   

3. Accepted and incorporated in substance.

21-22. Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony.

23. Third sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony.

24-26. Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony.

1. First and third sentences: Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony; Second and fourth sentences: Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.

   
   

2. Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument concerning the penalty that should be imposed in the instant case than a finding of fact. Respondent's September 28, 1990, Letter to the Hearing Officer. 1/

First unnumbered paragraph: Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of argument concerning the weight to be given testimony adduced at hearing than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Furthermore, the "deposition" 2/ referred to in this paragraph is not part of the record evidence. See Philpot v. City of Miami, 541 So.2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ("A deputy's decision [in a workers' compensation case] may not be predicated on material that has not been admitted in evidence"); Marrero v. State, 478 So.2d

1155, 1156 (Fla. 3d DC- 1985) ("The law of evidence does not provide--and never has-- that a party may attack the credibility of a witness simply by insinuating through his questions to the witness that the witness has in fact made statements which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony, and then treat the insinuating questions as if they were impeaching evidence" without offering any proof of these prior inconsistent statements); Manatee County v.

Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 387 So.2d 446, 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) ("It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that agencies required to make a determination upon or after a hearing, in the exercise of a quasi- judicial function, cannot act solely upon their own information"); Thorn v.

Florida Real Estate Commission, 146 So.2d 907, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)("All parties to [an administrative] hearing must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such").

Second and third unnumbered paragraphs and fourth unnumbered paragraph, second sentence: To the extent that these paragraphs propose that the Hearing Officer find that members of the North Lauderdale Police Department bear grudges against Popkin and Lavarello and that it has falsely accused them of wrongdoing "to get even" with them, these proposed findings have been rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 3/

Fourth unnumbered paragraph, remaining sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and because, in any event, they concern matters that should have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case.

Fifth through eighth unnumbered paragraphs: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony adduced at hearing and commentary regarding such testimony rather than findings of fact based upon such testimony.

Ninth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence and because, in any event, it is irrelevant and immaterial.

Tenth unnumbered paragraph: To the extent that this paragraph suggests that the North Lauderdale Police Department uses paid confidential informants, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it suggests that the North Lauderdale Police Department has not made any "legitimate arrest" without the assistance of a paid confidential informant, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and because, in any event, it is irrelevant and immaterial.

Eleventh unnumbered paragraph, First sentence: Rejected because it is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; Second sentence: Rejected because it is irrelevant and immaterial. 4/

Twelfth through sixteenth unnumbered paragraphs: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony adduced at hearing and commentary regarding such testimony rather than findings of fact based upon such testimony.

Seventeenth unnumbered paragraph: Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument concerning the sufficiency of Petitioner's proof than a finding of fact.

APPENDIX ENDNOTES

1/ Unlike Petitioner, Respondent has not identified in its post- hearing submittal those assertions that it wishes the Hearing Officer to treat as proposed findings of fact. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer will assume that the entire body of the letter was intended by Respondent to constitute its proposed findings of fact.

2/ A copy of the "deposition" was appended to Respondent's September 28, 1990, letter.

3/ The Hearing Officer has credited Harris' testimony that there was no "vendetta" against Popkin.

4/ Although they may not have been "friends" or "close acquaintances," the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that, at the very least, Popkin and Lavarello knew one another and were involved in the drug trade together.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Nancy C. Waller, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

Gary Popkin, President

Mr. Pop's Inc., d/b/a Lynda's Lounge 8007 Kimberly Boulevard

North Lauderdale, Florida 33068

Leonard Ivey, Director

Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages

and Tobacco

725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

Captain Russel R. Smith

499 N.W. 70th Avenue, Suite 302 Atrium Executive Plaza Plantation, Florida 33317

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMITWRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDEDORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY ATLEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTENEXCEPTIONS. SOME AGENCIES ALLOW ALARGER PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN

WHICH TOSUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULDCONSULT WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUETHE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNINGTHEIR RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILINGEXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER.ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDERSHOULD BE FILED WITH THE AGENCY THATWILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.

Docket for Case No: 90-001845

Orders for Case No: 90-001845