STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
THE ADMINISTRATORS CORPORATION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 90-5943F
) DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND ) TREASURER, )
)
Respondent. )
) CHARLES N. ZALIS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 90-5944F
) DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND ) TREASURER, )
)
Respondent. )
)
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned on Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order filed December 26, 1990, and on Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order filed December 31, 1990.
This action arose after Respondent Department of Insurance and Treasurer entered a Final Order finding Petitioners, The Administrators Corporation and Charles N. Zalis, not guilty of the allegations contained in an Order to Show Cause filed against them and dismissing that Order to Show Cause. Petitioners now seek reimbursement for their attorney's fees and costs expended in defending those allegations, pursuant to the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act.
Accordingly, the issue for consideration in this cause is whether Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs for defending that administrative action initiated against them.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 5, 1989, Respondent filed an Order to Show Cause seeking to take disciplinary action against the certification of authority issued to Petitioner, The Administrators Corporation, and the insurance licenses issued to Petitioner, Charles N. Zalis. Petitioners timely requested a formal hearing, and the case was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal hearing regarding the allegations contained in that Order to Show Cause. Upon receipt, the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 89-5981.
The final hearing in that disciplinary matter was conducted on May 14, 1990. Thereafter, a Recommended Order was entered on July 9, 1990, recommending to Respondent that a final order be entered finding Petitioners not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. None of the parties filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. On August 15, 1990, the Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner entered a Final Order adopting in full the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation contained within that Recommended Order; finding the Petitioners not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause filed against them, and dismissing the Order to Show Cause.
On September 21, 1990, Petitioners filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings their Petitions for Costs and Fees, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 221-6.035, Florida Administrative Code.
On September 27, 1990, an Initial Order was entered in each of the above-captioned causes. The Initial Order is a form order automatically prepared by the Clerk's Office and signed by the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings in every case filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, except for those proceedings conducted on an expedited basis pursuant to statutory directives. The Initial Order advises the parties as to the name of the Hearing Officer assigned to hear the matter, provides certain procedural information, and solicits specific information from the parties so that the matter can be scheduled for an evidentiary hearing appropriately.
On October 8, 1990, Respondent filed a joint Response to Initial Order on behalf of all parties, and on October 10, 1990, Respondent filed a joint Amended Response to Initial Order on behalf of all parties in this proceeding. The Amended Response to Initial Order advised that the parties had agreed that the final hearing should be scheduled for one day during the month of February, 1991, in Tallahassee.
Pursuant to the agreement of the parties regarding the scheduling of the evidentiary hearing in this cause, on October 19, 1990, these causes were consolidated sua sponte, and a formal hearing was scheduled in these consolidated causes for February 14, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.
No response by Respondent to either the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by The Administrators Corporation or the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by Charles N. Zalis has ever been filed in this cause even in the face of the Motion for Summary Final Order based upon Respondent's failure to respond. Accordingly, this matter is decided on the basis of the petitions filed in these consolidated causes, together with the documentation attached to those petitions, Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order, together with the documentation attached to that motion, and Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order. Since the Respondent has failed to controvert or dispute any of the factual allegations contained within those pleadings, there is no factual allegation in dispute in these consolidated causes.
Petitioners are small business parties as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. By virtue of the Final Order entered in DOAH Case No. 89- 5981, Petitioners are prevailing small business parties in an administrative proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120 initiated by a state agency. The actions of Respondent both in initiating and in pursuing the Order to Show Cause filed in
DOAH Case No. 89-5981 were substantially unjustified, and no special circumstance exists which would make unjust the award of attorney's fees and costs to Petitioners in these consolidated causes.
The itemized affidavits filed in these consolidated causes reveal the nature, extent, and monetary value of the services rendered by Petitioners' attorneys, as well as the costs incurred in the underlying proceeding. Petitioners incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $49,581.25 and costs in the amount of $7,351.72 in the underlying administrative proceeding. The amounts of attorney's fees and costs claimed by Petitioners are reasonable and necessary.
The Department of Insurance and Treasurer was not a nominal party only in the underlying administrative proceeding.
Petitioners filed their Petitions for Costs and Fees within 60 days after the date that they became prevailing small business parties.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in these consolidated cases. Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1990).
Rule 221-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, promulgated by the Division of Administrative Hearings to implement the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The state agency shall either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs or file a counter affidavit along with its response. The counteraffidavit shall specify each item of cost and fee in dispute.
(a) A state agency against which a petition for costs and fees; has been filed shall file a response within twenty (20) days of filing of the petition, which shall state whether the state agency seeks an evidentiary hearing and shall specify whether the state agency asserts:
That costs and attorney's fees claimed in the affidavit are unreasonable;
That the petitioner is not a prevailing small business party;
That the agency's actions were substantially justified;
That circumstances exist which would make the award unjust; or
That the agency was a nominal party only.
When a state agency relies upon any of the grounds listed in (a), it shall state
the facts supporting its position with particularity.
Respondent has failed to file a response to either of the petitions filed in these consolidated causes, not only within the twenty days required by Rule 221-6.035 but even as of the date of the entry of this Final Order. Therefore, Respondent has waived its right to raise any of the enumerated defenses, the only defenses available to a state agency pursuant to the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act. Jewell v. Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 10 F.A.L.R. 2128 (Final Order, March 8, 1988); David's Pharmacy v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 11 F.A.L.R. 72 (Final Order, December 8, 1988); Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Landscape Architecture v. Webster 11 F.A.L.R. 3016 (Final Order, August 25, 1988); and Heisler v. Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, 11 F.A.L.R. 3309 (Final Order, March 19, 1989).
A prima facia showing of entitlement to an award has been established by the petitions filed in these consolidated causes, together with the affidavits attached thereto and attached to Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order. Those documents have established that both Petitioners are small business parties within the contemplation of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act. The copies of the Recommended Order and Final Order in DOAH Case No. 89-5981 attached to each petition show that the Petitioners are prevailing parties. By failing to respond to the petitions as required by the rules of the Division of Administrative Hearings, Respondent has waived its right to: controvert whether Petitioners are prevailing small business parties; controvert whether the claimed costs and fees are reasonable; establish that the agency's actions were substantially justified; establish that circumstances exist which would make the award unjust; or establish that the agency was only a nominal party.
Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order alleges that:
(1) Respondent responded to the Initial Order entered in this cause requesting information regarding the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing, (2) Section (7) of Rule 221-6.035 allows the Hearing Officer to schedule an evidentiary hearing sua sponte, (3) the burden is on Petitioners to show their entitlement to attorney's fees and costs, (4) Respondent was substantially justified in bringing its action against Petitioners initially and an award would be unjust, and (5) Respondent believed it had complied with all prerequisites for an evidentiary hearing. Respondent's compliance with the Initial Order is not in dispute and is not relevant to disposition of Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order. What Respondent failed to comply with that is dispositive of the Motion for Summary Final Order is the requirement that it respond to the petitions in order to dispute any of the allegations and in order to raise any defenses available to Respondent. Respondent does correctly argue that the Hearing Officer may schedule an evidentiary hearing sua sponte. However, the power to schedule a hearing sua sponte implies the power to cancel a hearing sua sponte. Lastly, Rule 221-6.030 contemplates that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary where there remains no genuine issue as to any material facts.
Respondent is correct in its argument that the burden is on Petitioners to show their entitlement to attorney's fees and costs. However, Petitioners have done so in their pleadings, and Respondent has failed to controvert those allegations. Although Respondent alleges in its Response to Motion for Summary Final Order that it was substantially justified in bringing the underlying action against Petitioners and an award would be unjust, those defenses have been waived by Respondent's failure to allege them in its required response to the petitions in these consolidated causes. Additionally, Rule 221- 6.035(5)(b) requires that when a state agency relies upon any of the defenses enumerated in that rule, it shall state the facts supporting its position with
particularity in its required response. Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order fails to set forth any facts to support its allegation that it was substantially justified in bringing the underlying action against Petitioners and an award would be unjust. Similarly, Respondent did not file, along with its response to the motion, its required response to the petitions filed in these consolidated causes together with a motion for leave to late-file its response for reasons of mistake or excusable neglect. Lastly, Respondent's belief that it had complied with all prerequisites for an evidentiary hearing is irrelevant and in error.
Rule 221-6.030(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Any party to a proceeding in which a Hearing Officer of the Division has final order authority may move for summary final order, whenever there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The motion may be accompanied by supporting affidavits. All other parties may, within seven days of service, file a response in position, with or without supporting affidavits.
Section 57.111(4)(d) authorizes the entry of a final order in a proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act. Since Respondent failed to file a response to the petitions in these consolidated causes, there remains no g[ issue as to any material fact in this proceeding. Further Respondent's failure to dispute any of the allegations in the instant petitions and failure to raise any of the defenses available to it make an evidentiary hearing in this consolidated cause unnecessary. Accordingly, Petitioners are entitled to a final order granting their petitions for costs and attorney's fees as a matter of law.
Section 57.111(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes, provides that: "No award of attorney's fees and costs for an action initiated by a state agency shall exceed
$15,000." Accordingly, the maximum amount that can be awarded to each Petitioner in these consolidated causes is $15,000.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that:
The final hearing in these consolidated causes scheduled for February 14, 1991, be and the same is hereby cancelled.
Petitioners' Motion for Summary Final Order be and the same is hereby granted.
Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, shall pay to Petitioners, The Administrators Corporation and Charles N. Zalis, within thirty
days of the date of this Final Order the amount of $15,000 each for a total of $30,000 as attorney's fees and costs.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of January, 1991.
LINDA M. RIGOT
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division f Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1991.
COPIES FURNISHED:
S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire James A. Bossart, Esquire Office of Legal Services
412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
William M. Furlow, Esquire Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.
================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION
=================================================================
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO TREASURER, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.
Appellant, CASE NO. 91-330
DOAH CASE NO. 90-5943F
THE ADMINISTRATORS CORPORATION and CHARLES H. ZALIS,
Appellees.
/ Opinion filed August 18, 1992.
Appeal from an Order of the Division of Administrative Hearings. S. Marc Herskovitz, Department of Insurance, for appellant. William M. Furlow, Tallahassee, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Following their completely successful defense of an administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Insurance (the Department), appellees, The Administrators Corporation (TAC) and Charles N. Zalis, were awarded attorneys fees pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, 57.111, Florida Statutes (1989)(the Act), which provides as follows:
To apply for an award under this section, the attorney for the prevailing
small business party must submit an itemized affidavit to the court which first conducted the adversarial proceeding in the underlying action, or to the Division of Administrative Hearings which shall assign a hearing officer, in the case of a proceeding pursuant to chapter 120, which affidavit shall reveal the nature and extent of the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, hearings, and appeals in the proceeding.
2. The application for an award of attorney's fees must be made within 60 days after the date that the small business party becomes a prevailing small business party.
The state agency may oppose the applicant for the award of attorney's fees and costs by affidavit.
The court, or the hearing officer in the case of a proceeding under chapter 120, shall promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application for an award of attorney's fees and shall issue a judgment, or a final order in the case of a hearing officer. The final order of a hearing Officer is reviewable in accordance with the provisions of S. 120.68. If the court affirms the award of attorney's fees and costs in whole or in part, it may, in its discretion, award additional attorney's fees and costs for the appeal.
No award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made in any case in which the state agency was a nominal party.
No award of attorney's fees and costs for an action initiated by a state agency shall exceed $15,000.
On appeal, the Department contends that it was improperly denied a hearing prior to the fee award, and that, in any event, appellees were not entitled to fees.
First, we note that the Act, by its terms, leaves it up to the state agency to-make a determination whether or not to oppose the application for fees, and further provides that such opposition may be made by simply filing an affidavit. Section 7.111(4)(b)1. The Act directs the hearing officer to "promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing." Section 57.111(4)(d)
In the present case TAC and Zalis each filed a fee petition shortly after the time for appeal of the final administrative order in their favor had expired. The petitions were assigned to the same Division of Administrative Hearings hearing officer who heard the underlying matter and took extensive evidence on the issues raised therein. The Department made an appearance in the fee proceeding, but filed no affidavit or other paper stating its opposition to the petitions. Approximately two and a half months after the Department made its appearance, TAC and Zalis moved for a summary final order, setting out in some detail their positions. According to TAC and Zalis, Rule 221-6.035, Florida Administrative Code, establishes a procedure to be followed by a hearing officer in administering The Act. Rule 221-6.035 provides in pertinent part:
The state agency shall either admit to the reasonableness of the fees and costs or file a counter affidavit along with its response. The counter affidavit shall specify each item of costs and fees in dispute.
(5)(a) A state agency against which a petition for costs and fees has been filed shall file a response within twenty (20) days of filing of the petition, which shall state
whether the state agency seeks an evidentiary hearing and shall specify whether the state agency asserts:
That costs and attorney's fees claimed in the affidavit are unreasonable;
That the petitioner is not a prevailing small business party;
That the agency's actions were substantially justified;
That circumstances exist which would make the award unjust; or
That the agency was a nominal party only.
When a state agency relies upon any of the grounds listed in (a), it shall state the facts supporting its position with
particularity. TAC and Zalis argued that since the Department failed or refused to file a response to either petition, the Department accordingly waived its right to raise any defense, and by implication, admitted the allegations contained in the fee petitions.
In the face of appellees' motions seeking summary disposition, the Department still did not file the affidavit contemplated by Section 57.111(4)(c). Rather, the Department filed a response, arguing that the attorneys for the various parties had met to discuss the matter, the hearing officer had scheduled the matter for hearing, and that the burden would be on TAC and Zalis to show entitlement to fees. This response quite clearly does not contest any of the factual allegations made by TAC and Zalis in their fee petitions, nor does it raise any qualifying or contrary factual allegations. At no time did the Department ask for additional time to file an opposing affidavit or other paper.
Upon this procedural background, the hearing officer entered a final order providing that both TAC and Zalis are parties entitled to protection under the Act, that the Department waived its right to raise any defense available to a state agency under the Act, and that TAC and Zalis made a sufficient showing of entitlement to an award, based upon their petitions and affidavits. 1/ The hearing officer went on to award $15,000 attorney's fees to both TAC and Zalis. 2/
We reject the proposition advanced by the Department that the hearing officer was required to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing, despite the absence of any response from the Department controverting the factual matters raised in fee petitions and supporting affidavits.
The rules of the Division of Administrative Hearings contain a procedure for summary final orders:
221-6.030 Summary Final Order.
Any party to a proceeding in which a hearing officer of the Division has final order authority may move for summary final order, whenever there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The motion may be
accompanied by supporting affidavits. All other parties may, within seven days of service, file a response in opposition, with or without supporting affidavits.
A party filing a motion for summary final order later than twelve days before the final hearing waives any objection to the continuance of the final hearing.
The rule itself makes clear that a motion for summary final order may be filed whether or not a final hearing has been scheduled by the hearing officer. Thus, the Department's contention that the attorneys had met to discuss the matter, and the hearing officer had actually scheduled a hearing, has no bearing on the propriety of the summary final order.
The Act directs the hearing officer to promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application for fees, but this requirement must be read in light of the accompanying right of the affected state agency to oppose the application for fees and costs. Where the state has elected not to oppose the application for fees, it would make no sense to require the time and expense of a formal administrative hearing simply to determine facts as to which no issue has been made. Indeed, we believe that the thrust of Section 57.111(4)(d) is to require the prompt resolution of the fee dispute when a small business party has borne the initial expense of costs and fees in successfully defending an administrative action brought by a state agency. The issuance of a final order, based upon the unrefuted factual matters raised by TAC and Zalis, even though no formal final hearing was conducted, does not in any way thwart the aims of the Act.
In State, Department of Environmental Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So.2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the agency filed a response to a Section 57.111 petition for costs and fees four days late. The hearing officer held that he was constrained by Rule 221-6.035(5)(a) to disregard the late response and grant the petition. In reversing, this court pointed out that the provision of the rule requiring the agency to file a response to a petition for costs and fees within twenty days was directory rather than mandatory, giving the hearing officer authority to consider untimely responses. Significantly, in view of the present facts, this court went on to conclude that in circumstances in which no response is filed, the hearing officer has the right to conclude that a party has waived its right to respond and thereafter enter a summary final order.
We hold that the hearing officer followed an allowable procedure in adjudicating the fee petitions. The fee awards in the present case were not issued as sanctions against the Department for tardy filings, but to cover, in part, out of pocket costs and fees incurred by the successful small business party. The hearing officer analyzed the situation and determined that the Department waived its right under both the Act and the administrative rule to contest the applications.
We decline to hold that a state agency may properly ignore the provisions contained in the Act and the administrative rule for opposing an application, and then, after the fact, insist upon an evidentiary hearing'. This ruling, which amounts to upholding a default against a state agency, is not made lightly. We specifically observe the ease with which the state could have made the filings required to oppose these fee applications.
The hearing officer awarded $15,000 in fees to each appellee. A review of the evidence before the hearing officer clearly indicates that counsel submitted but one bill, and this bill was submitted to TAC. The TAC bill for legal services is attached to both TAC's petition for fees and to the petition filed by Zalis. There is no indication in the record that the award to Zalis is based upon anything other than legal services rendered to TAC. While TAC is entitled to the benefit of the summary final order procedure, it does not follow that a double recovery can be had, simply because two parties were named as respondents in the underlying administrative proceeding. The Department's administrative proceeding, initiated in the form of an order to show cause, names Zalis in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer of TAC. TAC argues, however, that the Department proceeded against Zalis individually, and not merely against him in his capacity as a corporate representative. Thus a material dispute exists not only as to whether identifiable legal services were actually rendered to Zalis individually, but as to the very nature of Zalis' status in the underlying proceeding. We therefore reverse the fee award to Zalis, and remand this matter to the hearing officer for further proceedings on the questions of Zalis' status, and his share, if any, of the reasonably incurred fees.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
MINER, WOLF and KAHN, JJ., CONCUR.
ENDNOTES
1/ These findings are set out as follows in the order:
No response by Respondent to either the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by The Administrators Corporation or the Petition for Costs and Fees filed by Charles N. Zalis has ever been filed in this cause even in the face of the Motion for Summary Final Order based upon Respondent1s failure to respond. Accordingly, this matter is decided on the basis of the petitions filed in these consolidated causes, together with the documentation attached to those petitions, Petitioners Motion for Summary Final
Order, together with the documentation attached to that motion, and Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order. Since the Respondent had failed to controvert or dispute any of the factual allegations contained within those pleadings, there is no factual allegation in dispute in these consolidated causes.
Petitioners are small business parties as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. By virtue of the Final Order entered in DOAH Case NO. 89-5981, Petitioners are prevailing small business parties in an administrative proceeding pursuant to Chapter 120 initiated by a state agency. The actions of Respondent both in initiating and in pursuing the Order to Show Cause filed in DOAH Case NO. 89-5981 were substantially unjustified, and no special circumstance exists which would make unjust the award of attorney's fees and costs to Petitioners in these consolidated causes.
2/ The maximum award of attorney's fees and costs under the Act is limited to
$15,000. Section 57.111(4)(d)2. Appellees' affidavits showed total fees of over $57,000, which the hearing officer found to be "reasonable and necessary."
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
DATE: August 18, 1993
CASE NO.: 90-1733, 90-1748, 90-1749
Florida League of Cities, Inc. vs. Dept. of Environmental
Regulation
Appellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent
ORDER
The motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc or for certification filed by appellants Florida League of Cities, Inc. and Pinellas County, Florida, and by amici curiae, Southern States Utilities, Inc. and Florida Waterworks Association, Inc., are denied. The motion for rehearing en banc or for certification filed by appellant, City of Altamonte Springs, Florida, is also denied. This court's opinion filed July 25, 1991 is, however, withdrawn and the attached opinion is substituted in lieu thereof.
By Order of the Court JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above was mailed this date to the following:
Harry Morrison, Jr.
Diane D. Tremor
Carole Joy Barice
Joseph Morrissey Deputy Clerk Douglas H. MacLaughlin
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Nov. 02, 1992 | Order sent out. (Agreed Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, granted) |
| May 28, 1991 | Index, Record, Certificate of Record sent out. |
| Apr. 17, 1991 | Second Amended Index & Statement of Service sent out. |
| Apr. 16, 1991 | Notice to Correct/Supplement the record on appeal filed. |
| Apr. 01, 1991 | Check in the Amount of $50.00 For the index filed. |
| Mar. 22, 1991 | Index & Statement of Service sent out. |
| Feb. 05, 1991 | Certificate of Notice of Administratiive Appeal sent out. |
| Feb. 04, 1991 | Petition for stay of agency action filed. |
| Feb. 04, 1991 | Notice of Administrative Appeal filed. |
| Jan. 24, 1991 | CASE CLOSED. Final Order sent out. (facts stipulated) Petitioner's Motion for Summary Final Order. |
| Dec. 31, 1990 | Respondent's Response to Motion for Summary Final Order filed. |
| Dec. 26, 1990 | (petitioners) Motion for Summary Final Order (+ exh 1-3) filed. |
| Oct. 19, 1990 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 02/14/91;9:30AM;Tallahassee) |
| Oct. 19, 1990 | Order of Consolidation sent out. Consolidated case are: 90-5943 and 90-5944 |
| Oct. 10, 1990 | Respondent's Response to Initial Order; Notice of Appearance and Subsitution of Counsel filed. (From S. Marc Herskovitz) |
| Sep. 27, 1990 | Initial Order issued. |
| Sep. 21, 1990 | Letter to DOAH from W. Furlow (Cover letter); Petition for Costs and Fees (Exhibits attached) filed. (Old DOAH Case No. 89-5981 closed 7/9/90). |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jan. 24, 1991 | DOAH Final Order | Final summary judgment awarding attorney's fees and costs proper where agency filed no response to dispute allegations of entitlement in petition. |
