STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADNINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL )

REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION )

INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-5266

)

MERWIN C. CARTER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, final hearing in the above-styled case was held in Orlando, Florida, on October 16, 1991, before Robert E. Meale, Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

The parties were represented at the hearing as follows: For Petitioner: Craig M. Dickinson

Senior Attorney

Department of Professional Regulation

1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-6792

For Respondent: Merwin C. Carter, pro se

611 Ensenada Avenue

Orlando, FL 32825 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of wilfully or deliberately violating applicable building codes or local laws; whether Respondent has been disciplined by a county for a violation of Chapter 489; and whether Respondent is guilty of fraud, deceit, gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contracting. If guilty of any of these allegations, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By Administrative Complaint filed June 10, 1991, Petitioner alleged that Respondent, as qualifying agent for Gold Medallion Pools, Inc., entered into a contract on March 27, 1985, for the construction of a swimming pool. The Administrative Complaint alleges that the pool was warranted against leaking from cracks, but cracks developed and Respondent failed to repair them. The Administrative Complaint also alleges that, as a result of the failure to repair

the swimming pool, the Seminole County Swimming Pool Contractors' Board revoked Respcndent's local license for violations of Sections 40.151 and 40.34 of the Seminole County Code.

Count I of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes, when he willfully or deliberately disregarded and violated local building codes or other local laws by failing to obtain a final inspection of the pool. Count II alleges that Respondent violated the same statute when he violated Section 40.151 and 40.34 of the Seminole County Code. Count III alleges that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(i) when he was disciplined by a local contracting board. Count IV alleges that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(m) because he was guilty of misconduct in the practice of contracting.

By Election of Rights filed July 8, 1991, Respondent requested a formal hearing.

At the hearing, Petitioner called four witnesses and offered into evidence

28 exhibits. Respondent called one witness and offered into evidence 13 exhibits. All exhibits were admitted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent is a certified pool contractor, holding license number CP CO27486. Respondent obtained his certificate in October, 1983. His only prior discipline consists of a letter of guidance in late 1989 or early 1990. At all material times, Respondent was qualifying agent for Gold Medallion Pcol, Inc.

   
   

2. On March 27, 1986, Respondent and Mr. and Mrs. Don Burson entered into a contract for the construction cf a swimming pool at the Bursons' residence. The Bursons had purchased the residence while it was still under construction in May or June, 1985. The lot was low and had required fill. Clearly visible behind the lot is a large marshy wetland.

   
   

3. The contract called for the Bursons to pay $16,315 for the construction of a 20' by 40' concrete lap pool with depths of 3' at either end and 6' in the center. Paragraph 4 of the contract provides:

   
   

   The Owner is responsible for increased costs incurred by the Contractor due to underground conditions which may be encountered during construction, such as but not limited to, muck, inadequate soil-bearing capacity,

   and excessive ground water. The Contractor, upon encountering such conditions, shall notify the Owner of their existence and give him an approximate cost estimate to rectify the problem. The Owner shall have five (5) days from the receipt of the approximate cost estimate to instruct the Contractor not to proceed with the pool. . . . If the Contractor determines that additional testing is required prior to furnishing approximate costs estimates to determine the exact nature or extent of the underground condition encountered, the Owner shall be responsible

   for the cost of all testing and/or engineering required by the Contractor.

   
   

4. Paragraph 8.D states that the Owner

   
   

   warrants that there [is] no . . . mock . . . in that portion of the owner's property which the contractor will construct the pool [and] decking . . .. The owner is responsible for the removal, repair or replacement of any underground conditions . . . encountered during construction unless he elects to terminate the contract and pay damages to the contractor as set forth in the clause on underground conditions.

   
   

5. Paragraph 11.A provides:

   
   

   Contractor warrants to the original owner for the lifetime of the original purchaser, the swimming pool structure, the shell, will not leak due to cracking. . . .

   This Limited Structural Warranty does not cover damage to the pool shell caused by fluctuations of the water table, construction in the vicinity of the pool site, or natural phenomenon. . . .

   The contractor's responsibility under this Limited Structural Warranty shall be to repair the shell so that it holds water without cost to the original owner. . . .

   The method of repair shall be at the discretion of the contractor.

   THE CONTRACTOR MAKES NO OTHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE IN REGARDS TO THE POOL STRUCTURE, THE SHELL.

   
   

6. Paragraph 11.B.2, which further describes the limited warranty, states:

   
   

   It is anticipated the concrete deck and deck coatings may crack due to settling of deck or weather. Cracks one-quarter inch or less with no substantial deviation in elevation are not covered. . . .

   
   

7. The plot plan, which is part of the contract, shows the pool located on the east side of the house. The pool is oriented in a north-south direction. The southern end of the pool runs toward the back of the lot, which is on a steep slope. The southern end of the pool adjoins the widest section of decking, which Respondent constructed at the time of the construction of the pool. The plot plan also shows that excavated dirt was to be placed just south of the decking on the south end of the pool.

   
   

8. Shortly after pulling a building permit from the Seminole County Building Department on March 27, 1986, Respondent began construction of the

   pool. The actual construction was performed by Mid-Florida Pool Company, which is a major pool construction company in Central Florida. Construction was completed on April 23, 1986, and the Bursons paid the amount required under the contract.

   
   

9. Prior to commencement of construction of the pool, this area of the Bursons' lot had been filled with about 2 1/2 to 3 feet of dirt. In order to construct the pool, Respondent or his subcontractors added another 2 1/2 to 3 feet of fill, at least to the southern end of site of the pool and decking. It is at this point that the land begins to slope most steeply toward the marsh in the back.

   
   

10. Neither Respondent nor any of his subcontractors conducted any soil tests prior to commencing construction or compressed or compacted the soil beneath the pool prior to installing the shell. This omission constitutes a departure from sound contracting practices under the facts cf this case. Respondent constructed several pilasters under the southern end of the deck, but these structural supports were designed to support the deck, not the pool.

    
    

11. In general, the depth of the excavation had to exceed the depth of the pool by one foot in order to accommodate the shell. Thus, the extreme southern end of the shell required a hole only about four feet deep. An excavation of this depth did not exceed the combined depth of the old and new fill.

    
    

12. There is no indication that Respondent or his subcontractors encountered muck during the excavation or construction of the pool. Likewise, there is no indication that Respondent or any of subcontractors was aware that mucky, unstable soils underlaid the location of the pool, especially the southern end.

    
    

13. The pool was completed to the initial satisfaction of the Bursons. However, within 90 days of completion, the southern half of the shell developed five or six major cracks as a result of the settlement of the southern end of the pool. This portion of the pool settled because the underlying muck had been compressed by the weight of the shell and water. Gradually, the water loss from the settlement cracks, which were mostly below the waterline, became significant. At Respondent's suggestion, the Bursons agreed to wait through the winter before commencing repairs in order to allow the cracking to stabilize.

    
    

14. In the spring of 1987, the Bursons drained the pool at Respondent's direction. Respondent then scored the cracks with a screwdriver and applied a filling compound in order to seal any leaks. As directed by Respondent, the Bursons then refilled the pool, but before more than two feet of water had been added, the filling compound fell out of the cracks.

    
    

15. When the Bursons informed Respondent of the failure of the repair, he responded that he had performed under the contract and had no further obligation. The Bursons exercised their right to arbitrate, as provided in the contract. The arbitrators conducted a limited investigation. Expressly noting that they were not soil engineers and thus could not determine why the soil under the pool failed to support the shell, the arbitrators determined that the contractor was not responsible for any damage to the pool, "which was built to industry standards."

    
    

16. The Bursons next contacted various pool contractors about repair options. Most of the contractors suggested a V-cut about 2 1/2 inches deep followed by the injection of hydraulic cement. When the Bursbns informed

    Respondent that this type of repair appeared necessary, he refused to undertake such work. By this time, one of the contractors documented that five of the cracks, which ranged from 1/16" to 1/4" wide, were pulling water out of the pool at a rate of 1-3" daily. This contractor charged the Bursons $125 for his services.

    
    

17. After contacting the Seminole County Building Department, the Bursons learned that the pool had never passed a final inspection. When they had an inspector visit the site on September 13, 1991, he failed the job due to, among ether things, "massive deck cracks." At the insistence of Seminole County officials, the Bursons obtained expert opinions as to the cause of the cracks in preparation for the local hearing on the Bursons' charges against Respondent.

    
    

18. In July, 1990, the American Testing Laboratories, Inc. conducted tests and opined that the south end of the pool had settled due to muck at a level of five feet below the bottom of the shell. Additional testing found muck at depths of 3-7 feet at two points just east of the south end of the pool. These tests cost the Bursons $498.

    
    

19. When the Seminole County officials insisted upon further testing, the Bursons hired Jammal & Associates, Inc., which performed soil borings on August 23, 1990. The boring sites were just east of a point about midway along the southern half of the pool and a point just south of the southern end of the pool. The latter boring site revealed muck after penetrating about six feet of fill.

    
    

20. At the request of Respondent, a Jammal employee returned to the site on November 13, 1990, to determine the potential cause of the cracking of the pool shell and deck. Jammal concluded that the cracking

    
    

    is the result of consolidation of the highly compressible peat layer found in the [southern] boring. Based upon the [cracking] observed, we suspect the southern 1/3 or so of the pool and deck area are underlain by the buried peat layer. The remainder of the pool and deck are most likely underlain by sandy soils. Because of the nature of the buried organic soils, the pool and deck will probably continue to settle at a diminishing rate for several years. Addition of new loads such as placement of additional fill around the pool and deck area, or a significant drop in the groundwater table could cause additional and accelerated settlement of the pool and deck.

    
    

21. Jammal offered three repair options. The first was to patch the cracks. Jammal assumed that, although continued cracking could be expected, it would occur at a lesser rate because most of the settlement of the buried muck had already taken place. The second option was to remove the pool and then remove the underlying muck. The third option was to install inside the shell a fiberglass liner. The last option had been first suggested by Respondent. If not rigidly attached to the shell, the liner probably would not reflect further cracking of the shell.

    
    

22. The Bursons paid Jammal the sum of $300 for its services.

23. Ultimately, the Bursons decided to install a fiberglass liner and entered into a contract on November 19, 1990, with Fibre Tech for the work. The total cost of the project was $5415. This cost excludes the cost of replacing a pool vacuum for which Respondent does not appear responsible. The liner was later installed, and the Bursons paid the contract price.

    
    

24. In the meantime, at a meeting on October 16, 1990, the Seminole County Swimming Pool Contractor's Board revoked Respondent's County certificate of competency until he repaired the pool or made restitution to the owners. This action was based upon a violation of Seminole County Code Section 40.151 and 40.34(2) and (9).

    
    

25. Section 40.151 provides that "[a]11 completed pools shall be absolutely watertight." Section 40.34(a) allows the Board to revoke a certificate of competency if the contractor:

    
    

    (2) Continue[s] performance of building work in a negligent, incompetent or unworkmanlike manner.

    (9) Violate[s] any provision of this Chapter.

    
    

26. The determination of the Seminole County Swimming Pool Board became final when Respondent failed to take a timely appeal of the order.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

27. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code.)

    
    

28. Section 489.129(1) authorized the Construction Industry Licensing Board to

    
    

    revoke, suspend, . . . require financial restitution to a consumer, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $5000, place a contractor on probation, require continuing education, or reprimand or censure

    a contractor if the contractor . . . is found guilty of any of the following acts:

    * * *

    (d) Willfully or deliberately disregarding and violating the applicable building codes or laws of the state or of any municipalities or counties thereof.

    * * *

    (i) Being disciplined by any municipality or county for an act or violation of this part, which discipline shall be reviewed by the state board before the state board takes any disciplinary action of its own.

    * * *

    (m) Being found guilty of fraud or deceit or of gross negligence, incompetency, or

    misconduct in the practice of contracting.

    
    

29. Petitioner must prove the material allegations against Respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Ferris v. Turlington, 516 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).

    
    

30. There is no evidence that Respondent's failure to obtain a final inspection represents a willful or deliberate violation of the requirement of a final inspection contained in the Seminole County Code. Respondent's testimony that he requested a final inspection, but that the Building Department lost his request, is rejected. However, the evidence fails to prove that Respondent's failure to request a final inspection was other than a mere oversight. Upon completion of the pool, it appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The cracks did not develop until weeks later. Absent evidence that the inspection would likely have disclosed that the pool had been constructed on unstable soils, or was otherwise in violation of the Seminole County Code, there is no reason to suspect that Respondent intentionally failed to request a final inspection. Thus, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of Count I.

    
    

31. There is no evidence that Respondent's violation of Seminole County Code Section 49.151 represents a willful or deliberate construction of a pool that was not watertight. There is no evidence that Respondent's violation of Seminole County Code Section 40.34(a)(2) represents the willful or deliberate performance of work in a negligent, incompetent or unworkmanlike manner. Thus, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of Count II.

    
    

32. Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of Count III. The local contracting board, as agent for Seminole County, disciplined Respondent for violating Seminole County Code Sections 40.15l and 40.34(a)(2) and (9).

    
    

33. The allegations of Count IV are not entirely clear. The sole allegation of Paragraph 21 in Count IV is that Respondent committed "misconduct in the practice of contracting." Paragraph 22 alleges that Respondent's misconduct constitutes fraud or deceit or gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct. Count IV will be construed as raising all of these issues, not merely misconduct.

    
    

34. There is no evidence that Respondent is guilty of fraud or deceit under Section 489.129(1)(m). The only questions under Count IV are whether Respondent is guilty of gloss negligence, gross incompetence, or gross misconduct. The word "gross" modifies not only "negligence," but also "incompetency" and "misconduct." This interpretation of Section 489.129(1)(m) is supported on two grounds.

    
    

35. First, "negligence" and "incompetency"' are largely synonymous. Purvis v. Department of Professional Regulation, 461 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA

    1984). If mere incompetency were a sufficient basis for discipline, then "gross negligence" would be unnecessary. There would be no reason to require gross negligence as a prerequisite for discipline if mere incompetency were an alternative prerequisite.

    
    

36. Second, the language of the statute suggests that "gross" modifies all "incompetency" and "misconduct." Otherwise, "fraud" and "deceit" would have been separated by only a comma, rather than "or," and only a comma would have

    separated "deceit" from "gross." Cf. Section 474.214(1)(1), which authorizes discipline if a veterinarian is guilty of "[f]raud, deceit, negligence, incompetence, or misconduct . . ." If the Legislature wished to predicate discipline upon a showing of mere incompetency or misconduct, the statute would have listed the disciplinary events in a far less awkward manner, as follows: fraud, deceit, gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct.

    
    

37. The failure to conduct soil tests under the facts of this case constitutes negligence or incompetency. Reasonable care demands that soil tests be performed prior to the construction of a pool in close proximity to a large marshy area.

    
    

38. It is more difficult to determine whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that Respondent's failure to exercise reasonable care constitutes gross negligence or gross incompetency. Charges of negligence or incompetence ordinarily require some proof of the relevant standard of care and the licensee's departure from the standard. Cf. Purvis v. Department of Professional Regulation, supra. Likewise, charges of gross negligence or gross incompetency ordinarily require proof of the relevant standard of care and a departure from the standard.

    
    

39. Although describing Respondent's failure to conduct soil tests as "negligent," Petitioner's expert did not testify that the failure constitutes gross negligence. It is unclear why Respondent installed pilasters to support the deck but did not address the need for supporting the pool, which represents a greater load on underlying soils. Howeyer, without additional evidence of standards of professional conduct in the construction of swimming pools, it is impossible to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent was grossly negligent or grossly incompetent in the construction of the Bursons' pool.

    
    

40. The failure to perform soil testing is not misconduct. The only question involving misconduct is whether Respondent's refusal to make effective repairs on the pool constitutes misconduct for which he may be disciplined. Again, however, the misconduct must be gross in nature.

    
    

41. It appears that Respondent repeatedly misinterpreted the contract. It was Respondent's job to advise the Bursons if the pool site required demucking. Although the Bursons were responsible under the contract for the cost of soil testing and demucking, nothing in the contract effectively relieved Respondent from the responsibility of determining whether muck existed under the pool site and had to be removed.

    
    

42. The sole contractual grounds for Respondent to insist that he was not liable for repairs under the contract are the provisions under which the Bursons warrant that muck was present on the pool site prior to construction of the pool and the warranty limitation for damage to the shell caused by natural phenomenon. However, it is unlikely that the owner's warranty extends to muck of which he is unaware or that natural phenomena include conditions in existence at the time of the construction of the pool. More likely, these provisions would yield to the contractor's warranty that the pool would not leak due to cracking, especially in a contract prepared by Respondent.

    
    

43. Respondent's refusal to honor the warranty nonetheless must be evaluated in light of the facts of the case. First, there are the two, above- noted contractual provisions that provide some support for Respondent's interpretation. There are also the findings of the arbitration panel, which,

    although not particularly compelling on their face, nevertheless are favorable to Respondent. These factors preclude a finding of gross misconduct, or even mere misconduct, in Respondent's refusal to repair the pool based upon his interpretation of his contractual obligations.

    
    

44. Rule 21E-17.001(16) provides that the standard penalty range for a first-time violation of Section 489.129(1)(i) is the penalty listed for the violation "most closely resembling the act underlying the local discipline." Respondent was found guilty of negligence and a failure to use gocd workmanship. He also failed to construct a watertight pool and obtain a final inspection.

    
    

45. Rule 21E-17.001(8) provides that a letter of guidance is the appropriate penalty for a failure to call for an inspection. Rule 21E- 17.001(11) provides that a fine of $250- $750 is the appropriate penalty for an unreasonable failure to honor a warranty. Rule 21E-17.001(19)(b) provides that a fine of $500-$1500 is the appropriate penalty for gross negligence, misconduct, or incompetence, if the contractor has caused monetary harm to the customer. These penalties, which are recommended for first-time violations, are violations most closely corresponding to the local violation for which discipline is presently appropriate.

    
    

46. Rule 21E-17.002(1) identifies as an aggravating factor monetary damage for which the contractor has not made reimbursement at the time of the assessment of the penalty.

    
    

47. Although Respondent is guilty only under Count III, there is considerable evidence of negligence in his failure to perform soil testing despite the presence of the marsh and prevailing low elevations. This omission was a clear departure from sound contracting practices and resulted in a substantial financial loss to the Bursons. Respondent has unjustifiably refused to make restitution to the Bursons in reliance upon a questionable arbitration process and an interpretation of the contract that would likely not survive judicial review.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order imposing an administrative fine of $2500 and suspending Respondent's license until he makes restitution to the Bursons in the amount of $6338.

ENTERED this 29th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT E. MEALE

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1991.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Jack McCray, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Daniel O'Brien Executive Director

Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2

Jacksonville, FL 32202

Craig M. Dickinson, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street

Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Merwin C. Carter, pro se 611 Ensenada Avenue

Orlando, FL 32825

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,

Petitioner,

vs CASE NO.: 90-06513

DOAH CASE NO.: 91-5266

MERWIN C. CARTER, LICENSE NO.: CP C027486,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER

THIS MATTER came before the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), Florida Statutes, on February 13, 1992, in Orlando, Florida, for consideration of the Recommended Order (a copy of which is attached here to and incorporated herein by reference). The Petitioner was represented by Wellington Meffert.

The Respondent appeared pro se at the Board meeting.

Upon consideration of the Hearing Officers Recommended Order, and the arguments of the parties and after a review of the complete record in this matter, and the exceptions filed, the Board makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondents exceptions to the Hearing Officers Recommended Findings of Fact are rejected for those reasons specified in Petitioners Response to Respondent's Exceptions which is hereby approved, adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

   
   

2. The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are hereby approved and adopted in toto.

   
   

3. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Board has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), and Chapter 489, Florida Statutes.

   
   

2. Respondent's exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Conclusions of Law are rejected for those reasons specified in Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Exceptions which is hereby approved, adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

   
   

3. The Hearing Officer's Recommended Conclusions of Law are approved and adopted except where they are contrary to Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order which is hereby approved, adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

   
   

4. The penalty recommended by the Hearing Officer is hereby approved and adopted in toto.

5. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the Board's findings and conclusions.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

Respondent shall pay to the Board a fine of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00), and provide written proof satisfactory to the Board's Executive Director of having paid restitution of six thousand three hundred thirty eight dollars ($6,338.00) to Mr. and Mrs. Dan Burson of Seminole County, Florida. All of Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure shall stand suspended until said proof of restitution is provided. In no event shall Respondent resume use of Respondent's licensure under this latter provision until notified in writing by the Executive Director that said licensure has been restored to good standing.

Pursuant to Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the Parties are hereby notified that they may appeal this Final Order by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Professional Regulation, Northwood Centre, 1940 N. Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792, and by filing the filing fee and one copy of the Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this Order.

This Order shall become effective upon filing with the clerk of the Department of Professional Regulation.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of April, 1992.

EDWIN M. GREEN, JR., CHAIRMAN

Construction Industry Licensing Board

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided by U.S. Mail to Merwin C. Carter, 611 Enserda Drive, FL 32825 and by hand delivery/United States Mail to the Board Clerk, Department of Professional Regulation and its Counsel, Northwood Centre, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792, on or before 5:00 p.m., this 14th day of April, 1992.

Docket for Case No: 91-005266

Orders for Case No: 91-005266