STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
ST. PETERSBURG JUNIOR COLLEGE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 97-2475
)
MARY TRANQUILLO, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On March 18 through 20, 1998, a formal administrative hearing was held in this case in St. Petersburg, Florida, before
Lawrence Johnston, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire
Allen Norton and Blue
Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350
324 South Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
For Respondent: John E. Tuthill, Esquire
3300 49th Street, North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this case are whether the continuing contract of employment between the Petitioner, St. Petersburg Junior College (SPJC or the College), and the Respondent, Mary Tranquillo, should be terminated and, if so, whether the Respondent should be dismissed from her employment.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about May 8, 1997, the College issued the President's Petition and Notice to Respondent of Hearing Rights. The Petition requested that the SPJC Board of Trustees dismiss the Respondent from her employment with the College, effective on the expiration of the Respondent's term of employment during the
1996-1997 school year. As grounds for dismissal, paragraph 7 of the Petition asserted:
Tranquillo has been absent from work with such frequency as to impair the educations [sic] experience received by students enrolled in her classes.
Tranquillo has failed to prepare or supply lesson plans for substitute teachers who conduct classes in her absence.
Tranquillo has been unavailable to participate in extracurricular activities required of other instructors.
The Notice to Respondent of Hearing Rights informed Tranquillo that she had the right to request a hearing under
Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
The Respondent requested formal administrative proceedings, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) on May 22, 1997. Initially, final hearing was scheduled for August 26 through 28, 1997, but the Respondent's unopposed Motion for Continuance was granted, and final hearing was continued until December 8 through 10, 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the Respondent filed an Emergency Motion for Continuance. For various reasons (including the filing of two motions in limine by the Petitioner on December 4,
1997, and the Petitioner's intent to file a third), another continuance was granted, final hearing was rescheduled for March 18 through 20, 1998, and a schedule was established for resolution of the motions in limine.
The first two motions in limine filed by the Petitioner were: (1) to exclude any allegations, evidence or testimony regarding the alleged disability of the Respondent; and (2) to exclude any allegations, evidence or testimony regarding multiple chemical sensitivity. Respectively, the grounds for the motions were: (1) case law that "multiple chemical sensitivity" is not a "disability"; and (2) case law that the diagnosis of "multiple chemical sensitivity" is not accepted generally enough in the medical field. In accordance with the schedule established in the Order Continuing Final Hearing, the Petitioner filed a third motion in limine on December 23, 1997, to prevent the Respondent from trying the issue of whether her alleged illness was caused or aggravated by her work environment on the ground that those issues were precluded by rulings of a Judge of Compensation Claims in a workers' compensation proceeding filed by the Respondent against the College. The Respondent filed a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner's motions in limine.
In consideration of the parties' written arguments, it was concluded that the third motion in limine should be granted but that the first two motions in limine should be denied. However, the Order on Motions in Limine, entered on February 9, 1998,
noted that denial of the first two motions in limine was not meant to imply that the issues of discrimination under the Federal ADA, the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, or Article I, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution would be determined in this case. It was stated: "The only issue in this proceeding is whether the College has good cause to dismiss the Respondent from her employment." In addition, it was noted that, while the denial of the first two motions in limine theoretically would allow the Respondent to attempt to present a defense on the ground that there was no good cause for her dismissal in view of her alleged multiple chemical sensitivity and the alleged availability of reasonable accommodations in her work environment, it appeared that proof of such a defense would be precluded by the ultimate and subordinate findings made in the workers' compensation proceeding--by which the Respondent would be bound as a result of the granting of the third motion in limine.
On February 23, 1998, the Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Order on Motions in Limine. An Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification was entered on March 2, 1998. It characterized the Order on Motions in Limine as clearly not saying that the Respondent could not present a case that illness caused her to be absent from work but rather as merely pointing out that the Judge of Compensation Claims already found that her illness was not "multiple chemical sensitivity" and that her work environment was not a cause of her
illness (or illnesses)(so that, logically, accommodation in her work environment should not be an issue). The question would be whether, considering any evidence the Respondent presented regarding her illness(es), there was good cause (i.e., legal cause) to dismiss the Respondent.
The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation on March 13, 1998.
At final hearing, the College called 22 witnesses and had 72 exhibits admitted in evidence. (The College's exhibits are not listed here because of the unnecessarily complicated and unwieldy system the College used to number its exhibits; the exhibits are, however, listed in the transcript of the final hearing.) (Ruling was reserved on objections to exhibits 87C and 125A; those objections are now overruled.) The Respondent testified in her own behalf and called 13 additional witnesses. Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 11 were admitted in evidence. (Ruling was reserved on objections to Respondent's Exhibits 10 and 11; those objections are now overruled.)
After presentation of the evidence, the Petitioner ordered the preparation of a transcript of the final hearing, and the parties' request to be given until May 1, 1998, for proposed recommended orders was granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Petitioner, St. Petersburg Junior College (SPJC or the College), has several campuses and approximately 60,000 students.
The Respondent, Dr. Mary Tranquillo, who has 32 years of teaching experience, has been employed by the College for
24 years as an instructor in the area of business technologies, with an emphasis in fashion and marketing.
The Respondent has been on a continuing contract with the College since 1974. There is no question as to her performance through approximately 1991. She was a competent, effective and valuable instructor during those years.
In approximately January 1992, the Respondent began to complain of illness which she attributed to various factors in her work environment. Over the years since then, Tranquillo has blamed tar fumes from roofing work being done in the vicinity, as well as fumes and molds from various buildings and other sources on or near the campus. The Respondent not only called in sick, she also sometimes stayed away to avoid what she said were the environmental factors responsible for her illnesses.
By her own reckoning, the Respondent was absent from work from January 15 through January 24, from February 19 through February 28, from March 27 through June 17, 1992 (for a total of
103 days during the 1991-92 school year.) During the 1992-93 school year, Tranquillo was absent from September 22 through September 24, on October 22, and from October 26 through
October 29, 1992, and from February 5 through 10, on February 15, from February 25 through February 26, and from March 23 through May 7, 1993 (for a total of 63 days.) During the 1993-94 school year, Tranquillo was absent on November 8 and 9, 1993, from
February 9 through 11, 1994, from June 14 through June 16, and
from July 6 through July 14, 1994 (for a total of 17 days.) During the 1994-95 school year, Tranquillo was absent on October 14, 1994, and on March 2 and 3, 1995 (for a total of 3
days.) During the 1995-96 school year, Tranquillo was absent on September 21 and 22, from October 9 through 12, from October 16
through 20, and from November 9 through 16, 1995 (for a total of
18 days.) During the 1996-97 school year, Tranquillo was absent from September 27 through 29, from October 21 through 25, and on November 15, 1996, and from January 6 through 9, from February 10 through 13, 1997 (for a total of 17 days.) During the 1997-98 school year, Tranquillo was absent from October 9 through 17, 1997.
Paid sick leave is accumulated by SPJC faculty at the rate of one day per month of service and is permitted to be carried over. Sick leave is credited at the beginning of each school year. There also is a sick leave pool available; members of the pool are assessed one day of leave in return for the ability to use up to 44 days of sick leave from the pool after their personal sick leave is exhausted. The Respondent exhausted her paid sick leave each year since 1992, except for the 1994-95 school year. In addition, the Respondent has used all 44 days of sick leave available to her as a member of the sick leave pool.
The Respondent's absences clearly impaired the educational experience of students enrolled in her classes. The Respondent's classes were not impacted equally. As evidenced by
the testimony of many students, the Respondent's students generally seem to have been able to obtain valuable educational experiences during times when the Respondent was not absent, or was absent less. On the other hand, as evidenced by the testimony of many other students, the students' educational experiences suffered during times when the Respondent was absent frequently. Despite efforts to focus attention on the former occasions, the Respondent herself admitted to the latter.
When the Respondent was absent frequently, it was sometimes difficult to obtain and prepare substitutes.
Sometimes, there was little or no notice. Sometimes, substitutes could not be found at all, and class had to be canceled.
Sometimes, a substitute was found, but the substitute was not qualified to teach the Respondent's class. Sometimes, there was not enough time to prepare the substitute.
The College did not prove that the problems with covering for the Respondent's absences were all the fault of the Respondent. Before June 1997, the Respondent generally seemed to try to prepare her substitutes, and the College did not prove that the Respondent failed to prepare lesson plans for substitutes prior to June 1997. But there sometimes was difficulty communicating instructions to substitutes or locating materials to be used by the substitutes.
The Respondent sought to blame all difficulties in covering for her absences on the administration, office clerical staff, and the substitutes. The Respondent blamed the
administration for having the clerical staff select substitutes and blamed the clerical staff for selecting substitutes who were not qualified. The Respondent also went so far as to suggest the existence of a conspiracy among members of the administration, clerical staff and substitutes to sabotage the Respondent's efforts to cover for her absences in order to trump up charges for her dismissal.
It is found that there was no such conspiracy against the Respondent. It is true that, as time went on, some of those involved in covering for the Respondent's absences felt put upon. Some administration and clerical staff became frustrated and aggravated; so did some substitutes, some of whom refused to continue to respond to requests to substitute for the Respondent. But these individuals did not cause the Respondent's problems. Rather, the problems of trying to cover for the Respondent were caused by the sheer number of the Respondent's absences, together with their general unpredictability in time and length; these problems made it difficult and frustrating for those involved. The Respondent failed to appreciate, and instead minimized, the hardships on the College in trying to cover for the Respondent's many absences.
Additional problems caused by the Respondent's absences included lack of continuity, failure of communication with the students, and student apprehension concerning grading. For some of the Respondent's classes, these problems were so severe that
the administration considered giving all students an "A" just for putting up with all of the problems.
The Respondent also tended to obsess on the environmental factors she thought was causing her absences. Sometimes, when the Respondent came to class, she spent excessive time discussing her grievances with the College regarding her illness and the factors she blamed for them. This also diminished the quality of the educational experience of many students.
The students most impacted by these problems felt cheated and became frustrated and angry, as well as concerned about grades. Some initiated and signed petitions to the administration to attempt to get satisfaction. Contrary to the Respondent's suspicions, these petition drives and student grievances were not instigated by substitutes (who essentially told complaining students that they should make their complaints known to the administration), by administration, or by other faculty. They were not yet another part of an alleged conspiracy to get rid of the Respondent. Rather, they were expressions of honest and understandable concerns and grievances on the part of the students.
Generally, instructors at the College are expected to not only teach classes but also attend faculty meetings, serve on committees, and be part of a professional group. It is clear that, due to her excessive absences, at times the Respondent was
unavailable to participate in these kinds of extracurricular activities.
Some of the extracurricular activities cited by the Respondent to demonstrate her level of participation actually were not extracurricular. For example, she cited the preparation of lesson plans and claimed that they were extracurricular. Similarly, she attempted to characterize the selection of a textbook for her class.
Some extracurricular "activities" cited by the Respondent were not very active. The Respondent cited a plan that she had to promote courses in her area of instruction as extracurricular, but there was no evidence that she acted on the plan. The Respondent testified that she was a member of an "organization development network" that holds meetings, but on cross-examination she admitted that she actually never has attended a meeting of the group. The Respondent cited a letter she wrote encouraging students to attend a meeting, but it was revealed on cross-examination that the Respondent herself did not attend the meeting.
The Respondent called a witness to testify to time the Respondent spent assisting with one particular extracurricular project, but the testimony was that, in that instance, the Respondent just compiled some materials for the witness, who could not say "how many minutes it took" the Respondent.
The Respondent credits herself with time spent writing for publication. Indeed, there was evidence to support this
claim. However, it appears that less time was spent writing for publication in the time period from 1992 through 1997, than earlier in the Respondent's career. For example, a book the Respondent claims to have been working on for the last five years still consists of only an outline.
While able to cite weaknesses in the Respondent's demonstration of her level of participation in extracurricular activities, and while proving a general requirement to participate in extracurricular activities, the College did not prove precisely what is required of instructors in this regard. There was no evidence of any standards by which an instructor's level of participation can be quantified or measured. Without such standards, the College was unable to prove that the Respondent failed to meet the College's requirements.
Beginning with the 1993-94 school year, the Respondent began receiving negative performance evaluations. Essentially, the College cited the problems caused by the Respondent's excessive absences, and the Respondent blamed them on illness allegedly caused by environmental factors on campus that were beyond her control.
Although the College tried to accommodate the Respondent, the Respondent did not think the College was doing enough and blamed the College for being callous and uncooperative. Eventually, the College came to question the existence of the environmental factors to which the Respondent attributed her problems and began to believe that the
Respondent's demands had become unreasonable. As a result, the working relationship between the Respondent and administration deteriorated, and the College began to give consideration to terminating the Respondent's continuing contract.
By the end of the 1996-97 school year, the College decided to terminate the Respondent's continuing contract as of the end of the school year. On or about May 8, 1997, the College issued the President's Petition and Notice to Respondent of Hearing Rights. On the belief that it was improper or unnecessary after initiation of termination proceedings, the College never completed the Respondent's performance evaluation process for the 1996-97 school year.
Due to the pendency of this proceeding, the Respondent has continued to teach during the 1997-98 school year. In June 1997, the Respondent began to take the position that, when she had to be out sick but had no more sick leave, she would not prepare lesson plans or otherwise do "work" at home to help prepare substitutes. When she invoked this new position, the College countered that it violated the requirement that instructors prepare lesson plans and prepare substitutes when necessary. Eventually, this dispute was resolved, and the Respondent receded from her position. It is not a continuing issue.
In 1994, the Respondent filed a workers' compensation claim against the College alleging that she had multiple chemical sensitivity and related illnesses arising out of and in the
course and scope of her employment. Both parties were represented by counsel in that proceeding, and they fully and fairly litigated the issue as to whether the Respondent was exposed to any chemical through her work environment at the College which caused, accelerated, or aggravated any physical or mental illness. On June 19, 1997, an Order was entered Judge of Compensation Claims ruling against the Respondent and in favor of the College on that issue and denying the claim.
The Respondent presented no evidence at the hearing to support her claim that her absences were caused by genuine illness. No physician testified, and no medical evidence was introduced.
Due to the long-standing problems beginning in January 1992, the evidence proved "good and sufficient reasons" to terminate the Respondent's continuing contract. Yet, the evidence also was that, when the Respondent is "on-the-job," physically and mentally, she can be a very effective instructor. Indeed, the evidence was that the Respondent's attendance at work and her work performance have been better since action was initiated to terminate her continuing contract. In January 1998, the Respondent was given an office and a classroom which she does not think affect her health adversely. (Ironically, they are the same office and classroom offered to the Respondent in 1994 and 1995; the Respondent believes that measures taken since then have ameliorated the environmental factors that allegedly were causing her health problems.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-14.0411(4) provides:
Any employee who is under continuing contract may be dismissed or may be returned to annual contract status for another three (3) years at the discretion of the board when a recommendation to that effect is submitted in writing to the board on or before April 1 of any college year giving good and sufficient reasons therefor by the president and provided the president's recommendation is approved by a majority of the board. The employee whose contract is under consideration shall be duly notified in writing at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the written recommendation with the board and such notice shall include a copy of the charges and the recommendation to the board. Should the board determine that it will consider the charges filed against the employee, it shall direct that a petition conforming to the requirements of the model rules of procedure adopted pursuant to Section 120.54(10), Florida Statutes, and including notification to the employee of his or her hearing rights, be filed with it and a copy served upon the employee. If the employee wishes a public hearing, he or she shall notify the board in writing within ten
(10) days after the date of service of the
petition. Upon receiving such a request, the board shall within fifteen (15) days notify the employee of the time and place of the public hearing on the charges which shall not be less than fourteen (14) days from the service of the notice unless a different time is agreed to by all parties. The hearing shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and should be in substantial compliance with the model rules of procedure, Title 28, FAC, unless the parties mutually agree to an alternative hearing procedure. In the event
the employee does not request a public hearing the board shall proceed to take appropriate action. Any decision adverse to
the employee shall be made by a majority vote of the full membership of the board. (emphasis added)
The issues in this case are whether there are "good and sufficient reasons" to dismiss the Respondent or return her to annual contract status for another three (3) years.
As found, the Respondent's absences were excessive. The Respondent intended to blame them on illness caused by environmental factors controlled by the College. But that issue was eliminated by the Order on Motions in Limine.
In the workers' compensation proceeding filed by the Respondent against the College, both parties were represented by counsel, and they fully and fairly litigated the issue as to whether the Respondent was exposed to any chemical through her work environment at the College which caused, accelerated, or aggravated any physical or mental illness. After considering all the evidence, the Judge of Compensation Claims ultimately ruled against the Respondent and in favor of the College on that issue.
The Respondent argued prehearing that collateral estoppel does not apply because the findings made by the Judge of Compensation Claims were not necessary to a determination that the Respondent was not entitled to compensation benefits in that case. To the contrary, it is concluded that the Respondent is bound by the Judge's ultimate and subordinate findings under the principle of collateral estoppel (also sometimes called estoppel
by judgment or issue preclusion.) See Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995). The Respondent is not permitted to relitigate those findings in this proceeding.
While the Order on Motions in Limine precluded the defenses that the Respondent had "multiple chemical sensitivity" caused by her work environment and that the College had to make accommodations in her work environment, the Respondent was not precluded from presenting a defense that genuine illness of some kind caused her to be absent from work. But no medical evidence of any kind was presented by the Respondent to support such a claim.
The Respondent's case essentially consisted of attempts to place blame on others for causing her absences and the problems that resulted from them, as well as attempts to minimize the extent of the problems caused. But the greater weight of the evidence was to the contrary. As found, the Respondent's excessive absences and the problems they caused the College and its students were "good and sufficient reasons" to terminate the Respondent's continuing contract.
At the same time, there is ample evidence that the Respondent can be an effective and valuable SPJC instructor when she is "on-the-job," physically and mentally. There also was evidence that the Respondent's performance has been satisfactory during the 1997-98 school year. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-14.0411(4), termination of the Respondent's
continuing contract does not preclude the College from returning the Respondent to an annual contract for another three (3) years.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of St. Petersburg Junior College enter a final order terminating the Respondent's continuing contract and returning her to an annual contract for another three years.
DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1998.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Board of Trustees
St. Petersburg Junior College c/o Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen Norton and Blue
Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350
324 South Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen Norton and Blue
Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350
324 South Hyde Park Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
John E. Tuthill, Esquire 3300 49th Street, North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33710
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Sep. 21, 1998 | Second DCA Case No. 2-98-3557 filed. |
| Sep. 16, 1998 | Notice of Agency Appeal filed. (filed by: Mary Tranquillo, Respondent) |
| Aug. 26, 1998 | Final Order filed. |
| Jun. 26, 1998 | Respondent`s Answer to Petitioner`s Motion to Strike Portions of Respondent`s Proposed Order filed. |
| Jun. 19, 1998 | (Respondent) Written Exceptions to Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
| Jun. 05, 1998 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 03/18-20/98. |
| May 15, 1998 | Petitioner`s Motion to strike Portions of Respondent`s Proposed Order filed. |
| May 04, 1998 | Petitioner`s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law filed. |
| May 04, 1998 | Respondent`s Final Argument, Findings of Fact, Rulings of the Judge, Application of Law, Conclusions and Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
| Apr. 14, 1998 | Transcripts (Volumes I, II, III, tagged) filed. |
| Mar. 19, 1998 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Supplemental Interrogatories filed. |
| Mar. 18, 1998 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Mar. 16, 1998 | Petitioner`s Response in Opposition to Respondent`s Motion to Allow Telephonic Testimony filed. |
| Mar. 13, 1998 | (Respondent) Eighth Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Mar. 13, 1998 | Letter to Judge Johnston from M. Sorolis (re: enclosing petitioner`s amended exhibit list/tagged) (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 13, 1998 | (Joint) Pretrial Stipulation filed. |
| Mar. 12, 1998 | (Respondent) Motion to Allow Telephone Testimony (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 12, 1998 | (Respondent) Exhibit List (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 12, 1998 | (Respondent) Notice of Location of Hearing (filed via facsimile). |
| Mar. 10, 1998 | (Respondent) Request for Copies filed. |
| Mar. 05, 1998 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Fifth Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Mar. 04, 1998 | Order Compelling Interrogatory Answers sent out. |
| Mar. 02, 1998 | Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification sent out. |
| Mar. 02, 1998 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Motion to Compel Production of Documents; Affidavit of Maria N. Sorolis filed. |
| Feb. 25, 1998 | (Respondent) Motion to Compel Production of Documents (filed via facsimile). |
| Feb. 23, 1998 | (Respondent) Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Order on Motions in Limine filed. |
| Feb. 11, 1998 | (Respondent) Seventh Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Feb. 09, 1998 | Order on Motions in Limine sent out. |
| Feb. 09, 1998 | Petitioner`s Expert Interrogatories to Respondent Mary Tranquillo filed. |
| Jan. 29, 1998 | (Respondent) Fifth Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Jan. 15, 1998 | Respondent`s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioner`s Motions in Limine filed. |
| Jan. 09, 1998 | (Respondent) Notice of Serving Supplemental Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Dec. 23, 1997 | (Petitioner) Motion in Limine filed. |
| Dec. 15, 1997 | (Respondent) Sixth Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Dec. 15, 1997 | (Respondent) Fourth Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Dec. 10, 1997 | Order Continuing Final Hearing sent out. (hearing set for March 18-20, 1998; 9:30am) |
| Dec. 09, 1997 | (Respondent) Fourth Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Dec. 09, 1997 | (Respondent) Fifth Notice of Production of Additional Discovery; Fourth Additional Witness List; Tangible Evidence List; Third Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Dec. 08, 1997 | (Respondent) Third Additional Witness List; Notice of Serving Amended Answers to Interrogatories to Petitioner; Amended Answer filed. |
| Dec. 08, 1997 | (Respondent) Motion for Continuance; Order Granting Continuance filed. |
| Dec. 04, 1997 | Notice of Final Hearing as to Location Only sent out. (hearing set for Dec. 8-10, 1997; 9:30am; St. Petersburg) |
| Dec. 04, 1997 | (Respondent) Motion for Continuance; Order Granting Continuance (for judge signature); Cover Letter (filed via facsimile). |
| Dec. 04, 1997 | Petitioner`s Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Allegations, Evidence or Testimony Regarding Multiple Chemical Sensitivity filed. |
| Dec. 04, 1997 | Petitioner`s Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Allegations, Evidence or Testimony Regarding the Alleged Disability of the Respondent filed. |
| Dec. 03, 1997 | CC: Letter to John Tuthill from Maria Sorolis (re: locations for hearing are suitable) filed. |
| Nov. 26, 1997 | (Respondent) Second Additional Witness List; Additional Witness List filed. |
| Nov. 24, 1997 | (Respondent) Second Notice of Production of Additional Discovery filed. |
| Nov. 24, 1997 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Nov. 20, 1997 | (Petitioner) Notice of Serving Answers to Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Nov. 18, 1997 | (From J. Tuthill) (2) Witness Subpoena for Deposition; (2) Affidavit of Service filed. |
| Nov. 18, 1997 | (Respondent) Witness List filed. |
| Nov. 17, 1997 | (Respondent) Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Nov. 12, 1997 | Third Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Nov. 12, 1997 | Notice of Production of Additional Discovery (Respondent) filed. |
| Oct. 30, 1997 | (Respondent) Response to Petitioner`s Production Requests filed. |
| Oct. 27, 1997 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Oct. 15, 1997 | (Respondent) Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Aug. 26, 1997 | Order Continuing Final Hearing sent out. (hearing set for Dec. 8-10, 1997; 10:00am) |
| Aug. 22, 1997 | Letter to Judge Johnston from Maria Sorolis (re: prehearing stipulation) (filed via facsimile). |
| Aug. 22, 1997 | Letter to Judge Johnston from Maria N. Sorolis (re: request for continuance) (filed via facsimile). |
| Aug. 22, 1997 | (Respondent) Motion for Continuance; Order Granting Continuance; Letter to Judge Johnston from J. Tuthill Re: Depositions filed. |
| Jul. 23, 1997 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s Second Request for Information filed. |
| Jul. 21, 1997 | (Defendant) Notice of Deposition filed. |
| Jul. 18, 1997 | Letter to M. Sorolis & cc: J. Tuthill from Judge Johnston (re: accommodations required under disabilities act) sent out. |
| Jul. 15, 1997 | (Respondent) Request for Production of Documents; Notice of Serving Interrogatories to Petitioner filed. |
| Jul. 10, 1997 | Petitioner`s Response to Respondent`s First Request for Information filed. |
| Jul. 09, 1997 | Letter to A. Cole from J. Tuthill Re: Special accommodations filed. |
| Jun. 30, 1997 | (John E. Tuthill) Notice of Appearance filed. |
| Jun. 27, 1997 | Letter to Judge Johnston from M. Sorolis Re: Unavailable dates filed. |
| Jun. 25, 1997 | Prehearing Order sent out. |
| Jun. 25, 1997 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for Aug. 26-28, 1997; 9:00am; St. Petersburg) |
| Jun. 13, 1997 | Joint Response to Initial Order (filed via facsimile). |
| Jun. 09, 1997 | Letter to C. Kuttler from M. Tranquillo Re: Requesting first request for information be answered promptly filed. |
| Jun. 05, 1997 | Letter to C. Kuttler from M. Tranquillo Re: Reqesting S. Smith to compel Dr. Kuttler, Jr. and St. Petersburg Junior College to provide me with the information requested; Request for Relevant Information filed. |
| May 30, 1997 | Initial Order issued. |
| May 22, 1997 | Agency Referral Letter; Request for Hearing, letter form; President`s Petition And Notice to Respondent of Hearing Rights filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 17, 1998 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jun. 25, 1998 | Recommended Order | Pet: dismiss Resp, continuing contract as instructor; excessive absenteeism. Resp: defended she had mult chem sensitivity; work environ caused/aggravated it. Work Comp judge ruling precluded this issue. RO: history of good perf., annual contract for 3 yr |
