STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CALVIN H. DePEW, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-4830

)

MIDWEST COAST TRANSPORT, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on June 24, 1998, in DeLand, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Calvin H. DePew, pro se

725 Temple Avenue

Orange City, Florida 32763

For Respondent: Samuel L. Bare, III, Esquire

Bare & Associates Suite 109

6601 Southwest 80th Street Miami, Florida 33143

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner's original Charge of Discrimination, dated

May 24, 1995, alleged that he had been discriminated against by Respondent Employer on the basis of race (Caucasian), national origin (United States citizen), and disability (handicap), the last act of discrimination being May 17, 1995, and "continuing."

The Florida Commission on Human Relations did not complete its investigation within 180 days. Upon Petitioner's request, the Commission forwarded his October 13, 1997, Petition for Relief to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about October 23, 1997.

This case was continued a number of times, and neither party complied with the Order of Prehearing Instructions.

At formal hearing, Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Glenn Mark Cecil, Matthew Hickox, Jr., and Connie Dale Bowman, and testified on his own behalf.

Petitioner also alleged at formal hearing that a letter or other document had been circulated at Respondent's work site warning Respondent's employees, most particularly

Mr. J. B. Gonzalez, that if any of Respondent's employees testified on Petitioner's behalf, Respondent would terminate their employment, and therefore, Petitioner could not present Mr. Gonzalez' testimony. In fact, Petitioner did not have a valid

return of service of a witness subpoena upon Mr. Gonzalez. Upon further inquiry by the undersigned, Petitioner represented that Mr. Gonzalez had physical possession of his subpoena; was aware of its effect; and had been intimidated by Respondent from testifying. Petitioner, Respondent's counsel, and the undersigned, respectively inquired of all three of Petitioner's witnesses concerning the alleged "letter of intimidation." Witnesses who appeared on Petitioner's behalf had "heard" there was such a letter, but none had ever seen such a letter, and each of Petitioner's witnesses testified that he was not afraid to testify and was not intimidated by the rumor of such a letter.

When questioned, Respondent's management witnesses denied the existence of any such letter.

The undersigned offered to make further inquiry into the matter and further arrangements to secure Mr. Gonzalez' appearance and testimony if Petitioner wished her to do so, but Petitioner ultimately declined to call Mr. Gonzalez as a witness and waived any opportunity to do so. (TR-171)

Petitioner had two exhibits admitted in evidence.

At the close of Petitioner's case in chief, Respondent made an ore tenus motion to dismiss, which was denied.

Respondent also presented the oral testimony of Messrs.

Bowman and Hickox, and the oral testimony of Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner. Respondent had three exhibits admitted in evidence.

At the close of all evidence, Respondent renewed its ore

tenus Motion to Dismiss, and that motion has been considered within this Recommended Order.

A transcript was provided in due course. Each party's Proposed Recommended Order has been considered.

Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order suggests that "his" witnesses were tampered with. For the reasons set out above, it is concluded that "witness tampering" has not been proven and that Petitioner's witnesses' testimony is, for the most part, credible. Petitioner's witnesses were able to credibly explain any prior inconsistent written statements they had signed on Petitioner's behalf.1

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

2. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995.

3. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens.

4. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly

   situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps.

5. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back.

6. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions.

7. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working

   10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing.

8. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner.

9. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part:

   [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are

   aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son.

   
   

10. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter.

11. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same

    restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence.

    
    

12. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees."

13. At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes.

14. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor.

15. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers

    every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business.

16. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17-

    18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday.

17. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes.

18. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used.

19. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest.

20. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him.

21. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time,

    with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week.

22. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project.

23. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than

    11 hours per day.

    
    

24. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition.

25. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had

    used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early,

    Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled

    old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----."

26. Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner.

27. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment."

28. Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg.

29. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of

    the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay.

30. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination.

31. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work.

    Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap.

32. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard,

    were offensive or otherwise inappropriate.

    
    

33. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and

    get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive.

34. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand.

35. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses.

36. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's

    instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr.

    Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations.

37. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident.

38. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so,

    Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He

    assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr.

    Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out.

39. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

40. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Section 120.57(1) and Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

41. Despite recent statutory amendments, the shifting burdens of proof in discrimination cases brought under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, are still best articulated in Department of Corrections v. Chandler, 582 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). That opinion instructs:

    Pursuant to the Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct.

    1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) formula, the employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, which once established raises a presumption that the employer discriminated against the employee. If the presumption arises, the burden shifts to the employer to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer discriminated against the employee. The employer may do this by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, a reason which is clear, reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. Because the employer has the burden of production, not of persuasion, which remains with the employee, it is not required to persuade the trier of fact that its decision was actually motivated by the reason given. If the employer satisfies its

    burden, the employee must then persuade the fact finder that the proffered reason for the employment decision was a pretext for intentional discrimination. The employee may satisfy this burden by showing directly that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the decision, or indirectly by showing that the proffered reason for the employment decision is not worthy of belief. If such proof is adequately presented, the employee satisfies his or her ultimate burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has been a victim of intentional discrimination.

    
    

42. Due to the shifting burdens of proof, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

43. The Florida Commission on Human Relations has stated, most recently in Clark v. Jackson County Hospital, Florida Commission on Human Relations' Final Order in DOAH Case No. 95- 4956, entered July 1, 1997, that

    ". . .to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination, the Petitioner must show: (1) she is handicapped; (2) that she performed or is able to perform her assigned duties satisfactorily; and (3) that despite her satisfactory performance, she was terminated." O'Neill v. Sarasota County School Board, 18 F.A.L.R. 1129, at 1130 (FCHR 1994), citing Swenson-Davis v. Orlando Partners, Inc., 16 F.A.L.R. 792, at 798 (FCHR

    1993).

    
    

44. Applying these principles to the facts as found, it is concluded that Petitioner established that he was handicapped, in that he had the specific medical restrictions described in Findings of Fact 7, 10, and 12. He also proved that he made these conditions known to his Employer. However, Petitioner did not go on to prove that he performed his job satisfactorily and

    was terminated despite his satisfactory performance.

    
    

45. However, Petitioner's medical conditions described in Findings of Fact 9 and 11 do not qualify under the applicable law. Petitioner did not prove that these conditions constituted "handicaps" at the material times, January 1995 - June 1995, or that he ever made his high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease known to the Employer in a manner that clearly requested accommodation.

46. Petitioner did not prove that he was able to do his job satisfactorily, with or without accommodation, and he was not terminated. He clocked-out and intentionally did not return to work.

47. For purposes of proving failure to accommodate his handicap, a Petitioner must minimally affirmatively show that he has a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, that the employer knew of the handicap, and that the employer failed to find a job function consistent with those physical limitations. See Section 760.22(7)(1), Florida Statutes, and Brand v. Florida Power Corporation, 633 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

48. Petitioner has proven that he is a handicapped person as contemplated by the statute only as to back and knee problems.

49. Petitioner has not shown that his anxiety, if it still existed in 1995, constituted a physical impairment which substantially limited one or more of his major life activities.

    Likewise, he did not show that he made his high blood pressure, anxiety, or arterial coronary disease known to his employer in any manner that would require accommodation. Indeed, the 1993 physician's statement regarding these conditions does not state any restrictions, and Petitioner's only suggested accommodation (resting for 15 minutes after every 20-minute work interval) was not one the Employer could have reasonably accommodated, even if that request had been clearly and unequivocally enunciated by Petitioner, which it was not.

50. Petitioner was already a checker, the least physically taxing of Respondent's job descriptions for which he was qualified. That position did not include any of the tasks precluded by the January 9, 1995, doctor's limitations. In response to the January 9, 1995, doctor's limitations, which Petitioner did communicate to the Employer and which I conclude legally constitute his "handicap," the Employer accommodated Petitioner by limiting his shifts. If Petitioner checked out early or late, that was pretty much in Petitioner's unilateral discretion. Again, Petitioner's only suggested accommodation (resting for 15 minutes every 20-minute work interval was not one the Employer could have reasonably accommodated, even if that request had been clearly an unequivocally enunciated by Petitioner, which it was not. An employer is not required to create an entirely new job for a handicapped employee or hire others to do his job for him, nor must it reallocate work. See

    29 CFR App. Section 1630.2(0); Brand v. Florida Power and Light, supra; Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp., 860 F. Supp. 488 (M.D. Alabama 1994); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F. 3d 827, (3d Cir. 1996). The employee has the burden to prove the existence and reasonableness of any proposed accommodations. Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F. 2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1998). Petitioner has not met the burden herein.

51. Respondent Employer herein had a system for maintaining the work force for its freight business by "making work" on clean-up jobs for several hours on slow days. Petitioner, like all employees, had the option of doing this type of work or not earning the hourly rate for those hours. Based on the facts as found, it cannot be said that these jobs were designed to harass

    Petitioner because of his known handicap (back and knees) or that they were a failure to accommodate his known January 9, 1995, medical restrictions.

52. Likewise, all of the comments directed to Petitioner which were actually proven to have occurred had a legitimate, non-discriminatory business purpose and did not constitute harassment due to handicap.

53. The single incident when Petitioner was required to load a truck with Willie T. which could have involved bending and squatting and lifting boxes which weighed more than his 30-pound restriction, demonstrates a lack of accommodation on a single, isolated occasion, but Petitioner did not point out this lapse to

    Mr. Bradner, and he ultimately quit over an unrelated incident. No damages were demonstrated as a result of the single lifting episode. Although Petitioner demonstrated a prima facie case as to this single episode, it is a de minimus lapse by the Employer, with no nexus to handicap discrimination as contemplated by the Act. As such, it cannot support a determination of an unlawful employment practice. See Rosario v. Orange County, Florida, DOAH Case No. 95-5380 (Recommended Order of ALJ Mary Clark entered April 9, 1996).

54. Petitioner did not demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Assuming arguendo, but not ruling, that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was demonstrated by the Willie T. and James Oliver incidents, Respondent Employer clearly demonstrated legitimate business purposes for its actions on each occasion, and Petitioner did not refute this proof. Moreover, Petitioner suffered no damages by either incident in pay, hours, seniority, or status.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues.

DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

ELLA JANE P. DAVIS

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.

ENDNOTES

1/ It is noted that Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination is dated May 24, 1995, and that on May 26, 1995, he obtained signed statements from several co-employees. No issue of retaliation was ever raised and the Petitioner's witnesses explained factually what they actually saw or heard, and how they came to sign their prior statements prepared by Petitioner.

2/ It is noted that Petitioner's May 24, 1995, Charge of Discrimination placed this raise in September 1994, well before management received his doctor's restrictions in January 1995.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Samuel L. Bare, III, Esquire Bare & Associates

Suite 109

6601 Southwest 80th Street Miami, Florida 33143

Calvin H. DePew 725 Temple Avenue

Orange City, Florida 32763

Sharon Moultry, Agency Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240

325 John Knox Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Dana Baird, Esquire

Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240

325 John Knox Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 97-004830

Orders for Case No: 97-004830