STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
MARY ANN STEADMAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
Respondent.
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) Case No. 10-8928
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, an evidentiary hearing was held in this case on December 3, 2010, by video teleconference with sites in Lakeland and Tallahassee, Florida, before Administrative Law Judge Elizabeth W. McArthur of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Darla K. Snead, Esquire
Darla K. Snead, P.L. Post Office Box 2477 Bartow, Florida 33831
For Respondent: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire
Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The sole threshold issue in this bifurcated proceeding is whether Petitioner has met her burden of proving grounds for
equitable tolling as a defense to the admitted untimely filing of Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing.
Consideration of the merits of Petitioner's challenge to the initial agency action was deferred, pending the threshold determination of whether the challenge can be heard.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By letter dated June 2, 2010, Respondent, Department of Management Services (Respondent or Department), notified Petitioner, Mary Ann Steadman (Petitioner or Ms. Steadman), that the Department was partially approving and partially denying
Ms. Steadman's request for a refund of overpayments of state group health insurance premiums. The notice was sent by certified mail and was received on June 5, 2010. The letter notified Ms. Steadman of her right to contest the Department's decision by filing a request for an administrative hearing within 21 days of receipt of the certified letter.
Ms. Steadman's daughter drafted the administrative hearing request for Ms. Steadman. The request for hearing, dated August 13, 2010, was signed by Ms. Steadman and sent to the Department, where it was received and filed on August 16, 2010.
Petitioner's request for an administrative hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, along with Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the request for hearing because it was not timely filed.
On September 15, 2010, the undersigned issued an Order directing Petitioner to show cause why the request for hearing should not be dismissed as untimely. In response, counsel for Petitioner raised equitable tolling as a defense, asserting that Petitioner suffered from depression and was seeing a psychiatrist and that Petitioner's condition constituted an extraordinary circumstance that prevented Petitioner from timely filing her petition.
In a telephonic hearing, the parties agreed to a bifurcated hearing, the first phase of which would be limited solely to the threshold issue of whether Petitioner could prove the asserted equitable tolling defense. The parties acknowledged that resolution of this threshold issue could be dispositive and that by bifurcating the hearing, resources would not be inefficiently expended preparing for and litigating the merits if Petitioner did not prove grounds for equitable tolling. An Order was entered bifurcating the hearing, and the first phase of the bifurcated hearing was duly noticed and held on December 3, 2010.
The parties filed a Joint Prehearing Stipulation in which they stipulated to a few issues of fact and law. Those stipulations are accepted by the undersigned and incorporated in this Recommended Order.
At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and also presented testimony of her daughter, Jeannette Viegas
(Ms. Viegas). Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 were received into evidence. Respondent presented no witnesses or evidence of its own. Respondent's Request for Official Recognition of two legislative staff analyses and two Department rules was granted without opposition from Petitioner.
A court reporter was in attendance to preserve the testimony at the December 3, 2010, hearing, but a transcript was not ordered. At the conclusion of the hearing, it was agreed that the parties would file their proposed recommended orders by December 16, 2010. That deadline was subsequently extended until December 22, 2010, by Order granting an unopposed motion for extension of time filed by the Department. Both parties timely filed Proposed Recommended Orders, which have been considered by the undersigned in the preparation of this
Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner's husband was a State of Florida employee.
He passed away in 1999. As the surviving spouse of a former State of Florida employee, Petitioner is entitled to, and has obtained coverage under, the state's group health insurance since 1999.
Since sometime in 2002, Petitioner has also had Medicare health care coverage. However, Petitioner continued to pay the individual monthly premium rate for state group health insurance through May 2010, instead of the lower monthly rate applicable to someone who also has Medicare coverage.
In May 2010, Petitioner submitted a written request to change her state group health insurance coverage level to accurately reflect the lower monthly Medicare rate and to refund the difference in premiums between the regular premium rate she had been paying and the lower Medicare rate from May 2002 to May 2010. Petitioner's May 2010 written request for changed coverage and reimbursement of overpaid premiums was not offered into evidence.
By certified letter dated June 2, 2010, the Department responded to Petitioner's May 2010 written request. The Department advised that it was granting Petitioner's request to change her coverage level to reflect that she has Medicare coverage and that Petitioner's request for a refund was granted, in part, and denied, in part. The letter advised Petitioner of her right to an administrative hearing to contest the partial denial and enclosed an informational page specifying how and when to request such a hearing. In addition, enclosed with the letter were copies of Florida Administrative Code Rules
28-106.201 and 28-106.301, which codify the manner for
initiating proceedings when there are disputed issues of material fact and when there are no disputed issues of material fact, respectively.
The Department's certified letter was delivered to Petitioner's home on June 5, 2010. Petitioner was at home and personally signed the certified receipt for the Department's letter on June 5, 2010.
Petitioner testified that she does not remember answering the door when the Department's certified letter was delivered to her home, nor does she remember signing the certified receipt, even though she acknowledged that she did so on June 5, 2010.
Petitioner and her daughter, Ms. Viegas, testified that Petitioner has had mental health issues since 2001, when Petitioner became depressed not too long after her husband died in 1999.
Petitioner testified that she has been seeing a psychiatrist since 2008 and has been taking medication prescribed by the psychiatrist for depression. No evidence was presented to establish how frequently or infrequently Petitioner was seeing a psychiatrist, nor was any evidence presented with respect to the type or dosage of medication Petitioner has taken. Neither the psychiatrist whom Petitioner said she had been seeing, nor any other expert testified with respect to
Petitioner's medical or psychological condition, and no medical records were offered into evidence.
Throughout the years of Petitioner's chronic depression, Petitioner has lived in her own home, at times alone or with a gentleman who lives there now and is now 81 years old. In addition, in June 2009, Ms. Viegas moved in with Petitioner and has lived there continuously since that time. Ms. Viegas is
39 years old and is unemployed. Since Ms. Viegas does not work, she is present at the home 90 percent of the time. Ms. Viegas testified that the reason she moved in with Petitioner was because Petitioner needed her help with business and other needs and, also, because Ms. Viegas broke up with her boyfriend with whom she had been living. Petitioner's other daughter, Cindy, also helps out. Cindy is a regular visitor and helps with household tasks, such as doing laundry, paying bills, and calling banks on Petitioner's behalf.
According to Ms. Viegas, Petitioner's chronic depression got worse in late January or early February 2010 and remained bad until sometime in July 2010, when Petitioner's medication was changed.
As described by Petitioner and Ms. Viegas, in Petitioner's worsened state for this six- or seven-month period in 2010, Petitioner slept most of the day in addition to at night. Petitioner did not clean the house or cook her own
meals, and she did not bathe until Ms. Viegas pushed her to bathe.
Because Petitioner was not cooking her own meals, she either ate peanut butter sandwiches or went out to eat at a restaurant. Petitioner testified that during this period when her depression worsened, she frequently went out to eat. Petitioner also acknowledged that she has had a valid driver's license and a car and that she would drive herself around, sometimes alone with no passengers.
Despite the fact that Ms. Viegas moved in with Petitioner to help with her business and other needs, Ms. Viegas testified that her mother was able to keep up with her own business affairs pretty well until she got worse in January or February 2010, at which point bills frequently would go missing, and Ms. Viegas would realize that when second notices were received. Even before Petitioner got worse in early 2010, important mail, such as utility bills, would occasionally go missing. Ms. Viegas explained that she was reluctant to impose tighter controls to address this chronic issue, because she did not want to give her mother the impression that she (Ms. Viegas) did not have faith in her mother's ability to handle her own business. In addition, Ms. Viegas was unwilling to restrict her mother's freedom to walk outside to the mailbox to collect the mail or to get the mail while she was out walking their poodle.
Instead, Ms. Viegas just dealt with the repercussions of the occasional lost mail. Ms. Viegas acknowledged that the problem of missing important mail, such as bills, became a more frequent occurrence when Petitioner's condition got worse in January or February 2010. Still, Ms. Viegas and Petitioner did nothing different with regard to the mail routine.
No evidence was presented that Petitioner's depression ever became so severe that Ms. Viegas and/or Petitioner contemplated hospitalization or some form of more intensive treatments beyond periodic office visits with a psychiatrist. Petitioner has not been adjudicated incompetent of handling her own affairs, and no guardian has been appointed to manage Petitioner's affairs, nor was there evidence that such a step was ever contemplated. The evidence suggested to the contrary-- that Petitioner led an independent lifestyle and that Ms. Viegas was unwilling to, and apparently believed it was unnecessary to, restrict Petitioner's freedoms.
Petitioner testified that in July 2010, her psychiatrist changed her medication, and after that, Petitioner felt better and began cleaning house, cooking, and doing other things she had not been doing. Petitioner found the letter from Respondent, showed the letter to Ms. Viegas, and asked
Ms. Viegas to help.
Ms. Viegas prepared a letter requesting an administrative hearing to dispute the partial denial of Petitioner's overpayment refund request. Ms. Viegas testified that she knew enough to prepare the letter without Petitioner's help, because Ms. Viegas knew all about Petitioner's dispute with the Department. Ms. Viegas had no problems understanding from the Department's notice how to request an administrative hearing for Petitioner. Ms. Viegas reviewed her draft with Petitioner to make sure there was nothing Petitioner wanted to change or add.
The request for administrative hearing prepared by
Ms. Viegas was signed by Petitioner on August 13, 2010, and sent to the Department where it was filed on August 16, 2010, nearly seven weeks after the 21-day deadline specified in the letter for filing a request for administrative hearing.
Petitioner does not assert that she was misled or lulled into inaction by anything said or done by the Department's representatives. Petitioner does not assert that the Department's notice was unclear or confusing with regard to when, whether, or how Petitioner needed to request an administrative hearing to contest the Department's proposed action. Instead, her sole contention is that her "diminished mental capacity"1/ constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that prevented her from timely filing her request for hearing.
The greater weight of the credible evidence does not support a finding that during the six- or seven-month period in 2010, when Petitioner's depression worsened, her condition rendered her incapable of functioning. The facts are inconsistent with the suggestion of a debilitated state. Petitioner drove a car, sometimes by herself; collected the mail from the mailbox herself; walked her pet poodle; and went out for meals when she tired of peanut butter sandwiches. Though she did not, herself, clean the house or cook meals, she had the help of two daughters, one of whom lived in the house and had no other job besides helping Petitioner. Moreover, in May 2010, Petitioner was capable of submitting an appropriate written request for change of insurance coverage level and for refund of overpaid premiums; and on June 5, 2010, Petitioner was able to respond to receive the delivery of the certified letter on
June 5, 2010, and to sign the certified receipt with a clear, steady signature.
Based on the credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Petitioner's condition rose to an extraordinary circumstance, such that she was "prevented" from timely filing a petition. "Prevented" suggests an external factor beyond one's control, something far beyond one's own lack of reasonable prudence. As Petitioner and her live-in daughter observed Petitioner's worsening condition, reasonable prudence
would have mandated an adjustment in protocol. It defies credibility to suggest that Petitioner's condition worsened to the point that it was impossible for Petitioner to care for herself and tend to her business and that Ms. Viegas would have stood by unwilling to assume full responsibility for Petitioner, including dealing with day-to-day business affairs.
It must be emphasized that no medical testimony and no medical records were offered to support the testimony of Petitioner and her daughter regarding Petitioner's condition during the critical time of June and July 2010. Not only are Petitioner and her daughter lay witnesses who lack the expertise to offer medical opinions, but these two witnesses share an interest in characterizing Petitioner's condition, in this proceeding, as extreme and extraordinary. Instead, the impression given by the inconsistencies noted above is that Petitioner's condition was neither extreme nor extraordinary, but, rather, was chronic and manageable or at least accepted as the norm for the household. If Petitioner's condition were as extreme and debilitating as suggested for purposes of arguing equitable tolling, it would have been reckless for Petitioner to be allowed to continue driving her car. If, in fact, Petitioner was unable to function or comprehend day-to-day occurrences, there would be no excuse, in the exercise of reasonable prudence, for Ms. Viegas, who was not otherwise employed and was
living in the home for the expressed purpose of helping Petitioner, to not have assumed full responsibility for her mother's functioning and dealing with day-to-day business affairs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (2010).2/
The parties stipulated that Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.111 sets forth the governing standards with respect to whether Petitioner's challenge may be heard. The rule states in pertinent part:
The notice of agency decision shall contain the information required by Section 120.569(1), F.S. . . .
Unless otherwise provided by law, persons seeking a hearing on an agency decision which does or may determine their substantial interests shall file a petition for hearing with the agency within 21 days of receipt of written notice of the decision.
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(4) Any person who receives written notice of an agency decision and who fails to file a written request for a hearing within 21 days waives the right to request a hearing on such matters. This provision does not eliminate the availability of equitable tolling as a defense.
Petitioner acknowledges that her request for hearing was not filed within 21 days of her receipt of the Department's notice. Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts justify application of the doctrine of equitable tolling to excuse her untimely filing of a request for administrative hearing. See, e.g., David Kim
(Nu-Look One Hour Dry Cleaning) v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Case No. 98-2676 (Fla. DOAH May 4, 1999; Fla. DEP June 7, 1999),
RO at 30-31, ¶ 57.
The availability of equitable tolling as a defense to the untimely filing of a request for an administrative hearing under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act was first recognized in Machules v. Department of Administration, 523 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1988). There, the Florida Supreme Court likened the deadline in which a party must file an administrative hearing request challenging agency action to a statute of limitations. Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1133 n.2. As such, the Court reasoned that the time limit should be subject to tolling when equitable principles require.
The Court drew on the equitable tolling principle espoused in federal cases in a variety of contexts. From these cases, the Machules Court compiled the following summary of when it has been considered appropriate to apply equitable tolling:
Generally, the tolling doctrine has been applied when the plaintiff has been misled or lulled into inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, or has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.
Id. at 1134.
The circumstances at issue in Machules were shown to be a combination of the first and third grounds. The Court found that the adverse party's actions in that case "sufficiently misled petitioner so as to excuse his failure to timely file in the appropriate forum." Id. As an additional fact, the Court noted that the petitioner was self-represented and, thus, perhaps more vulnerable to being misled or lulled into inaction.
As found above, there is no similar evidence presented here that Petitioner was misled or lulled into inaction by anything done or said by Respondent.
The fact that Petitioner was not represented by counsel when she signed the certified receipt for the notice of intended agency action or when her daughter assisted her to prepare a request for hearing and file that request with Respondent, is not a reason to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. See Adams v. Dep't of Mgmt. Servs., Case No. 09-2135 (Fla. DOAH May 5, 2009; Fla. DMS Aug. 25, 2009), citing Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Dep't of Health, 742 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA
1999). That is particularly true here where there was no contention that the Department's notice was unclear or misunderstood and where Petitioner's daughter was able to assist Petitioner to prepare and file a request for administrative hearing that was acceptable in form and content, if not in timeliness.
Although the Court in Machules did not limit equitable tolling to only those cases where the adverse party is guilty of some kind of misconduct, the court made clear that the party seeking to take advantage of equitable tolling must be shown to have acted with "reasonably prudent regard for his [or her] rights[.]" Machules, 523 So. 2d at 1134. That recognition is in keeping with the federal cases from which the Machules Court drew. These cases uniformly recognize that equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy that must be applied sparingly. A party seeking to take advantage of equitable tolling to excuse an untimely filing must show that the untimely filing was "because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence." Wakefield v. Cordis Corp., 211 Fed. Appx. 834, 836 (11th Cir. 2006), citing Sandvik
v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
As noted, Machules, as well as most of the Florida cases following Machules, do not rely on the "extraordinary circumstances" prong of the equitable tolling doctrine. The two
federal cases cited by the Court in Machules that invoke "extraordinary circumstances" as the predicate for equitable tolling, do so upon a showing that war intervened to prevent a plaintiff from timely acting. See Frabutt v. N.Y., Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 84 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Pa. 1949)(holding that under international law, the existence of a state of war between two countries tolls the statute of limitations as between citizens of the countries at war, because the courts are effectively closed to suits by citizens of the enemy country); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir.
1947)(statute of limitations tolled for period in which courts were not available to plaintiff while he was being held as a prisoner of war by Japan).
On very rare occasions in federal cases, a petitioner's or plaintiff's established mental incapacity has been invoked for equitable tolling. In these cases, courts have required a showing of extreme circumstances, such as hospitalization, or such complete and total incapacity as to render the party claiming equitable tolling completely unable to function in society. Barrett v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2004)(to obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, a party must show that the failure to timely file was the direct result of a mental illness that rendered the party incapable of rational thought or deliberate decision-making, incapable of
handling his own affairs, or unable to function in society; a medical diagnosis or vague assertions of mental problems will not suffice); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 2005)(combination of appellant's pro se status and asserted debilitating depression do not justify equitable tolling); Decrosta v. Runyon, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5006 (N.D.N.Y.
1993)(plaintiff's mental disorder did not constitute a circumstance beyond his control so as to activate equitable tolling, even though plaintiff's treating neuropsychologist opined that plaintiff was suffering from a major depressive disorder and was in a debilitated emotional state with severely limited ability to function in society, where evidence fell short of establishing plaintiff was unable to protect his legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society; evidence showed plaintiff could care for himself, communicate with his doctors, dress himself, drive, and fill out forms, albeit slowly); Speiser v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 670 F. Supp. 380, 385 (D.D.C. 1986)(rejecting as insufficient to invoke equitable tolling evidence from plaintiff's psychiatrist that plaintiff suffered from atypical depression, manifested by lethargy, excessive sleep, disorientation, appetite changes, and impaired judgment; "While plaintiff may have had impaired judgment, . . . [and] was preoccupied, depressed, and obsessed[,] . . . she has not shown that she was ever adjudged
incompetent, signed a power of attorney, had a guardian or caretaker appointed, or otherwise took measures to let someone else handle her affairs," as might be done for someone who is incapable of handling his own affairs or unable to function in society).
In this case, Petitioner has not proven, and has not even claimed, such complete inability to function. As asserted in the parties' joint prehearing stipulation, Petitioner claimed only "diminished mental capacity." Even if Petitioner's claim had been objectively supported, "diminished" capacity would be inadequate to justify equitable tolling. Particularly where, as here, Petitioner presented no medical expert testimony, no neutral witnesses, and no objective medical records to accept Petitioner's claim as sufficient to trigger equitable tolling would create a huge gaping hole such that the exception would swallow the rule. Cf. Hessam v. Gates, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102712, *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing the appropriateness of equitable tolling. Other than his own self-serving claim of severe depression, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of circumstances so extraordinary that equitable tolling should apply, such as medical records, or [testimony] from a neutral third party.") (cites and internal quotes omitted).
The dangers of being seduced down this slippery slope were addressed by the court in Bassett v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
578 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1984). There, the court borrowed from Ohio state statutory law setting forth the circumstances when mental incapacity should toll a statute of limitations, as follows:
After the cause of action accrues, if the person entitled to bring such action becomes of unsound mind and is adjudicated as such by a court of competent jurisdiction or is confined in an institution or hospital under a diagnosed condition or disease which renders him of unsound mind, the time during which he is of unsound mind and so adjudicated or so confined shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought.
Bassett, 578 F. Supp. at 1248. The court explained its rationale for using the state statutory test to determine when equitable tolling should be allowed:
We borrow this principle primarily because it embodies an objective standard which is fair to all parties concerned. [T]he
time during which the filing period will be tolled is measured by the objective standard of adjudication or institutionalization.
This protects defendants against specious allegations of mental incompetence advanced in desperate efforts to save time-barred claims. Thus, the objective standard permits of fair and convenient application.
Id. Accord Speiser, 670 F. Supp. at 384 (following Bassett, by applying District of Columbia's standard governing the tolling of statutes of limitations for a person who is noncompos
mentis--incapable of handling his own affairs or unable to function in society--until the disability is removed); Lake v.
Arnold, 232 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2000)(although mental incompetency is insufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations under Connecticut law when a guardian has been appointed to protect the incompetent's interests, equitable tolling would be allowed in the unusual case where the guardians allegedly violated their fiduciary duty to protect the ward's interests).
The Florida Legislature has adopted a similar tolling statute. With respect to mental incapacity, section 95.051, Florida Statutes, provides that the following shall toll a statute of limitations:
The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is tolled by:
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(d) The adjudicated incapacity, before the cause of action accrued, of the person entitled to sue. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.
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(h) The minority or previously adjudicated incapacity of the person entitled to sue during any period of time in which a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist, has an interest adverse to the minor or incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be incapacitated to sue; except with respect
to the statute of limitations for a claim for medical malpractice as provided in s.
95.11. In any event, the action must be begun within 7 years after the act, event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action.
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No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, s. 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law. (Emphasis added.)
The interested testimony of Petitioner and her daughter of "diminished mental capacity" fall well short of the standards imposed by the foregoing authorities to meet Petitioner's burden of proving entitlement to the asserted equitable tolling defense.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order dismissing the petition for administrative hearing filed by Petitioner, Mary Ann Steadman.
DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 2011.
ENDNOTES
1/ The parties agreed in their joint prehearing statement that the issues of fact and law to be determined were whether Petitioner had "diminished mental capacity" at the relevant time, and, if so, whether such diminished mental capacity constitutes an "extraordinary" circumstance under the doctrine of equitable tolling that would excuse Petitioner from timely filing her request for administrative hearing.
2/ Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Florida Statutes are to the 2010 version.
COPIES FURNISHED:
John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Darla K. Snead, Esquire Darla K. Snead, P.L. Post Office Box 2477 Bartow, Florida 33831
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Apr. 12, 2011 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jan. 26, 2011 | Recommended Order | Petitioner did not meet her burden of proving that claimed "diminished mental capacity" constituted an extraordinary circumstance preventing timely filing of the request for administrative hearing. |
