STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CLIFFORD J. DEYAMPERT,

vs.

Petitioner,

Case No. 17-4560MTR

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case via video teleconference between sites in Tallahassee and Gainesville, Florida, on October 24, 2017, before Garnett W. Chisenhall, Jr., a duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Floyd B. Faglie, Esquire

Staunton and Faglie, P.L.

189 East Walnut Street Monticello, Florida 32344

For Respondent: Alexander R. Boler, Esquire Suite 300

2073 Summit Lake Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32317

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue to be determined is the amount to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”),

for medical expenses paid on behalf of Clifford J. Deyampert (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Deyampert”) pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ from settlement proceeds received by Mr. Deyampert from a third party.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On August 15, 2017, Mr. Deyampert filed a “Petition to Determine Amount Payable to Agency for Health Care

Administration in Satisfaction of Medicaid Lien” by which he challenged AHCA’s lien for recovery of medical expenses paid by Medicaid in the amount of $76,944.67. The basis for the challenge was the assertion that the application of section 409.910(17)(b) warranted reimbursement of a lesser portion of the total third-party settlement proceeds than the amount calculated by AHCA pursuant to the formula established in section 409.910(11)(f).

On October 3, 2017, AHCA filed a Motion for Stay asserting that an order issued by the Honorable Mark E. Walker in the case of Gallardo v. Dudek, 4:16-cv-116-MW-CAS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59848 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2017), enjoined AHCA from enforcing portions of section 409.910(17)(b) at issue in the instant proceeding.

On October 10, 2017, the undersigned issued an Order denying AHCA’s Motion for Stay. In doing so, the undersigned relied on the reasoning set forth in Museguez v. Agency for

Health Care Administration, Case No. 16-7379MTR (Fla. DOAH

Sept. 19, 2017).

The final hearing was held as scheduled on October 24, 2017.

The parties filed a Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation in which they identified stipulated facts for which no further proof would be necessary. The stipulated facts have been accepted and considered in the preparation of this Final Order.

During the final hearing, Mr. Deyampert presented the testimony of F. Emory Springfield, Esquire, and R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, and the undersigned accepted Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 through 9 into evidence without objection.

AHCA offered no witnesses and did not move any exhibits into evidence.

The Transcript from the final hearing was filed on November 9, 2017.

In response to a “Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Final Orders,” the undersigned issued an Order on November 20, 2017, establishing November 30, 2017, as the deadline for filing proposed final orders.

The parties timely filed their Proposed Final Orders on November 30, 2017, and those Proposed Final Orders were considered in the preparation of this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following findings of fact are based on exhibits accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre- hearing stipulation, and matters subject to official recognition.

Facts Pertaining to the Underlying Personal Injury Litigation and the Medicaid Lien

1. On July 25, 2015, Mr. Deyampert was attending a party held at a friend’s house and was shot in the throat by another guest. The bullet traveled down Mr. Deyampert’s throat, struck his spinal cord, and caused Mr. Deyampert to be paralyzed from the chest down. As a result, Mr. Deyampert is permanently disabled, disfigured, and wheelchair-bound. In addition,

   Mr. Deyampert is bowel and bladder incontinent.2/

   
   

2. Medicaid paid $76,944.67 in order to cover Mr. Deyampert’s past medical expenses.

3. No portion of the $76,944.67 paid by Medicaid on Mr. Deyampert’s behalf represents expenditures for future

   medical expenses, and Medicaid did not make payments in advance for medical care.

4. Mr. Deyampert initiated a personnel injury lawsuit by making a claim against a homeowner’s insurance policy that covered the shooter.

   
   

5. Mr. Deyampert’s personal injury action settled for

   
   

   $305,000, and that was the limit of an aforementioned insurance policy.3/

6. The General Release memorializing the settlement stated the following:

   Although it is acknowledged that this settlement does not fully compensate Clifford Deyampert for all of the damages he has allegedly suffered, this settlement shall operate as a full and complete Release as to Releasees without regard to this settlement only compensating Clifford Deyampert for a fraction of the total monetary value of his alleged damages. The parties agree that Clifford Deyampert’s alleged damages have a value in excess of

   $6,000,000, of which $76,944.67 represents Clifford Deyampert’s claim for past medical expenses. Given the facts, circumstances, and nature of Clifford Deyampert’s injuries and this settlement, the parties have agreed to allocate $3,847.23 of this settlement to Clifford Deyampert’s claim for past medical expenses and allocate the remainder of the settlement toward the satisfaction of claims other than past medical expenses. This allocation is a reasonable and proportionate allocation based on the same ratio this settlement bears to the total monetary value of all Clifford Deyampert’s damages.

   Further, the parties acknowledge that Clifford Deyampert may need future medical care related to his injuries, and some portion of this settlement may represent compensation for future medical expenses Clifford Deyampert will incur in the future. However, the parties acknowledge that Clifford Deyampert, or others on his behalf, have not made payments in the past or in advance for Clifford Deyampert’s future medical care and Clifford Deyampert has not made a claim for reimbursement, repayment,

   
   

   restitution, indemnification, or to be made whole for payments made in the past or in advance for future medical care.

   Accordingly, no portion of this settlement represents reimbursement for future medical expenses.

   
   

7. During the pendency of Mr. Deyampert’s personal injury action, AHCA was notified of the suit and asserted a Medicaid lien in the amount of $76,944.67 against any damages received by Mr. Deyampert.

8. Via a letter issued on July 24, 2017, Mr. Deyampert’s attorney notified AHCA that Mr. Deyampert’s personal injury action had settled. The letter asked AHCA to specify what amount it would accept in satisfaction of the $76,944.67 Medicaid lien.

9. AHCA responded by demanding full payment of the lien.

   
   

10. Section 409.910(11)(f) sets forth a formula for calculating the amount that AHCA shall recover in the event that a Medicaid recipient or his or her personal representative initiates a tort action against a third party that results in a judgment, award, or settlement from a third party.4/

11. AHCA is seeking to recover $76,944.67 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien. See § 409.910(11)(f)4., Fla. Stat.

    (providing that “[n]otwithstanding any provision in this section to the contrary, [AHCA] shall be entitled to all medical

    
    

    coverage benefits up to the total amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid.”).

    Valuation of the Personal Injury Claim

    
    

12. F. Emory Springfield represented Mr. Deyampert during the personal injury action and testified during the final hearing.

13. Mr. Springfield has practiced law for 32 years. He owns his own law firm and handles cases involving personal injury, workers’ compensation, and social security disability.

14. Mr. Springfield has experience with jury trials and monitors jury verdicts issued in his fields of practice.

15. Mr. Springfield routinely assesses the value of damages suffered by injured parties.

16. He makes those assessments by determining the injured person’s life expectancy, evaluating the injuries, and conferring with lifecare planners about the injured party’s need for future care.

17. In addition, Mr. Springfield learns as much as possible about the injured party’s past life activities and compares those activities to what the injured party is presently capable of doing.

18. Mr. Springfield also assesses an injured party’s damages by examining jury verdicts from other cases.

    
    

19. Mr. Springfield was accepted in this proceeding as an expert regarding the valuation of damages.

20. Mr. Springfield is of the opinion that Mr. Deyampert’s damages (including damages for pain and suffering and economic damages) are well in excess of $6 million.

21. According to Mr. Springfield, the $305,000 settlement does not “come close” to fully compensating Mr. Deyampert for all of his damages. Furthermore, the $305,000 settlement only represents a five percent recovery of the more than $6 million in damages incurred by Mr. Deyampert.

22. Therefore, in Mr. Springfield’s opinion, only five percent (i.e., $3,847.23) of the $76,944.67 in Medicaid payments for Mr. Deyampert’s past medical expenses were recovered.

23. Mr. Deyampert also presented the testimony of

    
    

    R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, during the final hearing.

    
    

24. Mr. Barrett is a trial attorney who has been practicing in North Florida since the mid 1970s. Over the last

    30 years, he has focused his practice on the areas of medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical liability.

25. Mr. Barrett routinely handles jury trials and monitors jury verdicts issued in his practice areas.

26. Mr. Barrett routinely assesses the value of damages suffered by injured parties.

    
    

27. According to Mr. Barrett, a personal injury attorney must be skilled at estimating the value of a client’s claim. Otherwise, the high cost of bringing a case to trial can result in a personal injury attorney losing money and going bankrupt.

28. Mr. Barrett was accepted in this proceeding as an expert regarding the valuation of damages.

29. Mr. Barrett gave the following testimony regarding Mr. Deyampert’s damages:

    This man not only is a paraplegic, but during all this, and I couldn’t really tell from the records I read whether the bullet caused this or some intubation in the hospital, but he got air into the space between his lung and his diaphragm, which can be a very painful problem, he had to be intubated to get that out. He developed, I believe, sepsis, at some point in his -- in his treatment; and it’s already evidence early on in his situation that he’s going to be, and is very susceptible to pressure ulcers on his skin. His skin is going to be prone to breakdown from prolonged periods of sitting in the same position and that sort of thing.

    
    

    Fortunately, he has enough strength left in his upper body that he’s able to ameliorate that somewhat. He’s able actually, on his own, and after a lot of rehab, to roll over in his bed to different positions even though his lower extremities are not working at all. He’s able to -- he’s able to reposition himself in his chair using the strength of his arms, so that will cut down a little bit on that. But he had already developed a pressure ulcer or two by the time he got into rehab in this case.

    
    

    He – so, he’s got no use at all, it appears, of his lower extremities. He had a number of complications that had to be dealt with. He was in the hospital a long time. His overall prospects after rehabilitation -– and he was still in some rehabilitation as early as about February of this year, so I’m not totally sure he’s through all his rehab yet.

    
    

    He has to take rehabilitation courses to learn -– relearn how to do things. He’ll need his home made wheelchair accessible, cabinets, and thing[s] like that, all the things that a person normally does without thinking about, are going to be challenges for him just in daily household stuff. He will have to have modifications, most likely, of his kitchen, his bathroom, that sort of thing. And so, yeah, there’s quite a bit to work within this case to come up with an evaluation.

    
    

30. Mr. Barrett opined that $6 million was a “very conservative” estimate of the damages suffered by Mr. Deyampert.

31. Mr. Barrett also opined that allocating five percent of the $76,000 claim (i.e., $3,847.23) to past medical expenses was a reasonable and rational allocation to past medical expenses and reflected the ratio of the amount recovered to the actual value of Mr. Deyampert’s damages.

    Findings Regarding the Testimony Presented at the Final Hearing

    
    

32. The undersigned finds that the testimony from

    
    

    Mr. Springfield and Mr. Barrett was compelling and persuasive. While attaching a value to the damages that a plaintiff could reasonably expect to receive from a jury is not an exact

    
    

    science, Mr. Springfield’s and Mr. Barrett’s decades of experience with litigating personal injury lawsuits make them very compelling witnesses regarding the valuation of damages suffered by injured parties such as Mr. Deyampert.5/

33. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Mr. Deyampert proved by a preponderance of the evidence that $3,847.23 constitutes a fair and reasonable recovery for past medical expenses actually paid by Medicaid.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

34. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in this case pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1) and 409.910(17), Florida Statutes.

35. AHCA is the agency authorized to administer Florida’s Medicaid program. § 409.902, Fla. Stat.

36. The Medicaid program “provide[s] federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).

37. “The Medicaid program is a cooperative one. The Federal Government pays between 50 percent and 83 percent of the costs a state incurs for patient care. In return, the State pays its portion of the costs and complies with certain statutory requirements for making eligibility determinations,

    
    

    collecting and maintaining information, and administering the program.” Estate of Hernandez v. Ag. for Health Care Admin.,

    190 So. 3d 139, 141-42 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2016)(internal citations omitted).

38. Though participation is optional, once a State elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must comply with federal requirements. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301.

39. One condition for receipt of federal Medicaid funds requires states to seek reimbursement for medical expenses incurred on behalf of Medicaid recipients, who later recover from legally liable third parties. See Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 276 (2006); see also

    Estate of Hernandez, 190 So. 3d at 142 (noting that one such requirement is that “each participating state implement a third party liability provision which requires the state to seek reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures from third parties who are liable for medical treatment provided to a Medicaid recipient”).

40. Consistent with this federal requirement, the Florida Legislature enacted section 409.910, designated as the “Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act,” which authorizes and requires the state to be reimbursed for Medicaid funds paid for a recipient's medical care when that recipient later receives a personal injury judgment, award, or settlement from a third party. Smith

    
    

    v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., 24 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 5th DCA

    
    

    2009); see also Davis v. Roberts, 130 So. 3d 264, 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)(stating that in order “[t]o comply with federal directives the Florida legislature enacted section 409.910, Florida Statutes, which authorizes the State to recover from a personal injury settlement money that the State paid for the plaintiff’s medical care prior to recovery.”).

41. Section 409.910(1) sets forth the Florida Legislature’s clear intent that Medicaid be repaid in full for medical care furnished to Medicaid recipients by providing that:

    It is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be the payor of last resort for medically necessary goods and services furnished to Medicaid recipients. All other sources of payment for medical care are primary to medical assistance provided by Medicaid. If benefits of a liable third party are discovered or become available after medical assistance has been provided by Medicaid, it is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be repaid in full and prior to any other person, program, or entity. Medicaid is to be repaid in full from, and to the extent of, any third-party benefits, regardless of whether a recipient is made whole or other creditors paid.

    Principles of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, and subrogation are abrogated to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources. It is intended that if the resources of a liable third party become available at any time, the public treasury should not bear the burden of medical assistance to the extent of such resources.

    
    

42. In addition, the Florida Legislature has authorized AHCA to recover the monies paid from any third party, the recipient, the provider of the recipient’s medical services, and any person who received the third-party benefits:

    The agency shall recover the full amount of all medical assistance provided by Medicaid on behalf of the recipient to the full extent of third-party benefits.

    
    

    1. Recovery of such benefits shall be collected directly from:

       
       

       1. Any third party;

          
          

       2. The recipient or legal representative, if he or she has received third-party benefits;

          
          

       3. The provider of a recipient’s medical services if third-party benefits have been recovered by the provider; notwithstanding any provision of this section, to the contrary, however, no provider shall be required to refund or pay to the agency any amount in excess of the actual third-party benefits received by the provider from a third- party payor for medical services provided to the recipient; or

          
          

       4. Any person who has received the third- party benefits.

       
       

       § 409.910(7), Fla. Stat.

       
       

43. AHCA’s efforts to recover the full amount paid for medical assistance is facilitated by section 409.910(6)(a), which provides that AHCA:

    [I]s automatically subrogated to any rights that an applicant, recipient, or legal

    
    

    representative has to any third-party benefit for the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid. Recovery pursuant to the subrogation rights created hereby shall not be reduced, prorated, or applied to only a portion of a judgment, award, or settlement, but is to provide full recovery by the agency from any and all third-party benefits. Equities of a recipient, his or her legal representative, a recipient’s creditors, or health care providers shall not defeat, reduce, or prorate recovery by the agency as to its subrogation rights granted under this paragraph.

    
    

    See also § 409.910(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (providing that AHCA “is a bona fide assignee for value in the assigned right, title, or interest, and takes vested legal and equitable title free and clear of latent equities in a third person. Equities of a recipient, the recipient’s legal representative, his or her creditors, or health care providers shall not defeat or reduce recovery by the agency as to the assignment granted under this paragraph”).

44. AHCA’s efforts are also facilitated by the fact that AHCA has “an automatic lien for the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid to or on behalf of the recipient for medical care furnished as a result of any covered injury or illness by which a third party is or may be liable, upon the collateral, as defined in s. 409.901.” § 409.910(6)(c), Fla. Stat.

    
    

45. This Medicaid lien is iron-clad. For example, section 409.901(13) provides that no settlement impairs the lien:

    No action of the recipient shall prejudice the rights of the agency under this section. No settlement, agreement, consent decree, trust agreement, annuity contract, pledge, security arrangement, or any other device, hereafter collectively referred to in this subsection as a “settlement agreement,” entered into or consented to by the recipient or his or her legal representative shall impair the agency’s rights. However, in a structured settlement, no settlement agreement by the parties shall be effective or binding against the agency for benefits accrued without the express written consent of the agency or an appropriate order of a court having personal jurisdiction over the agency.

    
    

46. The amount to be recovered by AHCA from a judgment, award, or settlement from a third party is determined by the formula in section 409.910(11)(f). Ag. for Health Care Admin.

    v. Riley, 119 So. 3d 514, 515 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

    
    

47. Section 409.910(11)(f) provides:

    
    

    Notwithstanding any provision in this section to the contrary, in the event of an action in tort against a third party in which the recipient or his or her legal representative is a party which results in a judgment, award, or settlement from a third party, the amount recovered shall be distributed as follows:

    
    

    1. After attorney’s fees and taxable costs as defined by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, one-half of the remaining recovery shall be paid to the agency up to the total amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid.

       
       

    2. The remaining amount of the recovery shall be paid to the recipient.

       
       

    3. For purposes of calculating the agency’s recovery of medical assistance benefits paid, the fee for services of an attorney retained by the recipient or his or her legal representative shall be calculated at 25 percent of the judgment, award, or settlement.

       
       

    4. Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, the agency shall be entitled to all medical coverage benefits up to the total amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid. For purposes of this paragraph, “medical coverage” means any benefits under health insurance, a health maintenance organization, a preferred provider arrangement, or a prepaid health clinic, and the portion of benefits designated for medical payments under coverage for workers’ compensation, personal injury protection, and casualty.

    
    

48. In the instant case, applying the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to the $305,000 settlement results in AHCA being owed $76,944.67 in order to satisfy the lien.

49. As noted above, section 409.910(6)(a) and (b)2., prohibits the Medicaid lien from being reduced because of equitable considerations. However, when AHCA has not participated in or approved a settlement, the administrative procedure created by section 409.910(17)(b) serves as a means for determining whether a lesser portion of a total recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for medical expenses in

    
    

    lieu of the amount calculated by application of the formula in section 409.910(11)(f).

50. Section 409.910(17)(b) provides, in pertinent part,

    
    

    that:

    
    

    A recipient may contest the amount designated as recovered medical expense damages payable to the agency pursuant to the formula specified in paragraph (11)(f) by filing a petition under chapter

    120 within 21 days after the date of payment of funds to the agency or after the date of placing the full amount of the third-party benefits in the trust account for the benefit of the agency pursuant to paragraph

    (a) . . . . In order to successfully challenge the amount payable to the agency, the recipient must prove, by clear and convincing evidence,[6/] that a lesser portion of the total recovery should be allocated as reimbursement for past and future medical expenses than the amount calculated by the agency pursuant to the formula set forth in paragraph (11)(f) or that Medicaid provided a lesser amount of medical assistance than that asserted by the agency.

    
    

51. Section 409.910(17)(b) thus makes clear that the formula set forth in subsection (11) constitutes a default allocation of the amount of a settlement that is attributable to medical costs and sets forth an administrative procedure for adversarial testing of that allocation. See Harrell v. State,

    143 So. 3d 478, 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)(stating that petitioner “should be afforded an opportunity to seek the reduction of a Medicaid lien amount established by the statutory default

    
    

    allocation by demonstrating, with evidence, that the lien amount exceeds the amount recovered for medical expenses”).

52. Through the testimony provided by Mr. Springfield and Mr. Barrett, Mr. Deyampert proved by a preponderance of the evidence that $3,847.23 of the total third-party recovery represents that share of the settlement proceeds fairly and proportionally attributable to expenditures that were actually paid by AHCA for Mr. Deyampert’s past medical expenses.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the Agency for Health Care Administration is entitled to $3,847.23 in satisfaction of its Medicaid lien.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2018.

ENDNOTES

1/ Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references will be to the 2015 version of the Florida Statutes. That version of the Florida Statutes was in effect when Mr. Deyampert’s injury occurred.

2/ Mr. Deyampert was 30 years old at the time of the shooting and was a licensed massage therapist. Prior to the shooting, Mr. Deyampert engaged in activities such as canoeing, snorkeling, surfing, and baseball. In addition, he had recently spent two months hiking in Australia.

3/ The $305,000 settlement consisted of the $300,000 policy limit of the homeowner’s policy and $5,000 from a medical payments provision. At the conclusion of the final hearing, Petitioner and AHCA entered a stipulation concerning the

$5,000 received by Mr. Deyampert. Petitioner stipulated on the record that the $5,000 in medical payments were rightfully owed to AHCA under section 409.910(11)(f)4. Petitioner further stipulated that if this $5,000 amount had not already been paid to AHCA, then it would be tendered to AHCA in addition to the

$3,847.23 amount Mr. Deyampert considers compensation for past medical expenses. Furthermore, Petitioner explained that regardless of whether $305,000 or $300,000 is used as the settlement amount to calculate the ratio the settlement bears to the total damage claim, the ratio would remain five percent ($305,000 is 5.08 percent of $6,000,000 and $300,000 is

5.0 percent of $6,000,000). As a result, the payment of $5,000 does not impact the math in this proceeding.

For ease of reference, this Final Order will assume that the $5,000 from the policy’s medical payments provision will be paid to AHCA in addition to the amount determined herein as the settlement amount compensating AHCA for past medical expenses.

4/ Section 409.901(28) defines “third-party benefit,” in pertinent part, as “any benefit that is or may be available at any time through contract, court award, judgment, settlement, agreement, or any arrangement between a third party and any person or entity, including, without limitation, a Medicaid recipient, a provider, another third party, an insurer, or the agency, for any Medicaid-covered injury, illness, goods, or services, including costs of medical services related thereto, for personal injury or for death of the recipient ”

5/ Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 contained six reports about cases in which the plaintiffs’ circumstances were supposedly similar to Mr. Deyampert’s. Regardless of whether the reported cases in Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 are analogous to or distinguishable from the instant case, the undersigned finds that the testimony from Mr. Springfield and Mr. Barrett provided a sufficient basis for the findings herein.

6/ As discussed in Museguez, the clear and convincing burden of proof can no longer be applied in proceedings such as these. However, section 120.57(1)(j) contains a default provision regarding the burden of proof and provides that “findings of fact shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence,

except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence,” or evidence that “more likely than not tends to prove a certain proposition.” S. Fla. Water Mgmt. v. RLI Live Oak, LLC, 139 So. 3d 869, 871 (Fla. 2014).

COPIES FURNISHED:

Floyd B. Faglie, Esquire Staunton and Faglie, P.L.

189 East Walnut Street Monticello, Florida 32344 (eServed)

Kim Annette Kellum, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration Mail Stop 3

2727 Mahan Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)

Alexander R. Boler, Esquire Suite 300

2073 Summit Lake Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32317 (eServed)

Justin Senior, Secretary

Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1

Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)

Stefan Grow, General Counsel

Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)

Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire

Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3

Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of administrative appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings within

30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by any filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides or as otherwise provided by law.

Docket for Case No: 17-004560MTR

Orders for Case No: 17-004560MTR