vs.
Case No. 17-6001EXE
Respondent.
On January 5, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Hetal Desai of the Division of Administrative Hearings conducted a duly noticed final hearing with sites in Tallahassee and Tampa, Florida, by video teleconference.
For Respondent: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire
Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 315C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities’ intended decision to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification for a license is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
By letter dated September 29, 2017, Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD” or “Agency”), notified Petitioner her request for exemption from disqualification was denied. Petitioner timely filed a request for a hearing on October 27, 2017.
On November 1, 2017, APD referred the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) for assignment to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and the matter was noticed for final hearing.
The final hearing was held as scheduled on January 5, 2018.
At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of Michael Sherode, Diane Hoss, and Albert Green. The Agency offered the testimony of Tom Rice.
Petitioner offered no exhibits, and the Agency offered two: Exhibit 1 (the denial letter) and Exhibit 2 (the official APD application file for exemption). Both exhibits were admitted without objection.
The Transcript was filed with DOAH on February 6, 2018. On February 16, 2018, the Agency timely filed its Proposed Recommended Order (“PRO”) which has been considered. Despite being granted an extension, Petitioner did not file a PRO.
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code are to the 2017 versions.
Petitioner is a 40-year-old female seeking licensure from APD to serve as a direct service provider for vulnerable individuals--adults or children with developmental disabilities.1/
APD is the state agency responsible for serving and protecting vulnerable individuals. APD determines whether to approve licensure applications submitted by those who wish to work with vulnerable individuals and has administrative jurisdiction to enforce the laws governing such licensees.
As part of the licensing application process for a direct service provider, Petitioner was required to pass a pre- employment background screening.
The screening revealed Petitioner had a criminal record:
(1) a 1993 non-adjudicated battery charge (age 15); (2) a 1999 petit theft charge with adjudication withheld (age 21);
a 2007 guilty plea to uttering a forged instrument in violation of section 831.09, Florida Statutes (age 30); and
failure to appear in 2009 for a traffic citation (age 32).
Of these incidents, only the 2007 offense disqualifies Petitioner from a license to be a direct service provider. See
§ 393.0655(5)(l), Fla. Stat.
Petitioner sought an exemption from disqualification as provided for by statute. § 363.0655(2), Fla. Stat. To do so, she filed an application for exemption with the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”). DCF performed the initial screening, ensured Petitioner submitted all necessary documents, and finalized the background investigation. DCF then issued an “Exemption Review Summary,” along with supporting documentation as part of an investigative file to APD.
Among the items submitted by Petitioner to DCF in support of her exemption application were court documents related to her criminal charges, notarized letters of recommendation, and educational documentation.
APD relies on an Exemption Review Committee (“Committee”) to evaluate all the documentation compiled by both DCF and APD, including police reports, court documents, information from the applicant, DCF investigations, and any other information that may be accessible. The Committee makes a recommendation to the Agency’s director, who makes the final decision to grant or deny the exemption.
In this case, the Committee recommended denial of Petitioner’s request for exemption.
Tom Rice is employed by APD and serves on the Committee. Mr. Rice primarily considered two factors in recommending Petitioner was not rehabilitated and should not be offered an exemption: (1) she failed to accept responsibility for the 2007 offense; and (2) she failed to submit to a request by DCF to take voluntary drug tests.
Ultimately, in September 2017 the Agency’s director denied Ms. Ledbetter’s exemption request because Petitioner had not submitted clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation.
Disqualifying Event
Regarding the first factor of failing to take responsibility, Mr. Rice testified the Agency was concerned about Petitioner’s role in the 2007 offense, and a discrepancy between Petitioner’s current explanation of the offense and the 2007 police report.
Regarding Petitioner’s role, the evidence established Petitioner borrowed $500 from a man (“the check writer”) in Jacksonville she believed was a music producer. He wrote checks to her and another man, and the three traveled to Tampa. On the way, Petitioner tried to cash the check at a grocery store. The store manager recognized the other man as having previously committed fraud. The store manager notified law enforcement,
which arrived and took Petitioner and the other man into custody; the check writer fled the scene.
Once in custody, law enforcement asked Petitioner a number of questions, showing her the check. At that point Petitioner realized that it was not a legitimate check and informed the law enforcement officer.
Whereas the check writer fled the scene and the other man attempted to flee, Petitioner cooperated with law enforcement, provided a description of the vehicle driven by the suspect who fled, and gave a written statement.
The Agency relied on a police report notation in the officer’s narrative that Petitioner advised the arresting officer “the checks were counterfeit” as proof of Petitioner’s active role in the crime. Mr. Rice felt this was inconsistent with Petitioner’s written explanation in her exemption application that she “found out after I was arrested at Publix in Jacksonville that it was not a legitimate check.”
Based on the evidence at the hearing, these two statements are not wholly inconsistent. There is no indication in the police report when Petitioner realized the check was fraudulent, only that she admitted it was counterfeit after she was taken into custody and questioned.
Regardless, the police report relied upon by the Agency is hearsay. Even if the police report were admissible under a
hearsay exception, it is unreliable. Although the police report references a written statement by Petitioner about the incident and the counterfeit checks, neither Petitioner’s statement nor a copy of the checks are attached to the police report.
In the end, Petitioner’s testimony established that she showed remorse for her actions leading up to the 2007 arrest and that she takes responsibility for it and the other offenses:
“I did go ahead and take responsibility for . . . the 2007 case” and “I do take any and full responsibility for anything that transpired in my life.”
Subsequent Non-Disqualifying Events
Mr. Rice testified the Committee was also concerned about Petitioner’s petit theft charge, which it believed occurred after the disqualifying event.
Q.: [Was there] anything I didn’t ask you about that was concerning to . . . you--you being the committee--in deciding to deny or grant this application.
A.: []I’m not sure if that would part of what you mentioned, which is the petty theft charge that occurred after the disqualifying criminal offense.
Q.: Okay. And why was that concerning.
A.: Again, because it just speaks to what we perceived as a lack of rehabilitation. And, again, considering that our providers would have access to individuals that are living in areas of possession their funds, you know, their money, their assets, etc., that would be of concern to us.
Petitioner’s petit theft charge occurred in 1999, prior to the 2007 disqualifying offense.
As for non-disqualifying events subsequent to 2007, there is only evidence of one for “failure to appear.” The DCF summary simply lists “No action” next to this 2009 charge without indication of the resolution. Petitioner, however, testified she did fail to appear for a hearing on an unpaid traffic citation, but that this charge was resolved after she later appeared and showed her driver’s license to the court.
The evidence at the hearing established Petitioner received criminal traffic citations in 2009 and 2010 for failure to register her motor vehicle and/or display proof of registration or insurance. Petitioner did not take care of these citations and the matter escalated.
Petitioner admitted having financial difficulties, but eventually was able to correct and pay all fines related to these traffic violations. Most of these citations were dismissed or adjudication was withheld. Petitioner has not had such a violation since 2010.
Petitioner also received non-criminal civil citations on June 15, 2012, and September 18, 2014, for failure to properly vaccinate, register, and/or secure an animal. The evidence established Petitioner took responsibility, corrected the
violations, and paid the civil fines. Petitioner has not had a civil infraction in the past three years.
Other Factors Considered by APD
APD reviewed five DCF “Confidential Investigative Summaries” as part of Petitioner’s investigative packet. In recommending denial of the exemption, the Committee considered the “multiple DCF investigations” and placed emphasis on Petitioner’s refusal to perform a drug screen requested as part of a DCF investigation on two separate instances. (See Respondent’s PRO, p. 4 at paras. 9 and 10).
At the hearing, APD put on no witnesses to substantiate or explain the DCF investigations or how they became part of the Petitioner’s APD exemption file. The only credible evidence regarding these investigations was Petitioner’s unrefuted testimony.
Mr. Rice testified about the concerns the Committee had based on these DCF investigations:
A.: So we look at [ ] basically everything we had related to any Department of Children and Families investigations and any arrests or any other type of involvement.
Q.: Okay and what did you find with respect to that?
A.: We found that there were multiple DCF investigations . . . which [] contained some information with them that gave us some concern. And then there were also, as I said, numerous offenses.
* * *
Q.: Can you summarize what caused concern with the DCF investigations?
A.: This was, obviously, the concerns of the allegations for the drug abuse, smoking crack in front of the children when multiple children were present. [Petitioner] allegedly selling food stamps to purchase drugs and the children being neglected, not having enough food as a result.
Q.: Was it concerning that she refused the drug screen offered by the DFC?
A.: That was especially concerning. Because, honestly, if there are [false] allegations being made against somebody, if those are indeed false allegations, if someone has not been using any kind of illegal substances, we are not sure why
anyone would refuse a random drug screen. So that causes some suspicion and concern from the committee.
One of ADP’s assertions at the final hearing was that Petitioner had lost custody of her children. There is absolutely no evidence supporting this position. To the contrary, the court documents submitted by APD establish the opposite.
The probable cause statement for dependency filed in 2004 indicates that although the state sought to take the children away from the father, Petitioner was to retain custody of the children.
The Department offered the mother a referral to the [Shelter], and the referral was reluctantly accepted. The mother is fearful of the father, and afraid of repercussions from having filed the police report. She voluntarily admitted herself and both of her
children into [the Shelter], and has agreed to stay there until such time as the Courts deem it safe for her and the children to return to the family home . . . Department requests that the children be sheltered from the father and a non-shelter petition be filed as the mother. Children to remain in the custody of the mother at [the Shelter]. (emphasis added).
The Petition seeking emergency shelter placement for the children identified “mother” (Petitioner) as the adult relative able “to provide supervision and care” of the children.
The final court document closing out the emergency shelter placement indicates, “the children have been placed in the custody of the mother since they were sheltered in February of 2004 and it should be noted that these children have never been removed from their mother’s custody.” (emphasis added).
The evidence establishes Petitioner was the victim of domestic violence by her husband, which resulted in investigations by local law enforcement and DCF. Ultimately, she left the home and moved with her children into a shelter. Petitioner never lost custody or supervision of her children.
APD also considered four other DCF investigations which occurred after the 2007 disqualifying event, all which were closed without action taken against Petitioner.
The Committee relied solely on the hearsay allegations in DCF investigative reports. These summaries are filled with multiple layers of hearsay and are unreliable. Nonetheless,
Petitioner’s testimony corroborated the ultimate findings in those DCF reports that she was not neglectful or abusive.
The first DCF investigation (initiated February 2010) was triggered by a call to law enforcement by Petitioner regarding a possible assault against her eight-year-old daughter. Petitioner had left her children at their friend’s home, with the friend’s parents present. When Petitioner picked up the children, her daughter reported that the friend had “poked” her inappropriately. Petitioner immediately contacted law enforcement, and both a police and DCF investigation was initiated.
According to Mr. Rice’s testimony, the Committee was concerned by the allegations in the DCF report that Petitioner was not properly supervising her children. The DCF investigator, however, concluded Petitioner was not neglectful, and her children were happy, healthy, clean, and free of any signs of neglect or abuse.
The second investigation (initiated in May 2010) and third investigation (initiated June 2011) were triggered by anonymous complaints that Petitioner was using drugs and selling food stamps to fund a drug habit, and that her boyfriend was abusive to the children.2/
During two DCF home visits related to the 2010 and 2011 investigations, DCF asked Petitioner if she was willing to take a voluntary drug test; Petitioner admits she refused both times.
In 2010, Petitioner was pregnant when DCF offered her a drug screening. Although she refused to be tested, Petitioner offered the DCF investigator access to her medical records.
In 2011, Petitioner refused because there was also a police investigation, she knew the allegations were false, and she did not feel the drug screen was necessary. This DCF investigation was closed, in part, because the investigator had “no concerns for the children,” the police investigation into the drug use was closed as unfounded, and “the children were observed to be healthy and happy in their home environment and [there were] no disclosures of physical abuse, or substance misuse.”
DCF investigators noted in both the 2010 and 2011 investigative reports that there was no evidence of drug use and closed these two investigations without taking any further action.
The final investigation (initiated November 2013) stemmed from a complaint that Petitioner’s home was environmentally unsafe for the children. The allegation was that the home was cluttered and without running water. Petitioner admitted that on DCF’s initial visit the home did not have running water because she could not pay her water bill.
Petitioner explained she had inherited the home from her mother and the bill was unexpectedly high due to a leak.
The DCF investigator noted the children had access to bottled water in the home to drink and to flush the toilet; and confirmed they showered at a neighbor’s home. DCF closed the investigation with no substantiated findings for environmental hazards.
Contrary to the Committee’s concerns, there is no evidence that Petitioner was using drugs, was arrested for or convicted of drug charges, sold food stamps to purchase drugs, or neglected her children.
Rehabilitation
Petitioner has been employed as a home health aide or residential aide, providing companion care since 2014.
During this time, starting in 2015, Petitioner attended classes at Florida Career College. She graduated in 2017 with a certificate to be a Patient Care Technician. While in school, Petitioner was on the honor roll and completed an externship.
She received positive recommendations from Florida Career College staff.
Diane Hoss, a retired high school teacher and administrator, testified that she has known Petitioner since Petitioner was born. Ms. Hoss described Petitioner’s careful care of Petitioner’s ill mother and grandfather. Based on these
observations, Ms. Hoss stated Petitioner is “perfectly capable of working and taking care of other people and legally responsible.” Although she was aware of the 2007 arrest, Ms. Hoss believed Petitioner worked hard to better her situation and educate herself.
Albert Green, a military veteran, testified that Petitioner helped take care of his adult sister who suffers from a disability. Based on his personal observation, he believed Petitioner was a competent caretaker and a diligent worker.
Mr. Green based his opinion on his personal observations of Petitioner in his parents’ home. He noted that in the ten years Petitioner assisted them with his sister, Petitioner never stole anything from the home; and she had no conflicts with his disabled sister, his other siblings, or his parents who also lived in the home. Mr. Green noted that, unlike other caretakers, Petitioner took interest in making sure that his sister was active, engaged, and not neglected.
All of Petitioner’s witnesses characterized Petitioner as a protective and considerate caretaker who had taken great strides to better her situation and the situation of her children.
Petitioner has improved her situation in many ways since the 2007 disqualifying event. She has extricated herself
from some unfortunate personal relationships, maintained employment, and pursued educational opportunities.
The credible hearing testimony summarized above overwhelmingly established Petitioner is not and would not be a danger to APD clients, if she is allowed to be employed as a direct service provider.
The few concerns the Committee had, as expressed by Mr. Rice for recommending denial of Petitioner’s exemption request, were acquired without the benefit of the hearing testimony and based largely on unproven allegations. These allegations were effectively refuted by a closer reading of APD exemption application file and the credible testimony at hearing. Ultimate Findings of Fact
Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated from the single disqualifying offense she committed in 2007.
The undersigned finds that Petitioner presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by the Agency.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 435.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes.
To be employed as a direct service provider for persons with developmental disabilities, Petitioner must comply with certain background screening requirements, including
level 2 background screenings. See §§ 393.0655 and 435.04, Fla. Stat.
Violation of section 831.02, Florida Statutes, relating to uttering forged instruments, is an offense which disqualifies an individual from obtaining a direct service provider license. § 393.0655(5)(l), Fla. Stat.
The Agency is authorized to grant exemptions from disqualification as explained in section 393.0655:
(2) EXEMPTIONS FROM DISQUALIFICATION.—The agency may grant exemptions from disqualification from working with children or adults with developmental disabilities only as provided in s. 435.07.
Pursuant to section 435.07, Petitioner is eligible to seek an exemption from disqualification because “at least
3 years have elapsed since the applicant has completed or been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or sanction for the disqualifying felony.” § 435.07(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat.
As the applicant for an exemption, Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this proceeding. More precisely, she “must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the employee should not be disqualified from employment.”
§ 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
Petitioner can meet her burden by providing evidence of the following:
the circumstances surrounding the 2007 charge;
the time period that has elapsed since the incident;
the nature of the harm caused to the victim;
her history since the 2007 incident; and
any other evidence indicating that she would not present a danger if allowed employment.
See § 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
An ALJ is charged with making the factual determination of whether, based on the evidence adduced in a de novo hearing conducted pursuant to section 120.57(1), the applicant for exemption has shown rehabilitation. See
§ 435.07(3)(a), Fla. Stat.
Clear and convincing evidence is a heightened standard that requires more proof than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence “must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts at issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.” In re Davey, 645 So.
2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994); Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797,
800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
If, as in this case, the ALJ finds that Petitioner has met her burden of proving rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence, the ALJ must also determine whether the Agency head’s intended action to deny an applicant’s request for exemption constitutes an abuse of discretion. See J.D. v. Dep’t of Child.
and Fams. Servs., 114 So. 3d 1127, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)(“[E]ven if rehabilitation is shown, the applicant is only eligible for an exemption, not entitled to one.”); A.P. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. Servs., 230 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
(noting an agency’s decision to grant or deny an exemption is subject to the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review).
An agency abuses this discretion when the action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. An abuse of discretion can be found in two circumstances: (1) where the evidence in the record does not support the agency’s determination; or
(2) where the agency’s determination rests on an incorrect conclusion of law. See Jordan v. Brown, 855 So. 2d 231, 234
(Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Corbett v. Wilson, 48 So. 3d 131, 133 (Fla.
5th DCA 2010).
The undersigned finds the Agency abused its discretion in the following ways. First, the evidence does not support the Agency’s finding that Petitioner failed to take responsibility for the 2007 disqualifying event. The narrative by the officer who filled out the police report is an out-of-court statement used by the Agency to prove the truth of the matters asserted in it. The police report does not supplement or explain other admissible evidence, and as such, the police report cannot be used to establish or support any findings of fact in this case. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat.; e.g., Carter v. State, 951 So. 2d
939, 943-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)(holding a police report was “classic hearsay” and “[did] not fit within the business or public records exception to the hearsay rule”); Rivera v. Bd. of
Trs. of Tampa’s Gen. Emp’t Ret. Fund, 189 So. 3d 207, 212-13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). The Committee’s reliance on the police report was an abuse of discretion.
Second, the Committee wrongly believed the petit theft charge occurred subsequent to the 2007 disqualifying offense. In fact, it occurred well before, in 1999. Section 435.07(2)(b) limits APD’s consideration of an exemption applicant’s criminal history to arrests and convictions subsequent to the disqualifying offense. As such, it was an abuse of discretion for the Committee to consider the petit theft charge.
Third, the Agency’s reliance on the allegations in the DCF summaries to deny the exemption was also an abuse of discretion. It was evident from Mr. Rice’s testimony that the Committee considered only the unsubstantiated allegations in those summaries; it did not consider the final conclusions. Moreover, the investigators who drafted the DCF summaries relied upon by APD did not testify at the hearing. For the most part, the information in these summaries had to be gathered from other sources. Thus, the information in the summaries constitutes double or triple hearsay that would not be admissible over objection in civil actions. See §§ 90.805 and 120.57(1)(c), Fla.
Stat.; Holborough v. State, 103 So. 3d 221, 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); J.B.J. v. State, 17 So. 3d 312, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009);
Harris v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 495 So. 2d 806, 808-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Finally, to the extent the Agency made its decision to deny Petitioner’s exemption based on her refusal to take a drug test, such reliance was based on an improper application of the law. The Committee improperly presumed Petitioner was guilty of drug use because she refused to submit to a drug test.
To be clear, illegal drug use can be a factor considered by the Agency in denying an exemption. However, there is nothing in section 393.0655 or chapter 393, requiring direct service providers to submit to a drug test prior to being granted
a license.3/ Nor was Petitioner asked to submit to a drug test as part of a criminal investigation or a work-related incident.
Rather, she was offered a voluntary drug test, which she refused. This was her right. See Lebron v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013)(striking down
Florida’s drug testing of applicants for financial assistance and programs); and Hudson v. City of Riviera Beach, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1340-42 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
Although not involving licensing, the case of Hudson is instructive. There, the court explained in the employment context the government is restricted in conducting drug testing of its employees.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the government. It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment’s protection “extends beyond the sphere of criminal investigations,” “without regard to whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing another function.” City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627, 177 L.
Ed. 2d 216 (2010). Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies “even when the government acts as an employer.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.
Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989).
Id. at 1340.
It follows that if DCF did not (and perhaps could not) take action based on Petitioner’s refusal to take a drug test in 2010, APD cannot use that refusal as a basis to deny her a license in 2017. See Lebron, 710 F.3d at 1217 (“the state cannot
accomplish indirectly that which it has been constitutionally prohibited from doing directly”).
Here, given the circumstances of this case--where there was no competent evidence that Petitioner had engaged in illegal drug use--APD’s reliance on Petitioner’s refusal to take the drug tests for finding she was not rehabilitated or that she may pose a threat to vulnerable individuals was an abuse of discretion.
In a case such as this where the facts are in dispute, “the administrative law judge . . . has the opportunity to hear the witnesses’ testimony and evaluate their credibility.” Yerks
v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 219 So. 3d 844, 848 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017); see Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 146 So. 3d 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)(J. Wetherell
concurring)(“[I]t is solely the function of the ALJ to assess the persuasiveness of the evidence as a whole.”).
The Agency did not have the benefit of Petitioner’s unrefuted testimony establishing clearly and convincingly the laudable steps she has taken to become rehabilitated, despite personal and economic setbacks. This, coupled with the testimony of two very credible witnesses (one a school administrator and the other a veteran), establish Petitioner has been rehabilitated and will not pose a danger to vulnerable persons entrusted to her care.
For these reasons, Petitioner has met her burden to demonstrate her rehabilitation from her 2007 disqualifying offense, and that, under the circumstances specific to this case, if the Agency were to deny her exemption request, its action would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order granting Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification from employment.
DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2018.
1/ Vulnerable individuals served by APD include adults and children with developmental and intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, and Down’s syndrome.
2/ Petitioner testified the allegations were false and she believed these complaints were made by her ex-husband’s sister.
3/ Had Petitioner been arrested or guilty of a drug offense under chapter 893, Florida Statutes, it would have been a disqualifying offense. See § 435.07(2)(ss), Fla. Stat. (designating drug offenses as disqualifying offenses).
Kimberly Michelle Ledbetter 3401 East Knollwood Street Tampa, Florida 33610 (eServed)
Trevor S. Suter, Esquire
Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 335E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380
Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 335E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
