Filed: Mar. 13, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13/2020 Page: 1 of 10 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-11896 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20374-KMW-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE JESUS ARGIZ, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (March 13, 2020) Before WILSON, MARTIN, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13
Summary: Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13/2020 Page: 1 of 10 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-11896 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20374-KMW-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE JESUS ARGIZ, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (March 13, 2020) Before WILSON, MARTIN, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13/..
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Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13/2020 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11896
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20374-KMW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE JESUS ARGIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 13, 2020)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 19-11896 Date Filed: 03/13/2020 Page: 2 of 10
Jose Argiz was convicted of five counts of money laundering in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that it could
find that Argiz possessed the requisite mental state for the offenses—namely,
“knowledge”—if Argiz deliberately avoided learning of the illegal nature of the
scheme in which he was involved. On appeal, Argiz argues that the Court erred in
issuing this deliberate ignorance instruction. We reject that argument in Part I. He
also argues that the Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on his theory of
defense, and in denying him the opportunity to present evidence that he possessed
diminished mental capacity at the time he committed the offense. We reject those
arguments in Part II and Part III, respectively. Therefore, we affirm.
I.
We first consider whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury on
deliberate ignorance. We conclude that it did not.
The district court has “‘broad discretion’ in formulating jury instructions
provided that ‘the charge as a whole accurately reflects the law and the facts.’”
United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Turner,
871 F.2d 1574, 1578 (11th Cir. 1989)). We will not reverse a
conviction because of the instructions given to a jury “unless ‘the issues of law
were presented inaccurately, or the charge improperly guided the jury in such a
substantial way as to violate due process.’” United States v. Isnadin,
742 F.3d
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1278, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Prather,
205 F.3d 1265,
1270 (11th Cir. 2000)). If the jury instruction accurately states the applicable law,
“there is no reason for reversal even though isolated clauses may, in fact, be
confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.” United States
v. Gonzalez,
834 F.3d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
Gibson,
708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)).
The knowledge element of a criminal statute “can be proved by
demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.” Prather, 205 F.3d
at 1270. In other words, “if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately
omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is
deemed to have knowledge.” United States v. Hristov,
466 F.3d 949, 952 (11th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Rivera,
944 F.2d 1563, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Therefore, a deliberate ignorance jury instruction is appropriate if the facts
“support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of
the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.”
Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1571 (quoting United States v. Alvarado,
838 F.2d 311, 314
(9th Cir. 1987)). This standard applies whether the evidence is direct or
circumstantial.
Arias, 984 F.2d at 1143. We review de novo a defendant’s claim
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that the district court erred in instructing the jury on deliberate ignorance. United
States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993).
Here, the District Court did not err in instructing the jury on deliberate
ignorance. Argiz agreed to let a stranger deposit money into his bank accounts
without any explanation of why the stranger needed to do so. Then, Argiz would
hand deliver the deposits to different unknown individuals at different locations
pursuant to instructions from this stranger. For his services, Argiz was paid $500
per transaction.
Because of the sketchy and inexplicable circumstances surrounding this
arrangement and the fee that was being paid, it is a permissible inference that Argiz
was suspicious of the scheme but purposefully chose not to investigate it in order
to avoid learning the illegal nature of the funds. People who need to distribute
lawfully obtained money (1) do not enlist the help of random people, like Argiz,
whom they do not know, (2) do not request to use this random person’s bank
account, and (3) do not pay this random person $500 every time he distributes the
money deposited into his bank account to unknown individuals at various
locations. 1 Therefore, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Argiz
suspected that he was involved in unlawful activity, and that he chose not to
1
While $500 per transaction is not an exorbitant amount of money, it would take 40
hours—a full work-week—for a law-abiding citizen, who is earning $12.50 per hour, to earn that
much money. And, of course, the law-abiding citizen would have to pay taxes on that income.
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investigate so that he could keep making his commission. This inference is
bolstered by the fact that Argiz initially lied to investigators regarding the
circumstances under which he met and agreed to help this stranger—if Argiz did
not suspect that he was engaged in illegal activity, it is less likely that he would
have lied to investigators. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
II.
We next consider whether the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on Argiz’s theory of defense. We conclude that it did not.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a theory-of-defense instruction where
there is any foundation for the instruction in the evidence, even if the evidence is
“weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” United States v.
Lively, 803 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Young,
464
F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1972)). However, the refusal to give a theory-of-defense
instruction is not error if the defendant’s general theory was covered by the
instructions actually given by the district court. United States v. Barham,
595 F.2d
231, 245 (5th Cir. 1979).2
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), we adopted as binding
precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
Id. at 1209.
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Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct
the jury on Argiz’s theory of defense because the instruction was substantially—if
not entirely—covered by the Court’s other instructions.
Argiz requested that the Court issue one of the three following theory-of-
defense instructions. The numbers in brackets are inserted for ease of analysis.
First:
It is the theory of the defense that [1] Jose Argiz did not know
that any of the money deposited into his bank account was the proceeds
of unlawful activity. The defense contends that [2] Jose Argiz was also
victim of the bad actors, was not a part of their scheme and did not
intentionally associate with or participate in the crime with them. [3]
The defense contends that Jose Argiz was not aware of and did not
participate in any of the phone calls made to the victims in this case.
[4] The defense also contends that Jose Argiz was misled by the bad
actors just as the victims were. [5] If the government did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose Argiz knew that the money
deposited into his account was from fraud then you must find him not
guilty.
Second:
[Argiz] has raised as a defense that he did not have the knowledge
required to be guilty of money laundering. Specifically, [6] he did not
know that [] the money which was deposited into his Bank of America
accounts . . . were the proceeds of some kind of unlawful activity, or
[7] that the transactions were designed to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the illegal
activity.
[8] It is the government’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Jose Jesus Argiz had the knowledge required to commit money
laundering.
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[9] If after considering all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt
about whether Jose Jesus Argiz had the knowledge required for money
laundering, or if [Argiz] did not know that the money involved in the
transactions represented proceeds from some form of activity that is a
felony under state or Federal law you must find him not guilty of that
offense.
Third:
[10] It is the theory of the defense that Jose Argiz did not know
and had no reason to know that any of the money deposited into his
bank account was the proceeds of unlawful activity. [11] The defense
contends that Jose Argiz was a victim of the bad actors, was not a part
of their scheme and did not intentionally associate with or participate
in the crime with them. [12] The defense also contends that Jose Argiz
was merely foolish and perhaps careless, but not a willful participant in
any crime. [13] If you find that Jose Argiz was merely foolish and did
not have knowledge that the money deposited into his account was the
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity (wire fraud) then you must
find him not guilty.
The “theories” contained in these proposed instructions can be categorized
into three arguments. First, Points 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 all assert that Argiz
did not know that the money he was handling was the proceeds of illegal activity.
Second, Point 7 asserts that Argiz did not have a different aspect of the requisite
knowledge to be convicted of the crime—it claims that he did not know that the
transactions were designed to conceal illegal activity. Third, Points 2, 3, 4, and 11
all assert that Argiz was an unwitting victim of the scheme who did not intend to
participate in any illegal activity.
The District Court did not err by declining to give Argiz’s proposed theory-
of-defense instructions because the Court’s instructions adequately covered the
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substance of the proposed instructions. First, Points 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 are
covered by the Court’s instruction that the jury must find that “the defendant knew
that the money or property involved in the transaction were the proceeds of some
kind of unlawful activity.” Second, Point 7 is covered by the Court’s instruction
that the jury must find that “the defendant knew that the transaction was designed
in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or
control of the proceeds.” Third, all of the Points (1-13) are covered by the Court’s
deliberate ignorance instruction:
In other words, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was a willful participant and not merely a knowing spectator.
If a defendant’s knowledge of a fact is an essential part of a crime it’s
enough that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the fact
existed; unless the defendant actually believed the fact didn’t exist.
Deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge, which is the
equivalent of knowledge, occurs, for example, if a defendant possesses
a package and believes it contains a controlled substance but
deliberately avoids learning that it contains the controlled substance so
he or she can deny knowledge of the package’s contents.
So, in this case, you may find that a defendant knew that the
money or property involved in the financial transactions were the
proceeds of some kind of unlawful activity if you determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, one, actually knew that the money
or property involved in the financial transactions were the proceeds of
some kind of unlawful activity.
Or, two, had every reason to know but deliberately closed his
eyes. But I must emphasize that the requisite proof of knowledge on the
part of the defendant cannot be established by merely demonstrating
that the defendant was negligent, careless or foolish.
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Therefore, we affirm as to this issue.
III.
We finally consider whether the District Court erred in denying Argiz the
opportunity to present evidence regarding his alleged diminished mental capacity.
Because the District Court never actually denied Argiz such an opportunity, it did
not err.
The record does not support Argiz’s contention that the District Court denied
him the opportunity to present evidence regarding diminished capacity. At trial,
defense counsel made the following statement to the Court:
In the instances where the Government is asking for a deliberate
ignorance instruction I would argue that the defense should be
permitted to argue diminished capacity to the jury.
Because in deliberate ignorance the Government is asking --
saying a defendant should have known.
So it is fundamentally unfair to put that standard on someone
who does not have the ability or capacity to perceive information like a
reasonable person would.
So in this particular instance that is what I would argue in the
event the deliberate ignorance instruction is given -- as your Honor has
indicated she would -- I would like to preserve for the record that I
believe a diminished capacity defense should be permitted.
In response, the Court said: “All right. That issue is preserved for the record.”
Then, when Argiz’s opportunity to present evidence about diminished capacity
came in his case-in-chief, Argiz rested his case without presenting such evidence.
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We cannot see how the District Court’s statement could be interpreted as
precluding Argiz from offering evidence about diminished capacity. The Court
simply did not rule that such evidence would be precluded. Therefore, Argiz’s
failure to present evidence regarding diminished capacity was his own error, rather
than the District Court’s error.3
IV.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
3
Admittedly, during sentencing, the Court suggested that such evidence would have been
inadmissible at trial. But Argiz cannot argue that the Court’s statements, which it made after
Argiz was convicted, affected his decision not to present evidence of diminished capacity or
precluded him from offering such evidence before he was convicted because the Court had not
yet made those statements.
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