Filed: Nov. 25, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 18-1126 Reyes v. Ercole UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PA
Summary: 18-1126 Reyes v. Ercole UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PAR..
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18-1126
Reyes v. Ercole
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
25th day of November, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
PETER W. HALL,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
William Reyes,
Petitioner–Appellant,
v. No. 18-1126
Superintendent Robert E. Ercole,
Respondent–Appellee.
_____________________________________
For Appellant: STEPHANIE M. CARVLIN, Law Office of Stephanie M.
Carvlin, New York, NY
For Appellee: LISA ELLEN FLEISCHMANN, Assistant Attorney
General of Counsel (Nikki Kowalski, Deputy
Solicitor General for Criminal Matters, on the brief),
for Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General for the
State of New York, New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Stein, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner–Appellant William Reyes appeals from a judgment of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (Stein, J.), entered March 26, 2018, denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Reyes claimed that the admission of perjury
at his state court trial violated his right to due process. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
“We review a district court’s legal conclusions in denying a habeas petition de novo and
its factual findings for clear error.” Drake v. Portuondo,
553 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Drake
II”). “Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’), a federal
habeas court must apply a deferential standard of review to ‘any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court.’” Drake v. Portuondo,
321 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Drake I”) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
“‘Adjudicated on the merits’ has a well settled meaning: a decision finally resolving the
parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather
than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Sellan v. Kuhlman,
261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001). We
presume that a state court adjudicates a state prisoner’s federal claim on the merits when there is
no “clear and express statement of reliance on a state procedural bar” or other ground. Jimenez v.
Walker,
458 F.3d 130, 145 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Parker v. Ercole,
666 F.3d 830, 834 (2d Cir.
2012) (citing Jimenez for the proposition that “absent a clear and express statement of reliance on
2
a state procedural bar, we presume that a cursory state court decision rests on the merits of the
federal claim” (brackets and quotation marks omitted)).
Regarding Reyes’ perjury claim, the state court held:
The claim that the prosecutor knowingly utilized perjured testimony to obtain his
conviction may be dismissed out of hand. Assuming for the sake of argument that
Ms. Martinez testified falsely, defendant provides no basis to believe that the
prosecutor was aware or had reason to know that she did so.
J. App’x 1573. Reyes argues that the state court did not decide his perjury claim on the merits
because the court did not decide whether the complaining witness committed perjury. We disagree.
There is nothing in the state court decision to suggest that the court rejected Reyes’ perjury claim
on the basis of a procedural bar or alternate ground. See, e.g., Ortega v. Duncan,
333 F.3d 102,
105-06 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding no AEDPA deference where state court rejected a perjury claim on
the alternate ground that the issues surrounding potentially perjured testimony would not lead the
jury to reach a different verdict in a new trial because of a new witness testimony). The state court
rejected Reyes’ perjury claim because Reyes did not prove one of the requisite elements of a due
process claim in this context (that the prosecutor had, or should have had, knowledge that Martinez
testified falsely). Because the state court did not resolve the element of whether perjury occurred,
we do not presume that finding to be correct, but we still consider the perjury claim to have been
resolved on the merits. See Channer v. Brooks,
320 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(“[W]here a state court does not resolve a question of fact, no presumption of correctness can
possibly attach with respect to that issue.”).
Faced with a state court decision on the merits, we apply AEDPA’s deferential standard.
Under this standard, no federal habeas relief is available unless the state court proceedings
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
3
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). “[Clearly established Federal law] refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of
[the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.
Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
Here, the state court rejected Reyes’ perjury claim because, as noted above, the “defendant
provide[d] no basis to believe that the prosecutor was aware or had reason to know” that Martinez
testified falsely. This is the standard the Supreme Court articulated in United States v. Agurs.
427
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“[T]he prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury . . . .”).1 The
District Court determined that these findings were reasonable, and Reyes does not appeal this
issue. Reyes v. Ercole, No. 06-CV-5525 (SHS),
2018 WL 1517204, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2018). Applying AEDPA’s deferential standard, therefore, no federal habeas relief is available to
Reyes.
We have reviewed Reyes’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The
judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
1
In a prior case, we suggested that the “should have known” piece of the Agurs standard is dictum
and, therefore, not clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Drake
I, 321 F.3d at 345; see also
Drake
II, 553 F.3d at 240. We decline to address that issue here as it is not necessary to resolve
this appeal.
4