NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 16 2019
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GERALD SPENCE,                                  No. 19-15898

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:18-cv-01363-LJO-SAB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KELLY SANTORO, et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                   Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 11, 2019**

Before:      WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.

      California state prisoner Gerald Spence appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate

indifference to his safety and serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28



      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A. Watison v. Carter, 

, 1112

(9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes,

, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We

affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Spence’s action because Spence failed

to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 

, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed

liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 

, 833-34 (1994) (setting

forth elements of a failure-to-protect claim); Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 

, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability under

§ 1983.”); Toguchi v. Chung, 

, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth

elements of a medical deliberate indifference claim).

      We reject as meritless Spence’s contention that the district court applied a

“different” pleading standard to his claims.

      Spence’s “Request for Certificate of Appealability” is denied as

unnecessary.

      AFFIRMED.




                                            2                                     19-15898