The Secretary of the Treasury has implemented the foregoing provisions by issuing section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs., which, among other matters, provides that a "qualified appraisal" be obtained prior to the filing of the return in which the deduction is claimed and that an appraisal summary be submitted with that1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*73 return.

Respondent disallowed the amounts of petitioners' charitable deductions for the Jackson Hewitt stock in excess of basis due to the lack of qualified appraisals. ⁷ Respondent does not dispute that petitioners made charitable contributions to the church and foundation within the respective taxable years or that the claimed values did not represent the fair market values of such contributions. ⁸ Petitioners maintain that they should be allowed the claimed deductions because their use of the average per-share price of Jackson Hewitt stock traded in bona fide, arm's-length transactions constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs., and relieved them of any obligation to obtain a qualified appraisal.

It is clear that petitioners did not obtain any qualified appraisal, and no summary of any such appraisal was submitted 1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*74 with the returns. The returns only reflected gifts 109 T.C. 258">*263 of stock without identifying the gifts as Jackson Hewitt stock, without any indication of the number of shares, and setting forth only the cost and claimed values. The question is whether petitioners satisfied the appraisal requirements of the statute and the regulations.

Petitioners rely on Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32">100 T.C. 32 (1993), to sustain their position that a qualified appraisal is not a requirement under the circumstances herein. In that case, respondent challenged a charitable deduction for failure to obtain a qualified appraisal prior to filing the return. The parties stipulated there was no valuation overstatement. We found that the taxpayers had had the subject property, two blimps, appraised by a qualified appraiser within the specified time frame, and that substantially all of the information required by respondent's regulations, section 1.170A- 13(c)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs., was contained in an appraisal summary, signed by a qualified appraiser, ⁹ set forth in the Form 8283 attached to their return. Accordingly, we held that the taxpayers had substantially complied with the requirements of 1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*75 the statute and the regulations even though a separate appraisal had not been obtained and the qualifications of the appraiser were omitted from the appraisal summary attached to the return.

In so holding, we stated:

the essence of section 170 is to allow certain taxpayers a charitable deduction for contributions made to certain organizations. * * * However, the reporting requirements (of section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs., do not relate to the substance or essence of whether or not a charitable contribution was actually made. * * * [Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32">100 T.C. 41.]

We find nothing in 100 T.C. 32">Bond v. Commissioner, supra, which relieves petitioners of the requirement of obtaining a qualified appraisal. Such a requirement is statutorily imposed by section 155(a)(1)(A), and its impact is reflected in the legislative history of that provision. See H. Conf. Rept. 98-861, at 995-996 (1984), 1984-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 249-250, stating:

pursuant to present law (sec. 170(a)(1)), which expressly allows a charitable deduction only if the contribution is verified in the manner specified by Treasury regulations, no deduction is allowed for a contribution of property for which an appraisal is required under the conference agreement unless the appraisal requirements are satisfied.

* * *

For donations of property1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*77 as to which the donor appraisal requirements apply, the donor must obtain and retain a qualified written appraisal by a qualified appraiser for the property contributed and must attach a signed appraisal summary to the return on which the deduction is first claimed (with such other information as prescribed by regulations).

Petitioners herein furnished practically none of the information required by either the statute or the regulations. Given the statutory language and the thrust of the concerns about the need of respondent to be provided with appropriate information in order to alert respondent to potential overvaluations, see infra p. 12, petitioners simply do not fall within the permissible boundaries of 100 T.C. 32">Bond v. Commissioner, supra, where an appraisal summary, which was completed by a qualified appraiser, contained most of the required information and could therefore be treated as a written appraisal, was attached to the return. Cf. D'Arcangelo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-572 (respondent prevailed where no qualified appraisal was obtained).

Petitioners also seek to support their position by claiming that there was a market1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*78 which provided support for their use of the average per-share price of the Jackson Hewitt stock. This position is without merit. Given the amounts of the gifts in this case, the exemption from the qualified appraisal requirements is statutorily limited to "publicly traded securities". See sec. 155(a)(2)(A). The parties have stipulated 109 T.C. 258">*265 that the Jackson Hewitt stock did not qualify as "publicly traded securities". See supra p. 4; see also Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 506 n.21 (J. Comm. Print 1985). In this context, the fact that Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32">100 T.C. 32 (1993), involved blimps which were not as easily valued as the Jackson Hewitt stock is irrelevant.

Petitioners' reliance on cases such as Taylor v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1071">67 T.C. 1071 (1977); Columbia Iron & Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 5">61 T.C. 5 (1973); Sperapani v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 308">42 T.C. 308 (1964); Cary v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 214">41 T.C. 214 (1963), where taxpayers prevailed on the basis of substantial compliance is likewise1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*79 without merit. The key to those cases is that, as in 100 T.C. 32">Bond v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers had provided most of the information required, and the single defect in furnishing everything required was not significant. ¹⁰ Cf. Knight-Ridder Newspapers v. United States, 743 F.2d 781">743 F.2d 781, 743 F.2d 781">793-797 (11th Cir. 1984).

Moreover, it is clear that the principal objective of section 155 was to provide a mechanism whereby respondent would obtain sufficient return information in support of the claimed valuation of charitable contributions of property to enable respondent to deal more effectively with the prevalent use of overvaluations. See S. Comm. on Finance, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Explanation of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, S. Prt. 98-169, vol. I, at 444-445 (S. Comm. 1997 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 64">*80 Print 1984); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (J. Comm. Print 1985); cf. Atlantic Veneer Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1075">85 T.C. 1075, 85 T.C. 1075">1084 (1985), affd. 812 F.2d 158">812 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1987). Such need exists even though in a particular case, such as this, it turns out that the taxpayer's deduction was in fact based on the fair market value of the property. This happenstance is insufficient to constitute substantial compliance with a statutory condition to obtaining the claimed deduction. As we see it, what petitioners are seeking is not the application of the 109 T.C. 258">*266 substantial compliance principle but an exemption from the clear requirement of the statute and regulations in a situation where there is no overvaluation of the charitable contribution. We are not prepared to follow that path to decision.

We hold that petitioners are not entitled to deduct amounts in excess of those allowed by respondent for the contributions of Jackson Hewitt stock. See supra note 7.

To take into account the concessions of the parties,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.